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Using this tool requires elevated security, meaning you will likely be requested to log back on to use it (don't try it if you aren't somewhere you can log on, or you may be logged out).
Use of this tool is logged
Another user's 2FA enrollment status is considered sensitive, and should not be publicly shared
When would you ever use this? The primary use case would be if someone applies for interface-admin, you can use this tool to verify they meet the global requirement of being activated for 2FA prior to issuing access. If they do not, you can privately refer them to the enrollment process (WP:2FA locally).
Not necessarily, however WMF Privacy and Legal determined that this was appropriate. 2FA status isn't quite considered "private", as it does not contain any identifying information. It is sensitive, in that it is security related. —xaosfluxTalk17:01, 2 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
I should note that it's covered atwmf:Policy:Wikimedia Foundation Access to Nonpublic Personal Data Policy/Exceptions.Bureaucrats are permitted to access account two-factor authentication (2FA) status to verify whether other users have enabled 2FA prior to being added to groups that require 2FA. Bureaucrats are not covered under the Access to nonpublic personal data policy, but are nonetheless expected to use and disclose account 2FA status only when necessary.EggRoll97(talk)17:16, 3 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
And as far why bureaucrats, the primary use case is in checking before issuing sensitive groups, a task available to that group. (Stewards already use this for global requests). —xaosfluxTalk17:05, 2 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Seems fine if someone wants to. Users without access to it will just get a permission died issue, in some cases 'crats may get logged out if they click it and then don't complete the log on. —xaosfluxTalk11:05, 6 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Does the information they can see with this tool contain anything beyond a boolean yes/no flag for whether the user is 2FA-enabled? (E.g. does it show them the phone number used for 2FA or some such thing?) If it's just a boolean answer (and they can't see any personal information), then okay, the policy makes sense. (You don't want, say, a list of admins who are not 2FA to be disclosed because that presents bad actors with a list of accounts to attempt to compromise.) But if they can see anything more than a boolean, then there needs to be at least as much vetting as someone who has access to OTRS. --B (talk)01:59, 9 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]
With all the effort I have put in over the years regarding inactive admins, I have to admit to now having become one myself. Rather than wait for the inactivity desysop months or years from now I'd rather just have it removed now. Thanks.BeeblebroxBeebletalks17:49, 11 July 2025 (UTC)[reply]