State capture is a type of systemicpolitical corruption in which private interests significantly influence astate's decision-making processes to their own advantage.
The term was first used by theWorld Bank in 2000 to describe certainCentral Asian countries making thetransition fromSoviet communism, where small corrupt groups used their influence over government officials to appropriate government decision-making in order to strengthen their own economic positions.[1]
Allegations of state capture have led to protests against thegovernment in Bulgaria in 2013–2014 and in 2020–2021 andRomania in 2017,[2] and have caused an ongoing controversy inSouth Africa beginning in 2016.Turkey is considered as a post-2002 example of state capture.[3] The term has also been used againstElon Musk by critics ofU.S. PresidentDonald Trump.[4][5]
The original definition ofstate capture refers to the way formal procedures (such as laws and social norms) and governmentbureaucracy are manipulated by government officials, state-backed companies, private companies or private individuals, so as to influence state policies and laws in their favour.[6]
State capture seeks to influence the formation of laws, in order to protect and promote influential actors and their interests. In this way it differs from most other forms of corruption which instead seek selective enforcement of already existing laws.[6]
State capture is not necessarily illegal, depending on determination by the captured state itself,[7] and may be attempted through privatelobbying and influence. The influence may be through a range of state institutions, including thelegislature,executive,ministries, and thejudiciary, or through a corruptelectoral process. It is similar toregulatory capture but differs in the scale and variety of influenced areas and, unlike regulatory capture, the private influence is never overt.[8]
A distinguishing factor fromcorruption is that, though in cases of corruption the outcome (of policy or regulatory decision) is not certain, in cases of state capture the outcome is known and is highly likely to be beneficial to the captors of the state. In 2017, a group of South African academics further developed the concept in a report on state capture in South Africa, titled "Betrayal of the Promise Report".[9] The analysis emphasised the political character of state capture, arguing that in South Africa apower elite violated theConstitution and broke the law in the service of a political project, which they believed unachievable in the existing constitutional/legal framework.
A 2023 academic paper argued that "the concept of state capture helps to structure our understanding of patterns of grand corruption seen around the world in varied contexts, and increasingly even in countries once regarded as secure democracies."[3]
The Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD Ghana) in 2025 issued a new Democracy Capture Index (DEMCAP) indicates concern that powerful interests are increasingly taking control of democratic institutions, undermining legitimate state governance, particularly in nations transitioning fromauthoritarianism toliberal democracy.[10][11]
Protests inBulgaria in 2013–14 against theOresharski cabinet were prompted by allegations that it came to power due to the actions of an oligarchic structure (formerly allied toBoyko Borisov) which used underhand maneuvers to discredit theGERB party.[12] Conversely, in 2020large anti-GERB protests broke out, accusing Borisov and his party of once again allying themselves with oligarchic organizations, permitting corruption and undermining political opposition.[13] Press freedom in Bulgaria diminished to the point it was rated worst in the EU;[14] one oligarch,Delyan Peevski, controls close to 80% of the newspaper distribution market.[15] Bulgaria's exposure to oligarchic networks has had a negative impact, most significantly in the area of energy policy. The close proximity between Bulgarian and Russian elites is largely underpinned by Russia's significant economic presence in Bulgaria, with Gazprom being Bulgaria's sole natural gas provider and Rosatom having a dominant position in the country's nuclear sector. As Russia has increased influence over Bulgaria's economy, it has used dominant positions in strategic sectors to strengthen relationships and cultivate new ones with corrupt businessmen and local oligarchs. This has allowed for access to prominent politicians, over which they are able to exert considerable control.[16]
Instances where politics have been ostensibly deformed by the power of drug barons inColombia andMexico are also considered as examples of state capture.[1] Both Argentina and Bolivia have been the subject of Russian strategic corruption efforts by its usage ofcorrosive capital. While the Kremlin has used similar strategies in Argentina and Bolivia, it has adopted strategies that suit local conditions. In Argentina, political decision-making is more dispersed, while transfers of power are more frequent, making large-scale, long-term projects more difficult to implement. Therefore, in Argentina, Putin has used trade as a bargaining chip. In 2015 Argentina suspended the television license for RT, to which the Kremlin retaliated by threatening to ban Argentine beef exports and suspend investment projects; several weeks later, RT was officially allowed to continue operating. In Bolivia, power is concentrated, allowing Russian state-owned companies deeper traction, pushing through projects with no significant resistance. Therefore, the Kremlin strategy in Bolivia has been to maximise influence by focusing on strategic markets and long-term infrastructure deals.[17]
State capture in theWestern Balkans has been undermining the EU enlargement process, strengthening ruling parties and weakening independent institutions and political opposition.[18][19]
For instance, through clientelist networks and loyalty-based appointments, the ruling party ofSerbia, theSerbian Progressive Party, has effectively captured the state, resulting in the country losing its status as a 'free' country according to the Freedom House Index.[20]
In May 2017, a group of academics convened by Mark Swilling and includingIvor Chipkin, Lumkile Mondi,Haroon Bhorat and others, published theBetrayal of the Promise report, the first major study of state capture in South Africa.[9] It helped galvanise civil-society opposition to the unconstitutional developments in South African civil-society responses.[21] The analysis was further developed in the bookShadow State: The Politics of State Capture written by Chipkin and Swilling.[22]
The 2017 bookHow to Steal a City details state capture within theNelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality in South Africa during the Zuma government.
The pattern [of state capture] is a simple one. "You remove management, and put in compliant management. You remove boards, and put in boards that are compliant. The rest is very easy. That has been the scenario at state-owned enterprises.
-Mcebisi Jonas, former Deputy Finance Minister; explaining the process of state capture.[23]
In 2016, there were allegations of an overly close and potentially corrupt relationship between the wealthyGupta family and theSouth African presidentJacob Zuma, his family and leading members of theAfrican National Congress (ANC).[24][25][26][27]
South African opposition parties have made claims of "state capture" following allegations that the Guptas had inserted themselves into a position where they could offer Cabinet positions and influence the running of government.[28] These allegations were made in light of revelations by former ANC MPVytjie Mentor and Deputy Finance MinisterMcebisi Jonas that they had been offered Cabinet positions by the Guptas at the family's home inSaxonwold, a suburb in Johannesburg.[29]
Mentor claimed that, in 2010, the Guptas had offered her the position ofMinister of Public Enterprises, provided that she arranged forSouth African Airways to drop their India route, allowing a Gupta-linked company (Jet Airways) to take on the route.[31][32] She said that she declined the offer, which occurred at the Guptas' Saxonwold residence, while President Zuma was in another room. This came a few days before acabinet reshuffle in which ministerBarbara Hogan (then Minister ofPublic Enterprises) was dismissed by Zuma. The Gupta family denied that the meeting took place and also denied offering Vytjie Mentor a ministerial position,[33] while President Zuma claimed that he had no recollection of Mentor.[34]
Deputy Finance Minister Jonas said that he had been offered a ministerial position by the Guptas shortly before the dismissal of Finance MinisterNhlanhla Nene in December 2015, but had rejected the offer as "it makes a mockery of our hard-earned democracy‚ the trust of our people and no one apart from the President of the Republic appoints ministers."[35] The Gupta family denied offering Jonas the job of Finance Minister.[36] In 2016, Paul O'Sullivan's 'Forensics for Justice' published a report, which alleged that South Africa's criminal justice system had been "captured" by the underworld.[37]
Following a formal complaint submitted in March 2016 by a catholic priest, Father Stanslaus Muyebe,[38] the Guptas' alleged "state capture" was investigated byPublic ProtectorThuli Madonsela. President Zuma and MinisterDes van Rooyen applied for acourt order to prevent the publication of the report on 14 October 2016, Madonsela's last day in office.[39] Van Rooyen's application was dismissed, and the President withdrew his application, leading to the release of the report on 2 November 2016. On 25 November 2016, Zuma announced that the Presidency would be reviewing the contents of the state capture report.[40] He said it "was done in a funny way" with "no fairness at all," and argued he was not given enough time to respond to the public protector.[41]
Zuma and Van Rooyen denied any wrongdoing[42] whilst the Guptas disputed evidence in the report and also denied being involved in corrupt activities.[43][44][45][46] In an exclusive interview withANN7 (belonging to the Gupta Family), President Zuma said that 'state capture' was a fancy word used by media houses forpropaganda proliferation. He said that a real state capture would include seizure of the three arms of the constitution—Legislative,Executive, andJudiciary—which has never been the case in South Africa.[47]
The report recommended establishment of a judicialcommission of inquiry into the issues identified,[48] including a full probe of Zuma's dealings with the Guptas, with findings to be published within 180 days. In May 2017, Jacob Zuma denied the allegation of blocking an attempt to set up a commission of inquiry to probe state capture.[49] The report led to the establishment of theZondo Commission of Inquiry in 2018, set up to investigate allegations of state capture in South Africa.
On 11 September 2017, former Finance MinisterPravin Gordhan estimated the cost of state capture at 250 billionrand (almost $17 billionUSD), in a presentation at theUniversity of Cape Town Graduate School of Business.[50]The Daily Maverick, a South African news publication, estimated that state capture cost the country roughly R1.5 trillion (roughly US$100 billion) in the four years preceding 2019.[51]South African Reserve Bank economist David Fowkes stated that the negative impact of state capture on the country's economy was worse than expected, stating that it likely reduced GDP growth by an estimated 4% a year.[52]
Allegations of state capture were also known to have increased as the relationship between South Africa and Russia grew, resulting in a partnership that increasingly impacted upon the decision-making process of the African state. Soon after President Zuma took office, Moscow attempted to make inroads into Africa, all the while capitalizing on a South African leader who had extensive Soviet Bloc connections. The transactional nature of the relationship began when Zuma pushed to be included in theBRIC grouping during the2008 financial crisis, receiving important backing from the Kremlin which ultimately led to Zuma attending hisfirst BRICS meeting in 2011. The Kremlin also worked to establish ties between the two states’ security services, with some suggesting that Zuma had sought to implement state surveillance capabilities with Russia's help. Finally, amid countrywide debate surrounding the future electrical need of South Africa, a joint press statement with the Russian state nuclear cooperation,Rosatom, announced an agreement to provide up to 8 nuclear reactors. In 2017, that agreement was struck down in court as unconstitutional.[53]
In May 2019, reports of state capture in Kenya started emerging.Inside Kenya's Inability to Fight Corruption,[54] which was published by Africa Centre for Open Governance (AfriCOG) highlighted the issue, outlining why PresidentUhuru Kenyatta's anti-corruption measures were not working. This was attributed to state capture where state institutions had been repurposed for private profiteering mainly by the first family.[54] The study concluded that public-driven prosecutions, rampant in Kenya, were likely to worsen corruption rather than reduce it.
In June 2022, UDA presidential candidateWilliam Ruto (now the current president) stated that he would end state capture in Kenya if he took office after the August 2022 General Elections. He claimed he would form a quasi-judicial public inquiry within 30 days to establish the extent of cronyism and state capture in the nation and make recommendations.[55]
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