| Taiwan independence movement | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| Traditional Chinese | 臺灣獨立運動or 台灣獨立運動 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Simplified Chinese | 台湾独立运动 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| Abbreviation | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Traditional Chinese | 臺獨or 台獨 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Simplified Chinese | 台独 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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TheTaiwan independence movement is a political movement which advocates the formal declaration ofTaiwan as an independent and sovereign state, as opposed toChinese unification according to theone China principle or the status quo of co-existence incross-strait relations.
Taiwan's political status is ambiguous. ThePeople's Republic of China (PRC), under the control of theChinese Communist Party (CCP), claims theisland of Taiwan as aprovince of thePeople's Republic of China (PRC). TheRepublic of China consisting ofTaiwan and other islands under its control exercise full autonomy in its internal governance and already conducts officialdiplomatic relations with and is recognized by 11member states of the United Nations and theHoly See.[1] The use of "independence" for Taiwan can be ambiguous. If some supporters articulate that they agree to the independence of Taiwan, they may either be referring to the notion of formally creating an independent Taiwanese state (Republic of Taiwan) or to the notion that Taiwan has become synonymous with the current Republic of China and is already independent (as reflected in the concept ofOne Country on Each Side). Since 2016, the currentgovernment, led by theDemocratic Progressive Party (DPP), has asserted that there is no need for a formal push for independence through legal means,[2] maintaining that Taiwan is already an independent country called ROC.
The Taiwan independence movement is supported by the DPP and the broaderPan-Green Coalition given the threat posed to its sovereignty,regionalist identity,liberal democratic system andhuman rights. Radical activists advocate the ideal goal ofde-sinicization andTaiwanization of the island and society, although that sentiment is not shared by the Pan-Green establishment, which favors a more pragmatic status quo under the ROC. The movement is opposed by theKuomintang (KMT) and the broaderPan-Blue Coalition, which seeks to retain the somewhat ambiguous status quo of the ROC under the so-called "1992 Consensus" or gradually "reunify" with mainland China at some point. The process for a constitutional amendment in ROC or national territory alternation must be initiated by one-fourth (25%) of the members of theLegislative Yuan (the unicameral parliament of ROC), then voted in the Legislative Yuan with at least three-fourths (75%) members attended and by a three-fourths (75%) supermajority, then approved by majority popular vote in a referendum.[3]
The CCP and thePRC government oppose Taiwanese independence, believing that Taiwan and mainland China comprise two portions of a single country's territory, and regards any moves toward independence as potentially triggering a military response under theAnti-Secession Law. According to the PRC's interpretation, theCairo Declaration, thePotsdam Declaration and theUnited Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 establish that Taiwan is part of the PRC under international law. The PRC has officially maintained its position of "peaceful unification" of Taiwan under a "one country, two systems" formula butdoes not rule out using military force, if necessary, to "reunify" the island should formal independence be declared. Under2024 legal guidelines, the PRC regards advocating for Taiwan independence, regardless of jurisdiction, as a criminal offense subject tocapital punishment.
Taiwan is an island inEast Asia. Theindigenous population, who came from nearbyChina, spokeAustronesian languages.[4] Theseaboriginal people have lived on the island for over 6000 years and, before 1620, were its only inhabitants.[5] Taiwan has been occupied by several nations, includingSpain,[6] theNetherlands,Ming andQing DynastyChina, andJapan.
After its defeat in theChinese Civil War in 1949, the KMT party, which had ruled Nationalist China since 1928, moved to Taiwan where they reigned untilChen Shui-bian of the DPP becamepresident in 2000.[7]
From a pro-independence supporter's point of view, the movement for Taiwan independence began under Qing rule in the 1680s which led to a well known the saying, "Every three years an uprising, every five years a rebellion". Taiwan Independence supporters compared Taiwan under KMT rule toSouth Africa underapartheid.[8]
The Taiwan independence movement under Japan was supported byMao Zedong in the 1930s as a means of freeingTaiwan from Japanese rule.[9]
With the end ofWorld War II in 1945, by issuing "General Order No. 1" to theSupreme Commander for the Allied Powers, theAllies agreed that theRepublic of China Army under the KMT would "temporarily occupy Taiwan, on behalf of the Allied forces."[10]
From 1928 to 1942, the CCP maintained that Taiwan was a separate nation.[9] Mao Zedong was an early supporter of Taiwanese independence, tellingEdgar Snow in the 1930s that the CCP would lend "our enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence." He changed this position only after the Nationalists started claiming Taiwan with theCairo Declaration, challenging the status of China.[11]
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The modern-day political movement for Taiwan independence dates back to the Japanese colonial period, but it only became a viable political force within Taiwan in the 1990s.[citation needed] Taiwanese independence was advocated periodically during the Japanese colonial period, but was suppressed by theJapanese government. These efforts were the goal of theTaiwanese Communist Party of the late 1920s. Unlike current formulations, and in line with the thinking of theComintern, such a state would have been aproletarian one. With the end ofWorld War II in 1945, Japanese rule ended, but the subsequent autocratic rule of the KMT later revived calls for local rule. However, it was a movement supported by the Chinese students who were born on the Island and not associated with KMT. It found its roots in the US and Japan. In the 1950s, a Republic of Taiwan Provisional Government was set up in Japan.Thomas Liao was nominally the President. At one time it held quasi-official relations with the newly independentIndonesia. This was possible mainly through the connections betweenSukarno and the Provisional Government's Southeast Asian liaison,Chen Chih-hsiung, who had assisted in Indonesia's local resistance movements against Japanese rule.[citation needed]
After thetransfer of power from Japan to the ROC, the focus of the movement was as a vehicle for discontent from the native Taiwanese against the rule of "mainlanders" (i.e. mainland Chinese-born people who fled to Taiwan with KMT in the late 1940s).[12] TheFebruary 28 Incident in 1947 and the ensuingmartial law that lasted until 1987 contributed to the period ofWhite Terror on the island, persecuting not only indigenous leftists, but liberals and democracy advocates as well.[citation needed]
Between 1949 and 1991, the official position[13] of the ROC government on Taiwan was that it was the legitimate government of all of China and it used this position as justification for authoritarian measures such as the refusal to vacate the seats held by delegates elected on the mainland in 1947 for the Legislative Yuan. The Taiwan independence movement intensified in response to this and presented an alternative vision of a sovereign and independent Taiwanese state. This vision was represented through a number of symbols such as the use ofTaiwanese in opposition to the school-taughtMandarin Chinese.[citation needed]
Several scholars drafted various versions of a constitution, as both political statement or vision and as intellectual exercise. Most of these drafts favor abicameral parliament rather thanpresidential system. In at least one such draft, seats in the upper house would be divided equally among Taiwan's established ethnicities. In the 1980s the Chinese Nationalist government considered publication of these ideas criminal. In the most dramatic case, it decided to arrest the pro-independence publisherCheng Nan-jung for publishing a version in hisTang-wai magazine,Liberty Era Weekly (自由時代週刊). Rather than giving himself up, Chengself-immolated in protest. Other campaigns and tactics toward such a State have included soliciting designs from the public for a new national flag and anthem (for example,Taiwan the Formosa). More recently theTaiwan Name Rectification Campaign (台灣正名運動) has played an active role. More traditional independence supporters, however, have criticized name rectification as merely a superficial tactic devoid of the larger vision inherent in the independence agenda.[citation needed]
Various overseas Taiwan independence movements, such as the Formosan Association,World United Formosans for Independence, United Young Formosans for Independence, Union for Formosa's Independence in Europe, United Formosans in America for Independence, and Committee for Human Rights in Formosa, published "The Independent Formosa" in several volumes with the publisher "Formosan Association." In "The Independent Formosa, Volumes 2–3", they tried to justify Taiwanese collaboration with Japan during World War II by saying that the "atmosphere covered the whole Japanese territories, including Korea and Formosa, and the Japanese mainlands as well", when Taiwanese publications supported Japan's "holy war", and that the people who did it were not at fault.[14][promotional source?]
The anti-communist KMT leaderChiang Kai-shek, President of the ROC on Taiwan, believed that the Americans were going to plot a coup against him in collusion with Taiwan independence activists. In 1950, Chiang Ching-kuo became director of thesecret police, which he remained until 1965. Chiang also considered some people who were friends to Americans to be his enemies. An enemy of the Chiang family,Wu Kuo-chen, was kicked out of his position of governor of Taiwan byChiang Ching-kuo and fled to America in 1953.[15] Chiang Ching-kuo, educated in the Soviet Union, initiated Soviet style military organization in the ROC Military. He reorganized andSovietized the political officer corps, surveillance, and KMT party activities. Opposed to this wasSun Li-jen, who was educated at the AmericanVirginia Military Institute.[16] Chiang orchestrated the controversial court-martial and arrest of General Sun Li-jen in August 1955, for plotting a coup d'état with the AmericanCIA against his father Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT. The CIA allegedly wanted to help Sun take control of Taiwan and declare its independence.[15][17]
During themartial law era lasting until 1987, discussion of Taiwan independence was forbidden in Taiwan, at a time whenrecovery of the mainland andnational unification were the stated goals of the ROC. During that time, many advocates of independence and other dissidents fled overseas, and carried out their advocacy work there, notably in Japan and the United States. Part of their work involved setting up think tanks, political organizations, and lobbying networks in order to influence the politics of their host countries, notably the United States, the ROC's main ally at the time, though they would not be very successful until much later. Within Taiwan, the independence movement was one of many dissident causes among the intensifying democracy movement of the 1970s, which culminated in the 1979Kaohsiung Incident. The DPP was eventually formed to represent dissident causes.[18]
After the lifting of martial law in 1987 and the acceptance of multi-party politics, the DPP became increasingly identified with Taiwan independence, which was added to its party platform in 1991. At the same time, many overseas independence advocates and organizations returned to Taiwan. For the first time, they openly promoted their cause and gradually built up political support. Many had previously fled to the US or Europe and had been on a blacklist held by the KMT, which had prevented them from returning to Taiwan. In their places of exile, they established organisations like theEuropean Federation of Taiwanese Associations and theFormosan Association for Public Affairs.[citation needed]
As the electoral success of the DPP, and later, the DPP-led Pan-Green Coalition grew in recent years, the Taiwan independence movement shifted its focus toidentity politics by proposing many plans involving symbolism andsocial engineering. The reinterpretation of historical events such as the February 28 Incident, the use of broadcast language and mother tongue education in schools, the official name and flag of the ROC, slogans in the army, and the orientation of maps all have been issues of concern to the present-day Taiwan independence movement activists.[citation needed]
The movement, which peaked in the 70s through the 90s with theTaiwan literature movement and other cultural upheavals, has moderated in recent years with the assimilation of these changes. Friction between "mainlander" and "native" communities on Taiwan has decreased due to shared interests, such as increasing economic ties with mainland China, continuing threats by the PRC to invade, and doubts as to whether or not the United States would support a unilateral declaration of independence. Since the late 1990s many supporters of Taiwan independence have argued that Taiwan, as the ROC, is already independent from the mainland, making a formal declaration unnecessary. In May 1999, the DPP formalized this position in its "Resolution on Taiwan's Future".[citation needed]
In 1995, Taiwanese presidentLee Teng-hui was given permission to speak at Cornell University about his dream of Taiwanese independence, the first time a Taiwanese leader had been allowed to visit the United States. This led to amilitary response from China that included buying Russian submarines and conducting missile tests near Taiwan.[19]
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In February 2007, PresidentChen Shui-bian initiated changes to names of state-owned enterprises, and the nation's embassies and overseas representative offices. As a result,Chunghwa Post Co. (中華郵政) was renamed Taiwan Post Co. (臺灣郵政) and Chinese Petroleum Corporation (中國石油) is now calledCPC Corporation, Taiwan (臺灣中油) and the signs in Taiwan's embassies now display the word "Taiwan" in brackets after "Republic of China".[22] In 2007, the Taiwan Post Co. issued stamps bearing the name "Taiwan" in remembrance of the February 28 Incident. However, the name of the post office was reverted to "Chunghwa Post Co." following the inauguration of KMT presidentMa Ying-jeou in 2008.[citation needed]
The Pan-Blue camp voiced its opposition to the changes and the former KMT ChairmanMa Ying-jeou said that it would generate diplomatic troubles and cause cross-strait tensions. It also argued that without a change in the relevant legislation pertaining to state-owned enterprises, the name changes of these enterprises could not be valid. As the Pan-Blue camp held only a slim parliamentary majority throughout the administration of President Chen, the Government's motion to change the law to this effect was blocked by the opposition. Later, U.S. Department of State spokesmanSean McCormack said that the U.S. does not support administrative steps that would appear to change the status-quo by either Taipei or Beijing as threats to regional security.[23]
Former president Lee Teng-hui has stated that he never pursued Taiwanese independence. Lee views Taiwan as already an independent state, and that the call for "Taiwanese independence" could even confuse the international community by implying that Taiwan once viewed itself as part of China. From this perspective, Taiwan is independent even if it remains unable to enter the UN. Lee said the most important goals are to improve the people's livelihoods, build national consciousness, make a formal name change and draft a new constitution that reflects the present reality so that Taiwan can officially identify itself as a country.[24]
Legislative elections were held on 12 January 2008, resulting in asupermajority (86 of the 113 seats) in the legislature for the KMT and the Pan-Blue Coalition. President Chen Shui-bian's DPP was handed a heavy defeat, winning only the remaining 27 seats. The junior partner in the Pan-Green Coalition, theTaiwan Solidarity Union, won no seats.[citation needed]
Two months later, theelection for the 12th-term President and vice-president of the Republic of China was held on Saturday, 22 March 2008.[25] KMT nominee Ma Ying-jeou won, with 58% of the vote, ending eight years of DPP rule.[26] Along with the 2008 legislative election, Ma's landslide victory brought the KMT back to power in Taiwan.[citation needed]
On 1 August 2008, the Board of Directors of Taiwan Post Co. resolved to reverse the name change and restored the name "Chunghwa Post".[27] The Board of Directors, as well as resolving to restore the name of the corporation, also resolved to re-hire the chief executive dismissed in 2007, and to withdraw defamation proceedings against him.[28]
On 2 September 2008, President Ma defined the relations between Taiwan and mainland China as "special", but "not that between two states" – they are relations based on two areas of one state, with Taiwan considering that state to be the ROC, and mainland China considering that state to be the PRC.[29][30]
Ma's approach with the mainland is conspicuously evasive of political negotiations that may lead to unification which is the mainland's ultimate goal. The National Unification Guidelines remain "frozen" and Ma precluded any discussion of unification during his term by his "three no's" (no unification, no independence, and no use of force).[31]
The DPP, led byTsai Ing-wen, won a landslide victory over the KMT in2016 and was reelected in2020.[32][33] Her administration stated that it sought to maintain the current political status of Taiwan.[34][35] The PRC government continued to criticize the ROC government, as the DPP administration has continued to not officially recognize the1992 Consensus and theOne China policy.[36][37]
Lai Ching-te, the DPP candidate, won the presidential election in2024. During the campaign period, Lai asserted Taiwanese sovereignty, but said a formal declaration of independence would be unnecessary and favored maintaining the status quo.[38] He also said he would be willing to work with the Chinese government, but only if they renounce any intentions to use force against Taiwan.[39][40]
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Ideologies
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The questions of independence and the island's relationship to mainland China are complex and inspire very strong emotions amongTaiwanese people. There are some who continue to maintain the Kuomintang's position, which states that the ROC is the sole legitimate government forall of China (of which they consider Taiwan to be a part), and that the aim of the government should be eventual unification of the mainland and Taiwan under the rule of the ROC. Some argue that Taiwan has been, and should continue to be, completely independent from China and should become a Taiwanese state with a distinct name. Then, there are numerous positions running the entire spectrum between these two extremes, as well as differing opinions on how best to manage either situation should it ever be realized.
Taiwan independence is supported by the Pan-Green Coalition in Taiwan, led by the centre-left DPP, but opposed by the Pan-Blue Coalition, led by the conservative KMT. The former coalition aims to eventually achieve full sovereign independence for Taiwan. Whereas, the latter coalition aims to improve relations with the Beijing government (PRC) — which it refers to as "mainland China" — and eventually "reunify" at some point.
Both factions have long been forced to precariously dance around the so-called "status quo" of Taiwan's political status. The DPP is unable to immediately declare independence due to pressure from the PRC and the KMT, whereas the KMT and PRC are unable to immediately achieve Chinese unification due to pressure from the DPP and itsde facto allies (including the United States, Japan, and the European Union); further, the vast majority of Taiwanese as well as the KMT oppose the mainland's proposedone country, two systems solution.[41][failed verification]
The first view considers the move for Taiwan independence as a nationalist movement. Historically, this was the view of such pro-independence groups as theTangwai movement (which later grew into the DPP) who argued that the ROC under the KMT had been a "foreign regime" forcibly imposed on Taiwan. Since the 1990s, supporters of Taiwan independence no longer actively make this argument. Instead, the argument has been that, in order to survive the growing power of the PRC, Taiwan must view itself as a separate and distinct entity from "China." Such a change in view involves:
The goal of this movement is the eventual creation of a country where China is aforeign entity, and Taiwan is an internationally recognizedcountry separate from any concept of "China." Some supporters of Taiwan independence argue that theTreaty of San Francisco justifies Taiwan independence by not explicitly granting Taiwan to either the ROC or the PRC, even though neither the PRC nor the ROC government accepts such legal justification.
TheTaiwan Independence Party (TAIP) won a single seat in the Legislative Yuan in the 1998 legislative election. The Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) was formed in 2001, and is also supportive of independence. Though it gained more legislative support than TAIP in elections, the TSU's legislative representation has dropped over time. In 2018, political parties and organizations demanding a referendum on Taiwan's independence formed an alliance to further their objective. TheFormosa Alliance was established on 7 April 2018, prompted by a sense of crisis in the face of growing pressure from China for unification. The alliance wanted to hold a referendum on Taiwan's independence in April 2019, and change the island's name from the "Republic of China" to "Taiwan," and apply for membership in the United Nations.[42] In August 2019, another party supportive of independence, theTaiwan Action Party Alliance was founded.
Within the Pan-Green Coalition of Taiwan, there are two main factions, theHuadu andTaidu. The more moderateHuadu faction, mainly located in the ruling DPP, posits Taiwan and its outlying islands arealready a sovereign state under the name "Republic of China", making a formal declaration of independence unnecessary.Huadu politics is the semi-official stance of the ruling DPP under the Lai Ching-te and Tsai Ing-wen administrations.
Conversely, the more radicalTaidu faction advocates a more radical departure from thestatus quo by making a formal declaration of independence to create ade jure "Republic of Taiwan"; advocates for ade jure Taiwanese state can be found in smaller parties in the Pan-Green coalition, such as theTaiwan Statebuilding Party andTaiwan Solidarity Union, as well as in minority elements of the ruling DPP.
The term "Taiwan independence movement" is thus somewhat imprecise inasmuch its main representative, the DPP, does not support any change in the constitutional name of the Taiwanese state for the foreseeable future; they generally view the modern ROC assynonymous with a sovereign Taiwanese state; the incumbent President of Taiwan, Lai Ching-te of the DPP, believes that "Taiwan is already a sovereign, independent country called the Republic of China".[43]
A second view is that Taiwan is already an independent nation with the official name "Republic of China," which has been independent (i.e. de facto separate from mainland China/de jure separate from PRC) since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, when the ROC lost control of mainland China, with only Taiwan (including the Penghu islands), Kinmen (Quemoy), the Matsu Islands off the coast of Fujian Province, and some of theislands in the South China Sea remaining under its administration.[44] Although previously no major political faction adopted this pro-status quo viewpoint, because it is a "compromise" in face of PRC threats and American warnings against a unilateral declaration of independence, the DPP combined it with their traditional belief to form their latest official policy.
This viewpoint has not been adopted by more radical groups such as the Taiwan Solidarity Union, which favor only the view described above and are in favor of an independent Republic or State of Taiwan. In addition, many members of the Pan-Blue Coalition are rather suspicious of this view, fearing that adopting this definition of Taiwan independence is merely an insincere stealth tactical effort to advancede-sinicization and the radical view of Taiwan independence. As a result, supporters of Pan-Blue tend to make a clear distinction between Taiwanindependence and Taiwansovereignty, while supporters of Pan-Green tend to try to blur the distinction between the two.[45]
Most Taiwanese and political parties of the ROC support the status quo and recognize de facto independence through sovereign self-rule.[46] Even among those who believe Taiwan is and should remain independent, the threat of war from the PRC softens their approach, and they tend to support maintaining the status quo rather than pursuing an ideological path that could result in war with the PRC. When President Lee Teng-hui put forth the two-states policy, he received 80% support. A similar situation arose when President Chen Shui-bian declared that there was "one country on each side" of the Taiwan Strait. To this day, the parties disagree, sometimes bitterly, on such things as territory, name (ROC or Taiwan), future policies, and interpretations of history. The Pan-Blue Coalition and the PRC believe that Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian are intent on publicly promoting a moderate form of Taiwan independence in order to advance secretly deeper forms of Taiwan independence, and that they intend to use popular support on Taiwan for political separation to advance notions of cultural and economic separation.
The third view, put forward by the government of the PRC and the Kuomintang, defines Taiwan independence as "splitting Taiwan from China, causing division of the nation and the people." What the PRC claims by this statement is somewhat ambiguous according to supporters of Taiwanese independence, as some statements by the PRC seem to identify China solely and uncompromisingly with the PRC. Others propose a broader and more flexible definition suggesting that both mainland China and Taiwan are parts that form one cultural and geographic entity, although divided politically as a vestige of the Chinese Civil War.Chinese nationalists have called the Taiwan independence movement and its supporters to behanjian (traitors).[47][48]
The Kuomintang and the broader Pan-Blue coalition believe that China should be unified under the ROC and opposes any attempts in de-sinicization that erases any links with China. Since 2016, divisions have emerged in the coalition following electoral defeats and widespread sentiments among the Taiwanese electorate that rejects any form of unification, with pro-Beijing elements beginning to infiltrate the ranks of the coalition through theunited front that advocate unification under the PRC.[49]
The PRC considers itself the sole legitimate government of all China, and the ROC to be a defunct entity replaced in the Communist revolution that succeeded in 1949. Therefore, assertions that the ROC is a sovereign state are construed as support for Taiwan independence, so are proposals to change the name of the ROC. Such a name change is met with even more disapproval since it rejects Taiwan as part of thegreater China entity (as one side of a still-unresolved Chinese civil war). The ROC used to be recognized by the UN as the sole legal government of China until 1971. In that year, theUN Resolution 2758 was passed, and the PRC became recognized as the legal government of China by the UN.
The CCP classifies Taiwan independence activists as one of theFive Poisons.[50][51] In 2005, the10th National People's Congress passed theAnti-Secession Law authorizing military force for unification.[52] In 2024, the Chinese government issued theGuidelines on Imposing Criminal Punishments on Diehard "Taiwan independence" Separatists for Conducting or Inciting Secession to the courts stating that "diehard" independence supporters could betriedin absentia withcapital punishment imposed.[53][54]
The 1895Treaty of Shimonoseki and 1951Treaty of San Francisco are often cited as the main bases for Taiwan independence in international law[55][56][57] if such things as "self-determination" and theMontevideo Convention (on the Rights and Duties of States) are to be disregarded. These two treaties are not recognized by the Beijing government and the Pan-Blue Coalition of Taiwan.
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One hypothesis as to a legal basis for an independent Taiwanese state, thetheory of the undetermined status of Taiwan, posits that:
a) Japan gained sovereignty over Taiwan in 1895
b) Japan lost sovereignty over Taiwan around 1951–1952 according to the Treaty of San Francisco
c) The Treaty of San Francisco does not assign Taiwan to any power
Therefore, some activists and legal scholars hold that, legally speaking, the island of Taiwan is not an integral part of the territory of the ROC (or any other internationally recognized state); its status is more similar to aLeague of Nations mandate orUnited Nations trust territory administered by the ROC pending a final decision.
The PRC government regards these agreements as irrelevant to the Taiwan issue, arguing that the Treaty of Shimonoseki (being anunequal treaty) has been nullified and that the Treaty of San Francisco assigns Taiwan to China. It also cites thePotsdam Declaration andCairo Communique as confirming Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan; inasmuch as the PRC is the internationally recognized "China", it thus posits that it is the lawful sovereign power on the island. The United Nations currently recognizes Taiwan as an integral part of China (and thus, implicitly, the PRC).[citation needed]
In 2024, the PRC issued theGuidelines on Imposing Criminal Punishments on Diehard "Taiwan independence" Separatists for Conducting or Inciting Secession, based partially on the 2005Anti-Secession Law, stating that supporters of Taiwanese independence, regardless of their location, could betriedin absentia andsentenced to death by Chinese courts.[58][59]
Kinmen and Matsu are unique and important for several reasons. The islands straddle the southeastern coastline of mainland China, only a few kilometers away from mainland China'sFujian Province. They are geographically defined as being part of mainland China rather than Taiwan. The islands are defined as comprising thetruncated,streamlined Fujian Province (officially"Fuchien Province") of the ROC on Taiwan.
Within Taiwan, the radical camp believes that Kinmen County (Quemoy) and Lienchiang County (Matsu) should be abandoned from a potential independent and sovereign Taiwanese state. This view aligns with the aforementioned treaties and acts that do not define Kinmen and Matsu as being part of Taiwan. This same camp also believes that the PRC has only "allowed" the ROC to continue controlling Kinmen and Matsu in order to "tether" Taiwan to mainland China. The fact that the PRC propagandizes Kinmen and Matsu is evidence that this is true to at least a certain degree. In a hypothetical scenario where Kinmen and Matsu are abandoned by the Taiwanese state, they would likely be "ceded" to the PRC via apeace treaty, officially ending the Chinese Civil War. Many domestic and foreign defense analysts also grimly conclude that the islands could likely be easily taken by the PLA given its short distance from the mainland should the Chinese choose to do so,[60][61] and many inhabitants identify with China and would likely not resist due to their shared identity and ethnicity.[62][63]
Also within Taiwan, the moderate camp believes that Quemoy and Matsu belong to Taiwan. This camp believes that the ROC and Taiwan have become one and the same. By this logic, Taiwan effectively owns all of the same territories that the ROC is said to own. Among these territories is Quemoy and Matsu. If a potential Taiwanese state were to be created, this camp believes that the new country will actually be thesuccessor state to the ROC, rather than an entirely new country. Therefore, if Taiwan independence were to be successfully achieved, then the islands of Quemoy and Matsu would hypothetically cease to be administered as "Fujian Province", and would instead simply be classified as "satellite islands of Taiwan" (much in the same way as Penghu).[citation needed]
Despite the differing views of these two camps, there is a general understanding throughout Taiwan that Quemoy and Matsu are not part of the historical region of "Taiwan", due to having never been governed under the following regimes:Dutch Formosa,Spanish Formosa,Kingdom of Tungning,Republic of Formosa, and Japanese Formosa. Additionally, Quemoy and Matsu experienced a unique history for several years as military outposts of the ROC, further separating the islands from Taiwan in terms of culture.[citation needed]
Several polls have indicated an increase in support of Taiwanese independence in the three decades after 1990. In aTaiwanese Public Opinion Foundation [zh] (TPOF) poll conducted in June 2020, 54% of respondents supportedde jure independence for Taiwan, 23.4% preferred maintaining the status quo, 12.5% favored unification with China, and 10% did not hold any particular view on the matter. This represented the highest level of support for Taiwanese independence since the survey was first conducted in 1991.[64][65] A later TPOF poll in 2022 showed similar results, as 50% said they support Taiwan independence, 11.8% were for unification, 25.7% were for maintaining status quo.[66][67] In the Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland Survey by The Election Study Center ofNational Chengchi University there has been a steady increase in respondents choosing "maintain the status quo and move toward independence in the future" since the survey began in 1994. However, the option "maintain the status quo indefinitely" had a similar increase in the same period and the most popular option was "maintain the status quo and decide in the future between independence or unification" every year between 1994 and 2022. The option "independence as soon as possible" never went above 10% in the same time period. "Unification as soon as possible" has been more unpopular – never going above 4.5%.[68][69][70]
| Date(s) conducted | Polling firm | Sample size | Margin of error | Independence[a] | Unification[b] | Status quo | No opinion | Lead |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 17–21 October 2019 | MAC[71] | 1,073 | ±2.99 pp | 27.7% | 10.3% | 56.8% | 5.2% | 29.1% |
| 21–24 November 2019 | CWM[72] | 1,073 | ±2.99 pp | 32% | 5.5% | 58.1% | 4.4% | 26.1% |
| 15–16 June 2020 | TPOF[73] | 1,074 | ±2.99 pp | 54% | 12.5% | 23.4% | 10% | 30.6% |
| 8–9 August 2022 | TPOF[74] | 1,035 | ±3.05 pp | 50% | 11.8% | 25.7% | 12.5% | 24.3% |
| Year conducted | Sample size | Independence as soon as possible | Maintain status quo, move toward independence | Maintain status quo, decide at a later date | Maintain status quo indefinitely | Maintain status quo, move toward unification | Unification as soon as possible | No opinion |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1994 | 1,209 | 3.1% | 8.0% | 38.5% | 9.8% | 15.6% | 4.4% | 20.5% |
| 1995 | 21,402 | 3.5% | 8.1% | 26.3% | 15.6% | 19.4% | 2.3% | 26.3% |
| 1996 | 10,666 | 4.1% | 9.5% | 30.5% | 15.3% | 19.5% | 2.5% | 18.6% |
| 1997 | 3,910 | 5.7% | 11.5% | 30.5% | 16.3% | 17.3% | 3.2% | 15.4% |
| 1998 | 14,063 | 5.7% | 11.5% | 30.3% | 15.9% | 15.9% | 2.1% | 18.7% |
| 1999 | 9,273 | 4.7% | 13.6% | 30.9% | 18.8% | 15.2% | 2.2% | 15.2% |
| 2000 | 11,062 | 3.1% | 11.6% | 29.5% | 19.2% | 17.3% | 2.0% | 17.4% |
| 2001 | 10,679 | 3.7% | 10.5% | 35.9% | 16.4% | 17.5% | 2.8% | 10.5% |
| 2002 | 10,003 | 4.3% | 13.8% | 36.2% | 15.0% | 15.7% | 2.5% | 12.4% |
| 2003 | 14,247 | 6.2% | 14.5% | 35.0% | 18.0% | 11.9% | 1.8% | 12.5% |
| 2004 | 34,854 | 4.4% | 15.2% | 36.5% | 20.9% | 10.6% | 1.5% | 11.0% |
| 2005 | 7,939 | 6.1% | 14.2% | 37.3% | 19.9% | 12.3% | 1.8% | 8.5% |
| 2006 | 13,193 | 5.6% | 13.8% | 38.7% | 19.9% | 12.1% | 2.0% | 7.9% |
| 2007 | 13,910 | 7.8% | 13.7% | 36.8% | 18.4% | 10.0% | 1.9% | 11.4% |
| 2008 | 16,280 | 7.1% | 16.0% | 35.8% | 21.5% | 8.7% | 1.5% | 9.4% |
| 2009 | 20,244 | 5.8% | 15.0% | 35.1% | 26.2% | 8.5% | 1.3% | 8.1% |
| 2010 | 13,163 | 6.2% | 16.2% | 35.9% | 25.4% | 9.0% | 1.2% | 6.1% |
| 2011 | 23,779 | 4.6% | 15.6% | 33.8% | 27.4% | 8.8% | 1.5% | 8.2% |
| 2012 | 18,011 | 4.8% | 15.1% | 33.9% | 27.7% | 8.7% | 1.7% | 8.1% |
| 2013 | 13,359 | 5.7% | 17.2% | 32.6% | 26.3% | 9.2% | 1.9% | 7.2% |
| 2014 | 20,009 | 5.9% | 18.0% | 34.3% | 25.2% | 7.9% | 1.3% | 7.3% |
| 2015 | 22,509 | 4.3% | 17.9% | 34.0% | 25.4% | 8.1% | 1.5% | 8.8% |
| 2016 | 15,099 | 4.6% | 18.3% | 33.3% | 26.1% | 8.5% | 1.7% | 7.4% |
| 2017 | 13,455 | 5.1% | 17.2% | 33.1% | 25.3% | 10.1% | 2.3% | 6.9% |
| 2018 | 9,490 | 5.0% | 15.1% | 33.4% | 24.0% | 12.8% | 3.1% | 6.6% |
| 2019 | 16,276 | 5.1% | 21.8% | 29.8% | 27.8% | 7.5% | 1.4% | 6.5% |
| 2020 | 11,490 | 6.6% | 25.8% | 28.8% | 25.5% | 5.6% | 1.0% | 6.8% |
| 2021 | 12,026 | 6.0% | 25.1% | 28.4% | 27.3% | 6.0% | 1.4% | 5.8% |
| 2022 | 12,173 | 5.2% | 24.4% | 27.7% | 29.4% | 5.9% | 1.3% | 6.0% |
| 2023 | 14,933 | 3.8% | 21.5% | 27.9% | 33.2% | 6.2% | 1.2% | 6.2% |
| 2024/06 | 6,151 | 3.8% | 22.4% | 27.3% | 33.6% | 5.5% | 1.1% | 6.3% |
80年代末以后，国民党政权迅速"本土化"，台湾当局标榜实行西方民主制度，推行制造"两个中国"的分裂政策。
newspapers with the help of Roman letters within one month's learning." To be sure, Roman letters are a very effective means to transcribe Formsan. On this point Mr. Ozaki seems to mean that it is against the "Racial style", which is misleading...atmosphere covered the whole Japanese territories, including Korea and Formosa, and the Japanese mainlands as well. So quite naturally works to applaud the "holy war" were not infrequently produced. But who could blame them and who had a right to throw a stone at
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)Original from the University of Michigan| Diplomatic posts | |
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