 | This articleis missing information about the peace process between 2020 and 2023. Please expand the article to include this information. Further details may exist on thetalk page.(January 2023) |
TheSudanese peace process consists ofmeetings, written agreements and actions that aim to resolve theWar in Darfur, theSudanese conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile (theTwo Areas[1]), and armed conflicts in central, northern and eastern Sudan.[1]
In 2005, theComprehensive Peace Agreement led to a resolution of some of the armed conflict in Sudan, including the2011 South Sudanese independence referendum and the secession ofSouth Sudan. The 2006 Abuja and 2011 DohaDarfur Peace Agreements aimed to resolve the conflict in Darfur.
TheAugust 2019 Draft Constitutional Declaration, signed by military and civilian representatives during the2018–19 Sudanese revolution, requires that a peace agreement be made within the first six months of the39-month transition period to democratic civilian government.[2][3] A first round of negotiations took place inJuba in mid-September.[4][5][6] In the second round in October 2019, agreements were signed on 18 October on theTwo Areas track between the government and theSudan People's Liberation Movement–North (al-Hilu) (SPLM-N (al-Hilu))[7] and on theDarfur track between the government and theSudan Revolutionary Front (SRF).[8] The third round started in mid-December on theeastern Sudan track,[1] theTwo Areas track with the SPLM-N (Agar),[1] and theDarfur track.[9]
MANSAM and theNo to Oppression against Women Initiative called repeatedly for women to be included in the peace process.[10][11]
The 4 August Draft Constitutional Declaration lists "achieving a just and comprehensive peace, ending the war by addressing the roots of the Sudanese problem" as Article 7.(1), the first listed item in its "Mandate of the Transitional Period", and gives details in Chapter 15, Articles 67 and 58 of the document.[2][3] Article 67.(b) says that apeace agreement should be completed within six months of the signing of the Draft Constitutional Declaration. Article 67.(c) requires women to participate in all levels of the peace procedure and forUnited Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 to be applied, and legal establishment of women's rights is covered in Article 67.(d). Other mechanisms for implementing the comprehensive peace process are listed in Articles 67.(e) (stopping hostilities, openinghumanitarian assistance corridors, prisoner releases andexchanges), 67.(f) (amnesties for political leaders and members of armed opposition movements), and 67.(g) (transitional justice and accountability forcrimes against humanity andwar crimes and trials in national and international courts).[2] Article 68 lists 13 "essential issues for peace negotiations".[3]
During mid-September to mid-November 2019, 40 assaults by Sudanese security forces against civilians took place in Darfur, in which civilians were killed or wounded, in Mershing, Shangil Tobai, Gray Kalakl, Andro, Kadner, Mukjar, Gereida and Krenk. A representative of internally displace people (IDPs) described the security situation as unchanged since the power transfer from theTransitional Military Council to the civilian–military Sovereignty Council and civiliancabinet.[12]
Armed clashes between state security forces andSudan Liberation Movement/Army (al-Nur; SLM-al-Nur) occurred. As of November 2019[update], SLM (al-Nur) refused to join the Juba peace process.[12]
The peace negotiations were classified into parallel tracks on five geographical regions:[1]
Framework/final agreements:
| Region | Date | Type or status | Govt signee | Rebel group(s) | Rebels' signee(s) | Ref(s) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Darfur | 28 Dec 2019 | framework | Khabbashi | [13] | ||
| 31 August 2020 | final | al-Burhan |
| [14][18][24] | ||
| 28 June 2020 | (boycott) | SLM (al-Nur) | [13][25] | |||
| Two Areas | 24 Jan 2020; 17 Aug 2020; 31 Aug 2020 | final | al-Burhan | SPLM-N (Agar) | [15][16][17][18] | |
| 28 June 2020; 3 Sep 2020; 28 Mar 2021 | ongoing | SPLM-N (al-Hilu) | [25][26][27] | |||
| Northern | 26 Jan 2020 | final | Khabbashi | Kush Movement | Dahab Ibrahim | [21] |
| Central | 24 Dec 2019 | final | Hemetti | SRF | el-Tom Hajo | [22] |
| Eastern | 21 Feb 2020 | final | [23] |
In September 2019, following the transfer of power from theTransitional Military Council to theSovereignty Council of Sudan, South Sudanese presidentSalva Kiir hosted talks inJuba between rebel movements, military members of the Sovereignty Council, and the Sudanese prime minister. Rebel movements involved in the Juba meetings included fourDarfuri armed groups, theJustice and Equality Movement (JEM), theSudan Liberation Movement/Army led byMinni Minawi (SLM-MM), theSudan Liberation Movement–Transitional Council, and theAlliance of Sudan Liberation Forces;[4] theBlue Nile/South Kordofan rebel groupSudan People's Liberation Movement-North al-Hilu faction (SPLM-N (al-Hilu));[5] and the Sudan-wideSudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) that in 2011 allied together a wide range of Sudanese armed rebel groups.Hemetti, Sovereignty Council military member and leader of theRapid Support Forces, arrived in Juba for the negotiations on 9 September.[5]
Prime MinisterAbdalla Hamdok and threecabinet ministers planned to arrive in Juba on 12 September for the negotiations.[6]
Sudan researcherEric Reeves expressed scepticism about the possibility of Hemetti being "ready to make peace", arguing that Hemetti was responsible forcrimes against humanity andgenocide during the wars in Darfur and South Kordofan.[28]
On 18 October, two separate meetings took place in Juba between rebel andSovereignty Council (head of state) representatives, on theTwo Areas[7] andDarfur tracks.[8]
In theTwo Areas track, after a three-hour negotiating session mediated by a South Sudanese mediation team, Amar Daldoum, on behalf of the SPLM-N (al-Hilu) andShams al-Din Khabbashi, on behalf of the Sovereignty Council signed an agreement on political, security and humanitarian procedures. The agreement was cosigned by the chair of the mediation team, Tut Galwak. The SPLM-N (al-Hilu) and the Sovereignty Council planned to develop a Declaration of Principles to organise continuation of the peace process and to present their political vision.[7]
Independently on 18 October, the firstDarfur track meeting between the SRF and Sovereignty Council representatives took place under South Sudanese mediation, creating a joint committee. The joint committee stated its intention to study the 11 September Juba Declaration, and propose how to move from confidence-building measures to negotiations on core issues.[7] On 21 October, el-Hadi Idris, on behalf of the SRF, andHemetti, on behalf of the Sovereignty Council signed a political agreement (co-signed by a South Sudanese mediator) including a renewedceasefire, the delivering of humanitarian assistance by government agencies to areas under conflict, and commitment to negotiate further.[8]
Following the 18 October meetings, Tut Galwak stated that Sudan, South Sudan and other African countries are committed "to end all forms of war" in Africa by the end of 2020.[7]
The third round of negotiations started in Juba in mid-December 2019,[9] after having been planned to start on 21 November 2019.[10] The negotiation round was delayed for several weeks because of "the commitment of some of the armed movements to workshops related to the peace process", according to South Sudanese mediator Tut Galwak.[29] TheForces of Freedom and Change (FFC) agreed with the SRF to delay the creation of theTransitional Legislative Council to 31 December, giving the SRF, SPLM-N (al-Hilu) and the government time to reach an agreement prior to the creation of the Legislative Council.[29]
On 16 December, the SRF and "government representatives" discussed theeastern Sudan track. The government representatives wished to suspend talks until "civil leaders and prominent figures" from eastern Sudan were included; the SRF refused to wait, arguing that it would "[contradict] the Juba Declaration" and "hamper the negotiation tracks [which] are all intertwined".[1]
On 17 December, on theTwo Areas track, Hemetti andMalik Agar, head ofSPLM-N (Agar), signed an agreement establishing a "humanitarian protocol and a ceasefire". The agreement includes a ceasefire monitoring group with three representatives from both sides and a South Sudanese chair, to be located in Khartoum, with a sub-office inKadugli and another inEd Damazin; and the sending of a joint mission to the Two Areas to assess humanitarian needs and plan and carry out a humanitarian action plan.[1]
On 19 December, in theDarfur track, the SRF and government representatives created a committee, called a joint mechanism, for visiting Darfur with the help of theUnited Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in order to select "real representatives of the stakeholders". UNAMID committed itself to providing transport of the stakeholders to Juba for the negotiations. El Hadi Idris of the SRF described the creation of the mechanism as "an important breakthrough". DetailedDarfur track negotiations were expected to continue in Juba for several weeks.[9]
South Sudanese mediator Dams Dhieu Mathok stated that "participation of refugees, displaced people and civil society leaders" was being negotiated and would constitute a critical element of the Darfur peace process.[9]
In theTwo Areas track, Mathok stated that the proposal was provided by the SPLM-N (al-Hilu) delegation to government representatives.[9]
On 24 December, Hemetti on behalf of the Sovereignty Council andel-Tom Hajo, deputy head of the SRF and head of theCentral track negotiation team, signed a peace agreement regarding "development, farmers' issues, the El Gezira and El Managil Agricultural Scheme, land rights, in addition to a fair distribution of wealth". Hajo described the agreement as "inclusive" without "quotas or positions".[22]
Four Darfur representatives and Khabbashi signed a framework agreement on 28 December for the Darfur track, covering issues that included power sharing, wealth sharing, transitional justice and Darfur–Darfur dialogue.[13] On 31 December, the SRF suspended talks on the Darfur track in relation to fighting in that killed and wounded 708 people in el-Geneina.[30] AnFFC delegation visiting the area attributed the conflict to "the deep state" and victims attributed it to "janjaweed" and "militant herders in vehicles belonging to theRapid Support Forces".[31]
On 21 January, negotiations on theeastern track were suspended until 30 January, because a consultative forum preparing for the negotiations was not inclusive enough of representatives from the Red Sea state, and too many supporters of al-Bashir's government were present in the forum.[32]
Progress on land, transitional justice and system of government issues was made in theDarfur track on 21 January.[32] SRF and Sovereignty Council representatives agreed on the creation of aSpecial Court for Darfur to conduct investigations and trials forwar crimes andcrimes against humanity carried out during theWar in Darfur by the al-Bashir presidency and by warlords. The issue of whether or not to surrender Omar al-Bashir to theInternational Criminal Court was not discussed in the 21 January negotiations.[33]
Two Areas negotiations with SPLM-N (al-Hilu) had progressed by 21 January on six framework agreement points, after a two-week pause,[34] but disagreement remained on SPLM-N (al-Hilu)'s requirement of a secular state in South Kordofan andNuba Mountains andBlue Nile self-determination.[32]
On 22 January, talks on thenorthern track with the SRF were suspended in relation to deciding how to respect the rights of the displaced fromWadi Halfa.[20]
On 24 January on theTwo Areas track, political and security agreements,[16] constituting aframework agreement, were signed by Hemetti on behalf of the Sovereignty Council and Ahmed El Omda Badi on behalf of SPLM-N (Agar).[15] The agreements give legislative autonomy to South Kordofan and Blue Nile; propose solutions for the sharing of land and other resources; and aim to unify all militias and government soldiers into a single unified Sudanese military body.[16]
On 26 January, a "final" peace agreement for the northern track, including issues of studies for new dams, compensation for people displaced by existing dams, road construction and burial of electronic and nuclear waste, was signed by Shamseldin Kabashi of the Sovereignty Council and Dahab Ibrahim of theKush Movement.[21]
On 21 February 2020, a final agreement was made on the eastern track. The terms of the agreement included increased representation of eastern Sudan in the federal governmental structures; the establishment of a locally funded reconstruction fund; and the establishment of an internationally funded eastern Sudanese private bank to support political, educational, health and other administrative structures.[23]
Negotiations continued during theCOVID-19 pandemic thatreached Sudan in early 2020.
On 25 March, Sudan's defence minister Gamal al-Din Omar died of a heart attack in Juba after peace talks with rebel groups. Peace talks after al-Din Omar's death resumed on 2 April.
While talks in the Darfur track were ongoing,SLM (Minnawi) andJEM withdrew from the SRF in mid-May 2020, while continuing their alliance with each other and giving their new alliance the same name (Sudan Revolutionary Front). As of June 2020[update], the SLM (al-Nur) continued to boycott peace negotiations while waiting for the national authorities to make Darfur secure.[25]
On 17 August 2020, Khalid Abdin for the government, and Ahmed el-Omda for the SPLM-N (Agar) signed a security agreement for the Two Areas that included the integration of the armed forces of theSudan Revolutionary Front into theSudanese Armed Forces.[17] Negotiations on political issues continued in the following days.[35]
Negotiations with SPLM-N (al-Hilu) were planned to start around 21 August, discussing a declaration of principles, a ceasefire, and humanitarian aid.[35]
On 31 August 2020, a comprehensive peace agreement was signed between the Sovereignty Council and the SRF, which includes SPLM-N (Minnawi) and JEM for the Darfur track and SPLM-N (Agar) for the Two Areas track.[18][14] Under the terms of the agreement, the factions that signed will be entitled to three seats on thesovereignty council, a total of five ministers in thetransitional cabinet and a quarter of seats in thetransitional legislature. At a regional level, signatories will be entitled between 30 and 40% of the seats on transitional legislatures of their home states or regions.[36][37]
An agreement was reached between the transitional government and theSPLM-North al-Hilu rebel faction on 3 September 2020 in Addis Ababa toseparate religion and state and not discriminate against anyone's ethnicity in order to secure theequal treatment of all citizens of Sudan. The declaration of principles stated that 'Sudan is a multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural society. Full recognition and accommodation of these diversities must be affirmed. (...) The state shall not establish an official religion. No citizen shall be discriminated against based on their religion.'[26]Secularism had long been a demand of the SPLM-North al-Hilu, with a spokesperson saying: 'The problem is (...) to address why people became rebels? Because there are no equal citizenship rights, there is no distribution of wealth, there is no equal development in the country, there is no equality between black and Arab and Muslim and Christian.'[38]
TheJuba Peace Agreement was signed between the SRF, SPLM–N led by Malik Agar and SLM led by Minni Minnawi and the Sudanese government on 3 October 2020,[39] with the absence of both al Nur and al-Hilu.[40] The deal included terms to integrate rebels into the security forces, and to grant them political representation and economic and land rights, in addition to a 10-year plan to invest $750 million to develop southern and western regions, and to guarantee the return for displaced people.[41]
During the2023–present Sudanese civil war, ceasefires between theSudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and theRapid Support Forces (RSF) have been negotiated.[42] TheTreaty of Jeddah was internationally negotiated between the RSF, SAF,Saudi Arabia, and theUnited States. It became effective on 22 May 2023, and effectively expired the next day upon clashes resuming.
In December 2024, the Sudan welcomed Turkey’s diplomatic efforts to resolve the Sudanese conflict, and described the UAE as “terrorists”, over its constant support to the RSF military group. The Sudanese Foreign Minister called the Emirati efforts towards the Sudanese peace deal “hollow and false”, saying that peace will be achieved after the Emirates stop arms supply to the RSF.[43]
On 12 November,Ahlam Nasir, on behalf ofWomen of Sudanese Civic and Political Groups (MANSAM), met Sovereignty Council memberMohammed al-Ta'ishi, arguing that women should be included in the peace negotiations. Nasir presented specific proposals for women's participation in the negotiations and MANSAM's priorities in the peace process.[10] According to Neville Melvin Gertze ofNamibia who spoke at an October 2019 meeting of theUnited Nations Security Council, peace agreements that are the result of negotiations including women are 35 percent more likely to last at least 15 years than those which are the result of men-only negotiations.[44]
On 17 December, theNo to Oppression against Women Initiative requested the Sovereignty Council to include women, "especiallydisplaced women and war victims", in the Sudanese peace process.Ihsan Fagiri of the Initiative described women's view of the peace process as extending beyond the formal signing of national-level agreements, by including "social peace, and health and education" and by Sudan signing theConvention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.[11]
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