TheStimson Doctrine is the policy of nonrecognition of states created as a result of awar of aggression.[1][2][3] The policy was implemented by theUnited States government, enunciated in a note of January 7, 1932, to theEmpire of Japan and theRepublic of China, ofnonrecognition of international territorial changes imposed by force. The doctrine was an application of the principle ofex injuria jus non oritur.[4] Since the entry into force of theUnited Nations Charter, international law scholars have argued that states are under a legal obligation not to recognizeannexations as legitimate,[5] but this view is controversial and not supported by consistent state practice.[6]
Named afterHenry L. Stimson,U.S. Secretary of State in theHerbert Hoover administration (1929–1933), the policy followed Japan's unilateral seizure ofManchuria in northeastern China followingaction by Japanese soldiers inShenyang on September 18, 1931.[7] The doctrine was also invoked by U.S. Undersecretary of StateSumner Welles in theWelles Declaration on July 23, 1940, which announced nonrecognition of the Soviet annexation and incorporation of the threeBaltic states:Estonia,Latvia, andLithuania.[8] This remained the official U.S. position until the Baltic states regained independence in 1991.
It was not the first time that the U.S. had used nonrecognition as a political tool or symbolic statement. PresidentWoodrow Wilson had refused to recognize the Mexican Revolutionary governments in 1913 and Japan'sTwenty-One Demands upon China in 1915.[9]
TheJapanese invasion of Manchuria in late 1931 placed Stimson in a difficult position. It was evident that appeals to the spirit of theKellogg–Briand Pact had no impact on either the Chinese or the Japanese, and Stimson was further hampered by PresidentHerbert Hoover's clear indication that he would not supporteconomic sanctions as a means to bring peace in theFar East.[10]
On January 7, 1932, Stimson sent similar notes to China and Japan that incorporated a diplomatic approach that had been used by earlier secretaries facing crises in the Far East. Later known as the Stimson Doctrine or sometimes the Hoover-Stimson Doctrine the notes read in part as follows:
Stimson had stated that the U.S. would not recognize any changes made in China that would curtail American treaty rights in the area, that the "open door" must be maintained, and would refuse any legitimacy to territorial changes made in violation of the 1928 Pact. The declaration had few material effects on theWestern world, which was burdened by theGreat Depression, and Japan went on to establish apuppet state in Manchuria and later bombShanghai.[10] The doctrine was criticized on the grounds that its only effect was to alienate the Japanese.[12]
The Stimson Doctrine, originally intended only as a political declaration, attracted the attention of theLeague of Nations, which adopted a resolution on March 11, 1932 that "it is incumbent upon members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to theCovenant of the League of Nations or the Pact of Paris." It also acquired legal force for the members of theOrganization of American States after it was included in theSaavedra Lamas Treaty and theMontevideo Convention of 1933, later followed by theCharter of the Organization of American States of 1948.[5]
After the entry into force of the UN Charter, international law establishes a general prohibition on the use of force. Consequently, international legal doctrine argues that annexations are illegal, and states are under a legal obligation to comply with the Stimson Doctrine by not recognizing as legitimate territorial changes made through annexations.[5] This view, however, is controversial and not supported by consistent state practice.[6]
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
