| Second Jassy–Kishinev offensive | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of theEastern Front ofWorld War II | |||||||||
 Soviet advance | |||||||||
| |||||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||||
 Soviet Union Romania(24–29 August)  Yugoslavia[1] United States(Air support only) | Romania (20–24 August)  Germany | ||||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
| Joseph StalinSemyon TimoshenkoRodion MalinovskyFyodor TolbukhinFilipp OktyabrskyMichael IConstantin SănătescuGheorghe MihailNicolae Macici | Ion AntonescuIlie ȘtefleaPetre DumitrescuIoan Mihail RacovițăAdolf HitlerJohannes FriessnerOtto WöhlerMaximilian Fretter-PicoAlfred Gerstenberg | ||||||||
| Units involved | |||||||||
| see below | see below | ||||||||
| Strength | |||||||||
| Soviet Union: 1,314,200[3] 16,000 guns 1,870 tanks 2,200 aircraft Romania: 465,659[4] | Romania: 1,163,347[5] (as of 15 August 1944) 800 aircraft Germany: 250,000 (Army Group South Ukraine) | ||||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||||
Soviet Union: 8,586 killed or wounded[4] | Romania: [6] 25 aircraft[7][self-published source?] Germany: 150,000 killed, wounded or captured[8] | ||||||||
Thesecond Jassy–Kishinev offensive,[2][9][10][11][Notes 1] named after the two major cities,Jassy andKishinev, in the staging area, was aSoviet offensive againstAxis forces, which took place in EasternRomania from 20 to 29 August 1944 duringWorld War II. The2nd and3rd Ukrainian Fronts of theRed Army engagedArmy Group South Ukraine, which consisted of combinedGerman andRomanian formations, in an operation to reoccupyBessarabia and destroy the Axis forces in the region, opening the way into Romania and theBalkans.
The offensive resulted in the encirclement and destruction of the German forces, allowing the Soviet Army to resume its strategic advance further intoEastern Europe. It also pressured Romania toswitch allegiance from the Axis powers to the Allies. For the Germans, this was a massive defeat, which can be compared to the defeat atStalingrad.
The Red Army had advanced past Romania's pre-war borders in theUman–Botoșani offensive in early April. By late April, the German-Romanian allies managed to stabilize the frontline on the Carpathians-Târgu Frumos-lowerDniester alignment, and on May 6 theStavka ordered the Soviet troops to switch to a defensive posture.[12] HistorianDavid Glantz however claims the Soviets made an unsuccessful attack in the same sector in an operation he refers to as thefirst Jassy–Kishinev offensive, from 8 April to 6 June 1944. In 1944, theWehrmacht had been pressed back along its entire front line in the East. By May 1944, the South Ukraine Army Group (Heeresgruppe Südukraine) was pushed back towards the prewar Romanian frontier, with the German6th Army managing to establish a line on the lowerDniester River after the conclusion of the SovietOdessa Offensive. The line, however, was breached in two places, with the Red Army holdingbridgeheads. After June, calm returned to the sector, allowing the rebuilding of the German formations.[citation needed]
Heeresgruppe Südukraine had been, until June 1944, one of the most powerful German formations in terms of armour. However, during the summer most of its armoured units were transferred to the Northern and Central fronts to stem Red Army advances in theBaltic states,Belarus, northernUkraine, andPoland. On the eve of the offensive, the only armoured formations left were the 1st Romanian Armored Division (with theTiger I tank),[13][self-published source?] and the German13thPanzer and10thPanzergrenadier Divisions.
Soviet deception operations prior to the attack worked well. The German command staff believed that the movement of Soviet forces along the front line was a result of a troop transfer to the north. Exact positions of Soviet formations were also not known until the final hours before the operation.[14]
By contrast, the Romanians were aware of the imminent Soviet offensive and anticipated arerun ofStalingrad, with major attacks against the3rd and4th Armies and an encirclement of the German6th Army. Such concerns were dismissed by the German command as "alarmist".[15]MarshalIon Antonescu suggested a withdrawal of Axis forces to the fortifiedCarpathian–FNB (Focșani–Nămoloasa–Brăila)–Danube line, but Friessner, the commander of Army Group South Ukraine, was unwilling to consider such a move, having already been dismissed by Hitler fromArmy Group North for requesting permission to retreat.[citation needed]
Army Group South Ukraine[16] –GeneraloberstJohannes Friessner
The 1st Romanian Armored Division did not have all of its units immediately available for opposing the Soviet offensive. Some of its units were still in the interior as of 20 August. Therefore, an ad hoc organization of the Division's units which were actually available for opposing the Soviet offensive lists the Division's 80 front line tanks as follows (not including the Division's 12 armored cars):[18]
| Name | Type | Country of Origin | Quantity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Panzer IV | Medium tank | Nazi Germany | 48 |
| Sturmgeschütz III | Assault gun | Nazi Germany | 22 |
| TACAM T-60 | Tank destroyer | Romania | 10 |
The Division also had a dedicated anti-tank battalion. Its main weapons were entirely of Romanian origin: 10TACAM T-60 tank destroyers and 2475 mm Reșița field/anti-tank guns.[18] The 24 guns were the first ones produced of this model.[19]
The 1st Romanian Armored Division had lost 34 armored fighting vehicles by 23 August, but claimed 60 Soviet tanks on 20 August alone.[20]
Stavka's plan for the operation was based on adouble envelopment of German and Romanian armies by the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts.[2][21]
The 2nd Ukrainian Front was to break through north ofIași, and then commit mobile formations to seize thePrut River crossings before withdrawing German units of the 6th Army could reach it. It was then to unleash the 6th Tank Army to seize theSiret River crossings and theFocșani Gate, a fortified line between the Siret River and the Danube.
The 3rd Ukrainian Front was to attack out of its bridgehead across the Dniester nearTiraspol, and then release mobile formations to head north and meet the mobile formations of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. This would lead to the encirclement of the German forces near Chișinău.
Following the successful encirclement, the 6th Tank Army and the 4th Guards Mechanised Corps were to advance towardsBucharest and thePloiești oil fields.
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Both the 2nd and the 3rd Ukrainian Fronts undertook a major effort, leading to a double envelopment of theGerman Sixth Army and parts of theEighth Army. The German–Romanian front line collapsed within two days of the start of the offensive, and 6th Guards Mechanized Corps was inserted as the main mobile group of the offensive. The initial breakthrough in the 6th Army's sector was 40 km (25 mi) deep, and destroyed rear-area supply installations by the evening of 21 August. By 23 August, the 13thPanzer Division was no longer a coherent fighting force, and the German 6th Army had been encircled to a depth of 100 km (62 mi). The Red Army mobile group managed to cut off the retreat of the German formations intoHungary. Isolated pockets of German units tried to fight their way through, but only small remnants managed to escape the encirclement.
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The main effort of the front was in the sector of the37th Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Sharokhin, by the 66th and 6th Guards Rifle Corps. The 37th Army had a 4 km (2.5 mi)-wide breakthrough frontage assigned to it. It was divided in two groupings, two corps in the first echelon, and one in reserve. According to the plan, it was to break through the German–Romanian defence lines in seven days, to a distance of 110–120 km (68–75 mi), with the goal of covering 15 km (9.3 mi) per day during the first four days.
The 66th Rifle Corps, under Major General Kupriyanov, consisted of the61st Guards Rifle and333rd Rifle Divisions in the first echelon and the244th Rifle Division in reserve. Attached were the 46th Gun Artillery Brigade, 152nd Howitzer Artillery Regiment, 184th and 1245th Tank Destroyer Regiment, 10th Mortar Regiment, 26th Light Artillery Brigade, 87th Recoilless Mortar Regiment, 92nd and 52nd Tank Regiment, 398th Assault Gun Regiment, two pioneer assault battalions, and two light flamethrower companies.
Corps frontage: 4 km (2.5 mi)
Corps breakthrough frontage: 3.5 km (2.2 mi) (61st Rifle Division 1.5 km (0.93 mi), 333rd Rifle Division 2 km (1.2 mi))
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Troop density per kilometer of frontage:
Superiority:
There is no manpower information on the divisions, but they probably had between 7,000 and 7,500 men each, with the 61st Guards Rifle Division perhaps mustering 8,000–9,000. The soldiers were prepared over the course of August by exercising in areas similar to those they were to attack, with emphasis on special tactics needed to overcome the enemy in their sector.
Troops density in the 61st Guards Rifle Division's sector per kilometer of frontage was:
Troops density in the 333rd Rifle Division's sector per kilometer of frontage was:
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The 333rd Rifle Division put three regiments in the first echelon and had none in reserve. The 61st Guards Rifle Division attacked in a standard formation, with two regiments in the first echelon and one in reserve. This proved to be fortunate, because the right wing of the 188th Guards Rifle Regiment was unable to advance past the Plopschtubej strongpoint.[clarification needed] The 189th Guards Rifle Regiment on the left wing made good progress though, as did 333rd Rifle Division on its left. The commander of the 61st Guards Rifle Division therefore inserted his reserve (the 187th Guards Rifle Regiment) behind the 189th Guards Rifle Regiment to exploit the breakthrough. When darkness came, the 244th Rifle Division was assigned to break through the second line of defense. It lost its way, and only arrived at 23:00, by which time elements of the 13th Panzer Division were counterattacking.
The German–Romanian opposition was XXX. and XXIX. AK, with the 15th and 306th German Infantry Divisions, the 4th Romanian Mountain Division, and the 21st Romanian Infantry Division. The 13th Panzer Division was in reserve. At the end of the first day, the 4th Romanian Mountain (General de divizie, (Major General)Gheorghe Manoliu), and 21st Romanian Divisions were almost completely destroyed, while the German 15th and 306th Infantry Divisions suffered heavy losses (according to a German source, the 306th Infantry lost 50% in the barrage, and was destroyed apart from local strong-points by evening). Almost no artillery survived the fire preparation.
The 13th Panzer Division counterattacked the 66th Rifle Corps on the first day, and tried to stop its progress the next day to no avail. A study on the division's history says 'The Russians [Soviets] dictated the course of events.' The 13th Panzer Division at the time was a materially underequipped, but high manpower unit, with a high proportion of recent reinforcements. It only hadPanzer IVs,StuG IIIs and self-propelled anti-tank guns. By the end of the second day, the division was incapable of attacking or putting up meaningful resistance.
At the end of the second day, the3rd Ukrainian Front stood deep in the rear of the German 6th Army. No more organised re-supply of forces would be forthcoming, and the 6th Army was doomed to be encircled and destroyed again.Franz-Josef Strauss, who was to become an important German politician after the war, served with the Panzer Regiment of the 13th Panzer Division. He comments that the division had ceased to exist as a tactical unit on the third day of the Soviet offensive: 'The enemy was everywhere.'
In Mazulenko, results of the operations of the 66th Rifle Corps were described: "Because of the reinforcement of the Corps and the deep battle arrangements of troops and units the enemy defenses were broken through at high speed."
German survivors of the initial attack stated "By the end of the barrage, Russian [Soviet] tanks were deep into our position." (Hoffman). A German battalion commander, Hauptmann Hans Diebisch, Commander II./IR579, 306.ID, commented "The fire assets of the German defense were literally destroyed by the Soviet fighter bombers attacking the main line of resistance and the rear positions. When the Russian infantry suddenly appeared inside the positions of the battalion and it tried to retreat, the Russian air force made this impossible. The battalion was dispersed and partly destroyed by air attacks and mortar and machine gun fire."
It is often alleged that the speed and totality of the German collapse were caused by Romanian betrayal, for example, inHeinz Guderian's 1952 autobiographyPanzer Leader. The study of the combat operations by Mazulenko indicates that this is probably not correct. Romanian formations did resist the Soviet attack in many cases, but were ill-equipped to defend themselves effectively against a modern army due to a lack of modernanti-tank,artillery, andanti-air weapons. In contrast to German claims, for instance, in the symposium notes published byDavid Glantz, or in the history of the offensive published by Kissel, it appears that the Romanian 1st Armoured Division did offer resistance against the Soviet breakthrough. However, Mark Axworthy states in his book that the battered 1st Armoured Division maintained cohesion, experiencing some local, costly successes before being forced to cross theMoldova River.[22] Axworthy claims that the postwar Communist government would have obviously used this act of "betrayal" for propaganda purposes. Also, there are no Soviet reports of collaboration before 24 August 1944.[23] The Soviet rates of progress imply an ineffective defense of the Romanian troops, rather than active collaboration anden-masse surrender.[24]
Ion. S. Dumitru was a Romanian tank commander in the battle of the Romanian 1st Armoured Division against Soviet tanks and he described the battle in his book.[25] According to Dumitru, fighting took place near the village of Scobâlțeni in the vicinity of a town calledPodu Iloaiei on 20 August. The Romanian division destroyed 60 Soviet tanks and lost 30 tanks. At the end of the day, Romanians decided to retreat to the south after an analysis of the military results of the day.
The complete collapse of the German 6th Army and the Romanian 4th Army was more likely caused by the inability of the numerous horse-drawn infantry divisions to maintain cohesion while retreating and under attack of the Soviet mechanized troops.[26] This claim is reinforced by the fact that the only Romanian division which retained its cohesion under the Soviet attack was the 1st Armoured Division, which had the mobility and the anti-tank weapons needed to do so.
The surrender of Romania took place at a time when the Soviet Army had already moved deep inside Romania, and the German 6th Army had been cut off from the rest of the Wehrmacht in Romania. The opening of hostilities between the Wehrmacht and the Romanian Army commenced after a failedcoup d'état by the German ambassador.
Simultaneously, acoup d'état led by King Michael of Romania on 23 August deposed Antonescu and withdrew Romania from the Axis. By this time, the bulk of the German and Romanian armies had either been destroyed or cut off by the Soviet offensive, with only residual and rear-echelon forces present in the Romanian interior.[27] Hitler immediately ordered special forces under the command ofOtto Skorzeny andArthur Phleps, stationed in nearby Yugoslavia, to intervene in support of the remaining German troops, which were mostly concentrated around Bucharest, Ploiești,Brașov, andGiurgiu. GeneralAlfred Gerstenberg, commander of the Luftwaffe defenses around the oilfields at Ploiești, had already ordered a column of motorized troops to attack Bucharest on the evening of 23 August. Open hostilities between German and Romanian forces began the following morning on the city's northern outskirts. After capturing the airfield atOtopeni, the attack stalled, and by 28 August Gerstenberg and the remaining German forces in the vicinity of Bucharest surrendered. The fighting here featured the only instance of cooperation between Romanian andWestern Allied forces during the campaign, when Romanian ground troops requested aUSAAF bombing raid on theBăneasa Forest. Poor coordination however led to friendly fire when American bombers accidentally hit a company of Romanian paratroopers.[28]
Meanwhile,Brandenburger special forces landed atBoteni andȚăndărei airfields on 24 August in an attempt to immobilize the Romanian aircraft there, but they were overpowered by Romanian paratroopers and security companies before they could achieve their objectives.[29] A proposed operation to rescue Antonescu, led by Skorzeny and inspired by theGran Sasso raid which liberatedBenito Mussolini in 1943, could not materialize as Antonescu's whereabouts were unknown even to the Romanian government until 30 August, when he was handed over to the Soviets and shipped to Moscow.[30] Another group of Brandenburgers joined Gerstenberg's unsuccessful drive on Bucharest on 25 August and were captured three days later. Altogether, these events constituted one of the worst defeats suffered by the German special forces in the war.[29]
The German situation was further complicated by the loss of Brașov and thePredeal Pass, both of which were secured by the Romanian 1st Mountain Division by 25 August, thus cutting off the most direct route of reinforcement or retreat for the remaining Wehrmacht formations to the south. The following day, the Romanian 2nd Territorial Corps captured Giurgiu and neutralized the German AA units there, taking 9,000 prisoners in the process.[31] The 25,000-strong German presence around Ploiești, consisting mostly of flak troops and their security companies, was at first locked in a stalemate with the Romanian 5th Territorial Corps, which had a similar numerical strength. Over the following days however, the Germans were gradually confined to the city's immediate surroundings and became heavily outnumbered as Romanian reinforcements began arriving from Bucharest and also from the east, together with lead elements of a Soviet motorized brigade. On 30 August, an attack by the 5th Territorial Corps, now numbering over 40,000 men, reduced the Germans to a pocket around the village ofPăulești, roughly 10 km (6.2 mi) north of Ploiești. They surrendered the following day after a failed breakout attempt. About 2,000 Germans were able to escape to the Hungarian lines across the Carpathians.[32] Other major cities and industrial centers, such asConstanța,Reșița, andSibiu were secured by the Romanians with relative ease. By 31 August, all German resistance in Romania had been cleared.[33]
During the fighting between 23 and 31 August, the Romanian Army captured 56,000 German prisoners, who were later surrendered to the Soviet Army.[34] A further 5,000 Germans were killed in action, while Romanian casualties amounted to 8,600 killed and wounded.[33]
Romanian sources claim that internal factors played a decisive role in Romania's switch of allegiance, while external factors only gave support; this version is markedly different from the Soviet position on the events, which holds that the offensive resulted in the Romanian coup and "liberated Romania with the help of local insurgents".[21][35]
The German formations suffered significant irrecoverable losses, with over 115,000 prisoners taken, while Soviet casualties were unusually low for an operation of this size. The Red Army advanced intoYugoslavia and forced the rapid withdrawal of the German Army GroupsE andF fromGreece,Albania, and Yugoslavia to avoid being cut off. Together withYugoslav Partisans and Bulgaria, theyliberated the capital city of Belgrade on 20 October.
On the political level, the Soviet offensive triggered King Michael'scoup d'état in Romania, and the switch of Romania from the Axis to the Allies. Almost immediately, border hostilities between Romania and Germany's allyHungary erupted overterritory that Romania had been forced to cede to Hungary in 1940 as a result of theSecond Vienna Award.[36] Romania's defection meant the loss of a vital source of oil for Germany, leading to serious fuel shortages in the Wehrmacht by the end of 1944 and prompting Hitler's first admission that the war was lost.[37]
Following the success of the operation, Soviet control overBessarabia andNorthern Bukovina, which had beenoccupied by the USSR in 1940, was re-established. Soviet forces proceeded to collect and expel the remaining Romanian troops. According toAnatol Petrencu, President of the Historians' Association ofMoldova, over 170,000 Romanian soldiers were deported, 40,000 of which were incarcerated in aprisoner-of-war camp atBălți, where many died of hunger, cold, disease, or execution.[38]
In Soviet history, this offensive was listed as one ofStalin's ten blows.
In Moldova and thebreakaway stateTransnistria, August 24 is apublic holiday, and is known officially asLiberation Day. King Michael's coup on August 23 was also celebrated in neighboringRomania asLiberation from Fascist Occupation Day until 1990. In 1970, a street in Botanica was named in honor of Aleksei Belsky, aHero of the Soviet Union and a participant in the second Jassy–Kishinev offensive. After thecollapse of the USSR, the street was renamed to honorAlexandru Ioan Cuza. The village ofMalinovscoe, in theRîșcani District, named in honor of the MarshalRodion Malinovsky was dedicated to the anniversary of the end of the operation.
On 23 August 1969, during the 25th anniversary of the offensive, a liberation monument at theAcademy of Sciences of Moldova was opened. It has been renovated three times, in 1975, 2014, and 2019.[39] The monument to the second Jassy–Kishinev offensive in the village ofChițcani was opened on 9 May 1972 and is currently the site of the monument is a mass grave, in which 1,495 soldiers who died during the operation are buried.[40] TheCapul de pod Șerpeni Memorial Complex was opened in 2004.[41] Two years later, theEternity Memorial Complex in Chișinău was opened on Liberation Day, acting as the Soviet war memorial in Moldova.
In 2019, PresidentIgor Dodon dedicated the year to the 75th anniversary of the Liberation of Moldova, and ordered that a National Coordination Committee plan national events and celebrations throughout the country in honor of the anniversary. On the actual anniversary, celebrations were held, led by Dodon and attended by Russian Defence MinisterSergey Shoigu at the request of Moldovan Defence MinisterPavel Voicu.[42][43][44][45][46][47]
A ceremony with Dodon, Shoigu and Voicu in attendance at the Capul de pod Șerpeni Memorial Complex was held, in which Shoigu ceremonially handed Voicu the military flags of two Moldovan regiments who participated in the offensive, which until then, were kept at theCentral Armed Forces Museum.[48] A separate ceremony at the Transnistria-basedOperational Group of Russian Forces was also held.[49]
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