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Timothy Williamson

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
British philosopher (born 1955)
For other people named Timothy Williamson, seeTimothy Williamson (disambiguation).

Timothy Williamson
Williamson in 2014
Born (1955-08-06)6 August 1955 (age 70)
Academic background
Alma materBalliol College, Oxford
ThesisThe Concept of Approximation to the Truth (1980)
InfluencesRuth Barcan Marcus
Academic work
EraContemporary philosophy
DisciplinePhilosophy
Sub-discipline
School or traditionAnalytic philosophy
Institutions
Doctoral students
Main interestsEpistemology,metaphysics,vagueness
Notable ideas
Influenced

Timothy Williamson (born 6 August 1955) is a Britishphilosopher whose main research interests are inphilosophical logic,philosophy of language,epistemology andmetaphysics. He is the formerWykeham Professor of Logic at theUniversity of Oxford, and a fellow ofNew College, Oxford.

Education and career

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Born on 6 August 1955, Williamson's education began atLeighton Park School and continued at Henley Grammar School (nowthe Henley College).[citation needed] He then went toBalliol College,Oxford University. He graduated in 1976 with aBachelor of Arts degree withfirst-class honours in mathematics and philosophy, and in 1980 with a doctorate in philosophy (DPhil) for a thesis entitledThe Concept of Approximation to the Truth.[1]

Williamson was professor of logic and metaphysics at theUniversity of Edinburgh (1995–2000), fellow and lecturer in philosophy atUniversity College, Oxford (1988–1994), and lecturer in philosophy atTrinity College, Dublin (1980–1988). He took up the Wykeham Professorship in 2000 and retired in 2023, when he took up a Senior Research and Teaching Fellowship in Philosophy.[2]

He has been visiting professor atYale University,Princeton University,MIT, theUniversity of Michigan, and theChinese University of Hong Kong.

He was president of theAristotelian Society from 2004 to 2005.

He is aFellow of the British Academy (FBA),[3] theNorwegian Academy of Science and Letters,[4]Fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh (FRSE), and a Foreign Honorary Fellow of theAmerican Academy of Arts & Sciences.

Since 2022 he is visiting professor at theUniversità della Svizzera Italiana.

Philosophical work

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Williamson has contributed toanalyticphilosophy of language,logic,metaphysics,epistemology,metaethics andmetaphilosophy.

Onvagueness, he holds a position known asepistemicism, which states that every seemingly vaguepredicate (like "bald" or "thin") actually has a sharp cutoff, which is impossible for us to know.[5] For instance, there is some number of hairs such that anyone with that number is bald, and anyone with even one more hair is not. In actuality, this condition will be spelled out only partly in terms of numbers of hairs, but whatever measures are relevant will have some sharp cutoff. This solution to the difficultSorites paradox was considered a surprising and unacceptable consequence, but has become a relatively mainstream view since his defence of it.[6] Williamson is fond of using the statement, "no one knows whether I am thin" to illustrate his view.[7]

Inepistemology, Williamson suggests thatknowledge is unanalysable. This went against the common trend in philosophical literature up to that point, which was to argue that knowledge could be analysed into constituent concepts. (Typically, this would bejustified true belief plus an extra factor.) He agrees that knowledge entails justification, truth andbelief, but argues that it is conceptually primitive. He accounts for the importance of belief by discussing its connections with knowledge, but avoids the disjunctivist position of saying that belief can be analysed as the disjunction of knowledge with some distinct, non-factive mental state.[8]

Williamson also argues against the traditional distinction ofknowing-how andknowing-that. He claims that knowledge-how is a type of knowledge-that. Williamson argues that knowledge-how does not relate one's ability. He provides the example of a ski instructor who knows how to perform a complex move without having the ability to do it himself.[9]

Inmetaphysics, Williamson defends necessitism, according to which necessarily everything is necessarily something; in short, that everything exists of necessity.[10] Likewise, it is possible for something to have a property only if there is something which has that property. For instance, since it is possible forWittgenstein to have had a child, there is something which is a possible child of Wittgenstein. Necessitism is a theoretical interpretation of theBarcan formula, which is a theorem of themodal logic S5. However, Williamson has also developed an ontology of “bare possibilia” which he argues accounts for the seemingly unintuitive consequences of necessitism.[11]

Publications

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  • Identity and Discrimination, Oxford: Blackwell, 1990.
  • Vagueness, London:Routledge, 1994.
  • Knowledge and Its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
  • The Philosophy of Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell, 2007
  • Modal Logic as Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
  • Tetralogue: I'm Right, You're Wrong, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
  • Doing Philosophy: From Common Curiosity to Logical Reasoning, Oxford University Press, 2017.
  • Suppose and Tell: The Semantics and Heuristics of Conditionals, Oxford University Press, 2020.
  • Debating the A Priori (withPaul Boghossian), Oxford University Press, 2020.
  • Overfitting and Heuristics in Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 2024.
  • Good as Usual: Anti-Exceptionalist Essays on Values, Norms and Actions, Oxford University Press, 2025.

Williamson has also published more than 120 articles in peer-reviewed scholarly journals.

References

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  1. ^Timothy Williamson – New College, Oxford
  2. ^"Timothy Williamson".University of Oxford Faculty of Philosophy. Retrieved9 April 2024.
  3. ^British Academy Fellowship recordArchived 6 June 2011 at theWayback Machine
  4. ^"Gruppe 3: Idéfag" (in Norwegian).Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters. Retrieved16 January 2011.
  5. ^Williamson, Timothy (1996).Vagueness. Problems of philosophy. New York: Routledge.ISBN 978-0-415-03331-2.
  6. ^Zalta, Edward N. (ed.)."Vagueness".Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.ISSN 1095-5054.OCLC 429049174.
  7. ^Phil 2511: Paradoxes
  8. ^Williamson, Timothy (2002).Knowledge and its Limits.Oxford University Press.doi:10.1093/019925656x.001.0001.ISBN 9780199256563.
  9. ^Stanley, J., & T. Williamson (2001). "Knowing How",The Journal of Philosophy 98(8):pp. 411–444.
  10. ^Williamson, Timothy (2015).Modal logic as metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.ISBN 978-0-19-870943-5.
  11. ^Williamson, Timothy (1998)."Bare possibilia".Erkenntnis.48 (2/3):257–273.

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Preceded byWykeham Professor of Logic
2000–2023
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2004–2005
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