| Sino-Burmese War (1765–1769) | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part ofTen Great Campaigns | |||||||
 Burma and China prior to the war (1765) | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
Co-belligerents:  Ayutthaya Kingdom (until 1767)[1][2]Thonburi Kingdom (from 1767)[3] |  Burma | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Ekkathat †Taksin | |||||||
| Units involved | |||||||
 Royal Siamese Army |  Royal Burmese Army | ||||||
| Bamar andShan levies | |||||||
| Strength | |||||||
First invasion:
Second invasion:
Third invasion:
Fourth invasion:
| First invasionTotal: 2,500
Second invasion:
Third invasion: Fourth invasion: | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
2nd campaign: ~20,000 | Burmese Royal horse army (3,000), Shan local army (500–2,000), Burmese army (10,000) | ||||||
TheSino-Burmese War (Chinese:清緬戰爭;Burmese:တရုတ်-မြန်မာ စစ်ပွဲများ), also known as theQing invasions of Burma or theMyanmar campaign of the Qing dynasty,[13] was a war fought between theQing dynasty ofChina and theKonbaung dynasty ofBurma (Myanmar). China under theQianlong Emperor launched four invasions of Burma between 1765 and 1769, which were considered one of hisTen Great Campaigns. Nonetheless, the war, which claimed the lives of over 70,000 Chinese soldiers and four commanders,[14] is sometimes described as "the most disastrous frontier war that the Qing dynasty had ever waged",[13] and one that "assured Burmese independence".[4] Burma's successful defense laid the foundation for the present-day boundary between the two countries.[14]
At first, the Qing emperor envisaged an easy war, and sent in only theGreen Standard Army troops stationed inYunnan. The Qing invasion came as the majority of Burmese forces were deployed in theirlatest invasion ofSiam. Nonetheless, battle-hardened Burmese troops defeated the first two invasions of 1765–1766 and 1766–1767 at the border. The regional conflict now escalated to a major war that involved military maneuvers nationwide in both countries. The third invasion (1767–1768) led by the eliteManchu Bannermen nearly succeeded, penetrating deep into central Burma within a few days' march from the capital,Ava (Inwa).[15] But the bannermen of northern China could not cope with unfamiliar tropical terrains and lethal endemic diseases, and were driven back with heavy losses.[5] After the close call, KingHsinbyushin redeployed his armies from Siam to the Chinese front. The fourth and largest invasion got bogged down at the frontier. With the Qing forces completely encircled, a truce was reached between the field commanders of the two sides in December 1769.[13][16]
The Qing kept a heavy military lineup in the border areas ofYunnan for about one decade in an attempt to wage another war while imposing a ban on inter-border trade for two decades.[13] The Burmese, too, were preoccupied with the Chinese threat, and kept a series of garrisons along the border. Twenty years later, when Burma and China resumed a diplomatic relationship in 1790, the Qing unilaterally viewed the act as Burmese submission, and claimed victory.[13] Ultimately, the main beneficiaries of this war were theSiamese, who reclaimed most of their territories in the next three years after having lost their capitalAyutthaya to the Burmese in 1767.[15]
The long border betweenBurma andChina had long been vaguely defined. TheMing dynasty first conqueredYunnan borderlands between 1380 and 1388, and stamped out local resistance by the mid-1440s.[17] The Burmese control of theShan States (which covered the present-dayKachin State,Shan State andKayah State) came in 1557 when KingBayinnaung of theToungoo dynasty conquered all of the Shan States. The border was never demarcated in the modern sense, with localShansawbwas (chiefs) at the border regions paying tribute to both sides.[18] The situation turned to China's favor in the 1730s when theQing dynasty decided to impose a tighter control of Yunnan's border regions while the Burmese authority largely dissipated with the rapid decline of the Toungoo dynasty.
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TheQing attempts for tighter control of the border were initially met with fierce resistance by the local chiefs. In 1732, theYunnan government's demand of higher taxes led to severalShan revolts at the border. Shan resistance leaders united people by saying "The lands and water are our properties. We could plow ourselves and eat our own produces. There is not a need to pay tributes to foreign government". In July 1732, a Shan army, mostly consisted of native mountaineers, laid siege to the Qing garrison atPu'er for 90 days. The Yunnan government responded with an overwhelming force numbered around 5,000 and lifted the siege. The Qing army pursued further west but could not put down persistent local resistance. Finally, the Qing field commanders changed their tactics by allying with neutralsawbwas, granting them Qing titles and powers, includingGreen Standard captainships and regional commanderships.[19] To complete the agreements, the third ranking officer ofYunnan traveled toSimao personally and held a ceremony of allegiance.[20] By the mid-1730s, thesawbwas of the border who used to pay dual tributes, were increasingly siding with the more powerful Qing. By 1735, the year which theQianlong Emperor ascended the Chinese throne, tensawbwas had sided with the Qing. The annexed border states ranged fromMogaung andBhamo in present-dayKachin State toHsenwi State (Theinni) andKengtung State (Kyaingtong) in present-dayShan State toSipsongpanna (Kyaingyun) in present-dayXishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture, Yunnan.[21]
While the Qing were consolidating their hold at the border, theToungoo dynasty was faced with multiple external raids and internal rebellions and could not take any reciprocal action. Throughout the 1730s, the dynasty facedManipuri raids that reached increasingly deeper parts ofUpper Burma. In 1740, theMon ofLower Burma revolted and founded theRestored Hanthawaddy Kingdom. By the mid-1740s, the authority of the Burmese king had largely dissipated. In 1752, the Toungoo dynasty was toppled by the forces of the Restored Hanthawaddy Kingdom which capturedAva.
By then, the Qing control of the former borderlands was unquestioned. In 1752, the Emperor issued a manuscript,Qing Imperial Illustration of Tributaries, saying that all "barbarian" tribes under his rule must be studied and reported their natures and cultures back toBeijing.[22]
In 1752, a new dynasty calledKonbaung rose to challengeRestored Hanthawaddy Kingdom, and went on to reunite much of the kingdom by 1758. In 1758–59, KingAlaungpaya, the founder of the dynasty, sent an expedition to the fartherShan States (present-dayKachin State and northern and easternShan State), which had been annexed by theQing over two decades earlier, to reestablishBurmese authority.[23] (Nearer Shan States had been reacquired since 1754). Three of the ten farther Shan statesawbwas (Mogaung,Bhamo,Hsenwi) and their militias reportedly ran away intoYunnan and tried to persuade Qing officials to invadeBurma.[15] The nephew ofKengtungsawbwa and his followers also fled.[21]
The Yunnan government reported the news to the Emperor in 1759, and the Qing court promptly issued an imperial edict ordering reconquest.[22] At first, the Yunnan officials, who believed that "barbarians must be conquered using barbarians", tried to resolve the matter by supporting the defectedsawbwas. But the strategy did not work. In 1764, a Burmese army, which was on its way toSiam, was increasing its grip of the borderlands, and thesawbwas complained to China.[15] In response, the Emperor appointedLiu Zao, a respected scholarly minister from the capital to sort out the matters. AtKunming, Liu assessed that the use ofTai-Shan militias alone was not working, and that he needed to commit regularGreen Standard Army troops.[14]
In early 1765, a 20,000-strong Burmese army stationed atKengtung, led by GeneralNe Myo Thihapate, left Kengtung for yet anotherBurmese invasion of Siam.[24] With the main Burmese army gone,Liu Zao used a few minor trade disputes between local Chinese and Burmese merchants as the excuse to order an invasion of Kengtung in December 1765. The invasion force, which consisted of 3,500Green Standard Army troops along withTai-Shan militias,[14] laid siege to Kengtung but could not match battle-hardened Burmese troops at the Kengtung garrison, led by GeneralNe Myo Sithu.[25] The Burmese lifted the siege and pursued the invaders intoPu'er Prefecture, and defeated them there.[23] Ne Myo Sithu left a reinforced garrison, and returned toAva in April 1766.[26]
Governor Liu, in his embarrassment, first tried to conceal what had happened. When the Emperor became suspicious, he ordered Liu's immediate recall and demotion. Instead of complying, Liu committed suicide by slicing his throat with a stationery knife, writing as blood was pouring from his neck: "There is no way to pay back the emperor's favor. I deserve death with my crime". While this kind of suicide in the face of bureaucratic failure apparently was not unusual inQing China, it reportedly enraged the Emperor nonetheless. Sorting out theMien (the Chinese word for "Burmese") was now a matter of imperial prestige. The Emperor now appointedYang Yingju, an experienced frontier officer with long service inXinjiang andGuangzhou.[23]
Yang Yingju arrived in the summer of 1766 to take command.[23] Unlike the invasion ofLiu Zao inKengtung, which was located far away from the Burmese heartland, Yang was determined to strikeUpper Burma directly. He reportedly planned to place aQing claimant on the Burmese throne.[25] Yang's planned path of invasion was viaBhamo and down theIrrawaddy River toAva. The Burmese knew the route of invasion in advance, and were prepared.Hsinbyushin's plan was to lure the Chinese into Burmese territory, and then surround them. The Burmese commander in the fieldBalamindin was ordered to give up Bhamo, and instead stay at the Burmese stockade atKaungton, a few miles south of Bhamo on the Irrawaddy.[23] The Kaungton fort had been especially equipped with the cannon corps led byFrench gunners (captured at the battle ofThanlyin in 1756). To reinforce them, another army led byMaha Thiha Thura and posted at the easternmost Burmese garrison atKenghung (present-day Jinghong,Yunnan), was ordered to march to the Bhamo theater across the northernShan states.[27]
As planned, theQing troops easily capturedBhamo in December 1766, and established a supply base. The Chinese then proceeded to lay siege to the Burmese garrison atKaungton. ButBalamindin's defenses held off repeated Chinese assaults. Meanwhile, two Burmese armies, one led byMaha Sithu, and another led byNe Myo Sithu, surrounded the Chinese.[25]Maha Thiha Thura's army also arrived and took position near Bhamo to block the escape route back toYunnan.
The impasse did not favor the Chinese troops who were utterly unprepared to fight in the tropical weather ofUpper Burma. Thousands of Chinese soldiers reportedly were struck down bycholera,dysentery, andmalaria. One Qing report stated that 800 out of 1,000 soldiers in one garrison had died of disease, and that another 100 were ill.[23]
With the Chinese army greatly weakened, the Burmese then launched their offensive. First,Ne Myo Sithu easily retook the lightly heldBhamo. The main Chinese army was now totally holed up in theKaungton-Bhamo corridor, cut off from all supplies. The Burmese then proceeded to attack the main Chinese army from two sides—Balamindin's army out of Kaungton fort, and Ne Myo Sithu's army from the north.[25] The Chinese retreated eastwards and then northwards where another Burmese army led byMaha Thiha Thura was waiting. The two other Burmese armies also followed up, and the Chinese army was destroyed entirely.[28]Maha Sithu's army which had been guarding the western flank of theIrrawaddy River, then marched north ofMyitkyina and defeated other lightly held Chinese garrisons at the border.[25] The Burmese armies proceeded to occupy eight ChineseShan states withinYunnan.[28]
Victorious Burmese armies returned toAva with the captured guns, muskets and prisoners in early May.[27] AtKunming,Yang Yingju began resorting to lies. He reported thatBhamo had been occupied; that its inhabitants had begun wearingManchu-stylepigtails; and that the Burmese commander,Ne Myo Sithu, after losing 10,000 men had sued for peace. He recommended that the emperor graciously accept the peace offer to restore the normal trade relations between the two countries. TheQianlong Emperor however realized the falsity of the report, and ordered Yang back toBeijing. On his arrival, Yang committed suicide at the order of the Emperor.[28]
After the two defeats, the Qing emperor and his court could not comprehend how a relatively small country likeBurma could resist the might of theQing.[18] For the Emperor, it was time for theManchus themselves to come into the picture. He had always doubted the battle-worthiness of his ChineseGreen Standard armies. The Manchus saw themselves as a warlike and conquering race and the Chinese as an occupied people.[29] He commissioned a study of the first two invasions, and the report reinforced his biases—that the low battle-worthiness of the Green Standard armies was the reason for the failures.[14]
In 1767, the Emperor appointed the veteran Manchu commanderMing Rui, a son-in-law of his, as governor-general ofYunnan andGuizhou, and head of the Burma campaign. Ming Rui had seen battle againstTurkic peoples in the northwest and was in command of the strategically key post ofIli (in present-dayXinjiang). His appointment meant that this was no longer a border dispute but a full-fledged war. Ming Rui arrived in Yunnan in April. An invasion force consisting ofMongol and eliteManchu troops rushed down from northern China andManchuria. Thousands ofGreen Standards from Yunnan andTai-Shan militias accompanied this force.[15] Provinces throughout China were mobilized to provide supplies.[29] The total strength of the invasion force was 50,000 men, the vast majority being infantry. The mountains and thick jungles ofBurma kept the use ofcavalry forces to a minimum.[8] TheQing court now seriously considered the threat of illnesses among its troops; as a precaution, the campaign was planned for the winter months when diseases were believed to be less prevalent.[29]
The Burmese now faced the largest Chinese army yet mobilized against them. Yet KingHsinbyushin did not seem to realize the gravity of the situation. Throughout the first two invasions, he had steadfastly refused to recall the main Burmese armies, which had been battling inLaos andSiam since January 1765, and laying siege to the Siamese capital ofAyutthaya since January 1766. Throughout 1767, when the Chinese were mobilizing for their most serious invasion yet, the Burmese were still focused on defeating the Siamese. Even after the Siamese capital was finally captured in April 1767, Hsinbyushin kept part of the troops in Siam during the rainy season months in order to mop up the remaining Siamese resistance during the winter months later that year. He actually allowed manyShan andLaotian battalions todemobilize at the start of the rainy season.[30]
As a result, when the invasion did come in November 1767, the Burmese defenses had not been upgraded to meet a much larger and a more determined foe. The Burmese command looked much like that of the second invasion.Hsinbyushin again assigned the same commanders of the second invasion to face off against the Chinese.Maha Sithu led the main Burmese army, and was the overall commander of the Chinese theater, withMaha Thiha Thura andNe Myo Sithu commanding two other Burmese armies.Balamindin again commanded theKaungton fort.[31] Given that the main Burmese army was only about 7,000 strong,[32] the entire Burmese defense at the start of the third invasion was most likely no more than 20,000.
Ming Rui planned a two-pronged invasion as soon as the rainy season ended. The main Chinese army, led by Ming Rui himself, was to approachAva throughHsenwi,Lashio andHsipaw, and down theNamtu River. The main invasion route was the same route followed by theManchu forces a century earlier, chasing theYongli Emperor of theSouthern Ming dynasty. The second army, led by GeneralE'erdeng'e (額爾登額, or possibly額爾景額) was to try theBhamo route again.[33] The ultimate objective was for both armies to clamp themselves in a pincer action on the Burmese capital of Ava.[8] The Burmese plan was to hold the second Chinese army in the north atKaungton with the army led byNe Myo Sithu, and meet the main Chinese army in the northeast with two armies led byMaha Sithu andMaha Thiha Thura.[31]
At first, everything went according to plan for the Qing. The third invasion began in November 1767 as the smaller Chinese army attacked and occupiedBhamo. Within eight days,Ming Rui's main army occupied theShan states ofHsenwi andHsipaw.[31] Ming Rui madeHsenwi a supply base, and assigned 5,000 troops to remain at Hsenwi and guard the rear. He then led a 15,000-strong army in the direction ofAva. In late December, at theGoteik Gorge (south ofHsipaw), the two main armies faced off and the first major battle of the third invasion ensued. Outnumbered two-to-one,Maha Sithu's main Burmese army was thoroughly routed by Ming Rui'sBannermen.Maha Thiha Thura too was repulsed at Hsenwi.[34][35] The news of the disaster at the Goteik Gorge reached Ava. KingHsinbyushin finally realized the gravity of the situation, and urgently recalled Burmese armies fromSiam.[30]
Having smashed through the main Burmese army,Ming Rui pressed on full-steam ahead, overrunning one town after another, and reachedSingu on theIrrawaddy River, 30 miles north ofAva at the beginning of 1768. The only bright spot for the Burmese was that the northern invasion force, which was to come down the Irrawaddy to join up with Ming Rui's main army, had been held off atKaungton.[34]
AtAva, KingHsinbyushin famously did not panic at the prospect of a large Chinese army, numbering around 30,000 men[9][36] at his doorstep. The court urged the king to flee, but he scornfully refused, saying he and his brother princes, sons ofAlaungpaya, would fight the Chinese single-handed if they had to. Instead of defending the capital, Hsinbyushin calmly sent an army to take up position outsideSingu, personally leading his men toward the front line.[29][34][37]
It turned out thatMing Rui had overstretched himself, and was in no position to proceed any farther. He was now too far away from his main supply base atHsenwi, hundreds of miles away in the northernShan Hills. The Burmese guerrilla attacks on the long supply lines across the jungles of the Shan Hills were seriously hampering the Qing army's ability to proceed. Burmese guerrilla operations were directed by GeneralTeingya Minkhaung, a deputy ofMaha Thiha Thura. Ming Rui now resorted to defensive tactics, playing for time to enable the northern army to come to his relief. But it was not to be. The northern army had suffered heavy casualties in their repeated attacks against theKaungton fort. Its commanderE'erdeng'e, against the express orders of Ming Rui, retreated back toYunnan.[8] The commander was later publicly shamed and executed (sliced to death) on the orders of the Emperor.[34][38]
The situation turned worse forMing Rui. By early 1768, battle-hardened Burmese reinforcements fromSiam had begun to arrive back. Bolstered by the reinforcements, two Burmese armies led byMaha Thiha Thura andNe Myo Sithu succeeded in retakingHsenwi. The Qing commander at Hsenwi committed suicide.[31] The main Qing army was now cut off from all supplies. It was now March 1768.[34] Thousands of Bannermen from the freezing grasslands along the Russian border, began dying ofmalaria as well as Burmese attacks in the furnace-like hot weather of central Burma. Ming Rui gave up all hope of proceeding towardAva, and instead tried to make it back toYunnan with as many of his soldiers as possible.[29]
In March 1768,Ming Rui began his retreat, pursued by a Burmese army of 10,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry. The Burmese then tried to encircle the Chinese by splitting the army into two.Maha Thiha Thura had now assumed the overall command, replacingMaha Sithu. The smaller army, led by Maha Sithu, continued to pursue Ming Rui while the larger army led by Maha Thiha Thura advanced through the mountainous route to emerge directly behind the Chinese. Through careful maneuvering, the Burmese managed to achieve complete encirclement of the Chinese at modern-dayPyin Oo Lwin (Maymyo), about 50 miles northeast ofAva. Over the course of three days of bloody fighting at theBattle of Maymyo, theBannerman army was completely annihilated. The slaughter was such that the Burmese could hardly grip their swords as the hilts were slippery with enemy blood.[37] Of the original 30,000 men of the main army, only 2,500 of then remained alive and were captured. The rest had been killed either on the battlefield, through disease or through execution after their surrender.[8] Ming Rui himself was severely wounded in battle. Only a small group managed to break through and escaped the carnage. Ming Rui himself could have escaped with that group. Instead, he cut off hisqueue and sent it to the Emperor as a token of his loyalty by those who were escaping. He then hanged himself on a tree.[34] In the end, only a few dozen of the main army returned.[29]
TheQianlong Emperor had sentMing Rui and hisBannermen assuming an easy victory. He had begun making plans about how he would administer his newest territory. For weeks, theQing court had heard nothing, and then the news finally came. The Emperor was shocked and ordered an immediate halt to all military actions until he could decide what next to do. Generals returning from the front line cautioned that there was no wayBurma could be conquered. But there was no real choice but to press on. Imperial prestige was at stake.[39]
The Emperor turned to one of his most trusted advisers, the chief grand councilorFuheng, Ming Rui's uncle. Back in the 1750s, Fuheng had been one of the few senior officials who had fully backed the Emperor's decision to eliminate theDzungars at a time when most believed that war was too risky. On 14 April 1768, the imperial court announced the death of Ming Rui and the appointment of Fuheng as the new chief commander of the Burma campaign.Manchu generalsAgui,Aligun andSuhede were appointed as his deputies. Now, the top rung of theQing military establishment prepared for a final showdown with the Burmese.[39]
Before any fighting resumed, some on the Chinese side sent out peace feelers to the court ofAva. The Burmese also sent signals that they would like to give diplomacy a chance, given their preoccupations inSiam. But the Emperor, withFuheng's encouragement, made it clear that no compromise with the Burmese could be made. The dignity of the state demanded a full surrender. His aim was to establish direct Qing rule over all Burmese possessions. Emissaries were sent to Siam andLaotian states informing them of the Chinese ambition and seeking an alliance.[39]
Ava now fully expected another major invasion. KingHsinbyushin had now brought most of the troops back fromSiam to face the Chinese.[10] With the Burmese fully preoccupied with the Chinese threat, the Siamese resistance retookAyutthaya Kingdom in 1768 and went on to reconquer all of their territories throughout 1768 and 1769. For the Burmese, their hard-fought gains of the prior three years (1765–1767) in Siam had gone to waste but there was little they could do. The survival of their kingdom was now at stake.
Fuheng arrived inYunnan in April, 1769 to take command of a 60,000-strong force. He studied pastMing andMongol expeditions to form his battle plan, which called for a three-pronged invasion viaBhamo and theIrrawaddy River. The first army would attack Bhamo andKaungton head-on, which he knew would be difficult. But two other larger armies would bypass Kaungton and march down the Irrawaddy, one on each bank of the river, toAva. The twin invading armies on each side of the river would be accompanied by war boats manned by thousands of sailors from theFujian navy. To avoid a repeat ofMing Rui's mistake, he was determined to guard his supply and communication lines, and advance at a sustainable pace. He avoided an invasion route through the jungles of theShan Hills so as to minimize the Burmese guerrilla attacks on his supply lines. He also brought in a full regiment of carpenters who would build fortresses and boats along the invasion route.[10][39]
For the Burmese, the overall objective was to stop the enemy at the border, and prevent another Chinese penetration into their heartland.Maha Thiha Thura was the overall commander, the role which he had assumed since the second half of the third invasion. As usual,Balamindin commanded theKaungton fort. In the last week of September, three Burmese armies were dispatched to meet the three Chinese armies head-on. A fourth army was organized with the sole purpose of cutting the enemy supply lines. KingHsinbyushin had also organized a flotilla of war boats to meet the Chinese war boats.[10] The Burmese defenses now includedFrench musketeers and gunners under the command ofPierre de Milard, governor ofTabe, who had arrived back from the Siamese theater. Based on their troop movements, the Burmese knew at least the general direction from where the massive invasion force would come. Maha Thiha Thura moved upriver by boat towardBhamo.[39]
As the Burmese armies marched north,Fuheng, against the advice of his officers, decided not to wait until the end of themonsoon season. It clearly was a calculated gamble; he had wanted to strike before the Burmese arrived but he had also hoped that "miasma would not be everywhere."[39] So in October 1768, towards the end of (but still during) the monsoon season, Fuheng launched the largest invasion yet. The three Chinese armies jointly attacked and capturedBhamo. They proceeded south and built a massive fortress nearShwenyaungbin village, 12 miles east of the Burmese fortress atKaungton. As planned, the carpenters duly built hundreds of war boats to sail down theIrrawaddy.[10]
But almost nothing went according to plan. One army did cross over to the western bank of theIrrawaddy, as planned. But the commander of that army did not want to march far away from the base. When the Burmese army assigned to guard the west bank approached, the Chinese retreated back to the east bank. Likewise, the army assigned to march down the eastern bank also did not proceed. This left the Chinese flotilla exposed. The Burmese flotilla came up the river and attacked and sank all the Chinese boats. The Chinese armies now converged on attackingKaungton. But for four consecutive weeks, the Burmese put up a remarkable defense, withstanding gallant charges by theBannermen to scale the walls.[10]
A little over a month into the invasion, the entireQing invasion force was bogged down at the border. Predictably, many Chinese soldiers and sailors fell ill, and began to die in large numbers.Fuheng himself was struck down by fever.[39] More ominously for the Chinese, the Burmese army sent to cut the enemy line of communication also achieved its purpose, and closed in on the Chinese armies from the rear. By early December, the Chinese forces were completely encircled. The Burmese armies then attacked the Chinese fort atShwenyaungbin, which fell after a fierce battle. The fleeing Chinese troops fell back into the pocket nearKaungton where other Chinese forces were stationed. The Chinese armies were now trapped inside the corridor between the Shwenyaungbin and Kaungton forts, completely surrounded by rings of Burmese forces.[10]
The Chinese command, which had already lost 20,000 men, and a quantity of arms and ammunition, now asked for terms. The Burmese staff were averse to granting terms, saying that the Chinese were surrounded like cattle in a pen, they were starving, and in a few days, they could be wiped out to a man. ButMaha Thiha Thura, who oversaw the annihilation ofMing Rui's army at theBattle of Maymyo in 1768, realized that another wipe-out would merely stiffen the resolve of the Chinese government.[37]
Maha Thiha Thura was said to have said:[40]
He pointed out to his commanders that war with the Chinese was quickly becoming a cancer that would finally destroy the nation. Compared to Chinese losses, Burmese losses were light but considered in proportion to the population, they were heavy. The commanders were not convinced butMaha Thiha Thura, on his own responsibility, and without informing the king, demanded that the Chinese agree to the following terms:[40]
The Chinese commanders decided to agree to the terms. AtKaungton, on 13 December 1769[31] (or 22 December 1769),[39] under a 7-roofedpyathat hall, 14 Burmese and 13 Chinese officers signed apeace treaty (known as the Treaty of Kaungton). The Chinese burned their boats and melted down their cannon. Two days later, as the Burmese stood to arms and looked down, starved Chinese soldiers marched sullenly away up theTaping River valley; they began to perish of hunger by thousands in the passes.[31][37]
AtBeijing, theQianlong Emperor was not pleased with the treaty. He did not accept the Chinese commanders' explanation that the fourth stipulation—exchange of embassies bearing presents—amounted to Burmese submission and tribute. He did not permit the surrender of thesawbwas or other fugitives nor the resumption of trade between the two countries.[41]
AtAva, KingHsinbyushin was furious that his generals had acted without his knowledge, and tore up his copy of the treaty. Knowing that the king was angry, the Burmese armies were afraid to return to the capital. In January 1770, they marched toManipur where a rebellion had begun, taking advantage of Burmese troubles with the Chinese. After a three days' battle nearLangthabal, the Manipuris were defeated, and theirraja fled toAssam. The Burmese raised their nominee to the throne and returned. The king's anger had subsided; after all, they had won victories and preserved his throne. Still, the king sentMaha Thiha Thura, the decorated general, whose daughter was married to Hsinbyushin's son and heir-apparentSingu, a woman's dress to wear, and exiled him and other generals to theShan states. He would not allow them to see him. He also exiled ministers who dared to speak on their behalf.[42]
Although hostilities ceased, an uneasy truce ensued. None of the points in the treaty was honored by both sides. Because the Chinese did not return thesawbwas, the Burmese did not return the 2,500 Chinese prisoners of war, who were resettled. The Qing had lost some of the generation's most important frontier experts, includingYang Yingju,Ming Rui,Aligun, andFuheng (who eventually died ofmalaria in 1770). The war cost the Qing treasury 9.8 million silvertaels.[6] Nonetheless, the Emperor kept a heavy military lineup in the border areas ofYunnan for about one decade in an attempt to wage another war while imposing a ban on inter-border trade for two decades.[13]
The Burmese for years were preoccupied with another impending invasion by the Chinese, and kept a series of garrisons along the border. The high casualties of the war (in terms of the population size) and the ongoing need to guard the northern border seriously hampered the Burmese military's capability to renew warfare inSiam. It would be another five years when the Burmese sent another invasion force to Siam.
It would be another twenty years when Burma and China resumed a diplomatic relationship in 1790. The resumption was brokered by theTai-Shan nobles andYunnan officials who wanted to see trade resume. To the Burmese, then under KingBodawpaya, the resumption was on equal terms, and they considered the exchange of presents as part of diplomatic etiquette, not as tribute. To the Chinese however, all of these diplomatic missions were consideredtributary missions.[41] The Emperor viewed the resumption of relations as Burmese submission, and unilaterally claimed victory and included the Burma campaign in his list ofTen Great Campaigns.[13]
Burma's successful defense laid the foundation for the present-day boundary between the two countries. The border still was not demarcated, and the borderlands were still overlapping spheres of influence. After the war, Burma remained in possession ofKoshanpye, the nine states aboveBhamo.[43] At least down to the eve of theFirst Anglo-Burmese War in 1824, the Burmese exerted authority over the southernYunnan borderlands, as far as Kenghung (present-dayJinghong, Yunnan).[44] But, Chiang Huang (Jinghong) of southern Yunnan remained as authority of Burma until British occupied the whole Burma in 1886. Likewise, the Chinese exercised a degree of control over the borderlands, including present-day northeasternKachin State. Overall, the Burmese were able to push back the line of control up to one that existed before theQing consolidation drive of the 1730s.
However, the war also forced the Burmese to withdraw fromSiam. Their victory over the Qing is described as a moral victory. HistorianG.E. Harvey writes:"Their other victories were over states on their own level such as Siam; this was won over an empire.Alaungpaya's crusade against theMons was stained with treachery; the great siege ofAyutthaya was a magnificentdacoity", though he described the Sino-Burmese war "a righteous war of defense against the invader".[42]
The main beneficiaries of the war were the Siamese, who took full advantage of the Burmese absence to reclaim their lost territories and independence. By 1770, they had reconquered most of the pre-1765 territories. OnlyTenasserim remained in Burmese hands. Preoccupied by the Chinese threat, and recovering from the depletion of manpower from the war, KingHsinbyushin leftSiam alone even as Siam continued to consolidate its gains (he was finally forced to send Burmese armies to Siam in 1775 in response to a Siamese-backed rebellion inLan Na a year earlier). In the following decades, Siam would become a power in its own right, swallowing up Lan Na, theLaotian states, and parts ofCambodia.[citation needed]
From a wider geopolitical standpoint, theQing, and theQianlong Emperor, who hitherto had never faced defeat, now had to accept—albeit grudgingly—that there were limits to Qing power.[45] A historian of Chinese military history, Marvin Whiting, writes that the Burmese successprobably saved the independence of other states inSoutheast Asia.[4]
For theQing, the war highlighted limits to their military power. The Emperor blamed the low battle-worthiness of hisGreen Standard armies for the first two failed invasions. But he was to concede later that hisManchuBannermen too were less suited to fighting inBurma than inXinjiang.[45] Despite sending in 50,000 and 60,000 troops in the last two invasions, the Qing command lacked up-to-date information about invasion routes, and had to consult centuries-old maps to form their battle plan. This unfamiliarity exposed their supply and communication lines to repeated Burmese attacks, and allowed their main armies to be encircled in the last three invasions. The Burmesescorched earth policy meant that the Chinese were vulnerable tosupply line cuts. Perhaps most importantly, the Qing soldiers proved ill-suited to fight in thetropical climate of Burma. In the last three invasions, thousands of Chinese troops became ill withmalaria and other tropical diseases, and many perished as a result. This neutralized the Chinese advantage of superior numbers, and allowed the Burmese to engage the Chinese armies head-to-head towards the end of the campaigns.
The war is considered the peak ofKonbaung military power. HistorianVictor Lieberman writes:"These near simultaneous victories overSiam (1767) andChina (1765–1769) testified to a truly astonishing elan unmatched sinceBayinnaung."[46] The Burmese military proved that they were able and willing to take on a far superior enemy, using their familiarity with the terrain and the weather to their maximum advantage (theBattle of Maymyo is now a military case study of infantry fighting against a larger army.[8]).
Yet it proved that there were limits to the Burmese military power. The Burmese learned that they could not fight two simultaneous wars, especially if one of them was against the world's largest military. KingHsinbyushin's reckless decision to fight a two-front war nearly cost the kingdom its independence. Moreover, their losses, while smaller thanQing losses, were heavy in proportion to their much smaller size of population, hampering their military capability elsewhere.Konbaung's military power would plateau in the following decades. It made no progress againstSiam. Its later conquests came only against smaller kingdoms to the west —Arakan,Manipur andAssam.
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