Tito led the communistYugoslav Partisans duringWorld War II in Yugoslavia.[5][6] After the war, tensions arose betweenYugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Although these issues alleviated over time, Yugoslavia still remained largely independent in ideology and policy[7] due to the leadership of Tito,[8] who led Yugoslavia untilhis death in 1980.[9]
Tito himself claimed he was not a Titoist; "Titoism as a separate ideological line does not exist. [...] Should Titoism become an ideological line, we would become revisionists; we would have renounced Marxism. We are Marxists; I am a Marxist, and therefore I cannot be a Titoist."[10] Today, the term "Titoism" is sometimes used to refer toYugo-nostalgia across political spectrum, a longing for reestablishment ofYugoslavia or revival of Yugoslavism by the citizens ofYugoslavia's successor states.[citation needed]
Initially apersonal favourite of the USSR, Tito led the national liberation war to theNazi occupation during World War II, where theYugoslav Partisans liberated Yugoslavia with only limited help from theRed Army.[11][12][13] Tito met with the Soviet leadership several times immediately after the war to negotiate the future of Yugoslavia. Initially aligned with Soviet policy, over time, these negotiations became less cordial because Tito had the intention neither of handing overexecutive power nor of accepting foreign intervention or influence (a position Tito later continued within the Non-Aligned Movement).[14]
The Yugoslav regime first pledged allegiance, from 1945 to 1948, to Stalinism. But according to theTrotskyist (henceanti-Stalinist) historian Jean-Jacques Marie,[15] Stalin had planned toliquidate Tito as early as the end of the 1930s, and again after the Spanish Civil War, during which Tito participated in the recruitment and to the organization of the Dimitrov Battalion, a Balkan unit of the International Brigades, some of whose ex-combatants would be assassinated by the Soviets.
Tito's agreement withBulgarian leaderGeorgi Dimitrov onGreater Yugoslavia projects, which meant to merge the two Balkan countries into aBalkan Federation, made Stalin anxious. This led to the 1947cooperation agreement signed inBled (Dimitrov also pressuredRomania to join such a federation, expressing his beliefs during a visit toBucharest in early 1948).[6] The Bled agreement, also referred to as the "Tito–Dimitrov treaty", was signed 1 August 1947 in Bled,Slovenia. It foresaw also unification betweenVardar Macedonia andPirin Macedonia and return ofWestern Outlands to Bulgaria. The integrationist policies resulting from the agreement were terminated after theTito–Stalin split in June 1948, when Bulgaria was being subordinated to the interests of the Soviet Union and took a stance against Yugoslavia.[6]
The policy of regional blocs had been the norm inComintern policies, displaying Soviet resentment of thenation states inEastern Europe and of the consequences ofParis Peace Conference. With the 1943 dissolution of Comintern and the subsequent advent of theCominform came Stalin's dismissal of the previous ideology, and adaptation to the conditions created for Soviethegemony during theCold War.
Moreover, Stalin did not have free rein in Yugoslavia as he did in other countries of theFourth Moscow Conference on the partition of Europe; the USSR had not obtained preponderance there, as it was agreed in thePercentages agreement that he would retain only 50% influence over Yugoslavia. Tito therefore benefited from a margin of maneuver far greater than that of the other Southeast European leaders.[16]
When the rest ofEastern Europe becamesatellite states of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia refused to accept the 1948Resolution of theCominform[17][18][6] which condemned the leaders of theLeague of Communists of Yugoslavia[19] for allegedly abandoningMarxism-Leninism,[20] and any communists who sympathised with Yugoslavia.[21] The period from 1948 to 1955, known as theInformbiro, was marked by severe repression of opponents and many others accused of pro-Stalin attitudes being sent to thepenal camp onGoli Otok in Yugoslavia.[22][23] Likewise, real and accused Titoists or 'Titoites' were met with similar treatment in Eastern Bloc countries,[24] which furthermore served to publicize the dangers of challenging subservience to Moscow, as well as to purge 'unwanted' individuals from their Communist parties.[25]
Elements of Titoism are characterized by policies and practices based on the principle that in each country the means of attaining ultimate communist goals must be dictated by the conditions of that particular country, rather than by a pattern set in another country.[26] During Josip Broz Tito's era, this specifically meant that the communist goal should be pursued independently of and often in opposition to the policies of the Soviet Union.[27][28]
In contrast toJoseph Stalin's policy of "socialism in one country", Tito advocated cooperation between developing nations in the world through theNon-Aligned Movement while at the same time pursuing socialism in whatever ways best suited particular nations. During Tito's era, his ideas specifically meant that the communist goal should be pursued independently of (and often in opposition to) what he referred to as theStalinist andimperialist policies of the Soviet Union.[6] Through this split and subsequent policies some commentators have grouped Titoism withEurocommunism orreformist socialism.[29] It was also meant to demonstrate the viability of a third way between the capitalistUnited States and the socialistSoviet Union.[30]
Throughout his time in office, Tito prided himself on Yugoslavia's independence from the Soviet Union, with Yugoslavia never accepting full membership inComecon and Tito's open rejection of many aspects of Stalinism as the most obvious manifestations of this. The Soviets and their satellite states often accused Yugoslavia ofTrotskyism andsocial democracy, charges loosely based on Tito'ssocialist self-management,[32][33] attempts at greater democratization in the workplace, and the theory of associated labor (profit sharing policies and worker-owned industries initiated by him,Milovan Đilas andEdvard Kardelj in 1950).[34] It was in these things that the Soviet leadership accused of harboring the seeds ofcouncil communism or evencorporatism. Despite Tito's numerous disagreements with the USSR, Yugoslavia restored relations with the USSR in 1956 with theBelgrade declaration and it became an associated member of the Comecon in 1964. Therefore, Yugoslavia once again strengthened its economic and political ties with the USSR.[35]
Additionally, Yugoslavia joined the US-sponsoredBalkan Pact in July 1953, a military alliance with two NATO member states — Greece and Turkey. The pact had been signed a few days before Stalin died, and the new Soviet government failed to develop any response. However, it was continually met with opposition by Albanian leaderEnver Hoxha, who accused Tito and Yugoslavia for being agents of American imperialism.[36] Tito signed this pact to bolster the defense of Yugoslavia against a potential Soviet military invasion. It also made the option of Yugoslavia's NATO membership more plausible at its time. Under this pact, any potential Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia could also lead to NATO intervention to help defend Yugoslavia due to the NATO memberships of Greece and Turkey. However, the foreign policy disagreements between the three countries in the pact eventually crippled the alliance itself, thus ending the possibility of Yugoslavia's NATO membership.[37]
Some Trotskyists considered Tito to be an 'unconscious Trotskyist' because of the split with Stalin.[38][39] However, other Trotskyists claimed that there were no fundamental differences in principles between Stalin and Tito, despite significant evidence suggesting the contrary. Most notably, Trotskyist writerTed Grant published several articles criticizing both leaders in the British Trotskyist newspaper, of which he was the editor.[40]
The "Titoist" regime adopted a policy of economic "self-management", generalized from 1950, wishing to put themeans of production undersocial ownership of direct producers, thus excluding the formation of abureaucracy as was the case in other communist regimes.[41]
Thepropaganda attacks centered on thecaricature of "Tito the Butcher" of theworking class, aimed to pinpoint him as a covert agent of Western imperialism, pointing to Tito's partial cooperation with western and imperialist nations.[42] Tito and Yugoslavia were seen by Western powers as a strategic ally with the possibility to "[drive] a wedge into the Communist monolith".[43]
From 1949 the central government began to cede power to communal local governments, seeking to decentralise the government[28][44] and work towards awithering away of the state.[30][45] In the system of local self-government, higher-level bodies could supervise compliance with the law by lower-level bodies, but could not issue orders to them.[46]Edvard Kardelj declared in theAssembly of Yugoslavia "that no perfect bureaucratic apparatus, however brilliant the people at the top, can build socialism. Socialism can grow only from the initiatives of the masses of the people."[47]Rankovićism disagreed with this decentralisation, viewing it as a threat to the stability of Yugoslavia.[48] Other socialist states also criticised this move for deviating fromMarxism-Leninism with declarations that it "is an outright denial of the teachings of Marxism-Leninism and the universal laws on the construction of socialism."[36]
TheLeague of Communists of Yugoslavia retained solid power; the legislature did little more than rubber stamp decisions already made by the LCY's Politburo. Thesecret police, theState Security Administration (UDBA), while operating with considerably more restraint than its counterparts in the rest of Eastern Europe, was nonetheless a feared tool of government control. UDBA was particularly notorious for assassinating suspected "enemies of the state" who lived in exile overseas.[49] The media remained under restrictions that were onerous by Western standards, but still had more latitude than their counterparts in other Communist countries. Nationalist groups were a particular target of the authorities, with numerous arrests and prison sentences handed down over the years for separatist activities. Although the Soviets revised their attitudes under Nikita Khrushchev during the process ofde-Stalinization and sought to normalize relations with the Yugoslavs while obtaining influence in the Non-Aligned Movement,[50] the answer they got was never enthusiastic and the Soviet Union never gained a proper outlet to theMediterranean Sea. At the same time, the Non-Aligned states failed to form a third Bloc, especially after the split at the outcome of the1973 oil crisis.
Industry was nationalized, agricultureforcibly collectivized, and a rigid industrialization program based on theSoviet model was adopted. Yugoslav and Soviet companies signed contracts for numerous joint ventures. According to the American historianAdam Ulam, in no other country in theEastern Bloc was Sovietization "as rapid and as ruthless as in Yugoslavia".[51]
Despite the initial thaw between the USSR and the Yugoslavian authorities following the signing of theBelgrade declaration, relations became tense again between the two countries after Yugoslavia shelteredImre Nagy following the invasion of Hungary. Tito initially approved the Soviet military intervention in his letter to Khrushchev due to fears ofHungarian Revolution provoking a similar anti-communist and nationalist movement in Yugoslavia. Still, Tito later sheltered Nagy to prove Yugoslavia's sovereign status and non-aligned foreign policy to gain sympathy from the international community. The abduction and the execution of Nagy by the Hungarian government underJános Kádár cooled the bilateral relationship between Yugoslavia and Hungary, despite Tito's initial support and recommendations of Kadar as the successor ofMátyás Rákosi and Nagy.[52]
Yugoslavia backedCzechoslovakia's leaderAlexander Dubček during the 1968Prague Spring and then cultivated a special (albeit incidental) relation with the maverick Romanian PresidentNicolae Ceaușescu. Titoism was similar to Dubček'ssocialism with a human face, while Ceaușescu attracted sympathies for his refusal to condone (and take part in) the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, which briefly seemed to constitute acasus belli betweenRomania and the Soviets.[citation needed] However, Ceaușescu was an unlikely member of the alliance[which?] since he profited from the events in order to push his authoritarian agenda inside Romania.
After a significant expansion of the private sector in the 1950s and 1960s and a shift towards a moremarket-oriented economy, the Yugoslavian leadership did put a halt to overt capitalist attempts (such asStjepan Mesić's experiment withprivatization inOrahovica) and crushed thedissidence of liberal or democratic socialist thinkers such as the former leaderMilovan Đilas, while it also clamped down on centrifugal attempts, promotingYugoslav patriotism.[citation needed] Although still claimed as official policies, nearly all aspects of Titoism went into rapid decline after Tito's death in 1980, being replaced by the rival policies of constituent republics. During the late 1980s, nationalism was again on the rise one decade after theCroatian Spring, and inter-republic ethnic tensions escalated.
Titoism has been perceived very differently by international figures. During Stalin's lifetime, the Soviet Union andEastern Bloc countries reacted against Titoism with aggressive hostility. Participants in alleged Titoist conspiracies, such as the GDR historianWalter Markov, were subjected to reprisals, and some were put through stagedshow trials that ended with death sentences, such as theRajk trial in Budapest in 1949 or theSlánský trial in Prague in 1952.[53] About forty important trials against "Titoists" took place during the Informbiro period, in addition to persecution, arrest and deportation of thousands of less prominent individuals who were presumed to hold pro-Yugoslav sympathies.[54] In France, the Cominform ordered the central committee of theFrench Communist Party to condemn "Titoism" in 1948[55] With prominent members such asMarcel Servin [fr] writing of the need to hunt down "Titoist spies" within the party.[56][57] After Stalin's death, the Soviet conspiracy theories around Titoism subsided but continued. In the mid-1950s, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union temporarily reconciled. Nevertheless, Titoism was generally condemned as revisionism in the Eastern bloc.
In Marxist circles in the West, Titoism was considered a form of Western socialism alongside Eurocommunism, which was appreciated by left-wing intellectuals who were breaking away from the Soviet line in the 1960s.[58] In the 1960s, political scientists understood Titoist state narrative as a form ofsocialist patriotism.[59][60] HistorianAdam Ulam was more critical of Titoism and writes that Titoism has always "retained its (albeit mild) totalitarian one-party character".[61]
Muammar Gaddafi'sThird International Theory, outlined in hisGreen Book which informed Libyan national policy from its formation in 1975 until Gaddafi's downfall in 2011, was heavily inspired by and shared many similarities with Titoism and Yugoslav workers' self-management.[62][63]
Titoism has sometimes been referred to as a form of "national communism", an attempt to reconcilenationalism withcommunism, traditionally considered incompatible by Marxist social philosophers.[59][60]Walker Connor posits that Titoism is more akin to "state communism", and that Tito advocated patriotism rather than nationalism, as the loyalty is to a state comprising multiple nations. Nationalism was, therefore a threat to Titoism.[68] Tito and the Yugoslav leadership firmly rejected existence of 'national communism', describing the accusations as "attempts to stigmatise recognition of the diversity of forms in socialist processes"[69] and asserted that Yugoslav communists too are proletarian internationalists, stating that:
... internationalism does not start where autonomy and independence end. Real revolutionary unity and socialist solidarity must be based on such a community of interests and views as arises from the full independence and responsibility of each party. Today, more than ever before, the international workers' movement needs such unity as does not conceal differences; but, on the contrary, recognized them. After all, total unity in the international workers' movement has never existed.
Yugoslav interpretation of proletarian internationalism was outlined in "The Programme of the League of Yugoslav Communists": "Proletarian internationalism demands correct relationships, and support of and solidarity with every socialist country and every socialist movement genuinely fighting for socialism, peace, and active peaceful coexistence between peoples."[69] This posture was contrasted to Stalin's conception of proletarian internationalism "which required unity within the Communist Camp under the leadership of one party which was committed to the interest of one country, the Soviet Union."[71]
^Boeckh, Katrin (2014). "Allies Are Forever (Until They Are No More): Yugoslavia's Multivectoral Foreign Policy During Titoism". In Keil, Soeren;Stahl, Bernhard[in German] (eds.).The Foreign Policies of Post-Yugoslav States. New Perspectives on South-East Europe. London: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 18–43.doi:10.1057/9781137384133_2.ISBN978-1-137-38412-6.
^Turlejska (1972), pp. 109–110:W drugiej połowie czerwca 1948 roku odbyło się posiedzenie przedstawicieli ośmiu partii w Bukareszcie bez udziału przedstawicieli KPJ, którzy nie zgodzili się przybyć na naradę. Przyjęto rezolucję o sytuacji w Komunistycznej Partii Jugosławii. Podpisali ją: w imieniu BPR(k) – Trajczo Kostow i Wyłko Czerwenkow; RPR – Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Vasile Luca i Anna Pauker; WPP – Mátyás Rákosi, Michał Farkas, Ernö Gerö; PPR – Jakub Berman i Aleksander Zawadzki; WKP(b) – Andrzej Żdanow, Goergij Malenkow, Michaił Susłow; FPK – Jacques Duclos i Etienne Fajon; KPCz – Rudolf Slánský, Viliam Široký, Bedřich Geminder, Gustav Bareš; WłPK – Palmiro Togliatti i Pietro Secchia. [In the second half of June 1948, a meeting of representatives of eight parties was held in Bucharest without the participation of CPY representatives, who did not agree to come to the meeting. A resolution on the situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was adopted. It was signed by: on behalf ofBWP(C) –Traicho Kostov andValko Chervenkov;RWP –Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej,Vasile Luca andAna Pauker;HWPP –Mátyás Rákosi,Mihály Farkas,Ernö Gerö;PWP –Jakub Berman andAleksander Zawadzki;AUCP(B) –Andrei Zhdanov,Georgy Malenkov,Mikhail Suslov;FCP –Jacques Duclos and Etienne Fajon;CPC –Rudolf Slánský,Viliam Široký,Bedřich Geminder,Gustav Bareš [cs];ICP –Palmiro Togliatti andPietro Secchia.]
^Leonhard, Wolfgang (1979).Die Dreispaltung des Marxismus. Ursprung und Entwicklung des Sowjetmarxismus, Maoismus & Reformkommunismus [The tripartite Marxism. Origin and Development of Soviet Marxism, Maoism & Reform Communism] (in German). Düsseldorf/Vienna. pp. 346–355.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
^"Histoire de la Yougoslavie" [History of Yugoslavia].archivescommunistes.chez-alice.fr (in French). Archived fromthe original on 5 December 2024. Retrieved6 December 2021.
^Analis, Dimitri T. (1978).Les Balkans 1945–1960 [The Balkans 1945–1960] (in French). PUF. pp. 192–194.
^Jovanović, Miodrag (19 January 2002)."TITOIZAM: i sukobi u bivšoj Jugoslaviji" [TITOISM: and conflicts in the former Yugoslavia].Pobunjeni um (in Bosnian). Translated by Mirkovic, Amela. Archived fromthe original on 30 November 2024. Retrieved30 April 2022.
^Vucinich, Wayne S.; Tomasevich, Jozo (1969).Contemporary Yugoslavia: Twenty Years of Socialist Experiment.University of California Press. pp. 299–301.
^Haug 2012, p. 137, Chapter 6: Towards Self-Management Socialism and Yugoslav Unity, 1948–1958.
^Szymczak, Tadeusz[in Polish] (1982).Jugosławia – państwo federacyjne [Yugoslavia – federal state] (in Polish). Łódź. pp. 98–99,185–186.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
^Damachi, Ukandi G.; Seibel, Hans D.; Scheerder, Jeroen (1982).Self-Management in Yugoslavia and the Developing World. Springer. pp. 31–32.
^Bokovoy, Melissa Katherine; Irvine, Jill A.; Lilly, Carol S. (1997).State-society relations in Yugoslavia, 1945–1992. Scranton, Pennsylvania, USA:Palgrave Macmillan. p. 295.
^Schindler, John (4 February 2010),Doctor of Espionage: The Victims of UDBA, Sarajevo: Slobodna Bosna, pp. 35–38
^Hodos, Georg Hermann (1990). "Links" [The Left].Schauprozesse. Stalinistische Säuberungen in Osteuropa 1948–1954 [Show trials. Stalinist purges in Eastern Europe 1948–1954] (in German). Berlin.ISBN3-86153-010-4.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
^Boulland, Paul; Pennetier, Claude; Vaccaro, Rossana (2005)."André Marty : l'homme, l'affaire, l'archive" [André Marty: the man, the case, the archive] (in French). CODHOS Editions.Archived from the original on 21 September 2023 – via HAL.
^Garde, Paul[in French] (2000).Vie et mort de la Yougoslavie [Life and Death of Yugoslavia] (in French) (New ed.). Fayard.ISBN978-2-213-60559-3.
^abHartl, Hans (1968). "Nationalismus in Rot. Die patriotischen Wandlungen des Kommunismus in Südosteuropa" [Nationalism in Red. The patriotic changes of communism in Southeastern Europe].Schriftenreihe der Studiengesellschaft für Zeitprobleme e.V. Zeitpolitik (in German).1. Seewald, Stuttgart-Degerloch. 187966-2.
^abMeier, Viktor E. (1968).Neuer Nationalismus in Südosteuropa [New Nationalism in Southeastern Europe] (in German). Leske, Opladen.ASINB0092XPOV6.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
"Niedługo potem we wrześniu 1949 r. doszło do zerwania stosunków państwowych między ZSRR a Jugosławią. Inne państwa demokracji ludowej poszły tą samą drogą.
W kolejnej rezolucji Biura Informacyjnego nazwano jugosłowiańskie kierownictwo partyjne i rządowe "bandą szpiegów i zdrajców" (listopad 1949 r.).
Latem tego roku na Węgrzech i w Bułgarii (półtora roku później w Czechosłowacji) dokonano aresztowań wielu wybitnych i pełniących odpowiedziałoe funkcje partyjne i państwowe działaczy komunistycznych. W czerwcu 1949 roku znaleźli się w więzieniu Laszló Rajk (od 1946 roku minister spraw wewnętrznych, od 1948 r. minister spraw zagranicznych Węgier), Andrasz Szalay, Tibor Szónyi i wielu innych. Trzech wyżej wymienionych skazano pod koniec września 1949 roku w Budapeszcie za szpiegostwo i zdradę na karę śmierci, trzech innych oskarżonych w tym procesie na dożywocie lub długoletnie więzienie. Wszyscy oskarżeni pod wpływem tortur (a także "dla dobra sprawy") przyznali się do zarzuconych im przestępstw."
["Shortly thereafter, in September 1949, state relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia were severed. Other people's democracy countries followed the same path.
Another resolution of the Information Bureau called the Yugoslav party and government leadership "a gang of spies and traitors" (November 1949).
In the summer of that year, many prominent communist activists holding responsible party and state positions were arrested in Hungary and Bulgaria (a year and a half later in Czechoslovakia). In June 1949, László Rajk (from 1946 the Minister of Internal Affairs, from 1948 the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hungary), Andrasz Szalay, Tibor Szónyi and many others were imprisoned. The three above-mentioned people were sentenced to death in Budapest at the end of September 1949 for espionage and treason, while three other defendants in this trial were sentenced to life imprisonment or long-term imprisonment. All defendants confessed under torture (and "for the good of the cause") to the crimes they were accused of."]
^Turlejska 1972, p. 140:"W grudniu 1949 roku odbył się w Sofii proces Trajczo Kostowa Dżunewa. Tego wybitnego przywódcę ruchu komunistycznego przed wojną i w czasie okupacji, wicepremiera rządu i sekretarza KC uważano powszechnie przed śmiercią Dymitrowa (która nastąpiła 2 lipca 1949 roku) za jego następcę. Wraz z Kostowem sądzono dziesięciu innych oskarżonych. Jedynie Trajczo Kostow, zarówno w pierwszym dniu rozprawy 7 grudnia, jak i w swym ostatnim słowie — 14 grudnia 1949 roku — oświadczył, że nie przyznaje się do winy, że nie załamał się — jak to głosił akt oskarżenia — w śledztwie w 1942 roku (ówczesny sąd bułgarski skazał go na dożywocie), że w 1944 roku po wyzwoleniu Bułgarii nie zwerbował go Inteligence Service, że nie brał udziału w antypaństwowym ośrodku konspiracyjnym wspólnie z Tito i jego współpracownikami. Kostow skazany został na karę śmierci, sześciu oskarżonych — na dożywocie, trzech — na 15 lat, jeden—na 12 lat więzienia." ["In December 1949, the trial of Traicho Kostov Dzhunev took place in Sofia. This outstanding leader of the communist movement before the war and during the occupation, deputy prime minister of the government and secretary of the Central Committee was widely considered to be his successor before Dimitrov's death (which occurred on July 2, 1949). Ten other defendants were tried along with Kostov. Only Traicho Kostov, both on the first day of the trial on December 7 and in his last word – on December 14, 1949 – declared that he was not guilty, that he had not broken down – as the indictment said – during the investigation in 1942 (the then a Bulgarian court sentenced him to life imprisonment), that in 1944, after the liberation of Bulgaria, he was not recruited by the Intelligence Service, that he did not participate in an anti-state conspiracy center together with Tito and his collaborators. Kostov was sentenced to death, six defendants were sentenced to life imprisonment, three were sentenced to 15 years, and one was sentenced to 12 years in prison."]
^Turlejska 1972, p. 139:"Latem tego roku na Węgrzech i w Bułgarii (półtora roku później w Czechosłowacji) dokonano aresztowań wielu wybitnych i pełniących odpowiedziałoe funkcje partyjne i państwowe działaczy komunistycznych." ["In the summer of that year, many prominent communist activists holding responsible party and state positions were arrested in Hungary and Bulgaria (a year and a half later in Czechoslovakia)."]
^Turlejska 1972, p. 170:"Mogło się zdawać wówczas, że Clementis ma odegrać rolę „czechosłowackiego Rajka”. Jednak już od jesieni 1950 n zasięg podejrzeń rozszerzył się ze Słowacji na południowe Morawy i Pragę Aresztowany został Otto Šling sekretarz KPCz w Brnie. Na początku 1951 r. aresztowano m.in. wyżsźych funkcjonariuszy MBP i MSZ, przeszło 50 osób, piastujących wysokie stanowiska partyjne i państwowe. 21 lutego 1951 r. sprawa Šlinga, Švermovej, Clementisa, Husaka, Novomeskiego i innych „spiskowców” została przedłożona plenum KC KPCz. Potępiono ich jako zdrajców szpiegów, dywersantów i sabotażystów. Większość aresztowanych potwierdziła oskarżenia. Nieliczni tylko mężnie wytrzymali katusze nie przyznając się do zarzucanych im czynów, jak np. Husak, ale i ci skazani zostali później w niejawnych procesach." ["It might have seemed then that Clementis was to play the role of the "Czechoslovak Rajk". However, already in the autumn of 1950, the scope of suspicion spread from Slovakia to southern Moravia and Prague.Otto Šling, secretary of the Communist Party of the Czech Republic in Brno, was arrested. At the beginning of 1951, people were arrested, among others: senior officers of the Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, over 50 people holding high party and state positions. On February 21, 1951, the case of Šling, Švermová, Clementis,Husak,Novomeský and other "conspirators" was submitted to the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Czech Republic. They were condemned as traitors, spies, saboteurs and subterfugists. Most of those arrested confirmed the accusations. Only a few bravely endured the torture without admitting to the crimes they were accused of, such as Husak, but these were also later convicted in secret trials."]
^"The Role of the League of Communists in the Further Development of Socialist Social Relations and Current Problems in the International Workers Movement and in the Struggle for Peace and Socialism in the World".Practice and Theory of Socialist Development in Yugoslavia. Belgrade:VIII Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. 1965. p. 17 – via Međunarodna Politika.
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