| Part of a series on theIsraeli–Palestinian conflict | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Israeli–Palestinian peace process | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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History
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Proposals
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TheTaba Summit (also known asTaba Talks) were talks betweenIsrael and thePalestinian Authority, held from 21 to 27 January 2001 inTaba, Egypt. The talks took place during a political transition period. Israeli Prime MinisterEhud Barak had resigned six weeks previously on 9 December 2000, andelections were due on 6 February 2001, and theinauguration of President George W. Bush had taken place just one day prior, on 20 January 2001.
The Taba negotiations followed previous peace negotiation efforts, including theOslo Accords (1993–1995) and theCamp David Summit (2000), which had failed to reach an agreement on key issues such as borders,Palestinian refugees,Israeli settlements in occupied territories, andJerusalem.
The Taba negotiators hoped to address final status issues and bring an end to theIsraeli–Palestinian conflict. According to a statement issued at the end of the talks, they came closer to this goal than in any previous peace talks. The talks ended on 27 January 2001 due to the upcoming Israeli election, and the newAriel Sharon government did not restart them.
The Taba Summit took place from 21 to 27 January 2001 atTaba, after the failedCamp David 2000 Summit between Prime Minister of IsraelEhud Barak and the Palestinian PresidentYasser Arafat, and against the backdrop of theSecond Intifada that commenced. The parties had first negotiated atBolling Air Force Base inWashington, hosted by PresidentBill Clinton from 19 to 23 December 2000. The Israelis under Foreign MinisterShlomo Ben-Ami, the Palestinian under senior negotiatorSaeb Erekat, MinisterYasser Abed Rabbo and Gaza security chiefMohammed Dahlan attended the meeting.[1] President Clinton presented bridging proposals (the so-called"Clinton Parameters"). A summit inSharm el-Sheikh, mediated by Egyptian PresidentHosni Mubarak, was planned on 28 December. As the Palestinians delayed their acceptance of the Clinton Parameters, Barak decided not to go.[2]
At the start of the Taba Summit, Israel held on three main points:[3]
January 2001, theEuropean Special Representative to the Middle East ProcessMiguel Moratinos presented a document, known as "The Moratinos non-paper," describing the outcome of the Taba negotiations.[4][5][6] Although the paper has no official status, it has been acknowledged by the parties as being a relatively fair description of the outcome of the negotiations on the permanent status issues at Taba. It describes observed positions on the permanent status issues territory, Jerusalem, refugees and security, in order to find ways to come to joint positions. "At the same time it shows that there are serious gaps and differences between the two sides, which will have to be overcome in future negotiations." Summary of the paper:
The two sides agreed that in accordance with theUN Security Council Resolution 242, the 4 June 1967 lines would be the basis for the borders between Israel and the Palestinian state. Israel reduced its demands to 6% with territorial compensation that would offset about 3%, while the Palestinians proposed an Israeli annexation of about 3% along with a territorial compensation of the same amount. The Israeli proposal would have given the Palestinians some 97% of the land area of the West Bank.[7]
Both sides presented their ownmaps of theWest Bank. The maps served as a basis for the discussion on territory and settlements. The Israeli side presented two maps, and the Palestinian side engaged on this basis. The Palestinian side presented some illustrative maps detailing its understanding of Israeli interests in the West Bank. The Israeli side stated that the Clinton proposals provide for annexation ofSettlement blocs, areas which only had a small number of Palestinians. The Palestinian side did not agree that the parameters included blocs, and did not accept proposals to annex blocs. The Palestinian side stated that blocs would cause significant harm to the Palestinian interests and rights, particularly to the Palestinians residing in areas Israel sought to annex.
Neither side presented any maps of theGaza Strip. It was implied that the Gaza Strip would be under total Palestinian sovereignty, but details still had to be worked out. All settlements would be evacuated. The Palestinian side claimed it could be arranged in 6 months, a timetable not agreed to by the Israeli side. Both sides agreed that there was going to be a safe passage from the north of Gaza (Beit Hanun) to theHebron district, and that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip must be territorially linked.
Both sides accepted in principle the Clinton suggestion of having a Palestinian sovereignty overArab neighborhoods and an Israeli sovereignty overJewish neighborhoods inJerusalem. Both sides favored the idea of anopen city. The Israeli side accepted that Jerusalem would be the capital of the two states:Yerushalaim, capital of Israel andAl-Quds, capital of the state of Palestine. Both parties accepted the principle of respective control over each side's respective holy sites. Israel's sovereignty over theWestern Wall would be recognized although there remained a dispute regarding the delineation of the area covered by the Western Wall and especially the link to what is referred to in Clinton's ideas as the space sacred toJudaism of which it is part. Both sides agreed that the question ofHaram al-Sharif/Temple Mount has not been resolved.
Non-papers were exchanged which were regarded as a good basis for the talks. Both sides agreed to adopt the principles and references which could facilitate the adoption of an agreement. Both sides suggested, as a basis, that the parties should agree that a just settlement of therefugee problem in accordance with theUN Security Council Resolution 242 must lead to the implementation ofUN General Assembly Resolution 194. The Israeli side expressed its understanding that the wish to return shall be implemented within the framework of one of the following programs:
A. Return and repatriation
B. Rehabilitation and relocation
Both sides agreed thatUNRWA should be phased out in accordance with an agreed timetable of five years, as a targeted period.
The Israeli side requested that the issue of compensation toJewish immigrants from Arab countries be recognized, while accepting that it was not a Palestinian responsibility or a bilateral issue. The Palestinian side raised the issue of restitution of refugee property. The Israeli side rejected this.
Israel wanted to keep military control over Palestinian land and airspace in states of emergency, not because of a possible future threat from Palestine, but because of possible other threats from the East. The Palestinians wanted to accept international forces only.[8]
The Palestinians could not accept Israeli annexation ofGiv'at Ze'ev andMa'ale Adumim in the Jerusalem area. Israel wanted future expansion of the settlements into the West Bank. Unlike the Palestinians, Israel did not consider East Jerusalem part of the West Bank and its Israeli inhabitants settlers.[9]
The Taba Summit officially ended with a joint statement,[10] which included some of the following points:
The Israeli and Palestinian delegations conducted ... deep and practical talks with the aim of reaching a permanent and stable agreement between the two parties. ... Given the circumstances and time constraints, it proved impossible to reach understandings on all issues, despite the substantial progress that was achieved in each of the issues discussed. ... The sides declare that they have never been closer to reaching an agreement and it is thus our shared belief that the remaining gaps could be bridged with the resumption of negotiations following the Israeli elections. The two sides take upon themselves to return to normalcy and to establish [a] security situation on the ground through the observation of their mutual commitments in the spirit of theSharm e-Sheikh memorandum. The negotiation teams discussed four main themes: refugees, security, borders and Jerusalem, with a goal to reach a permanent agreement that will bring an end to the conflict between them and provide peace to both people. ... The Taba talks conclude an extensive phase in the Israeli–Palestinian permanent status negotiations with a sense of having succeeded in rebuilding trust between the sides. ... The two sides express their gratitude to PresidentHosni Mubarak. ... They also express their thanks to theEuropean Union. ... The sides declare that they have never been closer to reaching an agreement and it is thus our shared belief that the remaining gaps could be bridged with the resumption of negotiations following the Israeli elections. ..."
The breakdown is often attributed to the political circumstances posed by Israeli elections and changeover in leadership in the United States:[11] They had run out of political time. They could not conclude an agreement with Clinton now out of office and Barak standing for reelection in two weeks. Israel's negotiatorShlomo Ben-Ami said that "We made progress, substantial progress. We are closer than ever to the possibility of striking a final deal".[12][13] Palestinian chief negotiatorSaeb Erekat also lamented the lack of a final agreement. "My heart aches because I know we were so close. We need six more weeks to conclude the drafting of the agreement."[12][13]
The following month theLikud party candidateAriel Sharon defeated Ehud Barak in the Israeli elections and was elected as Israeli prime minister on 6 February 2001. Sharon's new government chose not to resume the high-level talks.[14] Immediately after the elections and before the change of government, an 8 February 2001 statement published by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that:
Prime Minister and Defense Minister Ehud Barak clarified this evening that the ideas which were brought up in the course of the recent negotiations conducted with the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority, including those raised at theCamp David Summit and by President Clinton towards the end of his term in office, are not binding on the new government to be formed in Israel. In a letter to President George Bush, Prime Minister Barak stated that his government had done the utmost to bring about an end to theIsraeli–Palestinian conflict, but that these efforts did not bear fruit, primarily because of a lack of sufficient readiness for compromise on the part of the Palestinian leadership. ... Before sending the letter, Barak spoke with former PresidentClinton, and they were in agreement that the ideas raised in the past months are not binding on the new government in Israel. Prime Minister Barak intends to convey this position also to the heads of theEuropean Union and to chairman Arafat.[15]
In June 2002, approximately 18 months after the conclusion of the Taba Summit, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat gave an interview to the Israeli newspaperHaaretz, in which he stated that he had accepted theMiddle East peace plan proposed by U.S. President Bill Clinton. However, by that time, the new Israeli government emphasized that this offer was no longer under consideration.[16]