The Syrian Popular Resistance, through the help ofHezbollah, heavily solicit funds through various cryptocurrencies includingBitcoin andEthereum.[16]
The group portrayed its threats to attack HTS and HTS-affiliated leaders as part of its response against theextrajudicial killings ofChristians,Shias, andAlawites after the fall of the Assad regime.[17] The group also denounced theSyrian transitional government as heretical, by labelling the HTS-led coalition as "Kharijite" (extremists).[17]ISW predicted that growing conflict between armed minority groups of this kind and HTS would increase sectarian tensions in Syria because the HTS would struggle to contain some of the moreSalafi Jihadist and sectarian groups within its coalition. Iran may have attempted to exploit this sectarian violence aiming to destabilize theSyrian caretaker government.[17][18] Two days after the formation of the group, Iran'sIslamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) released a statement advocatingcounter-revolutionary action in Syria.[17][19]
Iran has been engaged in efforts to foment sectarian conflict in Syria, as part of its attempts to reestablish its proxy network in Syria and destabilize the region.[20][21] SPR became a target from both Turkey and Turkish-backed militias, as well as theSDF.[22] SPR utilizessleeper cells across Syria in order to perpetrate its attacks.[23]
On 4 February 2025, the Syrian Popular Resistance issued a statement calling it the "Final Statement" which urges for operations from allsects of Islam in Syria to fight against the new Syrian government if "they oppose Zionism,America, andWahhabism".[24]
In the aftermath of theWestern Syria clashes, the Syrian Popular Resistance issued a statement on August 19th, 2025, announcing plans to reform its structure. According to the group’s official telegram page, it intended to “form specialized units, organizing twenty-five groups carefully distributed across the west, east, north and south of the country”. The group said these reforms were in order to “enter 2026 with a wider and more widespread structure”.[25]
On 6 January, the Syrian Popular Resistance ambushed HTS units inLatakia.[26]
On 10 January, the Syrian Popular Resistance attacked Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham personnel in theTalfita region in the countryside of theRif Dimashq Governorate where a large number of people were killed and injured in the operation aimed at Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham.[27]
On 13 January, the Syrian Popular Resistance claimed to have attacked and killed 35 Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham fighters in westernHoms near theLebanon–Syria border in coordination with fighters fromHermel, Lebanon, who may have affiliation withHezbollah, with members of theinterim government not giving any comment on the situation.[28]
On 16 January, the Syrian Popular Resistance announced there would be more attacks against Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and other affiliates.[30]
On 22 January, the Syrian Popular Resistance attacked a checkpoint controlled by Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham which led to the death of 22 militants associated with Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and injured several, including Ibrahim Abdulrahman Hajj, also known by the nom-de-guerre Ebu Mutaybin, who is one of the leading figures of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham.[31]
On 23 January, the Syrian Popular Resistance claimed responsibility through theirTelegram channel for the assassination of the head of theAl-Sheykh Maskin police station inDaraa, Muhammad Khalid Al-Safadi (who also had associations to Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham), who was shot several times in response to, what they call, the "brutal massacres committed by these terrorist groups against innocent civilians in various Syrian regions".[32]
On 25 January, members of the Syrian Popular Resistance assassinated a local leader of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, Ahmed al-Wazir Abu Akar, and wounding other men that were with him at the time of his death in the vicinity of theDabousieh area in theTalkalakh District ofHoms Governorate, and on the same day, Syrian Popular Resistance militants executed an ambush targeting a military vehicle belonging to Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham which resulted in several deaths and injuries of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham militants, including a higher ranking militant by the name of Muhammad Abdul Qadir Khalil, also known by thenom-de-guerre Abu Abdo Talbiseh.[33]
On 31 January, the Syrian Popular Resistance shot at Israeli military personnel in the city of Tirangah in the countryside ofQuneitra, southern Syria, they targeted Israeli forces withheavy machine guns which they claimed resulted in the injury of multiple Israeli soldiers.[34] They officially claimed responsibility on 1 February 2025 in a statement released on their Telegram channel, stating more attacks will continue,[35] The IDF acknowledged the incident, but said that they had suffered no injuries.[36] This would be the first time Israeli forces came under fire since their incursion.[37]
On 1 February, the Syrian Popular Resistance claimed responsibility for an ambush on theLatakia-Aleppo highway near Al-Mukhtariyah inLatakia countryside, in which one member ofMilitary Operations Command was killed, two others were injured and a fourth one went missing.[38][39]
On 12 February, the Syrian Popular Resistance attacked a checkpoint belonging to HTS located in a former gas station in Tartous.[citation needed]
On 14 February, the Syrian Popular Resistance shot and killed 2 members of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham in village of Al-Qabbou, west of the Syrian city ofHoms though theSyrian Ministry of Defense and Security deny this claim.[41][42] The two members were Mohammed Hamdi Alulu and Yahya Abdul Qader Kurdo fromIdlib, they were kidnapped fromQalamoun where surveillance camera footage from a bakery on the victims' route showed that motorcycles were chasing the car they were driving, minutes before contact with them was lost. They were found in the towns of Hafir al-Fawqa and Hafir al-Tahta.[43]
On 5 March 2025, the Director of the Public Security Department in Latakia Governorate, Major Mustafa Knefati, revealed in an official statement that a group of remnants of the defunct regime targeted two members of theSyrian Ministry of Defense through an armed ambush in the Al-Datour neighborhood in the city ofLatakia, which led to their immediate death.[44]
On 7 March, the Syrian Popular Resistance stated that it had taken control of numerous villages in Jabal al Alawiyin and expanded the scope of its operations to Masyaf in the Hama countryside.[45]
On 13 March, theSyrian Ministry of Health announced that 150 people inDeir Qanun were poisoned, but they were all treated.[46] On the 26th, the Syrian Popular Resistance announced its responsibility for the poisoning cases, claiming that a number of them were killed by arrows, and threatened to use more dangerous weapons until it takes control of Syria.[47]
On September 8, the Syrian Popular Resistance publishes footage of the execution of 2Alawite citizens who were collaborators with government forces, as well as threatening other Alawites.[48]
On November 12, the Syrian Popular Resistance claimed responsibility for a grenade attack againstIsmailiShias in a Syrian government headquarter inSalamiyah,Hama Governorate.[51]
^Wells, Braverman, Kishore, Campa, Carter, Katherine, Alexandra, Siddhant, Kelly, Brian (5 January 2025)."Iran Update, January 5, 2025".isw. Archived fromthe original on 9 January 2025.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
^Wells, Braverman, Kishore, Campa, Carter, Katherine, Alexandra, Siddhant, Kelly, Brian (5 January 2025)."Iran Update, January 5, 2025".isw. Archived fromthe original on 9 January 2025.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
^Moore, Johanna (28 December 2024)."Iran Update, December 28, 2024"(Journal).understanding war. ISW. Retrieved6 January 2025.HTS's response to the current violence is fueling accusations of sectarianism and arbitrary targeting, which could in turn trigger further violence. .... Syrian opposition fighters continue to target the Alawite community fueling distrust and accusations that arrests conducted by the HTS-led security forces are driven by sectarianism and not in pursuit of justice for crimes committed under the former regime.
^Wells, Braverman, Kishore, Campa, Carter, Katherine, Alexandra, Siddhant, Kelly, Brian (5 January 2025)."Iran Update, January 5, 2025".isw. Archived fromthe original on 9 January 2025.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
^Wells, Ganzeveld, Moorman, Campa, Borens, Carl, Katherine, Annika, Carolyn, Kelly, Avery, Nicholas (30 December 2024)."Iran Update, December 30, 2024".isw. Archived fromthe original on 14 January 2025.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
^Kishore, Siddhant; Parry, Andie; Campa, Kelly; Moorman, Carolyn; Braverman, Alexandra; Reddy, Ria; Wells, Katherine; Ganzeveld, Annika; Borens, Avery; Carl, Nicholas (14 January 2025)."Iran Update, January 14, 2025".Institute for the Study of War. Retrieved24 January 2025.
Syria
Ba'athist Syria
Islamic Resistance Front in Syria
Hezbollah[7]
Eastern Lebanese Shia tribes[8]
Guardians of Truth Battalions[9]
Syrian Democratic Forces
United States
Turkey
Israel[10]
European Union
Saraya Ansar al-Sunnah%2c_Flag_of_Syria_(1980%25E2%2580%25932024).svg)