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Religion in Turkey |
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| Secularism in Turkey |
| Irreligion in Turkey |
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1st President of Turkey | ||
InTurkey,secularism orlaicism (seelaïcité) was first introduced with the 1928 amendment of theConstitution of 1924, which removed the provision declaring that the "Religion of the State isIslam", and with the laterreforms of Turkey's first presidentMustafa Kemal Atatürk, which set the administrative and political requirements to create a modern, democratic, secular state, aligned withKemalism.
Nine years after its introduction,laïcité was explicitly stated in the second article of the then Turkish constitution on 5 February 1937. The currentConstitution of 1982 neither recognizes anofficial religion nor promotes any.[1]
The principles of Turkish secularism, and theseparation of state and religion, were historically established in order tomodernize the nation. This centralized progressive approach was seen as necessary not only for the operation of theTurkish government but also to avoid a cultural life dominated by superstition, dogma, and ignorance.[2]
Turkey's concept oflaiklik ("laicism") calls for theseparation of state and religion, but also describes the state's stance as one of "active neutrality", which involves state control and legal regulation of religion.[3] Turkey's actions related with religion are carefully analyzed and evaluated through thePresidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı or simplyDiyanet).[4] The duties of the Presidency of Religious Affairs are "to execute the works concerning the beliefs, worship, and ethics of Islam, enlighten the public about their religion, and administer the sacred worshipping places".[5]
The history of secularism in Turkey extends to theTanzimat reforms of Ottoman Empire. The second peak in secularism occurred during theSecond Constitutional Era. The current form was achieved byAtatürk's Reforms.
The establishing structure (Ruling institution of the Ottoman Empire) of theOttoman Empire (13th century) was an Islamic state in which the head of theOttoman state was the Sultan. The social system was organized aroundmillet. Millet structure allowed a great degree of religious, cultural and ethnic continuity to non-Muslim populations across thesubdivisions of the Ottoman Empire and at the same time it permitted their incorporation into the Ottoman administrative, economic and political system.[6] The Ottoman-appointed governor collected taxes and provided security, while the local religious or cultural matters were left to the regional communities to decide. On the other hand, the sultans were Muslims and the laws that bound them were based on theSharia, the body ofIslamic law, as well as various cultural customs. The Sultan, beginning in 1517, was also acaliph, the leader of all theSunniMuslims in the world. By the turn of the 19th century the Ottoman ruling elite recognized the need to restructure the legislative, military and judiciary systems to cope with their new political rivals in Europe. When the millet system started to lose its efficiency due to therise of nationalism within its borders, the Ottoman Empire explored new ways of governing its territory composed of diverse populations.
SultanSelim III founded the first secular military schools by establishing the new military unit,Nizam-ı Cedid, as early as 1792. However the last century (19th century) of the Ottoman Empire had many far reaching reforms. These reforms peaked with theTanzimat which was the initial reform era of the Ottoman Empire. After the Tanzimat, rules, such as those relating to the equalizedstatus of non-Muslim citizens, the establishment ofa parliament, the abandonment of medieval punishments for apostasy,[7] as well as the codification of the constitution of the empire and the rights of Ottoman subjects were established. TheFirst World War brought about thefall of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequentpartitioning of the Ottoman Empire by the victorious Allies.
Reforms and policies designed to modernize Turkey adopted by Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938), the founder and the first president of Republic of Turkey, were known as "Kemalism", and had "six principles: republicanism, nationalism, populism, secularism, revolutionism and statism".[8] Unlike some "softer" forms of secularism, Kemalist secularism "did not mean the separation of religion only from the state, rather it meant the separation of religion from whole public spheres—politics, jurisprudence, education, society and so on".[9][10]
Kemalism excluded "religious symbols from public domain" and put religion "under the strict control of the state".[11][12] The weekly holiday was changed from Friday to Sunday, the calendar changed from the Muslim lunar to Gregorian, and the alphabet changed from Arabic to Latin.[13][12][8]
During the establishment of the Republic, there were two sections of the elite group at the helm of the discussions for the future. These were the Islamist reformists and Westerners.[6] They shared a similar goal, the modernization of the new state. Many basic goals were common to both groups. The founder of the modern Turkish Republic Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's achievement was to amplify this common ground and put the country on a fast track of reforms, now known as Atatürk's reforms.
Their first act was to give the Turkish nation the right to exercisepopular sovereignty viarepresentative democracy. Prior to declaring the new Republic, theTurkish Grand National Assembly abolished theconstitutional monarchy on 1 November 1922. TheTurkish Grand National Assembly then moved to replace the extant Islamic law structure with the laws it had passed during theTurkish War of Independence, beginning in 1919. The modernization of the Law had already begun at the point that the project was undertaken in earnest. A milestone in this process was the passage of theTurkish Constitution of 1921. Upon the establishment of the Republic on 29 October 1923, the institution of thecaliphate (a title held by the Ottoman Sultanate since 1517) remained, but the passage of anew constitution in 1924 effectivelyabolished this title. Even as the new constitution eliminated the caliphate it, at the same time, declared Islam as the official religion of the Turkish Republic. According to the law text passed by the Turkish Parliament, "Since the Caliphate was essentially present in the meaning and concept of the Government and the Republic, the office of the Caliphate was abolished."[14]
Following quickly upon these developments, a number of social reforms were undertaken. Many of these reforms affected every aspect of Turkish life, moving to erase the legacy of dominance long held by religion and tradition. The unification of education, installation of a secular education system, and the closure of many religious orders took place on 3 March 1924. This extended to closure of religious convents and dervish lodges on 30 November 1925. These reforms also included the extension to women of voting rights in 1931 and the right be to elected to public office on 5 December 1934. The inclusion of reference tolaïcité into theconstitution was achieved by an amendment on 5 February 1937, a move regarded as the final act in the project of instituting complete separation between governmental and religious affairs in Turkey.
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According to at least one observer (Mustafa Akyol), under the IslamistJustice and Development Party (AKP) government ofRecep Tayyip Erdoğan, "hundreds of secularist officers and their civilian allies" were jailed starting in 2007, and by 2012 the "old secularist guard" were removed from positions of authority and replaced by members/supporters of the AKP and the IslamistGülen movement.[15] On 25 April 2016, the Turkish Parliament Speakerİsmail Kahraman told a conference of Islamic scholars and writers in Istanbul that "secularism would not have a place in a new constitution", as Turkey is "a Muslim country and so we should have a religious constitution". (One of the duties of Parliament Speaker is to pen a new draft constitution for Turkey.)[16]
Traditionally, the function of theDiyanet was to maintain control over and limit the religious sphere of Islam in Turkey. Some (David Lepeska,Svante Cornell) have complained that under Erdoğan that role has "largely been turned on its head",[17] with theDiyanet, now greatly increased in size, promoting Islam in Turkey, specifically a certain type of conservative Islam—issuingfatawa forbidding such activities as "feeding dogs at home, celebrating the western New Year, lotteries, and tattoos";[18] and projecting this "Turkish Islam"[17] abroad.[19][20]
In education, the AKP government pursued the explicit policy agenda of Islamization to "raise a devout generation" against secular resistance,[21][22] in the process causing many non-religious citizens of Turkey to lose their jobs and schooling.[23] The turn to a more conservative and Islamic policy by the AKP, according to scholars such as M. Yavuz arises from the aftermath of the AKP's victory in the 2007 Turkish national elections. Due to the AKP's strong religious leanings and the centrality of political secularism in the state of Turkey, the AKP was charged with anti-secularism and had its funding cut by the Turkish constitutional court. Subsequently, this had led the AKP and through its collaboration with theGülen movement to prosecute individuals who they had associated with their prosecution by the constitutional court in what Yavuz describes as "kangaroo courts". From there, it is arguably seen that the AKP with the Gülen movement, had begun to reshape state institutions and promoted Islamic-centric parties and individuals with the Gülen movement up till the2016 Turkish coup attempt.[24]
Following theJuly 2016 coup attempt—which President Erdoğan called "a gift from God"[25]—thousands were purged by the AKP government. The victims were primarily followers of the Gülen movement — which is alleged to have launched the coup[26]—but also secularists who had not already been sacked in earlier purges.[27] One explanation for the replacement of secularist policies[28] in Turkey is that business interests who felt threatened by socialism saw Islamic values as "best suited to neutralize any challenges from the left to capitalist supremacy."[29]
Some (such as Turan Kayaoğlu) see interest and support of secularism in Turkey as strengthening, not decreasing.[30][31][32] After Erdoğan stated his desire to "raise a religious youth," politicians of all parties condemned his statements as abandoning Turkish values. A petition reading "[O]f Muslim, Christian, Jewish, Zoroastrian, Alawite, Shafi’i, religious and nonreligious, atheist and agnostic backgrounds, all joined with a firm belief in secularism, [we] find your recent remarks about raising a religious and conservative youth most alarming and dangerous" was signed by over 2,000 people. The pro-government newspaperBugün ran a story stating "no one has the right to convert this society into a religious one, or the opposite." Surveys of the Turkish people also show a great support for maintaining a secular country. The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation found that only 9% of Turks supported a religious state in 2006.[30] A more recent 2015 poll by Metropoll found that over 80% of Turkish people supported the continuation of Turkey as a secular state, with even the majority ofAKP voters supporting a secular state too.[33]
The Constitution asserts that Turkey is supposed to be asecular anddemocraticrepublic, deriving itssovereignty from the people. The sovereignty rests with the Turkish Nation, who delegates its exercise to an elected unicameral parliament, theTurkish Grand National Assembly. Moreover, Article 4 declares the immovability of the founding principles of the Republic defined in the first three Articles:
The Constitution bans any proposals for the modification of these articles (seeEntrenched clause). Each of these concepts which were distributed in the three articles of the constitution can not be achieved without the other two concepts.[citation needed] The constitution requires a central administration which would lose its meaning (effectiveness, coverage, etc.) if the system is not based onlaïcité, social equality, and equality before law. Vice versa, if the Republic differentiate itself based on social, religious differences, administration can not be equal to the population when the administration is central.[citation needed] The system which tried to be established in the constitution sets out to found a unitary nation-state based on the principles of secular democracy.[citation needed]
| Do you cover when going outside?[34] | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| 1999 | 2012 | ||
| No, I do not | 47.3% | 66.5% | |
| Yes, I wear a headscarf | 33.4% | 18.8% | |
| Yes, I wear a türban | 15.7% | 11.4% | |
| Yes, I wear açarşaf | 3.4% | 0.1% | |
| NI/NA | 0.3% | 2.2% | |
The Turkish government had outlawed the wearing of headscarves by women who work in thepublic sector in 1982.[35] The ban had applied toteachers,lawyers,parliamentarians and others working on state premises. The ban on headscarves in thecivil service andeducational andpolitical institutions was expanded to cover non-state institutions. Authorities began to enforce the headscarf ban among mothers accompanying their children toschool events or publicswimming pools, while femalelawyers andjournalists who refused to comply with the ban were expelled from public buildings such ascourtrooms anduniversities[citation needed]. In 1999, the ban on headscarves in the public sphere hit the headlines whenMerve Kavakçı, a newly elected MP for theVirtue Party was prevented from taking her oath in the National Assembly because she wore a headscarf. The constitutional rule that prohibits discrimination on religious grounds is taken very seriously. Turkey prohibited by law the wearing of religious headcover and theo-political symbolic garments for both genders in government buildings, schools, and universities;[36] a law that was upheld by the Grand Chamber of theEuropean Court of Human Rights as legitimate on 10 November 2005, inLeyla Şahin v. Turkey.[37] In 2022, PresidentRecep Tayyip Erdoğan has suggested the constitutional change to guarantee the right to wear a headscarf in the civil service, schools, and universities should be decided through a referendum.[38]
TheTurkish Constitution recognizesfreedom of religion forindividuals whereas identifiedreligious communities are placed under the protection of state. The constitution explicitly states that it is illegal for a religious community to get involved in politics, or to form a Party openly representing a religious group.[citation needed]
In recent history, two parties have been ordered to close (Welfare Party in 1998, andVirtue Party in 2001) by theConstitutional Court for Islamist activities and attempts to "redefine the secular nature of the republic". The first party to be closed for suspected anti-secularist activities was theProgressive Republican Party on 3 June 1925.[citation needed]
Issues relating to Turkey's secularism were discussed in the lead up to the2007 presidential election, in which the ruling party chose a candidate with Islamist connections,Abdullah Gül, for the first time in the history of the secular republic. While some in Turkey have expressed concern that the nomination could represent a move away from Turkey's secularist traditions, including particularly Turkey's priority on equality between the sexes, others have suggested that the conservative party has effectively promoted modernization while reaching out to more traditional and religious elements in Turkish society.[39][40] On 22 July 2007, it was reported that the more religiously conservative ruling party won a larger than expected electoral victory in thesnap general election.[41]
Turkey's preservation and maintenance of its secular identity has been a profound issue and source of tension. Prime MinisterRecep Tayyip Erdoğan has broken with secular tradition, by speaking out in favor of limited Islamism and against the active restrictions,[citation needed] instituted by Atatürk on wearing the Islamic-stylehead scarves in government offices and schools. TheRepublic Protests (Turkish:Cumhuriyet Mitingleri) were a series of peaceful mass rallies that took place in the spring of 2007 in support of theKemalist ideals ofstate secularism.[42]
Although the constitution prohibits discrimination on religious grounds, religious discrimination was official policy: In Turkey, wearing headscarves in government buildings and schools was prohibited.[36] The law was upheld by the Grand Chamber of theEuropean Court of Human Rights as legitimate on 10 November 2005, inLeyla Şahin v. Turkey. They held that government "encouragement of secularism" (i.e. discouragement of religion) was a legitiamate state policy.[37]
The strict application of secularism in Turkey has been credited for enabling women to have access to greater opportunities, compared to countries with a greater influence of religion in public affairs, in matters of education, employment, wealth as well as political, social and cultural freedoms.[43]
Also paradoxical with the Turkish secularism is the fact thatidentity document cards of Turkish citizens include the specification of the card holder's religion.[44] This declaration was perceived by some as representing a form of the state's surveillance over its citizens' religious choices.[citation needed]
The mainstreamHanafite school ofSunni Islam is entirely organized by the state, through theDiyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Religious Affairs Directorate), which supervises allmosques, educates theimams who work in them, and approves all content for religious services and prayers. It appoints imams, who are classified as civil servants.[45] This micromanagement of Sunni religious practices, at times, seems much more sectarian than secular, as it violates the principle of state neutrality in religious practice.[citation needed] Groups that have expressed dissatisfaction with this situation include a variety of non-governmental Sunni / Hanafi groups (such as theNurcu movement), whose interpretation of Islam tends to be more activist; and the non-Sunni (Alevi), whose members tend to resent supporting the Sunni establishment with their tax money (whereas the Turkish state does not subsidize Alevi religious activities).[citation needed]
This principle, unlike in western countries, is not realized by evolutionary currents and philosophers' ideas, spread among most people throughout the century, but rather by direct and decisive action and revolutionary enthusiasm from a very small elite consisting of bureaucrats and young army officer.
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