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TheSvātantrika–Prāsaṅgika distinction is a doctrinal distinction made within Tibetan Buddhism between two stances regarding the use of logic and the meaning of conventional truth within the presentation ofMadhyamaka.
Svātantrika is a category of Madhyamaka viewpoints attributed primarily to the 6th-century Indian scholarBhāviveka. Bhāviveka criticisedBuddhapalita’s abstinence from syllogistic reasoning in his commentary onNāgārjuna.[1] Following the example of the influential logicianDignāga, Bhāviveka used autonomous syllogistic reasoning (svātantra) syllogisms in the explanation of Madhyamaka. To have a common ground withessentialist opponents, and make it possible to use syllogistic reasoning in discussion with those essentialists, Bhāviveka argued that things can be said to exist conventionally 'according to characteristics'. This makes it possible to take the mere object as the point of departure for the discussion on inherent existence. From there, it is possible to explain how these things are ultimately empty of inherent existence.[2]
Prāsaṅgika views are based onCandrakīrti's critique of Bhāviveka, arguing for a sole reliance onprasaṅga, "logic consequence," a method ofreductio ad absurdum which is used by all Mādhyamikas, using syllogisms to point out the absurd and impossible logical consequences of holding essentialist views.[3] According to Candrakīrti, the mere object can only be discussed if both parties perceive it in the same way.[4][note 1] As a consequence (according to Candrakīrti) svātantrika reasoning is impossible in a debate, since the opponents argue from two irreconcilable points of view, namely a mistaken essentialist perception, and a correct non-essentialist perception. This leaves no ground for a discussion which starts from a similarly perceived object of discussion. And it also makes impossible the use of syllogistic reasoning to convince the opponent.[note 2]
Candrakīrti's works had no influence on Indian and early Tibetan Madhayamaka, but started to rise to prominence in Tibet in the 12th century.Tsongkhapa (1357–1419), the founder of theGelugpa school and the most outspoken proponent of the distinction, followed Candrakīrti in his rejection of Bhavaviveka's arguments.[5] According to Tsongkhapa, the Svātantrikas do negate intrinsic nature ultimately, but "accept that things conventionally have intrinsic character or intrinsic nature."[6] Tsongkhapa, commenting on Candrakīrti, says that he "refute[s] essential or intrinsic nature even conventionally."[7] For Tsongkhapa, as well as for theKarma Kagyu school, the differences with Bhavaviveka are of major importance.[8]
Established by Lama Tsongkhapa, Candrakīrti's view replaced theYogācāra-Mādhyamaka approach ofŚāntarakṣita (725–788), who synthesized Madhyamaka, Yogācāra and Buddhist logic in a powerful and influential synthesis calledYogācāra-Mādhyamaka. Śāntarakṣita established Buddhism in Tibet, and hisYogācāra-Mādhyamaka was the primary philosophic viewpoint until the 12th century, when the works of Candrakīrti were first translated into Tibetan.[9] In this synthesis, conventional truth or reality is explained and analysed in terms of the Yogācāra system, while the ultimate truth is presented in terms of the Madhyamaka system.[10] While Śāntarakṣita's synthesis reflects the final development of Indian Madhyamaka and post-dates Candrakīrti, Tibetan doxographers ignored the nuances of Śāntarakṣita's synthesis, grouping his approach together with Bhāviveka's, due to their usage of syllogistic reasonings to explain and defend Madhyamaka.[9]
After the 17th century civil war in Tibet and the Mongol intervention which put the Gelugpa school in the center of power, Tsongkhapa's views dominated Tibetan Buddhism until the 20th century.[9] TheRimé movement revived alternate teachings, providing alternatives to Tsongkhapa's interpretation, and reintroducing Śāntarakṣita's nuances. For theSakya andNyingma schools, which participated in the Rimé movement, the Svātantrika–Prāsaṅgika distinction is generally viewed to be of lesser importance.[11][12][8] For these schools, the key distinction between these viewpoints is whether one works with assertions about the ultimate nature of reality, or if one refrains completely from doing so. If one works with assertions, then that is a Svātantrika approach. Refraining from doing so is a Prāsangika approach. In this contextTenzin Gyatso, his holiness theDalai Lama, says in a forward toShantideva's book "A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life," a work based on the idea that the Mahayana teachings are focused on cultivating a mind wishing to benefit other sentient beings, that Shantideva’s philosophical stance follows the Prāsangika-Madhyamaka viewpoint of Chandrakīrti.[13]
Madhyamaka originated with the works of
The namePrāsaṅgika is derived fromPrasaṅga, a method of logical inquiry which deconstructs the opponents' argument in debate through the use of unwanted logical consequences. It arises fromBhāvaviveka's criticism that Buddhapālita ought not to have relied solely onreductio ad absurdum argumentation —hence the name "Prāsangika", fromprāsanga ("consequence")—but ought to have set forth "autonomous" (svātantra) syllogisms of his own.[16][note 3]
Bhāviveka (c. 500 – c. 578 CE) argued thatautonomous syllogistic reasoning was required when explaining or commenting on Nagarjuna's teachings on voidness or essencelessness.[17][note 4] To be able to use syllogistic reasoning, both parties need to share a common object of discussion at the conventional level. While the various opponents have different opinions on the specifics of their teachings, themere objects ormere forms are commonly appearing to both parties, "enjoy[ing] a certain existence 'according to their characteristics."[4][note 5]
Bhāviveka criticised Buddhapalita for merely repeating Nāgārjuna's ad absurdum approach in his commentary, instead of clarifying Nāgārjuna's teachings. According to Bhāviveka, syllogistic reasoning could be used for the sake of clarification.[note 6] Bhāviveka further argued that Buddhapalita only showed the logical consequences, and incoherence, of the Samkhya's views on causation and inherent existence, but failed to address their arguments against Buddhist critiques. Furthermore, simply negating the opponent's view, without positing one's own position, "leaves room for doubt in the opponent's mind," and is unwarranted.[20]
To facilitate the possibility of discussing Madhyamaka with opponents, Bhāviveka made a provisional division of the two truths, accepting that phenomena exist "according to their characteristics."[21] Bhāviveka made a further distinction in his treatment of ultimate truth or reality. Ultimate truth or reality transcends discursive thought, and cannot be expressed in words. To be able to talk about it anyway, and distinguish it from relative truth or reality, Bhāviveka makes a distinction between the "world-transcending" or "ultimate truth in itself," which is ineffable and beyond words; and the "pure worldly wisdom" or "approximate truth," which can be talked about and points to the "ultimate truth in itself," which has to be personally experienced.[22]
Dreyfus and McClintock observe that Bhāvaviveka was more influential in Indian Madhyamaka than was Candrakīrti: "In this regard, Bhāvaviveka should probably be seen as quite successful: apart from Candrakīrti and Jayananda, nearly all other Indian Mādhyamikas were to follow in his footsteps and embrace autonomous arguments as important tools in their endeavors to establish the supremacy of the Madhyamaka view."[23]
Candrakīrti (c. 600 – c. 650 CE) had little impact during his lifetime. The first commentary on hisMadhyamakāvatāra was written in India in the 11th century, more than 300 years after his death.[24] In the 12th century his works were translated in Tibetan, and became highly influential.[24]
Candrakīrti rejected Bhāviveka's criticism of Buddhapālita, and his use of independent logic.[24] According to Candrakīrti, the mere object can only be discussed if both parties perceive it in the same way.[4][note 1] According to Candrakīrti, this is impossible, since the opponents argue from two irreconcilable points of view, namely a mistaken essentialist perception, and a correct non-essentialist perception. This leaves no ground for a discussion starting from a similarly perceived object of discussion, and also makes impossible the use of syllogistic reasoning to convince the opponent.[note 2] According to Candrakīrti, without a conventionally appearing set of characteristics to designate upon, the Svātantrika would not be able to establish a syllogism.[note 7]
Candrakīrti also rejected Bhāviveka's argument that autonomous arguments should be used in commentaries to clarify the original text, noting that Nāgārjuna himself, in his auto-commentary on theVigrahavyavartani, also didn't use autonomous arguments.[24]
Candrakīrti rejected "the use of autonomous arguments, for the very reason that they imply the acceptance (however provisional) of entities.[24] According to Candrakīrti, this mode of thinking is a subtle form of grasping at inherent existence: one's mind is still searching for some way to hold on to an essence, self, or identity for conventionally perceived objects.[27] For Candrakīrti, there is no use in explaining the relative truth in any philosophical system; "the relative truth consists simply of phenomena as we observe them, the unanalyzed constituents of the common consensus."[24] The only aim of consequential arguments "is to introduce the mind to the direct knowledge of emptiness, not an intellectual understanding of it,"[24] making "no concessions to the spiritually unprepared."[24]
Candrakīrti's criticism was "part of a wider rejection of the logico-epistemological tradition of Dignāga, which he regarded as a misguided attempt to find "philosophical completeness" and a sense of intellectual security that is antithetical to the fundamental insight of Madhyamaka."[24] Candrakīrti did not reject the use of logic, but it served to demarcate the limits of discursive thought.[24] In the absence of any agreement between Mādhyamikas and substantialists,prasaṅga is the best approach "to indicate the ultimate without making statements that [...] compromise or [...] obscure their own position."[24] Since the use of autonomous arguments implies the acceptance of real entities, even if only provisional, they should not be used.[24]
Born and educated in India,Śāntarakṣita (725–788) came to theTibetan Empire at the instigation of KingTrisong Detsen after Nyang Tingdzin Zangpo had encouraged the King to make the invitation.Śāntarakṣita came to Tibet sometime before 767 CE. He oversaw the construction of the first Buddhist monastery atSamye in 787 CE, ordained the first monastics there, had Indian Buddhist texts brought to Tibet, and started the first translation project. He also advised the king to invitePadmasambhava to come to Tibet. He was also instrumental in the coming ofKamalaśīla to Tibet, who participated in the so-called "council of Lhasa," which, according to Tibetan tradition, led to the defeat of the Chinesechan monkMoheyan, and the establishment of Indian Buddhism as the norm for Tibetan Buddhism.[28]
Śāntarakṣita synthesised Madhyamaka, Yogācāra, and the logico-epistemological tradition of Dignaga and Dharmakirti. In this synthesis, conventional truth or reality is explained and analysed in terms of the Yogācāra system, while the ultimate truth is presented in terms of the Madhyamaka system.[10]
When Buddhism was established in Tibet, the primary philosophic viewpoint established there was that ofŚāntarakṣita (725–788), a synthesis of Madhyamaka, Yogācāra and Buddhist logic calledYogācāra-Mādhyamaka.[29] A common distinction of Madhyamaka teachings was given byJñanasutra (Wylie:ye shes sde, 8th–9th centuries), a student of Śāntarakṣita:[30]
The difference lies in their "acceptance or rejection of extramental phenomena on the conventional level."[29] While Bhavaviveka considered material phenomena at the conventional level as to be existent outside the mind, he applied Sautrāntika terminology to describe and explain them. Śāntarakṣita rejected this approach, denying "the extramental status of phenomena appearing within the sphere of conventional truth." Instead, he saw conventional phenomena as manifestations of the mind, in line with the Yogācāra approach.[30]
Candrakīrti's works were known in Tibet as early as the 8th century, but "specifically in connection with the logical tradition," when Candrakīrti'sYuktishashtika was translated by Yeshe De (Jñanasutra) and some others.[31] The Prāsangika-Svātantrika distinction was possibly invented by the Tibetan translatorPa tshab nyi ma grags (1055–1145), using the termsRang rgyud pa andThal 'gyur ba, which were Sanskritized by modern scholars asSvātantrika andPrāsaṅgika.[32] According to Dreyfus and McClintock, Tibetan scholars themselves state that the distinction "is a Tibetan creation that was retroactively applied in an attempt to bring clarity and order to the study of contemporary Indian Madhyamaka interpretations."[33][note 8] Later Gelugpa scholars as well as Nyingmapas, after Candrakīrti's works were translated in Tibetan in the 12th century,[29] considered both of the above to constitute subdivisions of Svātantrika, however, under the names of "Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka and "Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka."
Those various teachers, and their approaches were grouped together due to their usage of syllogistic reasonings to explain and defend Madhyamaka, in disregard of the philosophical nuances of Śāntarakṣita's approach.[29]
A related doctrinal topic of profound disagreement is betweenRangtong-Shentong, which concerns the "nature" of ultimate truth as empty of a self or essence, or as constituting an absolute reality which is "truly existing" and empty of any other, transitional phenomena.[note 9]
Initially, this new distinction based on Candrakīrti'sPrasannapada met with fierce resistance in Tibet, but gained in popularity and was strongly supported by Je Tsongkhapa[29] (1357 – 1419 CE). He became the most outspoken defender of the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction, arguing that "the two subschools are separated by crucial philosophical differences, including a different understanding of emptiness and of conventional reality."[11] Tsongkhapa was a powerful personality with a large following, but he too met with a strong resistance, especially within theSakya school to which he originally belonged. His critics rejected his interpretation as "inadequate, newfangled, and unsupported by tradition."[29] According to those critics, Tsongkhapa had "greatly exaggerated the divergence of view."[29]
Tsongkhapa's view became the dominant view in the beginning of the 17th century, whenGusri Khan (1582–1655) ended the civil war in central Tibet, putting the5th Dalai Lama in command of the temples in Tibet. This gave the Gelugpa school a strong political power, and the means to effectively ban the writings of Tsongkhapa's critics.[29]
For Tsongkhapa, the Svātantrika–Prāsaṅgika distinction centers around the usage ofautonomous syllogistic reasoning to convince opponents of the Madhyamaka point of view, and the implications of the establishment of conventional existence 'according to characteristics'.
Tsongkhapa objected against Bhaviveka's use ofautonomous syllogistic reasoning in explaining voidness or essencelessness.[5] To be able to use syllogistic reasoning, both parties need to have a common ground onto which those syllogistic reasonings can be applied. This common ground is the shared perception of the object whose's emptiness of inherent existence is to be established. According to Bhaviveka, this shared perception is possible because the perceived objects are mentally imputed (labeled) based on characteristic marks which distinguishes them from other objects.[35][web 1][note 10]
The Prāsaṅgika reject this idea, arguing that "[w]hat establishes that things exist is only that they are imputable, not that they are imputable with a findable characteristic."[web 1] According to Tsongkhapa, there is no such common ground or shared perception,[note 2][note 11] while the reliance on characteristic marks implies an inherent existence at the conventional level, which is not in accord with the Madhyamaka point of view.[2]
Tsongkhapa holdsreductio ad absurdum of essentialist viewpoints to be the most valid method of demonstratingemptiness of inherent existence, and of demonstrating that conventional things do not have a naturally occurring conventional identity.[37][web 2][note 12] According to Tsongkhapa, if both people in a debate or discussion have a valid understanding of emptiness already, then autonomous syllogistic arguments could be quite effective. However, in a circumstance where one or both parties in a debate or discussion do not hold a valid understanding, "the debate [should be] founded on what the parties accept as valid. Hence, it is proper to refute opponents in terms of what they accept."[25] In other words, it is more appropriate to establish a position of emptiness through showing the logical consequences of the incorrect position that the opponent already accepts, than it is to establish emptiness through syllogistic reasoning using premises that the opponent (and perhaps even the proponent) do not fully or deeply understand.[38]
While Tsongkhapa's view met with strong resistance after their introduction,[39] his views came to dominate Tibet in the 17th century, with theGanden Phodrang government, after the military intervention of the Mongol lord Gusri Khan. He supported the Gelugpa's against theTsangpa family, and put the 5th Dalai Lama in charge of Tibet.[40] Seminal texts which were critical of Tsongkhapa's views, such asGorampa's critique, "ceased to be available and were almost lost."[29]
Lama Tsongkhapa outline eight key points that differentiate the Prāsaṅgika from his opponents that, according to him, hold a Svātantrika view. They are:[41]
However, many scholars will assert that the main difference is condensed in point 3: the use of autonomous syllogisms by the Svātantrikas and thereductio ad absurdum by the Prāsaṅgikas, whereas they consider the other points posited by Tsongkhapa as just minor doctrinal differences in Gelugpa's Madhyamaka approach. Others schools assert that Tsongkhapa exaggerated the gap between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika by positing another 7 points.
According to Dreyfus & McClintock, "many other Tibetan commentators have tended to downplay the significance of any differences."[11]
In the 19th century the concurring Nyingma, Kagyu and Sakya schools joined forces in theRimé movement, in an attempt to preserve their religious legacy against the dominant Gelugpa school.[42]Ju Mipham's commentary on Śāntarakṣita'sMadhyamakālaṃkāra ("The Adornment of the Middle Way") is an example of this new impetus to older strands of Tibetan Buddhism.[43] Mipham presents an alternative interpretation of the Svātantrika–Prāsaṅgika distinction, in which the emphasis is not on "dialectical preferences," (consequential reasoning versus syllogistic reasoning), but on the distinction between the "approximate ultimate truth" and the "actual ultimate truth," just like Bhāviveka did.[44] According to Mipham, "the authentic Svatantrika is the approach that emphasizes the approximate ultimate, while the Prasangika approach emphasizes the ultimate in itself, beyond all assertions."[43] His is a gradual approach, starting with sensory experience and the 'realness' of the "things" perceived through them, which are "provisionally accorded a certain existence." From there the approximate ultimate truth is posited, demonstrating that "phenomena cannot possibly exist in the way that they appear," invalidating the conventional reality of appearances. From there, "the ultimate truth in itself, which is completely free from all assertion, is reached."[43] While the Svātantrikas do make assertions about conventional truth or reality, they stay silent on the ultimate in itself, just like the Prāsaṅgikas.[45]
In the light of Mipham's writings, the Prāsaṅgikas reject the Svātantrikas' approach by the use of "three sovereign reasoning", which are three absurd consequences deriving from the separation between the two truths emphasized by the Svātantrikas. They are: (1) the āryas' meditation on emptiness would destroy phenomena; (2) production according to its characteristics could not be disproved on the ultimate level; and (3) the conventional truth would resist absolute analysis.[46] These correspond respectively to stanzas 34, 36 and 35 in the sixth chapter of Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra presented in Mipham's commentarial outline.
According to Ju Mipham, Tsongkhapa's approach was seriously flawed.[47] Tsongkhapa's approach leads students in the right direction but will not lead to the true ultimate until they go further.[48] Mipham further argues that Tsongkhapa's approach is an excellent Svātantrika approach, because of the way he refutes true establishment instead of objects themselves.[48] According to the Padmakara Translation Group, "its presentation of "conventional," as distinct from "true," existence seems very close to the "existence according to characteristics" that Bhavya had ascribed to phenomena on the relative level.[49]
The Sakya teacherGorampa was critical of Tsongkhapa and his views. One of Gorampa's most important and popular works isDistinguishing the Views (Tibetan:ལྟ་བའི་ཤན་འབྱེད,Wylie:lta ba'i shan 'byed), in which he argues for his view ofMadhyamaka. He and other Sakya teachers classify themselves as presenting the "Freedom from Proliferation" (Tibetan:སྤྲོས་བྲལ་,Wylie:spros bral) Madhyamaka.[50] Gorampa does not agree with Tsonghkapa that the Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika methods produce different results, nor that the Prāsaṅgika is a "higher" view. He does also critique the Svātantrika approach as having too much reliance on logic, because in his view the component parts of syllogistic logic are not applicable in the realm of the ultimate. But this critique is constrained to the methodology, and he believed both approaches reach the same ultimate realization.[51]
MainstreamSakyas (following Rongtön andGorampa) also hold the position that the distinction between these two schools is merely of a pedagogical nature. With regard to the view of the ultimate truth there is no difference between them.[12]
Kagyu and Sakya scholars have argued against the claim that students using Svātantrika do not achieve the same realization as those using the Prāsaṅgika approach.[48] According to those critics, there is no difference in the realization of those using the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika approaches. They also argue that the Svātantrika approach is better for students who are not able to understand the more direct approach of Prāsaṅgika, but it nonetheless results in the same ultimate realization.[48]
The debate is also not strictly along lineage lines, since there are some non-Gelugpa's who prefer Je Tsongkhapa's points, while a notable Gelugpa,Gendün Chöphel, preferred and wrote about Ju Mipham's interpretation.[citation needed]
While Lama Tsongkhapa's approach to Madhyamaka is still viewed as authoritative in the Gelug school of Tibetan Buddhism, the 14th Dalai integrates Gelugpa Madhyamaka with Dzogchen views, as did the5th Dalai Lama. The 14th Dalai Lama has published works likeThe Gelug/Kagyu Tradition of Mahamudra which seem to be influenced by the views ofŚāntarakṣita andPadmasambhava, and contain a blend ofTantric theory,Chittamātra, and Madyamaka-Prāsaṅgika.[52]
The 14th Dalai Lama, echoing sentiments from classical authorities likeLobsang Chökyi Gyaltsen (4th Panchen Lama), states that the credible teachers of the various systems of Buddhist philosophy all "arrive at the same intended point" of realization.[53] However, it is also stated that this non-denominational position is very difficult to establish through reason.[53]
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