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China-Third World relations

Third World	China

Taiwanese-Third World relations

Third World	Taiwan

Sino-Third World relations refers to the general relationship between thetwo Chinese states across theTaiwan Strait (thePeople's Republic of China and theRepublic of China) and the rest of theThird World.

Next in importance to its relations with the superpowers—the Soviet Union and United States—during theCold War were China's relations with the rest of theThird World. Chinese leaders have tended to view thedeveloping nations ofAsia,Africa, andLatin America as a major force in international affairs, and they have considered China an integral part of this major Third World force. As has been the case with China's foreign relations in general, policy toward the countries of the developing world has fluctuated over time. It has been affected by China's alternating involvement in and isolation from world affairs and by the militancy or peacefulness of Beijing's views. In addition, China's relations with the Third World have been affected by China's ambiguous position as a developing country that nevertheless has certain attributes more befitting a major power.^{[citation needed]} China has been variously viewed by the Third World as a friend and ally, a competitor for markets and loans, a source of economic assistance, a regional power intent on dominatingAsia, and a "candidatesuperpower" with such privileges as a permanent seat on theUN Security Council.^{[citation needed]}

In addition to bilateral relations, China conducts international relations with other Third World countries through a variety of multi-lateral bodies or programs, including the Belt and Road Initiative, BRICS, the Forum on Africa-China Cooperation, the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum, and the G77.

China's relations with the Third World have developed through several phases: the Bandung Line of the mid-1950s (named for a 1955Bandung Conference of Asian and African nations held inBandung,Indonesia), support for liberation and world revolution in the 1960s, the pronouncement of theTheory of the Three Worlds and support for a "new international economic order" in the 1970s, and a renewed emphasis on theFive Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the 1980s. Chinese government provides consistent political support to theGroup of 77 and has made financial contributions to the Group since 1994.^[1] As a result, official statements of the G77 are delivered in the name ofThe Group of 77 and China.^[2] In addition, the foundation for China's 21st century engagement with Africa as the largest bloc of the Third World is the October 2000 Beijing ministerial conference for China-Africa dialogue (FOCAC) that set the basis for China's aspirations for a new world order, with elevated voice of the Third World.^[3]

China began developing relations with the Third World countries in 1954.^[4]: xxiv TheBandung Conference in 1955, at whichZhou Enlai led the Chinese delegation, was an important milestone for China's foreign relations.^[5]: 80 China developed its foreign relations with many newly independent and soon-to-be independent countries.^[5]: 80 China termed this cooperative approach the "Bandung Line."^[6]: 25 This was the beginning of China's official discourse ofSouth-South cooperation.^[7]: 74 China'sFive Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were incorporated into the Ten Principles of Bandung.^[5]: 80

During the 1960s China cultivated ties with Third World countries andinsurgent groups in an attempt to encourage "wars of national liberation" and revolution and to forge an international united front against both superpowers. China offered economic and technical assistance to other countries andliberation movements, which, although small in comparison with Soviet and United States aid, was significant considering China's own needs. Third World appreciation for Chinese assistance coexisted, however, with growing suspicions of China's militancy. Such suspicions were fed, for example, by Zhou Enlai's statement in the early 1960s that the potential for revolution in Africa was "excellent" and by the publication ofLin Biao's essay "Long Live the Victory of People's War!" in 1965. Discord between China and many Third World countries continued to grow. In some cases, as with Indonesia's charge of Chinese complicity in the1965 coup attempt in Jakarta and claims by several African nations of Chinesesubversion during theCultural Revolution, bilateral disputes led to the breaking off ofdiplomatic relations. Although the Third World was not a primary focus of the Cultural Revolution, it was not immune to the chaos this period wrought upon Chinese foreign relations.^{[citation needed]}

In the 1970s, China began to redefine its foreign policy after the isolation and militancy of the late 1960s. China reestablished those of its diplomatic missions that had been recalled during the Cultural Revolution and began the process ofrapprochement with the United States. In 1971, the support of Third World nations was crucial in the PRC joining theUnited Nations (UN), taking over the seat of the ROC on Taiwan.^[8] China preferred aUnited Nations Secretary-General from the Third World.^[9][10]

China's major foreign policy statement during this time was Mao'sTheory of the Three Worlds, which was announced at the UN in 1974 byDeng Xiaoping.^[7]: 74

According to this theory, theFirst World consisted of the two superpowers—the Soviet Union and the United States—both "imperialist aggressors" whose rivalry was the greatest cause of impending world war. The Third World was the main force in international affairs. Its growing opposition to superpowerhegemony was exemplified by such world events as theArab nations' control ofoil prices,Egypt's expulsion of Soviet aid personnel in 1972, and the United States withdrawal fromVietnam. TheSecond World, comprising thedeveloped countries ofEurope plusJapan, could either oppress the Third World or join in opposing the superpowers. By the second half of the 1970s, China perceived an increased threat from the Soviet Union, and the theory was modified to emphasize that the Soviet Union was the more dangerous of the two superpowers.^{[citation needed]}

The other primary component of China's Third World policy in the early 1970s was a call for radical change in the worldpower structure and particularly a call for a "new international economic order." Until the late 1970s, the Chinese principles of sovereignty, opposition to hegemony, and self-reliance coincided with the goals of the movement for a new international economic order. Chinese statements in support of the new order diminished as China began to implement theopening up policy, allowforeign investment, and seek technical assistance and foreign loans. China's critical opinion of international financial institutions appeared to change abruptly as Beijing prepared to join theInternational Monetary Fund and theWorld Bank in 1980. Chinese support for changes in the economic order stressed the role of collective self-reliance among the countries of the Third World, or "South-South Cooperation," in the 1980s.^{[citation needed]}

Also in the 1980s, China reasserted its Third World credentials and placed a renewed emphasis on its relations with Third World countries as part of its independent foreign policy. China stressed that it would develop friendly relations with other nations regardless of their social systems or ideologies and would conduct its relations on the basis of theFive Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Beijing exchanged delegations with Third World countries regularly, and it made diplomatic use of cultural ties, for example, by promoting friendly links betweenChinese Muslims andIslamic countries. Officially, China denied that it sought a leadership role in the Third World, although some foreign observers argued to the contrary. Beijing increasingly based its foreign economic relations with the Third World on equality and mutual benefit, expressed by a shift towardtrade andjoint ventures and away fromgrants andinterest-freeloans.^{[citation needed]}

By the second half of the 1980s, China's relations with Third World nations covered the spectrum from friendly to inimical.Bilateral relations ranged from a formal alliance withNorth Korea, to a near-alliance withPakistan, to hostile relations withVietnam marked by sporadic border conflict. Many relationships have changed dramatically over time: for example, China previously had close relations with Vietnam; its ties with India were friendly during the 1950s but were strained thereafter by border tensions and Pakistan hoped that China would serve as a counterweight to Indian influence. Particularly inSoutheast Asia, a legacy of suspicion concerning China's ultimate intentions affected Chinese relations with many countries.^{[citation needed]}

China has a major role in fostering cooperation among the global south countries in the area of climate change and clean energy.^[11]: 18 China engaged in South-South climate and clean energy cooperation through: (1) bilateral clean energy agreements, (2) multilateral clean energy cooperation, (3) expanding exports of its clean energy technology to other developing countries, and (4) foreign energy infrastructure development via theBelt and Road Initiative.^[11]: 221 Much of China's overall South-South Cooperation is now explicitly linked to the BRI.^[11]: 226 The BRI is likewise tied to the concepts of theChinese Dream and theCommunity of Common Destiny.^[12]: 35

The "Ten, Hundred, Thousand" program is China's overarching initiative for South-South cooperation in addressing climate change.^[11]: 224 As of 2023^[update], China had signed partnerships with at least 27 other developing countries as part of this initiative.^[11]: 224 Through framing BRI and other economic mechanisms as South-South cooperation, China seeks to position itself as a global South leader and draw a contrast with the global North countries.^[13]: 125

China is a major contributor to digital development in the global south.^[14]: 6 China began to engage in digital initiatives with the global south, such as telecommunications projects, as part of itsGo Out policy since 1999.^[14]: 5

BRICS is a further mechanism for China's cooperation with the global south and functions as a forum for policy coordination among its members.^[15]: 249

TheForum on China-Africa Cooperation is the primary multi-lateral coordination mechanism between African countries and China.^[16]: 56Along with theChina-Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF), FOCAC was one of the first regional organizations established by China outside its territorial periphery.^[16]: 56 As of 2022, the members of FOCAC are 53 African countries (all except Eswatini), China, and theAfrican Union Commission. A number of North African states are dual members of both CASCF and FOCAC:Algeria,Djibouti,Egypt,Libya,Mauritania,Morocco,Somalia,Sudan, andTunisia.^[16]: 57 Although the African Union has increasingly played a coordinating role since joining CASCF in 2012, each African state represents itself in FOCAC and activities are implemented bilaterally between China and individual African countries.^[16]: 57

CASCF was established in 2004 during a visit by Chinese PresidentHu Jintao to theArab League headquarters in Cairo, Egypt.^[5]: 56 CASCF was the first cooperation forum between the Arab League and any other country or region.^[16]: 59 CASCF membership consists of China and the Arab League, which officially represents its twenty-two member states as a relatively unified body.^[16]: 57 CASCF therefore serves as the primary multilateral coordination mechanism between China and the Arab States.^[16]: 56 This coordination by the Arab League allows Arab states to negotiate actively for collective projects involving multiple states, such as railway projects, nuclear power projects, and Dead Sea initiatives.^[16]: 58

Effective 1 December 2024, China eliminatedtariffs for goods imported from all of the countries that the United Nations categorizes asleast developed and with which China hasdiplomatic relations.^[17] Thirty-three of the countries benefiting from the agreement are inAfrica and the non-African countries receiving zero tariff treatment areYemen,Kiribati, theSolomon Islands,Afghanistan,Bangladesh,Cambodia,Laos,Myanmar,Nepal, andEast Timor.^[17]

One primary motivation for involvement in third world conflicts for PRC and ROC was to gain influence and legitimacy, claiming to be the only 'China' while undermining other side. This was part wider pattern in theCold War where the world was divided into spheres of influence. Later theSino-Soviet Split occurred, with the PRC completing against the Soviet Union for influence.^{[citation needed]}

• Sino-African relations
• Sino-Pacific relations
• Sino-Caribbean relations
• Communist front

This article incorporates text from this source, which is in thepublic domain. Country Studies.Federal Research Division.[1]

• The Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the People's Republic of China - Official website
• Nigel HarrisMaoist China foreign policy: 1970s and 1980s (Excerpt fromThe Mandate of Heaven)

• Foreign relations of China
• Foreign relations of Taiwan
• Third-Worldism

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