While there may be a formalalliance or othertreaty obligations between the influenced and influencer, such formal arrangements are not necessary and the influence can often be more of an example ofsoft power. Similarly, a formal alliance does not necessarily mean that one country lies within another's sphere of influence. High levels of exclusivity have historically been associated with higher levels of conflict.
In more extreme cases, a country within the "sphere of influence" of another may become a subsidiary of that state and serve in effect as asatellite state orde factocolony. This was the case with theSoviet Union and itsEastern Bloc after World War II. The system of spheres of influence by which powerful nations intervene in the affairs of others continues to the present. It is often analyzed in terms ofsuperpowers,great powers, and/ormiddle powers.
Before modern international relations were established in Europe, many powerful states had subordinatetributary states, in which the less powerful states or kingdoms submit to the payment of tribute in order to maintain a degree of independence.[1]
This doctrine, dubbed the 'Monroe Doctrine', was formalized under PresidentJames Monroe, who asserted that theNew World was to be established as a Sphere of influence, removed fromEuropean encroachment. As the U.S. emerged as a world power, few nations dared to trespass on this sphere[4] (a notable exception occurred with theSoviet Union and theCuban Missile Crisis).
As of 2018, Secretary of StateRex Tillerson continued to refer to the Monroe Doctrine to tout theUnited States as the region's preferredtrade partner over othernations such asChina.[5]
Delimitation of British and Russian influence in Iran
For Siam (Thailand),Britain andFrance signed an agreement in 1904 whereby the British recognised a French sphere of influence to the east of the River Menam's (Chao Phraya River) basin; in turn, the French recognised British influence over the territory to the west of the Menam basin and west of theGulf of Thailand. Both parties disclaimed any idea of annexing Siamese territory.[6]
In theAnglo-Russian Convention of 1907, Britain andRussia divided Persia (Iran) into spheres of influence, with the Russians gaining recognition for influence over most of northern Iran, and Britain establishing a zone in the Southeast.[7][8]
In China, during the mid 19th and 20th centuries (known in China as the "century of humiliation"),Great Britain,France,Germany,Russia, andJapan held special powers over large swaths of Chinese territory based on securing "nonalienation commitments" for their "spheres of interest"; only the United States was unable to participate due to their involvement in theSpanish–American War. These spheres of influence were acquired by forcing theQing government to sign "unequal treaties" and long-term leases.[9]
In early 1895, the French laid claim to a sphere inSouthwest China.[10] By December 1897, German KaiserWilhelm II declared his intent to seize territory in China, precipitating thescramble to demarcate zones of influence in China. The Germans acquired, inShandong province, exclusive control over developmental loans, mining, and railway ownership,[11] while Russia gained a sphere over all territory north of theGreat Wall,[12] in addition to the previous tax exemption for trade inMongolia andXinjiang,[13] economic powers similar to Germany's overFengtian,Jilin, andHeilongjiang provinces. France gained a sphere overYunnan, as well as most ofGuangxi andGuangdong provinces;[14] Japan overFujian province;[14] and the British over the wholeYangtze River valley[14] (defined as all provinces adjoining the Yangtze river as well asHenan andZhejiang provinces),[12] parts of Guangdong and Guangxi provinces,[15] and part ofTibet.[16] OnlyItaly's request forZhejiang province was declined by the Chinese government.[14] These do not include the lease andconcession territories where the foreign powers had full authority.
Spheres of influence in Chinese empire in early 20th century
The Russian government militarily occupied their zone, imposed their law and schools, seized mining and logging privileges, settled their citizens, and even established their municipal administration on several cities,[17] the latter without Chinese consent.[18]
The powers (and the United States) might have their own courts, post offices, commercial institutions, railroads, and gunboats in what was on paper Chinese territory. However, the foreign powers and their control in some cases could have been exaggerated; the local government persistently restricted further encroachment.[19] The system ended after theSecond World War.
On September 6, 1899, U.S. Secretary of StateJohn Hay sent notes to the major powers (France, Germany, Britain, Italy, Japan, and Russia), asking them to declare formally that they would uphold Chinese territorial and administrative integrity and would not interfere with the free use of thetreaty ports within their spheres of influence in China, as the United States felt threatened by other powers' much larger spheres of influence in China and worried that it might lose access to the Chinese market should the country be officially partitioned.[20] Although treaties made after 1900 refer to this "Open Door Policy", competition among the various powers for special concessions within China for railroad rights, mining rights, loans, foreign trade ports, and so forth, continued unabated,[21] with the US itself contradicting the policy by agreeing to recognise the Japanese sphere in theLansing-Ishii Agreement.[22]
In 1910, the great powers, Britain, France, Germany, United States, and later, Russia and Japan, ignored the Open Door Policy to form abanking consortium, consisting of national banking groups backed by respective governments, through which all foreign loans to China were monopolised, granting the powers political influence over China and reducing economic competition between foreigners. This organisation controlled the majority of Chinese tax revenue in a "trust", utilising a small portion to bolster the rule of Chinese warlordYuan Shikai to great effect. The renewed consortium of UK, France, Japan and the U.S. in 1920 effectively vetoed all developmental loans to China, exerting control over the Chinese government by aiming to control all railroads, ports and highways in China.[23][24] The Consortium helped to contain the political and financial conflict between parties and states over the loans, while imposing foreign control on China's finances during the period of revolutionary upheaval, which the Consortium also helped to precipitate.[25]
Poland was to be partitioned in the event of its "political rearrangement"—the areas east of theNarev,Vistula, andSan Rivers going to the Soviet Union, while Germany would occupy the west.[26]
Lithuania, adjacent toEast Prussia, would be in the German sphere of influence, although a second secret protocol agreed in September 1939 assigned Lithuania to the USSR.[27]
Another clause of the treaty stipulated thatBessarabia, then part ofRomania, would join theMoldovan ASSR and become theMoldovan SSR under the control of Moscow.[26] TheSoviet invasion ofBukovina on 28 June 1940 violated the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, as it went beyond the Soviet sphere of influence as agreed withthe Axis.[28] The USSR continued to deny the existence of the Pact's protocols until after thedissolution of the Soviet Union when theRussian government fully acknowledged the existence and authenticity of the secret protocols.[29]
From 1941 and theGerman attack on the Soviet Union, theAllied Coalition operated on the unwritten assumption that theWestern Powers and theSoviet Union had each its own sphere of influence. The presumption of the US-British and Soviet unrestricted rights in their respective spheres began to cause difficulties as the Nazi-controlled territory shrank and the allied powers successively liberated other states.[30]
The wartime spheres lacked a practical definition and it had never been determined if a dominant allied power was entitled to unilateral decisions only in the area of military activity, or could also force its will regarding political, social and economic future of other states. This overly informal system backfired during the late stages of the war and afterward, when it turned out that the Soviets and theWestern Allies had very different ideas concerning the administration and future development of the liberated regions and of Germany itself.[30]
However, the level of control exerted in these spheres varied and was not absolute. For instance,France and theUnited Kingdom were able toact independently to invade (withIsrael) theSuez Canal (they were later forced to withdraw by joint U.S. and Soviet pressure). Later,France was also able to withdraw from the military arm of theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Cuba, as another example, often took positions that put it at odds with its Soviet ally, including momentary alliances with China, economic reorganizations, and providing support for insurgencies in Africa and the Americas without prior approval from the Soviet Union.[citation needed]
According to Ulrich Speck, writing forCarnegie Europe, "After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the West's focus was on Russia. Western nations implicitly treated the post-Soviet countries (besides the Baltic states) as Russia's sphere of influence."[33]
In 1997,NATO and Russia signed theFounding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, stating the "aim of creating in Europe a common space of security and stability, without dividing lines or spheres of influence limiting the sovereignty of any state."[34]
On August 31, 2008, Russian president Dmitri Medvedev stated five principles of foreign policy, including the claim of a privileged sphere of influence that comprised "the border region, but not only".[35]
Following the 2008Russo-Georgian War,Václav Havel and other former central and eastern European leaders signed an open letter stating that Russia had "violated the core principles of theHelsinki Final Act, theCharter of Paris ... all in the name of defending a sphere of influence on its borders."[36] In April 2014, NATO stated that, contrary to theFounding Act,
Russia now appears to be attempting to recreate a sphere of influence by seizing a part of Ukraine, maintaining large numbers of forces on its borders, and demanding, as Russian Foreign MinisterSergei Lavrov recently stated, that "Ukraine cannot be part of any bloc."[37]
Criticising Russia in November 2014, German ChancellorAngela Merkel said that "old thinking about spheres of influence, which runs roughshod over international law" put the "entire European peace order into question."[38] In January 2017, British Prime MinisterTheresa May said, "We should not jeopardise the freedoms that President Reagan and Mrs Thatcher brought to Eastern Europe by accepting President Putin's claim that it is now in his sphere of influence."[39]
In 2009, Russia asserted that theEuropean Union desires a sphere of influence and that theEastern Partnership is "an attempt to extend" it.[40] In March that year, Swedish Foreign MinisterCarl Bildt stated that the "Eastern Partnership is not about spheres of influence. The difference is that these countries themselves opted to join."[40]
In corporate terms, the sphere of influence of abusiness, organization, or group can show its power and influence in the decisions of other businesses/organizations/groups. The influence shows in several ways, such as in size, frequency of visits, etc. In most cases, a company described as "bigger" has a larger sphere of influence.
For example, the software companyMicrosoft has alarge sphere of influence in the market ofoperating systems; any entity wishing to sell a software product may weigh up compatibility with Microsoft's products as part of a marketing plan.[citation needed] In another example, retailers wishing to make the most profits must ensure they open their stores in the correct location. This is also true for shopping centers that, to reap the most profits, must be able to attract customers to their vicinity.[citation needed]
There is no defined scale measuring such spheres of influence. However, one can evaluate the spheres of influence of two shopping centers by seeing how far people are prepared to travel to each shopping center, how much time they spend in its vicinity, how often they visit, the order of goods available, etc.[citation needed]
Corporations have significant influence on the regulations and regulators that monitor them. During theGilded Age in the United States, corruption was rampant as business leaders spent significant amounts of money ensuring that government did not regulate their activities.[41]Wall Street spent a record $2 billion trying to influence the2016 United States elections.[42][43]
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^abDallin, David J. (2013). "2 The Second Drive to the Pacific, Section Port Arthur".The Rise Of Russia In Asia. Read Books Ltd.ISBN978-1-4733-8257-2.
^abcdLo Jiu-Hwa, Upshur (2008).Encyclopedia of World History, Ackerman-Schroeder-Terry-Hwa Lo, 2008: Encyclopedia of World History Volume 7 of Encyclopedia of World History. Fact on File Publishing, Inc Bukupedia. pp. 87–88.
^Shan, Patrick Fuliang (2003).The Development of the North Manchuria Frontier, 1900–1931. Hamilton, Ontario: McMaster University. p. 13.
^Shan, Patrick Fuliang (2016).Taming China's Wilderness: Immigration, Settlement and the Shaping of the Heilongjiang Frontier, 1900–1931. Routledge. p. 154.ISBN978-1-317-04684-4.
^Shan, Patrick Fuliang (Fall 2006). "What was the 'Sphere of Influence'? A Study of Chinese Resistance to the Russian Empire in North Manchuria, 1900–1917".The Chinese Historical Review.13 (2):271–291.doi:10.1080/1547402X.2006.11827243.S2CID152244604.
^Sugita, Yoneyuki, "The Rise of an American Principle in China: A Reinterpretation of the First Open Door Notes toward China" inRichard J. Jensen, Jon Thares Davidann, and Yoneyuki Sugita, eds.Trans-Pacific relations: America, Europe, and Asia in the twentieth century (Greenwood, 2003) pp 3–20onlineArchived 2020-01-07 at theWayback Machine
^Tuchman, Barbara (2001).Stillwell and the American Experience in China 1911–1945. Grove Press. p. 48.ISBN0-8021-3852-7.
^Davis, Clarence B. (1982). "Financing Imperialism: British and American Bankers as Vectors of Imperial Expansion in China, 1908–1920".Business History Review.56 (2):236–264.doi:10.2307/3113978.ISSN0007-6805.JSTOR3113978.S2CID154584987.
^Christie, Kenneth; Cribb, R. B. (2002).Historical Injustice and Democratic Transition in Eastern Asia and Northern Europe. London: Routledge.ISBN0-7007-1599-1.
^Brackman, Roman (2001).The Secret File of Joseph Stalin: A Hidden Life. p. 341.
^Etkind, Alexander; Finnin, Rory; Blacker, Uilleam; Julie Fedor; Simon Lewis; Maria Mälksoo; Matilda Mroz (2013).Remembering Katyn. John Wiley & Sons.ISBN978-0-7456-6296-1.
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Piffanelli, Luciano. 2018. "Crossing Boundaries: A Problem of Territoriality in Renaissance Italy",Viator. Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 49(3):245–275.
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