| Stormtroopers | |
|---|---|
 A stormtrooper poses with hisMP 18 and aLuger pistol (France, 1918). Note the characteristicStahlhelm, modified uniform with reinforcement patches on the elbows and knees, andputtees (to replace the boots of 1914). | |
| Active | 1916–1918 |
| Country |  German Empire |
| Branch |  Imperial German Army |
| Type | Shock troops |
| Role | Anti-tank warfare Artillery observer Close-quarters battle Demining Direct action Hand-to-hand combat Maneuver warfare Patrolling Raiding Reconnaissance Shock tactics Trench warfare |
| Size | 17battalions (as of 1917)[1] |
| Colors | Green, Grey |
| Equipment | MP 18,Karabiner 98a,Luger pistol,Stahlhelm,Stielhandgranate |
| Engagements | Western Front of World War I |
| Commanders | |
| Notable commanders | Ernst Jünger,Willy Rohr |
Stormtroopers (German:Sturmtruppen[2] orStoßtruppen[3]) were the only eliteshock troops of theImperial German Army (Deutsches Heer) that specialized incommando-style raids, infiltrating the trenches and wiping out the enemy quickly,maneuver warfare,reconnaissance, andshock tactics. In the last years ofWorld War I,Stoßtruppen ('shock troopers' or 'shove troopers') were trained to useinfiltration tactics – part of the Germans' improved method of attack on enemytrench warfare.[1]
TheGerman Empire entered the war certain that the conflict would be won in the course of great military campaigns, thus relegating results obtained during individual clashes to the background; consequently the best officers, concentrated in theGerman General Staff, placed their attention onmaneuver warfare and the rational exploitation of railways, rather than concentrating on the conduct of battles. This attitude made a direct contribution to operational victories of Germany inRussia,Romania,Serbia andItaly, but it resulted in failure in theWest. Thus the German officers on the Western Front found themselves in need of resolving the static situation caused by trench warfare on the battlefield.
Two concepts can be identified with the attempt to find a solution to the problem. The first was the belief, mainly held byErich von Falkenhayn, that tactical action alone, the mere killing of enemy soldiers, was a sufficient means to achieve the strategic goal. The second was the idea, emerging from experience of countless "limited target attacks" and forays into the trenches, that combat had become such a difficult task that operational considerations had to be subordinated to tactical ones. The promoter for this last thesis wasGeneral der InfanterieErich Ludendorff who, having becomede facto commander of the Imperial German Army after the German defeat at theBattle of Verdun, gave decisive support to the development of assault battalions as a solution to resumemaneuver warfare.[1]
The creation of these units was the first, and perhaps the most innovative, attempt by the German army to break out of theimpasse of trench warfare. With the use of well-trained soldiers, commanded byNCOs with autonomous decision-making capacity, an attempt was made to traverseno man's land and to break through enemy lines in predefined points in order to allow subsequent waves to liquidate the now confused and isolated opponent, opening large gaps in its defensive systems and then resuming maneuver warfare, which would have allowed Germany to win the conflict.[disputed –discuss]
Ever since the introduction ofbreechloaders, there had been a growing realization that the days ofclose-order infantry assault were coming to an end. For a time, up to the turn of the 19th century, armies tried to circumvent the problem by moving into range in dispersed formations and charging only the last meters, as the French did in theSecond Italian War of Independence (1859), the Prussians in theAustro-Prussian War (1866), or the Germans against the French in theFranco-Prussian War (1870–71).
The advent of the machine gun and the adoption ofhydraulic-recoil artillery was a further setback for close order. The showing of theBoers against the British in theSecond Boer War (1899–1902) fanned an enthusiasm for "Boer tactics": open order tactics reliant more on achieving fire superiority and moving quickly when enemy fire was ineffective than on positioning oneself for the final bayonet charge.
In the first part of the war, the standard assault on a trench line consisted of a lengthyartillery barrage all along the line, attempting to smash the enemy positions, followed by a rush forward of infantry in massed lines to overwhelm any remaining defenders. This process either failed, or at most gained only a short distance, while incurring enormous casualties, and the armies settled intotrench warfare.
The first experimental pioneer assault unit of the German army formed in the spring of 1915, founded by Major Calsow and later commanded and refined by HauptmannWilly Rohr. These methods[4] further evolved war tactics originally developed by the Prussians, to form the basis of German infiltration tactics. The troops involved were identified asStoßtruppen (literally: "thrust-troops"), and the term was translated as "storm troops" in English.
Allied versions of infiltration tactics were first formally proposed byFrench Army captainAndré Laffargue [fr].[5] In 1915, Laffargue published a pamphlet, "The attack in trench warfare", based upon his experiences in combat that same year. He advocated that the first wave of an attack identify hard-to-defeat defenses but not attack them; subsequent waves would do this. The French published his pamphlet "for information", but did not implement it. TheBritish Empire armies did not translate the pamphlet, and theBritish Army continued to emphasise fire power, although Laffargue's proposals were gradually adopted informally. The U.S.Infantry Journal published a translation in 1916.[6]
The Germans captured copies of Laffargue's pamphlet in 1916, translating and issuing it to units,[7] but by this point they already had their own, more sophisticated infiltration tactics, over two months before Laffargue's pamphlet was published.[8][9][10][11] The distinction between the German and French tactics was that Laffargue recommended using waves of infantry to attack despite the high casualties that would ensue.[12]
Soldiers were trained to consider fire as a means to facilitate movement in progress. Movement would be a call for fire. N. R. McMahon advocated using combined arms in the attack, particularly light machine guns (some six light and two heavy MGs perbattalion) using a decentralised fire control and tactical command system (known asAuftragstaktik in German). These methods, suggested in 1909, bore a strong resemblance to theStoßtrupptaktik used by the Germans six years later.[13]
In February 1917, the British Army issued "Manual SS 143" on the subject. The British made the platoon the basic tactical unit rather than the company as in 1916. The platoon was made up of four sections,Lewis Gun,rifle grenade,grenade, andrifle. The new organisation allowed the platoon to make best use of the trench-fighting equipment that had arrived in adequate quantities since the beginning of theBattle of the Somme. They were also supported by sophisticated artilleryflash spotting andsound-ranging, something the German Army never perfected, instead relying on the aural method with ever more accurate measuring devices.[14]
The concept of "stormtroopers" first appeared in March 1915, when theMinistry of War directed theEighth Army to formSturmabteilung Calsow ("Calsow's Assault Detachment" or SA Calsow). SA Calsow consisted of a headquarters, twopioneer companies and a 37mm gun (Sturmkanone) battery. The unit was to use heavy shields andbody armor as protection in attacks.
However, SA Calsow was never employed in its intended role. Instead it was sent into the line in France as emergency reinforcements during heavyAllied attacks. By June, the unit had already lost half its men. Major Calsow was relieved for this, against his protests that it was not his fault that the unit was not used as intended.[1]
The new commander of the Assault Detachment from 8 September 1915 wasHauptmann (Captain) Willy Rohr, previously commander of the Guard Rifle Battalion. The Assault Detachment was reinforced with a machine gunplatoon andflamethrower platoon. The oldinfantry support guns had been shown to be too difficult to move across the battlefield, and a new model was developed based on captured Russian76.2mm fortress guns and issued to the Assault Detachment.[1][15][16]
Captain Rohr (later promoted to Major[1]), at first experimented with the Assault Detachment's body armor and shields, but realized that speed was better protection than armor. The only item of armor kept was theStahlhelm[broken anchor], a new model of steel helmet. It later became the standard in all German units by the end of the war, and was used throughoutWorld War II.[1]
The new tactics developed by Captain Rohr, building much on his own previous experiences from the front, was based on the use of squad sized stormtroops ("Sturmtruppen" or "Stoßtruppen"), supported by a number of heavy support weapons andfield artillery that was to be coordinated at the lowest level possible and rolling up enemy trenches using troops armed withhand grenades. These tactics were tested the first time in October 1915 in a successful assault on a French position in theVosges Mountains.[1]
In December 1915, the Assault Detachment started training men of other German units in the new assault tactics. Around this time the Assault Detachment also changed some of its equipment to better fit its new requirements. Lighter footwear was issued, and uniforms were reinforced with leather patches on knees and elbows to protect them when crawling. Special bags designed to carry grenades replaced the old belts and ammunition pouches, and the standardGewehr 98 rifle was replaced with the lighterKarabiner 98a previously used bycavalrymen. The stocked artilleryman's pistol/carbine, the 9mmLange Pistole 08, was also used in concert with an extended 32-rounddrum magazine to increase the close-range firepower of the unit. The long and impracticalépée-style Seitengewehr 98bayonet was replaced by shorter models, and supplemented withtrench knives, clubs, and other melee weapons. While continuing to train other units, the Assault Detachment also participated in many smalltrench raids and attacks with limited objectives.[1]
The first major offensive led by the new Assault Detachment was the initial German attack atVerdun in February 1916. Stormtroops were in the first wave, leading some units into the French trenches, attacking seconds after the barrage had lifted. This generally worked very well, even though it worked much better against the first trenchline than against the less well-known enemy rear-area.[1]
On 1 April 1916, the Assault Detachment was redesignated "Assault Battalion Rohr". Around this time it was expanded from two to four pioneer companies. At the same time, severalJäger battalions began retraining as new Assault Battalions.[1][17]
GeneralOskar von Hutier, now commanding Eighth Army, became a champion of the new tactics, which became known asHutier tactics in Britain and by the allies.
Hutier suggested an alternative approach, combining some previous and some new attacks in a complex strategy:[18]
The new assault method had men rushing forward in small groups using whatever cover was available and laying downsuppressive fire for other groups in the same unit as they moved forward. The new tactics, which were intended to achieve tactical surprise, were to attack the weakest parts of an enemy's line, bypass his strongpoints and to abandon the futile attempt to have a grand and detailed plan of operations controlled from afar. Instead, junior leaders couldexercise initiative on the spot. Any enemy strong points which had not been overrun by stormtroopers could be attacked by the second echelon troops following the stormtroopers.
With the withdrawal of Russia, Germany moved troops from theEastern Front to reinforce theWestern Front. This allowed them to take units out of the line for retraining as stormtroopers.
On 21 March 1918, Germany launchedOperation Michael, a major offensive, using the new tactics. Four successive German offensives followed and for the first time in four years the stalemate of trench warfare was broken. However, the German advance failed to achieve the complete breakthrough necessary for a decisive result and in July the Allies began theirHundred Days Offensive.[14]
Apart from suffering heavy casualties, several other reasons for the failure of the stormtroops have been suggested.
With three infantry battalions, the German 703rd Infantry Battalion, some machine-gun, cavalry, and artillery units, the 3rd Assault Company, and the 46th Assault Company counterattacked theEgyptian Expeditionary Force during theSinai and Palestine Campaign. At theFirst Battle of Amman, during theFirst Transjordan attack on Amman at the end of March 1918, the attackers were forced back to theJordan River.[22]
The assault troops were organised into combined arms assault detachments ... The assault detachment of the 23rd Infantry Division was composed of one infantry company (about 100 men), one engineer (pioneer) platoon (one officer, four NCOs and thirty men), and sevenlight machine gun teams. The officers assigned to the assault detachments were hand–picked from within the division by the division staff. The assault detachment was given a four–week course in German–style stormtrooper tactics, to which the division sent an additional officer and five NCOs. Eventually the assault detachment was expanded into an assault battalion, giving the 23rd Infantry Division additional combat capability.[23]
With the 3rd Battalion 145th Infantry Regiment (24th Infantry Division) and the 8th and 9th Cavalry Regiments (3rd Cavalry Division), the 24th Assault Company (24th Infantry Division) pushed the Egyptian Expeditionary Force back fromEs Salt at the end of April 1918 during theSecond Transjordan attack on Shunet Nimrin and Es Salt.[22]
This assault company remained in reserve atAmman during the attack onEs Salt.[22]
According toVanguard of Nazism byRobert G. L. Waite andMale Fantasies byKlaus Theweleit, some of the psychological and social aspects of the Stormtrooper experience found their way into theparamilitary wings of everypolitical party during theWeimar Republic, which were largely made up of World War I veterans and younger recruits whom they trained. For example, the formal barrier between officers and enlisted men was largely broken down and replaced by a fierce loyalty. There was also a "brutalization" process owing to the uniquely violent conditions oftrench warfare. Such units included themonarchistStahlhelm, the paramilitaryRoter Frontkämpferbund wing of theCommunist Party of Germany, and theSturmabteilung, the name of which was commandeered by theNazi Party for its own paramilitary wing.
During the winter of 1914–1915, large parts of theEastern Front switched to trench warfare. To cope with the new situation many Austro-Hungarian regiments spontaneously formed infantry squads calledJagdkommandos. These squads were named after the specially trained forces of Russian army formed in 1886 and were used to protect against ambushes, to perform reconnaissance and for low intensity fights in no-man's-land.
Austro-Hungarian High army command (Armeeoberkommando, AOK) realised the need forspecial forces and decided to draw on German experience. Starting in September–October 1916, about 120 officers and 300 NCOs were trained in the German training area in Beuville (near the village ofDoncourt) to be the main cadre of the newly raised Austro-Hungarian army assault battalions. The formerJagdkommandos were incorporated into these battalions.
The formation of a storm battalion was ordered byEnver Pasha, theOttoman Empire's Minister of War, in 1917. In May of that year, acadre of officers and NCOs were given introductory training in assault techniques atDubliany in occupiedUkraine, prior to the establishment of the "Constantinople Assault battalion" on 1 July atMaltepe, close to the capital. The first troops to arrive for training were deemed to be too old and many were barefoot, so more suitable recruits were selected from other units. With the aid of German instructors, the troops were trained in the use of weapons such as flamethrowers, known to the Turks as "hellfire machines", and7.58 cm Minenwerfer mortars. Ottoman troops had never been issued with steel helmets, so GermanM1916 helmets were ordered but with the visors and neck-guards removed because they were thought to make it difficult to hear orders in the field.[24]
During theMiddle Eastern theatre of World War I, especially inSinai and Palestine Campaign, Ottomans utilized this storm battalion which formed part of theYıldırım Army Group using the latest Western Front infiltration tactics andclose combat gear with concentrated fire of artillery and machine guns.[25] A notable action by this unit was at theBattle of El Burj on 1 December 1917, when they dislodged two squadrons of the 3rdAustralian Light Horse from their defensive positions on a ridge, but were halted and isolated when British reinforcements arrived.[26]
This article incorporatespublic domain material from websites or documents of theUnited States Army.