InBuddhism, thethree marks of existence are three characteristics (Pali:tilakkhaṇa;Sanskrit: त्रिलक्षणtrilakṣaṇa) of all existence and beings, namelyanicca (impermanence),dukkha (commonly translated as "suffering" or "cause of suffering", "unsatisfactory", "unease"),[note 1] andanattā (without a lasting essence).[5][6][7][8] The concept of humans being subject to delusion about the three marks, this delusion resulting in suffering, and removal of that delusion resulting in the end of dukkha, is a central theme in the BuddhistFour Noble Truths, the last of which leads to theNoble Eightfold Path.
Impermanence (Pali:anicca,Sanskrit:anitya) means that all things (saṅkhāra) are in a constant state of flux. Buddhism states that all physical and mental events come into being and dissolve.[15] Human life embodies this flux in the aging process and the cycle of repeated birth and death (Samsara); nothing lasts, and everything decays. This is applicable to all beings and their environs, including beings who arereborn indeva (god) andnaraka (hell) realms.[16][17] This is in contrast tonirvana, the reality that isnicca, or knows no change, decay or death.[18]
As theFirst Noble Truth,dukkha is explicated as the physical and mental dissatisfaction of changing conditions as inbirth,aging,illness,death; getting what one wishes to avoid or not getting what one wants; and "in short, the five aggregates of clinging and grasping" (skandha).[19][22][23] This, however, is a different context, not the Three Marks of Existence, and therefore 'suffering' may not be the best word for it.
The relationship between the three characteristics is explained in thePali Canon as follows: What isanicca isdukkha. What isdukkha isanatta (Samyutta Nikaya.Vol4.Page1).
"That which is impermanent isdukkha (i.e. it cannot be made to last). That which isdukkha is not permanent."
Anatta (Sanskrit:anatman) refers to there being no permanent essence in any thing or phenomena, including living beings.[24][25]
Whileanicca anddukkha apply to "all conditioned phenomena" (saṅkhārā),anattā has a wider scope because it applies to alldhammās without the "conditioned, unconditioned" qualification.[26] Thus,nirvana too is a state of without Self oranatta.[26] The phrase "sabbe dhamma anatta" includes within its scope eachskandha (group of aggregates, heaps) that compose any being, and the belief "I am" is a conceit which must be realized to be impermanent and without substance, to end alldukkha.[27]
Theanattā doctrine of Buddhism denies that there is anything permanent in any person to call one's Self, and that a belief in a Self is a source ofdukkha.[28][29] Some Buddhist traditions and scholars, however, interpret theanatta doctrine to be strictly in regard to thefive aggregates rather than a universal truth.[30][31][32] Religious studies scholar Alexander Wynne callsanattā a "not-self" teaching rather than a "no-self" teaching.[33]
In Buddhism, ignorance (avidyā, ormoha; i.e. a failure to grasp directly) of the three marks of existence is regarded as the first link in the overall process ofsaṃsāra whereby a being is subject to repeated existences in an endless cycle of dukkha. As a consequence, dissolving that ignorance throughdirect insight into the three marks is said to bring an end tosaṃsāra and, as a result, to thatdukkha (dukkha nirodha ornirodha sacca, as described in the third of theFour Noble Truths).
Gautama Buddha taught that all beings conditioned by causes (saṅkhāra) are impermanent (anicca) and suffering (dukkha), and that not-self (anattā) characterises alldhammas, meaning there is no "I", "me", or "mine" in either the conditioned or the unconditioned (i.e.nibbāna).[34][35] The teaching of three marks of existence in the Pali Canon is credited to the Buddha.[26][36][37]
^Richard Gombrich (2006).Theravada Buddhism. Routledge. p. 47.ISBN978-1-134-90352-8.All phenomenal existence [in Buddhism] is said to have three interlocking characteristics: impermanence, dukkha and lack of soul, that is, something that does not change.
^abcdTse-fu Kuan 關則富, 'Mahāyāna Elements and Mahāsāṃghika Traces in the Ekottarika-āgama' in Dhammadina (ed.)Research on the Ekottarika-āgama (2013). Dharma Drum Publishing, Taipei.
^Hahn, Thich Nhat (1999).The Heart of the Buddha's Teaching. New York: Broadway Books. p. 22.
^Thich Nhat Hanh,The Heart of the Buddha's Teaching
^Ulrich Timme Kragh (editor),The Foundation for Yoga Practitioners:The Buddhist Yogācārabhūmi Treatise and Its Adaptation in India, East Asia, and Tibet, Volume 1 Harvard University, Department of South Asian studies, 2013, p. 144.
^Thomas William Rhys Davids; William Stede (1921).Pali-EnC. Motilal Banarsidass. pp. 355, Article onNicca.ISBN978-81-208-1144-7.{{cite book}}:ISBN / Date incompatibility (help)
^[a]Christmas Humphreys (2012).Exploring Buddhism. Routledge. pp. 42–3.ISBN978-1-136-22877-3. [b]Brian Morris (2006).Religion and Anthropology: A Critical Introduction. Cambridge University Press. p. 51.ISBN978-0-521-85241-8.(...) anatta is the doctrine of non-self, and is an extreme empiricist doctrine that holds that the notion of an unchanging permanent self is a fiction and has no reality. According to Buddhist doctrine, the individual person consists of five skandhas or heaps - the body, feelings, perceptions, impulses and consciousness. The belief in a self or soul, over these five skandhas, is illusory and the cause of suffering. [c]Richard Gombrich (2006).Theravada Buddhism. Routledge. p. 47.ISBN978-1-134-90352-8.(...) Buddha's teaching that beings have no soul, no abiding essence. This 'no-soul doctrine' (anatta-vada) he expounded in his second sermon.
^abcRichard Francis Gombrich; Cristina Anna Scherrer-Schaub (2008).Buddhist Studies. Motilal Banarsidass. pp. 209, for context see pp. 195–223.ISBN978-81-208-3248-0.
^Bodhi, Bhikkhu (2003).The Connected Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Samyutta Nikaya. Somerville, MA: Wisdom Publications. p. 1457.ISBN978-0-86171-331-8.
Alexander, James (2019), "The State Is the Attempt to Strip Metaphor Out of Politics", in Kos, Eric S. (ed.),Michael Oakeshott on Authority, Governance, and the State, Springer