| The Fog of War | |
|---|---|
Theatrical release poster | |
| Directed by | Errol Morris |
| Produced by | Errol Morris Michael Williams Julie Ahlberg |
| Starring | Robert McNamara |
| Cinematography | Robert Chappell (interviews) Peter Donahue |
| Music by | Philip Glass John Kusiak |
Production companies | RadicalMedia SenArt Films |
| Distributed by | Sony Pictures Classics |
Release dates |
|
Running time | 107 minutes |
| Country | United States |
| Language | English |
| Box office | $5 million[1] |
The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara is a 2003Americandocumentary film about the life and times of formerU.S. Secretary of DefenseRobert McNamara, illustrating his observations of the nature of modernwarfare. It was directed byErrol Morris and features an original score byPhilip Glass. The title derives from the military concept of the "fog of war", which refers to the difficulty of making decisions in the midst of conflict.
The film was screened out of competition at the2003 Cannes Film Festival[2] and won theAcademy Award for Best Documentary Feature and theIndependent Spirit Award for Best Documentary Feature of 2003.[3] In 2019, it was selected by theLibrary of Congress for preservation in the United StatesNational Film Registry for being "culturally, historically, or aesthetically significant".[4]
Composed ofarchival footage, recordings from the 1960s of conversations of theUnited States Cabinet, and new interviews with formerSecretary of DefenseRobert McNamara,The Fog of War depicts McNamara's life, as seen from his perspective as an eighty-five-year-old man. It is divided into eleven sections based upon "lessons" Morris derived from his interviews with McNamara, as well as the eleven lessons presented at the end of McNamara's 1995 book,In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (written with Brian VanDeMark).
Born inSan Francisco duringWorld War I, McNamara says his earliest memory is of American troops returning from Europe. Coming from humble origins, he graduated fromUniversity of California, Berkeley, where he met his first wife,Margaret Craig, andHarvard Business School, where he went on to teach. DuringWorld War II, he served as an officer in theArmy Air Forces under GeneralCurtis LeMay, who was laterChief of Staff of the Air Force while McNamara was Secretary of Defense.
After the war, McNamara was one of theWhiz Kids atFord Motor Company, of which he was brieflypresident before he left to become Secretary of Defense for newly elected PresidentJohn F. Kennedy, a role he continued to hold, until 1968, under PresidentLyndon Johnson. As Secretary of Defense, McNamara was a controversial figure, and in the film he discusses, in particular, his involvement in theCuban Missile Crisis and the escalation of theVietnam War. At some points, McNamara speaks openly and critically about the actions of himself and others, while at others, he is somewhat defensive and withholding.
In a 2004 appearance atU.C. Berkeley, director Errol Morris said the documentary had its origins in his interest in McNamara's 2001 book,Wilson's Ghost: Reducing the Risk of Conflict, Killing, and Catastrophe in the 21st Century (written with James G. Blight).[5] Morris initially approached McNamara about an interview for an hour-long television special, but, after the interview was extended multiple times, he decided to make a feature film instead;[6] ultimately, Morris interviewed McNamara for some twenty hours. At the event at U.C. Berkeley, McNamara disagreed with the interpretations of the lessons that Morris used inThe Fog of War, and he later provided ten new lessons for a special feature on theDVD release of the film. When asked to apply the lessons fromIn Retrospect to theU.S. invasion of Iraq, McNamara refused, arguing that ex-secretaries of defense must not comment upon the policies of the incumbent defense secretary, though he did suggest other people could apply the lessons to the war in Iraq, as they are about war in general, not a specific war.
For his interviews with McNamara, Morris used a special device he had developed called the "Interrotron", which projects images of interviewer and interviewee on two-way mirrors in front of their respective cameras so each appears to be talking directly to the other. The use of this device is intended to approximate an actual interaction between the two, while encouraging the subject to make direct eye contact with the camera and, therefore, the audience.
Reviews for the film were very positive. Onreview aggregator websiteRotten Tomatoes, it has an approval rating of 96%, based on 142 reviews, and an average rating of 8.32/10; the website's critical consensus states: "The Fog of War draws on decades of bitter experience to offer a piercing perspective on the Cold War from one of its major architects."[7] OnMetacritic, the film has a score of 87 out of 100, from 36 critics, indicating "universal acclaim".[8]
Roger Ebert of theChicago Sun-Times wrote: "Although McNamara is photographed through the Interrotron, the movie is far from offering only a talking head. Morris is uncanny in his ability to bring life to the abstract, and here he uses graphics, charts, moving titles and visual effects in counterpoint to what McNamara is saying."[9]
Over the course of the documentary, Morris distills McNamara's philosophy of war into eleven basic tenets:[10]
Lesson #1: Empathize with your enemy.
McNamara repeats this sentence several times throughout the documentary. He discusses a moment during theCuban Missile Crisis when he andKennedy were trying to keep the United States out of war, but GeneralCurtis LeMay wanted to invade Cuba. Kennedy received two messages fromNikita Khrushchev during the Crisis, which McNamara refers to as the "soft message" and the "hard message." He says the first message sounded like it came from a "drunk man or one under a lot of stress" and stated that, if the United States guaranteed it would not invade Cuba, the missiles would be removed, while the second stated that, if the United States attacked Cuba, "we're prepared to confront you with masses of military power."[11]Llewellyn Thompson, a former US ambassador to Moscow who knew Khrushchev personally, urged Kennedy to respond to the soft message, as he believed Khrushchev would be willing to remove the missiles if, afterward, he could draw attention away from the fact that he had failed to establish nuclear weapons in Cuba by taking credit for saving Cuba from being invaded by the US. Kennedy eventually agreed with Thompson and the situation was resolved without further escalation.
Lesson #2: Rationality alone will not save us.
McNamara emphasizes that it was luck that prevented nuclear war—rational individuals like Kennedy, Khrushchev, andCastro came close to destroying themselves and each other. He states that the possibility of nuclear destruction still exists today.
Lesson #3: There's something beyond one's self.
This lesson refers to McNamara's private life. He states that "there's something beyond one's self and a responsibility to society" while discussing when he started to court his wife,Margaret Craig McNamara, and had a child. Around this time,WWII began and McNamara became the youngest assistant professor atHarvard.
Lesson #4: Maximize efficiency.
McNamara was brought back from theEighth Air Force and assigned to the58th Bomb Wing. He flew in some of the firstB-29s, which, it was hoped, would be able to destroy targets much more efficiently and effectively than earlier bombers, and was responsible for analyzing bombing operations and making recommendations for improvements.
Lesson #5: Proportionality should be a guideline in war.
McNamara talks about the proportions of cities destroyed in Japan by the US before the dropping of the nuclear bomb, comparing the destroyed Japanese cities to similarly-sized cities in the US:Tokyo, roughly the size ofNew York City, was 51% destroyed;Toyama, the size ofChattanooga, was 99% destroyed;Nagoya, the size ofLos Angeles, was 40% destroyed;Osaka, the size ofChicago, was 35% destroyed;Kobe, the size ofBaltimore, was 55% destroyed; etc. He says LeMay once said that, had the United States lost the war, they would have been tried forwar crimes, and agrees with this assessment.
Lesson #6: Get the data.
McNamara worked atFord in an executive position and commissioned studies on subjects like buyer demographics, the causes of accidents, and ways to make cars safer. He was chosen to replaceHenry Ford II as president of the company, the first person outside the Ford family to hold that position, though he quit after five weeks to become Kennedy'sSecretary of Defense, having first declined an offer to beSecretary of Treasury.
Lesson #7: Belief and seeing are both often wrong.
McNamara affirms Morris' framing of lesson 7 in relation to theGulf of Tonkin incident: "We see what we want to believe."
Lesson #8: Be prepared to reexamine your reasoning.
McNamara says that, even though the United States is the strongest nation in the world, it should never use that powerunilaterally: "if we can't persuade nations with comparable values of the merit of our cause, we better reexamine our reasoning."
Lesson #9: In order to do good, you may have to engage in evil.
McNamara says: "Recognize at times we have to engage in evil, but minimize it."
Lesson #10: Never say never.
McNamara believed the ultimate responsibility for theVietnam War was on the president and says that, had Kennedy lived, the situation would have unfolded more desirably. In 1968, he resigned as Secretary of Defense (or was fired) and became president of theWorld Bank.
Lesson #11: You can't change human nature.
McNamara talks about the "fog of war" and how many things only become clear in hindsight.
(Provided by McNamara to supplement the documentary as a special feature on the DVD release of the film.)
(From McNamara's 1995 bookIn Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam.[12] The following are slightly shortened versions of the text from pages 321-3 of this book.)
Sony Pictures Classics allowed proceeds from limited screenings of the film to benefit Clear Path International's work with victims of theVietnam War.[13][14]