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| Transnistria conflict | |||||||||
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| Part of thepost-Soviet conflicts | |||||||||
 Moldova Transnistria | |||||||||
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TheTransnistria conflict (Romanian:Conflictul din Transnistria;Russian:Приднестровский конфликт,romanized: Pridnestrovsky konflikt;Ukrainian:Придністровський конфлікт,romanized: Prydnistrovskyi konflikt) is anongoingfrozen conflict betweenMoldova and theunrecognized state ofTransnistria. Its most active phase was theTransnistria War. There have been several unsuccessful attempts to resolve the conflict.[9][10] The conflict may be considered to have started on 2 September 1990, when Transnistria made a formal sovereignty declaration from Moldova (then part of theSoviet Union).[11]
Transnistria is internationally recognized as a part ofMoldova. It hasdiplomatic recognition only from two Russian-backed separatist states:Abkhazia andSouth Ossetia.
TheSoviet Union in the 1930s had an autonomous region of Transnistria insideUkraine, called theMoldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR), half of whose population wereRomanian-speaking people, and withTiraspol as its capital.[citation needed]
DuringWorld War II, whenRomania, aided byNazi Germany, took control ofTransnistria, it did not attempt to annex the occupied territory during the war, although it planned do so in the future.[12][13]
During theWar of Transnistria, some villages in the central part of Transnistria (on the eastern bank of theDniester) rebelled against the new separatist Transnistria (PMR) authorities. They have been under effective Moldovan control as a consequence of their rebellion against the PMR. These localities are: communeCocieri (including villageVasilievca), communeMolovata Nouă (including villageRoghi), communeCorjova (including villageMahala), communeCoșnița (including villagePohrebea), communePîrîta, and communeDoroțcaia. The village ofCorjova is in fact divided between PMR and Moldovan central government areas of control. Roghi is also controlled by the PMR authorities.[citation needed]
At the same time, some areas on the right bank of the Dniester are under PMR control. These areas consist of the city ofBender with its suburbProteagailovca, the communesGîsca,Chițcani (including villages Mereneşti and Zahorna), and the commune ofCremenciug, formally[14] in theCăușeni District, situated south of the city of Bender.[15]
The breakaway PMR authorities also claim the communes ofVarnița, in theAnenii Noi District, a northern suburb of Bender, andCopanca, in the Căușeni District, south of Chițcani, but these villages remain under Moldovan control.[16]
Several disputes have arisen from these cross-river territories. In 2005, PMR militia enteredVasilievca, which is located over the strategic road linkingTiraspol andRîbnița, but withdrew after a few days.[17][18] In 2006 there were tensions aroundVarnița. In 2007 there was a confrontation between Moldovan and PMR forces in theDubăsari-Cocieri area; however, there were no casualties. On 13 May 2007, the mayor of the village ofCorjova, which is under Moldovan control, was arrested by the PMR militsia (police) together with a councilor of Moldovan-controlled part of theDubăsari district.[19]
Amid theprelude to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, on 14 January 2022 Ukrainian military intelligence declared that Russian special services were preparing "provocations" against Russian soldiersstationed in Transnistria at the time to create acasus belli for a Russian invasion ofUkraine.[20]
On 24 February, on the first day ofthe invasion, there were allegations that some rockets that had hit Ukraine had been launched from Transnistria, althoughMoldova'sMinistry of Defense denied this.[21] On 4 March, Ukraine blew up a railway bridge on its border with Transnistria to prevent the 1,400 Russian troops stationed in the breakaway territory from crossing into Ukraine.[22] Later, on 6 March, there were again claims thatattacks that had hitVinnytsia'sairport had been launched from Transnistria, although Moldovan officials again denied this and said that they had been launched from Russian ships in theBlack Sea.[23]
Amid rumors that Transnistria would attack Ukraine,Transnistrian PresidentVadim Krasnoselski declared Transnistria to be a peaceful state which never had any plans to attack its neighbors and that those who spread these allegations were people without control over the situation or provocateurs with malicious intentions. He also made reference to the large ethnicallyUkrainian population of Transnistria and howUkrainian is taught in Transnistrian schools and is one of the official languages of the republic.[24] However, in March, an image of theBelarusian PresidentAlexander Lukashenko standing in front of a battle plan map of the invasion of Ukraine was leaked. This map showed a supposed incursion of Russian troops from the Ukrainian city port ofOdesa into Transnistria and Moldova, revealing that Transnistria could become involved in the war.[25]
Ukrainian military officials had identified the establishment of a "land corridor" to Transnistria as one of Russia's primary objectives since the first day of the invasion.[26] On 22 April 2022, Russia's Brigadier General Rustam Minnekayev in a defence ministry meeting said that Russia planned to extend its Mykolaiv–Odesa front in the Ukraine war further west to include the Transnistria on the Ukrainian border with Moldova.[27][28] Minnekaev announced that the plan of Russia's military action in Ukraine included taking full control of Southern Ukraine and achieving a land corridor to Transnistria. He also talked about the existence of supposed evidence of "oppression of the Russian-speaking population" of Transnistria, echoing Russia's justifications for the war in Ukraine.[29] TheMinistry of Defence of Ukraine described this intention asimperialism, saying that it contradicted previous Russian claims that it did not have territorial ambitions in Ukraine".[27]
On 26 April, Ukrainian presidential adviserOleksiy Arestovych said during an interview that Moldova was a close neighbor to Ukraine, that Ukraine was not indifferent to it and that Moldova could turn to Ukraine for help. He also declared that Ukraine was able to solve the problem of Transnistria "in the blink of an eye", but only if Moldovan authorities requested the country's help; and that Romania could also come to Moldova's aid as "they are in fact the same people", with the same language as he continued, even though "there are many Moldovans who would not agree with me".[30] Moldova officially rejected this suggestion from Ukraine, expressing its support only for a peaceful outcome of the conflict.[31]
On 12 September 2024, a Moldovan soldier was killed under unclear circumstances in the demarcation line of Transnistria.[32]
On 29 December 2024, Moldova's Transnistria region faced gas cuts as a transit deal with Ukraine expired, prompting fears of power shortages. Moldova denies owing debts to Gazprom and has secured alternative supplies from Romania to manage the situation.[33] The agreement reached in May 2025 by Moldova and the Romanian-ownedOMV Petrom will account for 25% of Moldova's gas demands starting in 2027, via the Neptun Deep project.[34] Transnistria, after rejecting several EU offers, has secured a deal with the HungarianMET Gas and Energy Marketing group.[35][36]
According to PMR advocates, the territory to the east of theDniester River never belonged either toRomania nor to its predecessors, such as thePrincipality of Moldavia. This territory was split off from theUkrainian SSR in a political maneuver of theUSSR to become a seed of theMoldavian SSR (in a manner similar to the creation of theKarelo-Finnish SSR). In 1990, thePridnestrovian Moldavian SSR was proclaimed in the region by a number of conservative local Soviet officials opposed toperestroika. This action was immediately declared void by the thenGeneral Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet UnionMikhail Gorbachev.[37]
At thedissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Moldova became independent. TheMoldovan Declaration of Independence denounced theMolotov–Ribbentrop Pact and declared the 2 August 1940 "Law of the USSR on the establishment of the Moldavian SSR" null and void. The PMR side argues that, since this law was the only legislative document binding Transnistria to Moldova, there is neither historical nor legal basis for Moldova's claims over the territories on the left bank of theDniester.[38]
A 2010 study conducted by theUniversity of Colorado Boulder showed that the majority of Transnistria's population supports the country's separation from Moldova. According to the study, more than 80% of ethnic Russians and Ukrainians and 60% of ethnic Moldovans in Transnistria preferred independence or annexation by Russia to reunification with Moldova.[39]
In 2006, officials of the country held areferendum to determine the status of Transnistria. There were two statements on the ballot: the first one was, "Renunciation of independence and potential future integration into Moldova"; the second was, "Independence andpotential future integration into Russia". The results of this double referendum were that a large section of the population was against the first statement (96.61%)[40] and in favor of the second one (98.07%).[41]
Moldova lostde facto control ofTransnistria in 1992, in the wake of theWar of Transnistria. However, theRepublic of Moldova considers itself the rightfulsuccessor state to theMoldavian SSR (which was guaranteed the right tosecession from theSoviet Union under thelast version of the Soviet Constitution). By the principle ofterritorial integrity, Moldova claims that any form of secession from the state without the consent of the central Moldovan government is illegal.[citation needed] The Moldavian side hence believes that its position is backed by international law.[42]It considers the current Transnistria-based PMR government to be illegitimate and not the rightful representative of the region's population, which has aMoldovan plurality (39.9% as of 1989).[43] The Moldovan side insists that Transnistria cannot exist as an independent political entity and must bereintegrated into Moldova.[citation needed]
According to Moldovan sources, the political climate in Transnistria does not allow the free expression of the will of the people of the region and supporters of reintegration of Transnistria in Moldova are subjected to harassment, arbitrary arrests and other types of intimidation from separatist authorities.[citation needed]
Because of the non-recognition of Transnistria's independence, Moldova believes that all inhabitants of Transnistria are legally citizens of Moldova. However, it is estimated that 60,000 to 80,000 inhabitants of Transnistria have acquired Russian citizenship[44] and around 20,000 have acquired Ukrainian citizenship. As a result, Moldovan authorities have tried to block the installation of a Russian and Ukrainian consulate inTiraspol.[44]
Only twostates recognizeTransnistria's sovereignty, each itself a largely unrecognized state:Abkhazia andSouth Ossetia. These two states are members of theCommunity for Democracy and Rights of Nations.
On 21 February 2023, Russian presidentVladimir Putin revoked the foreign policy document that declared Russian commitment to Moldovan sovereignty in the context of the Transnistria conflict.[45][46]
| State | Notes |
|---|---|
 Albania | Along with other states on the Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP of 16 February 2009, Albania supported "renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova."[47] |
 Belarus | Officially, Belarus does not recognise Transnistria as independent.[48] De facto, Belarusian corporations and officials treat Transnistria as independent.[49][50][51][52][53][54] |
 Bosnia and Herzegovina | Along with other states on the Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP of 16 February 2009, Bosnia supported "renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova."[47] |
 Croatia | Along with other states on the Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP of 16 February 2009, Croatia supported "renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova."[47] |
 Georgia | Along with other states on the Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP of 16 February 2009, Georgia supported "renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova."[47] |
 Liechtenstein | Along with other states on the Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP of 16 February 2009, Liechtenstein supported "renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova."[47] |
 Moldova | Moldova's Prime MinisterVlad Filat wanted to see the Russian army presence replaced with an international civil mission and hoped for European support.[55] Deputy Prime MinisterVictor Osipov said that Moldova was a European problem. When theEU passed theLisbon Treaty and created the new position ofHigh Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy he said "The results of these efforts (to have more powerful tools for an effective foreign policy) will be very important, along with the place that the Transnistrian problem will occupy on the agenda of the EU and its new institution. Our task here is to attract attention to the Transnistrian problem, precisely so that it will occupy a higher place in the foreign and security policy agenda of the EU. We will always seek a solution through peaceful means, but we should never forget that we are talking about a conflict. We are talking about an administration [in the city ofTiraspol] that has and is developing military capabilities and a very fragile situation that could deteriorate and create risky situations in the East of Europe. This affects the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Russia and Romania – because Romania is not indifferent to the developments – and other countries from the region. Experiences from other frozen conflicts show that it is not a good idea to wait until a major incident happens."[56] |
 Montenegro | Along with other states on the Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP of 16 February 2009, Montenegro supported "renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova."[47] |
 North Macedonia | Along with other states on the Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP of 16 February 2009, North Macedonia supported "renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova."[47] |
 Norway | Along with other states on the Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP of 16 February 2009, Norway supported "renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova."[47] |
 Russia | Main article:Russia–Transnistria relations During a visit to Kyiv, PresidentDmitri Medvedev said he supported "special status" for Transnistria and recognised the "important and stabilising" role of the Russian army.[55] There have been calls from Russian figures to recognize the separatist republic.[57] However, to date, Russia officially recognizes Moldovan sovereignty over Transnistria. |
 Serbia | Initially, Serbia, along with other states on the Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP of 16 February 2009, supported "renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova."[47] In November 2015 Serbian politicians participated in a conference in Tiraspol. At the end of the conference, those politicians adopted a resolution which proclaimed that the "Transnistrian Moldovan Republic (PMR) and the Republic of Serbia are interested in broadening their multifaceted cooperation with the Russian Federation, including in the military-political sphere."[58] |
 Turkey | Along with other states on the Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP of 16 February 2009, Turkey supported "renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova."[47] |
 Ukraine | Main article:Transnistria–Ukraine relations In June 1992, then Ukrainian PresidentLeonid Kravchuk said that Ukraine would guarantee the independence of Transnistria in case of aMoldovan-Romanian union.[59] Over the following two decades Ukraine had an ambivalent relationship with Transnistria. In 2014, then Ukrainian PresidentPetro Poroshenko has said that Pridnestrovie is not a sovereign state, but rather, the name of a region along the Ukraine–Moldova border.[60] In 2017, Transnistrian presidentVadim Krasnoselsky said that Transnistria had "traditionally good relations with (Ukraine), we want to maintain them" and "we must build our relations with Ukraine – this is an objective necessity".[61] |
| Organization | Notes |
|---|---|
 Commonwealth of Independent States | In June 2015, the Secretary General of theCollective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO),Nikolay Bordyuzha, said that "[there] is no military solution to [the] Transnistria conflict. If a war breaks out in the region it will last for a long time and cause great bloodshed."[62] |
 European Union | European Union took note of and welcomed "the objectives of Council Common Position 2009/139/CFSP of 16 February 2009, renewing restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova".[47] The EU was asked to restart negotiations for the5+2 format.[55] |
On 22 June 2018, theRepublic of Moldova submitted a UN resolution that calls for "Complete and unconditional withdrawal of foreign military forces from the territory of the Republic of Moldova, includingTransnistria." The resolution was adopted by a simple majority.[63]
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link){{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link){{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)| Background | |||||||
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| Transnistria War | |||||||
| Post-war developments | |||||||
| Resolution attempts |
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| Participants and figures |
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| See also | |||||||
