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The1957 White Paper on Defence (Cmnd. 124) was a Britishwhite paper issued in March 1957 setting forth the perceived future of the British military.[1]Duncan Sandys, the recently appointedMinister of Defence, produced the paper. It had profound effects on all aspects of the defence industry but probably the most affected was the British aircraft industry. The decisions were influenced by two major factors: the finances of the country and the coming of the missile age.
In the past, combat in the air would have been between high flying aircraft, bombers carrying nuclear weapons and interceptor fighter aircraft trying to stop them. Now theballistic missile could deliver these weapons with no possible defensive response. In this new environment, the interceptors andsurface-to-air missiles (SAMs), along with their associated radar networks, seemed superfluous. Likewise, it appeared new manned aircraft of any sort would have little utility in airspace dominated by SAMs. Numerous ongoing projects were abandoned, leaving too little work for the large number of aircraft companies. The paper suggested that the companies join forces to rationalize their operations for a future in which there would be smaller numbers of military projects.
At the time, the Army had a strong presence in Germany as a counter toWarsaw Pact forces. The paper noted that its ultimate goal was not to stop the Pact forces, but to act as atripwire force to deter any attack as it would result in a larger British response – the actual battle was assumed to be carried out by nuclear weapons. The size of the Army was far larger than it had to be for this role, and led to reductions in the Army's size.
Only theRoyal Navy was left significantly unchanged. The paper noted its important role in smaller engagements like theKorean War, and refocussed it onforce projection rather than all-out battle with a Soviet fleet. The paper noted that the outcome of a continental nuclear war was not entirely obvious, and that continued fighting would give time for the large Soviet conventionalsubmarine fleet to sortie. The paper suggested the Navy improve its anti-submarine capabilities and its ability to work in concert with otherNATO forces.
UK war plans of the 1950s were based on a "three-day war", in which theWarsaw Pact's forces would begin with a conventional attack in Europe, but the war would quickly progress to the use of tactical nuclear weapons. NATO's overwhelmingair superiority would win the resulting battle. From that point, if the war continued, strategic weapons would be unleashed and the battle would be between the strategic bombers and the opposing defences. The massive superiority of the western air forces meant this battle would be short and largely one-sided, but the UK would have to survive at least one wave of Soviet attacks.
To handle this attack, in the post-World War II era theRoyal Air Force deployed theROTOR radar network that covered the entire British Isles in order to attack anystrategic bomber that might attempt to approach. The defensive weapons of the system included new jet-poweredinterceptor aircraft and, originally, reorganisedanti-aircraft artillery with newtactical control radars. By the early 1950s, the increasing speeds and altitudes of bombers meant they could "toss" their weapons from ranges outside even the largest anti-aircraft artillery, and plans began to replace these weapons withsurface-to-air missiles.
By the mid-1950s, the USSR was known to be developing a variety ofballistic missiles able to deliver nuclear warheads. Split into classes based on their range, much of the attention internationally was on the longest-rangedintercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). However, short-range missiles were both less expensive and easier to develop, and these had the performance needed to deliver a warhead to the UK from bases inEast Germany. There was no defence from thesemedium range ballistic missiles and it appeared they would be widespread by the mid-1960s.
The introduction of strategic missiles seriously disrupted the UK's defensive posture. Planners of ananti-ballistic missile system code-namedViolet Friend concluded no effective defence against these weapons was possible. The only way to stop an attack would be to stop it from being launched, and the only way to do that was through deterrence. Although the survival of theV force was required even before this point, there was some expectation that it would survive direct air attack given the ROTOR defence. With missiles, there was no way to do this. Any sign of an attack would require the immediate launch of the V force to ensure its survival - even if attacking bombers were detected, they would undoubtedly be accompanied by missiles. In this case, there was no point trying to defend their airfields - they would either be empty or the war was already lost.
In such a scenario, the need for air defences was essentially eliminated. If an attack occurred, even the complete attrition of attacking bombers would have little to no effect on the ultimate outcome once the missiles arrived. Much more likely was the opposite scenario, a missile attack on the V-force with Soviet bombers arriving later to ensure hits on targets that would likely have already been destroyed. With no existing system for detecting missile launches at long range, this became the primary concern.
As a result, the White Paper cancelled many defensive systems, like theBlue Envoy SAM andSaunders-Roe SR.177 interceptor, and significantly reduced the scope and mission of theLinesman/Mediator radar network that was being planned to replace ROTOR. To provide an indication of such a missile attack, the UK arranged to have a USBMEWS radar sited in England. Linesman was now tasked mostly with intercepting aircraft carryingcarcinotron jammers, which the Soviets might use to mask BMEWS.
With the development of missiles, those roles that missiles could cover meant that certain aircraft in development could be cancelled.
These included the next generation of supersonic interceptor for high flying bombers, theF.155 and the interim aircraft that would have covered it until its introduction in 1963, namely theSaunders-Roe SR.53 andSaunders-Roe SR.177. Sandys felt that the existing interceptor fleet would serve until theBristol Bloodhound was in service, and after that point, a bomber attack was unlikely as the world increasingly switched to missiles. As such, even theBlue Envoysurface-to-air missile was also cancelled; although it offered much higher performance than Bloodhound, by the time it arrived in the mid-1960s it would have nothing to shoot at.
The RAF was especially critical of one part of Sandys' conclusions. They noted the introduction of theTupolev Tu-22 andMyasishchev M-50supersonic bombers would occur before Bloodhound was fully deployed, and that their existing interceptor aircraft like theGloster Javelin were incapable of successfully attacking these aircraft. Sandys relented and allowed the English Electric P.1 (which would become theLightning) to continue development, along with a newair-to-air missile to arm it, theHawker Siddeley Red Top.
TheAvro 730 supersonic light bomber was also cancelled, as was theBlue Rosette nuclear weapon to arm it.
TheRoyal Auxiliary Air Force's flying role was also brought to an end.
The paper stated that the aircraft industry should re-organise, with a number of smaller companies becoming a few larger ones. It was made clear that new contracts would only be given to such merged firms, including the only new aircraft project, which would become theTSR-2.
Under pressure, in 1960English Electric,Bristol Aeroplane Company andVickers-Armstrong merged to form theBritish Aircraft Corporation, or BAC.Hunting Aircraft soon joined the BAC group. In the same year,de Havilland,Blackburn Aircraft andFolland merged intoHawker Siddeley, which had already consisted ofArmstrong Whitworth,Avro,Gloster andHawker since 1935.Westland Aircraft took over all thehelicopter manufacturers, includingSaunders-Roe,Fairey Aviation and Bristol's helicopter work. Saunders-Roe'shovercraft work was spun off and merged with Vickers Supermarine as theBritish Hovercraft Corporation.
Very few companies were left independent after this wave of mergers, leaving onlyHandley Page as a major independent, along with the smaller companies likeAuster,Boulton Paul,Miles Aircraft,Scottish Aviation andShort Brothers. Most of these disappeared by the 1970s, having merged into theBritish Aerospace conglomerate. Scottish Aviation remained independent until 1977 and Shorts was purchased byBombardier in 1989.
Engine companies were likewise "encouraged" to merge. In 1959Armstrong Siddeley and Bristol's engine division merged to becomeBristol Siddeley, but were shortly purchased byRolls-Royce in 1966, leaving RR as the only major British aircraft engine manufacturer.
TheBritish Army was to be reduced in size and reorganised to reflect the ending ofNational Service and the change to a voluntary army, and to "keep the Army abreast of changing circumstances, policies, weapons and techniques of war". 51 major units and a large number of smaller ones were to be disbanded oramalgamated, leaving the army with a strength of 165,000 officers and men. The process was to be carried out in two phases, to be completed by the end of 1959 and 1962 respectively.[2]
TheRoyal Armoured Corps was to be reduced by the amalgamation of:
The infantry of the line was to undergo major changes. Existing regiments were to be grouped in "brigades". Each brigade was to have a single depot with those of the individual regiments being reduced to the status of regimental headquarters. There was to be a reduction in the number of regular infantry battalions from 64 to 49 by the merging of pairs of regiments. The brigades and regiments were to be (with changes to 1966):[3][4]
The Royal Artillery saw many changes, mostly in the way of AA units. When AA command was disbanded in 1955, many of the regular AA units were not disbanded like their Territorial counterparts, but disbanded in 1958/62.[5]
TheRoyal Engineers would be reduced by approximately 15,000 officers and men, with divisional engineer regiments to be replaced by field squadrons. TheRoyal Signals was to lose 13,000 soldiers by reduction of second-line units. Some of the work of theRoyal Army Service Corps was to pass to civilian contractors, allowing a loss of 18,000 men. TheRoyal Army Ordnance Corps was to lose 11,000 soldiers, and was to be organised more efficiently with a large number of depots closed. TheRoyal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers was to lose 23,000 soldiers. Other arms and services were to be reduced in proportion.
Since 1938 the Air Branch of theRoyal Navy Volunteer Reserve had been contributing reservists for air operations. From 1947 it had been curtailed to anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and fighter units only — there being a large number of propeller aircraft still in use. The increasing complexity of weapons system and the use of helicopters for ASW was thought to be beyond what reservist training could manage. With the ending of the Air branch, theShort Seamew was no longer required and production was cancelled.