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Salafi jihadism, also known asSalafi-jihadism,jihadist Salafism andrevolutionary Salafism,[1] is a religiopoliticalSunniIslamist ideology that seeks to establish a globalcaliphate through armed struggle. In a narrower sense, jihadism refers to the belief that armed struggle with political rivals is an efficient and theologically legitimate method of socio-political change.[2][3] The Salafist interpretation of sacred Islamic texts is "in their most literal, traditional sense",[4] which adherents claim will bring about the return to "trueIslam".[5][6][7][8][9]
The term "jihadist salafists"[5][6][7][10] was coined by French political scientistGilles Kepel.[11][12][13][14] Kepel used it to refer to international volunteers of thejihad against theSoviet Union inAfghanistan, who, after the Soviet withdrawal and loss of American-Saudi funding, sought new paths to engage in jihad.[15] Isolated from their national and social class origins and seeking to "rationalize" their "existence and behavior",[11] some Arab volunteers as well as local Islamists expanded the targets of their jihad to include the United States and other countries with Muslim causes around the world.[4]
Jihadist and Salafist elements of the new "hybrid"ideology developed by international volunteers (Arab-Afghanmujahideen) had not been joined previously because mainstream Salafis,[5][10][16] dubbed by some Western commentators as "good Salafis",[13] had mostly adhered topolitical quietism and eschewed political activities and partisan allegiances. Jihad had been viewed as potentially divisive for the broaderMuslim community and as a distraction from the studying and practicing of Islam.[17] Prominent Quietist Salafi scholars have denounced doctrines of Salafi jihadism asBid'ah ("innovation") and "heretical",[18] strongly forbidding Muslims from participating or assisting in any armed underground activity against any government.[Note 1][a] Jihadist salafists often dismiss the quietist scholars as "'sheikist" traitors, portraying them as palace scholars worried about the patronage of "the oil sheiks of theArabian peninsula" rather than pure Islam,[4] and contend that they are not dividing theMuslim community because, in their view, the rulers ofMuslim-majority countries and other self-proclaimed Muslims they attack are not actually part of the community, having deviated from Islam and becomeapostates orfalse Muslims.[5][7][21]
Early ideologues of the movement were Arab Afghan veterans of the Afghan jihad, such asAbu Qatada al-Filistini, the naturalized Spanish SyrianAbu Musab, and Mustapha Kamel known asAbu Hamza al-Masri, among others.[4] The jihadist ideology ofQutbism has been identified variously as the ideological foundation of the movement,[5][22][23] a closely related Islamist ideology,[5][24][25][26] or a variety of revolutionary Salafism.[5][25] While Salafism had littlepresence in Europe during the 1980s, Salafi jihadists had by the mid-2000s acquired "a burgeoning presence in Europe, having attemptedmore than 30 terrorist attacks among E.U. countries since 2001".[13] While many see the influence and activities of Salafi jihadists as in decline after 2000 (at least in the United States),[27][28] others see the movement as growing in the wake of theArab Spring, the breakdown of state control inLibya andSyria in 2014,[29] and theU.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021.[30]
In the words ofMadawi al Rasheed, Salafi jihadism is "a hybrid construction deeply rooted in the last three decades of the twentieth century that is desperate to anchor itself in an authentic Islamic tradition, yet reflecting serious borrowing from the discourse of Western modernity".[31]
According to Madawi Al Rasheed, ideology of Jihadi-Salafism is a post-modern hybridity whose sources can be found in the past and present, in both the Muslim world and Western world. Thus, it is the outcome of cross-fertilisation of sources that are both transnational and local, resulting in a devastating ideology that re-invents the past to induce a "cataclysmic war between two binary oppositions". Contemporary Salafi-Jihadis are primarily products of modernity rather than an extension of traditional Muslim societies. Thus, Jihadis seek to create a mimicry of the West of which they want to be part of, but reject the other leading to violence. However, more than the ideology itself, it is the circumstances that explain the appeal of Jihadis which is the real cause of violence. The traditional Mujahideen of the previous eras, such as ‘Omar al-Mukhtar, ‘Abd al-Qadir, al-Jaza’iri and ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam were a different category of people, products of different social circumstances who sought to liberate occupied lands from foreignimperialist andcolonial penetrations. Although they gained solidarity across the Islamic World, they were not transnational actors. Salafi-Jihadis on the other hand, die for an imagined globalised faith, shares Western modernity (despite its critique), and advocate aneo-liberalfree-market rationale, in their quest for a global World Order. Thus Jihadi-Salafism has as much to do with the West as with Salafism or religion in general.[32]
Another definition of Salafi jihadism, offered byMohammed M. Hafez, is an "extreme form ofSunni Islamism that rejectsdemocracy andShia rule". Hafez distinguished them from apolitical and conservative Salafi scholars (such asMuhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani,Muhammad ibn al Uthaymeen,Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz,Wasiullah Abbas,Zubair Ali Zai, andAbdul-Azeez ibn Abdullaah Aal ash-Shaikh) but also from thesahwa movement associated withSalman al-Ouda orSafar Al-Hawali.[33] According toMichael Horowitz, Salafi jihad is an ideology that identifies the "alleged source of the Muslims' conundrum" in the "persistent attacks and humiliation of Muslims on the part of an anti-Islamic alliance of what it terms 'Crusaders', 'Zionists', and 'apostates'."[34] The concept was described by the American-Israeli scholarMartin Kramer as an academic term that "will inevitably be [simplified to]jihadism or thejihadist movement in popular usage."[14]
According to political scientistGilles Kepel, Salafist jihadism combined "respect for the sacred texts in their most literal form, ... with an absolute commitment to jihad, whose number-one target had to be America, perceived as the greatest enemy of the faith."[35] 13th-centuryHanbalite juristTaqi al-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyya (1328 C.E/ 728 A.H), a maverick cleric known for his fierce anti-Mongol stances, is the most authoritative classical theologian in Salafi-jihadist discourse.[36]
According to Mohammed M. Hafez, contemporary jihadi Salafism is characterized by "five features":
Another researcher,Thomas Hegghammer, has outlined five objectives shared by jihadis:[37]
Robin Wright notes the importance in Salafi jihadist groups of
Al Jazeera journalist Jamal Al Sharif describes Salafi jihadism as combining "the doctrinal content and approach of Salafism and organisational models fromMuslim Brotherhood organisations. Their motto emerged as 'Salafism in doctrine, modernity in confrontation'".[39]
Much of Salafi-Jihadist discourse borrows heavily from Sayyid Qutb's concept ofjahiliyya (pre-Islamic ignorance),hakimiyya (Sovereignty of God) andtakfir (excommunication). Prominent contemporary ideologues of Salafi jihadism, such asAbu Muhammad al-Maqdisi andAbu Qatada al Filistini, drew heavily from the works of Sayyid Qutb and adopted concepts ofAl-Wala wal Bara from his writings. Maqdisi’s interpretation ofAl-Wala wal Bara marked a distinct shift from traditional Salafi theology by introducingTakfiri principles to it. Adopting a binary world-view, Maqdisi excommunicated contemporary governments in the Muslim World and their collaborators as apostates. Salafi Jihadists also rejectdemocracy as it contradicts their interpretation ofHakimiyya.Salafi Islamists, while supporting revolutions to topple authoritarian regimes, permit the participation in democratic systems across the world toIslamize the political order through the existing structures. Theserevolutionary Islamist doctrines advocating violent overthrow of the existing political order, is seen as heretical by Quietist Salafis.[40]
Salafi jihadists distinguish themselves from Quietist salafis whom they label "sheikist", so named because – the jihadists believe – that the "sheikists" had forsaken adoration of God for adoration of "the oil sheiks of the Arabian peninsula, with theAl Saud family at their head". Principal among the sheikist scholars wasAbd al-Aziz ibn Baz – "the archetypal court ulema [ulama al-balat]". These allegedly "false" salafi "had to be striven against and eliminated", but even more infuriating was the Salafi Islamists of theMuslim Brotherhood, whom the Salafi jihadists considered excessively moderate and lacking in a stricter literalist interpretation of holy texts.[35]
Quietist Salafi scholarship in turn, denounce Salafi jihadism as a heterodox ideology far-removed from Salafi orthodoxy.[18] Quietist Salafi scholars such asAlbani,Ibn Uthaymeen,Ibn Baz,Saleh Al-Fawzan, andMuqbil ibn Hadi condemned rebellion against the rulers as "the most corrupt of innovations", and forbade Muslims "to take it upon himself to execute a ruling" which is under the jurisdiction of the rulers.[41][42][43][44][45][Note 2] Salafi jihadists contend that they are not dividing theMuslim community because, in their view, the rulers ofMuslim-majority countries and other self-proclaimed Muslims they attack have deviated from Islam and are actuallyapostates orfalse Muslims.[5][7][21]
Quietist Salafis criticizeAl-Qaeda andIslamic State asQutbists and often labelSalafi Islamists as "Surooris". According to them, these organizations are directly opposed toSalafiyya and itsmanhaj (methodology). Major doctrines of the Salafi Jihadist movement have its roots in early heterodox sects such as theKharijites. As a result, heavy creedal disparities exist between traditional Salafis and Salafi Jihadists. Mainstream Salafism, which consists of both quietist and political Salafis, reject the violence of Jihadists. Major Purist Salafiulema condemn certain Salafi-jihadist organisations asKharijites.[40]
TheEgyptianIslamist movements of 1950s are generally considered to be the precursors of contemporary Salafi-Jihadist movements.[40] The theological doctrines of theSyrian-Egyptian Islamic scholarSayyid Rashid Rida (1865–1935 CE) greatly influenced these movements. Amongst his notable ideas included reviving the traditions of the early Muslim generations (Salaf) as well ridding theIslamic World of Western influences andJahiliyya by specifically looking up to the model ofKhulafa Rashidun. Rida's ideas would set the foundations of future Salafi-Jihadist movements and greatly influence Islamists likeHasan al-Banna,Sayyid Qutb, and otherIslamic fundamentalist figures.[47][48][49][50] Rashid Rida fervently opposed Western ideas and foreign influences, and his activities were focused on overturning the encroachment ofsecular laws across the Muslim World following theFirst World War. Rida believed that deference toman-made laws was tantamount to thepolytheism of "Jahiliyya" and campaigned for the re-establishment of aSunni Caliphate that would unite the Muslims. Only this, Rida asserted, alongside the "return to true and pure Islam" exemplified by the tenets of theSalafiyya movement; could liberate Muslim World fromcolonialism and restore pastIslamic glory.[51][52]Rida's treatises laid the theological framework of future militants who would eventually establish the Salafi-Jihadi movement.[51][53]
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Fore-runners of Salafi jihadism principally includes Egyptian militant Islamist scholar and theoreticianSayyid Qutb, who developed "the intellectual underpinnings", in the 1950s, for what would later become the doctrine of most Jihadist organizations around the world, includingAl-Qaeda andISIS.[54][55][56][57] Going radically further than his predecessors, Qutb called upon Muslims to form an ideologically committed vanguard that would wage armedJihad against the secular and Western-allied governments in theArab World, until the restoration ofIslamic rule.[51][53] Sayyid Qutb's brother,Muhammad Qutb was one of Osama bin Laden’s teachers at university. Sayyid Qutb has been described as "Al-Qaeda's Philosopher".Ayman al Zawahiri, the Egyptian who was second in command and co-founder ofAl-Qaeda, called Qutb, "the most prominent theoretician of the fundamentalist movements".[58][59]
In his writings, both before and after joining theMuslim Brotherhood Qutb argued that the Muslim world had reached a crisis point and that the Islamic world has been replaced bypagan ignorance ofJahiliyyah, (which directly translates to "ignorance", a term used by Muslims to describe the "dark" ages ofpre-Islamic Arabia). When Qutb went abroad for a two-year scholarship to theUnited States, it is said he came back with extremist radical beliefs. He used what's been often described by scholars as his "genuine literary excellence" to spread these views of western criticism to form the main intellectual doctrine for theMuslim Brotherhood, which later be adopted by most terrorist organizations worldwide.[60][61]
Qutbism doctrine ofIslam interpretation emphasizes how the secular, infidel Muslim leaders and populations have fallen to imitating the western way of life, and that before any prosperity would occur, the Muslim world must revert to theCaliphate-ageShari'ah Law instead of "Man-made laws". He issued ideological & religious debates stating that the violent means are justifiable under Islamic Law for an end as great as returning theIslamic State "days of glory", and these means are often leading a victorious violentholy war (Jihad) against theWest.[62]
A part of his writings which have influenced Islamists and terrorist organizations on the nature of The West, can be found in his book "The America that I Have Seen", which he wrote immediately after returning toEgypt from theUnited States. In it he complained of Westernmaterialism,individual freedoms, economic system,racism, brutalboxing matches, "poor"haircuts,[63] superficiality in conversations and friendships,[64] restrictions ondivorce, enthusiasm forsports, lack ofartistic feeling,[64] "animal-like"mixing of the sexes (which "went on even in churches"),[65] and strong support for the newIsraeli state.[66]
He was appalled by what he perceived as loose sexual openness of American men and women. Qutb noted with disapproval the openly displayed sexuality of American women stating in the same influential bookThe America that I Have Seen:
the American girl is well acquainted with her body's seductive capacity. She knows it lies in the face, and in expressive eyes, and thirsty lips. She knows seductiveness lies in the round breasts, the full buttocks, and in the shapely thighs, sleek legs – and she shows all this and does not hide it.[63]
On 29 August 1966,Sayyid Qutb wasexecuted by hanging by Egyptian president'sGamal Abdel-Nasser's regime for his alleged role in the president's assassination plot.[67][68][69][70] This would later paint him as an Islamic martyr orshahid (he is often called "Shahid Sayyid Qutb" or Sayyid Qutb al-Shahid by admirers) among supporters & Islamist circles, particularly as the trial was alleged to be ashow trial.[71] Qutb wrote his major Islamist works (a commentary of the Qur'an,Fi Zilal al-Qur'an (In the Shade of the Qur'an), and a manifesto of political Islam calledMa'alim fi-l-Tariq (Milestones), while incarcerated and allegedly tortured. This, alongside his allegedly extrajudicial execution, elevated the value of these two major writings, giving his radical, violent Islamist doctrine in his writings a stronger influence over future terrorist organizations.[72][73]
The crushing defeat of various Arab states in the 1967Six-Day War led to the de-legitimization of socialist and nationalist ideologies across the Arab world. Their demise provided a fertile ground for theSalafiyya movement, which spread across the Arab world as well as the wider Islamic world. The rise of oil industry in Gulf states also brought in a large-workforce. The workforce embraced Salafi doctrines and founded Salafi organisations as they returned to their home-countries.[40]
Beginning from 1970s, various Islamist and Jihadist factions attempted to idealize traditionalSalafiyya, recasting it as a totalizing political system based on the doctrines of Sayyid Qutb. Majority of Salafis traditionally viewedSalafiyya as a scholarly movement that revived the religious faith of Muslims through teaching and devout adherence to Islamic decrees. Additionally, they advocated Salafism to remain uncontaminated from politics. However, a minority sought the establishment of an Islamic system through violent means, based on Sayyid Qutb's concepts ofHakimiyya (Sovereignty of God). They advocated a global Jihad, with clear political overtones, to fight for Muslim liberation across national boundaries. This movement came to be known as Salafi-Jihadism.[40] Groups likeTakfir wal-Hijra, who kidnapped and murdered an Egyptian ex-government minister in 1978, also inspired some of "the tactics and methods" used by Al Qaeda.[13]
Gilles Kepel writes that theSalafis whom he encountered in Europe in the 1980s, were "totally apolitical".[11][13] However, by the mid-1990s, he met some who felt jihad in the form of "violence and terrorism" was "justified to realize their political objectives". The mingling of many Salafists who were alienated from mainstream European society with violentjihadists created "a volatile mixture".[13]
In the 1990s, militant Islamists of theal-Jama'a al-Islamiyya were active in theterrorist attacks on police, government officials, and foreign tourists in Egypt, and theArmed Islamic Group of Algeria was a principal extremist group in theAlgerian Civil War.[11] InAfghanistan, theTaliban were adherents of theDeobandi, not the Salafi school of Islam, but they closely co-operated with bin Laden and various Salafi-jihadist leaders.[11]CIA officerMarc Sageman described Salafi jihadism as a "Muslim revivalist social movement" with "roots in Egypt". According to Sageman, Salafi Jihadists are influenced by the strategy of prominent Islamist Egyptians such asSayyid Qutb andMuhammad 'Abd al-Salam Faraj, who advocated the revolutionary overthrow of secular regimes throughJihad and the establishment of Islamic states.[74]
In his research, Seth Jones of theRand Corporation finds that Salafi-jihadist numbers and activity have increased from 2007 to 2013. According to his research:
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"Theoreticians" of Salafist jihadism included Afghan jihad veterans such as the PalestinianAbu Qatada, the SyrianMustafa Setmariam Nasar, the Egyptian Mustapha Kamel, known asAbu Hamza al-Masri.[75]Osama bin Laden was its most well-known leader. The dissident Saudi preachersSalman al-Ouda andSafar Al-Hawali, were held in high esteem by this school.Al Qaeda leaderAyman Al Zawahiri would praiseSayyid Qutb, stating that Qutb's call formed the ideological inspiration for the contemporary Salafi-Jihadist movement.[76] Other leading figures in the movement includeAnwar al-Awlaki, former leader ofAl-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP);[77]Abu Bakar Bashir, leader of the banned Indonesian militant group (Jema'ah Islamiyah);Nasir al-Fahd, Saudi Arabian Salafi-Jihadist scholar who opposes the Saudi state, and reportedly pledged allegiance toISIS;[78]Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of theNigerianBoko Haram;[79]Omar Bakri Muhammad,[80]Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of terrorist groupIslamic State of Iraq and Levant;[81][82] etc.
Murad al-Shishani ofThe Jamestown Foundation states there have been three generations of Salafi-jihadists: those waging jihad inAfghanistan,Bosnia andIraq. As of the mid-2000s, Arab fighters in Iraq were "the latest and most important development of the global Salafi-jihadi movement".[83] These fighters were usually not Iraqis, but volunteers who had come to Iraq from other countries, mainlySaudi Arabia. Unlike in earlier Salafi jihadi actions, Egyptians "are no longer the chief ethnic group".[83] According to Bruce Livesey Salafist jihadists are currently a "burgeoning presence in Europe, having attempted more than 30 terrorist attacks amongEU countries" from September 2001 to the beginning of 2005".[13]
According to Mohammed M. Hafez, in Iraq jihadi salafi are pursuing a "system-collapse strategy" whose goal is to install an "Islamic emirate based onSalafi dominance, similar to theTaliban regime in Afghanistan." In addition to occupation/coalition personnel they target mainly Iraqi security forces andShia civilians, but also "foreign journalists, translators and transport drivers and the economic and physical infrastructure of Iraq."[33]
Salafist jihadist groups includeAl Qaeda,[16] the now defunct AlgerianArmed Islamic Group (GIA),[35] and the Egyptian groupAl-Gama'a al-Islamiyya which still exists.
In theAlgerian Civil War 1992–1998, the GIA was one of the two major Islamist armed groups (the other being the Armee Islamique du Salut or AIS) fighting the Algerian army and security forces. The GIA included veterans of the Afghanistan jihad and unlike the more moderate AIS, fought to destabilize the Algerian government with terror attacks designed to "create an atmosphere of general insecurity".[84] It considered jihad in Algeriafard ayn or an obligation for all (sane adult male) Muslims,[84] and sought to "purge" Algeria of "the ungodly" and create an Islamic state. It pursued what Gilles Kepel called "wholesalemassacres of civilians", targeting French-speaking intellectuals, foreigners,[84] and Islamists deemed too moderate, and took itscampaign of bombing to France, which supported the Algerian government against the Islamists. Although over 150,000 were killed in the civil war,[85] the GIA eventually lost popular support and was crushed by the security forces.[86] Remnants of the GIA continued on as "Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat", which as of 2015 calls itselfal-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.[87]
Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, (the Islamic Group) another Salafist-jihadi movement[88] fought an insurgency against the Egyptian government from 1992 to 1998 during which at least 800 Egyptian policemen and soldiers, jihadists, and civilians were killed. Outside of Egypt it is best known for aNovember 1997 attack at the Temple of Hatshepsut inLuxor where fifty-eight foreign tourists trapped inside the temple were hunted down and hacked and shot to death. The group declared a ceasefire in March 1999,[89] although as of 2012 it is still active in jihad against theBa'athist Syrian regime.[88]
Perhaps the most famous and effective Salafist jihadist group was Al-Qaeda.[90] Al-Qaeda evolved from theMaktab al-Khidamat (MAK), or the "Services Office", a Muslim organization founded in 1984 to raise and channel funds and recruit foreignmujahideen for the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. It was established inPeshawar, Pakistan, byOsama bin Laden andAbdullah Yusuf Azzam. As it became apparent that the jihad had compelled theSoviet military to abandon its mission in Afghanistan, somemujahideen called for the expansion of their operations to include Islamist struggles in other parts of the world, and Al Qaeda was formed by bin Laden on August 11, 1988.[91][92] Members were to making a pledge (bayat) to follow one's superiors.[93] Al-Qaeda emphasized jihad against the "far enemy", by which it meant the United States. In 1996, it announced its jihad to expel foreign troops and interests from what they considered Islamic lands, and in 1998, it issued a fatwa calling on Muslims to kill Americans and their allies whenever and wherever they could. Among its most notable acts of violence were the1998 bombings of US embassies inDar es Salaam andNairobi that killed over 200 people;[94] and the 9/11 attacks of 2001 that killed almost 3,000 people and caused many billions of dollars in damage.
According to Mohammed M. Hafez, "as of 2006 the two major groups within the jihadi Salafi camp" in Iraq were theMujahidin Shura Council and theAnsar al Sunna Group.[33] There are also a number of small jihadist Salafist groups inAzerbaijan.[95]
The group leading the Islamist insurgency inSouthern Thailand in 2006 by carrying out most of the attacks and cross-border operations,[96]BRN-Koordinasi, favours Salafi ideology. It works in a loosely organized strictlyclandestine cell system dependent on hard-line religious leaders for direction.[97][98]
Jund Ansar Allah is, or was, an armed Salafist jihadist organization in theGaza Strip. On August 14, 2009, the group's spiritual leader, SheikhAbdel Latif Moussa, announced during Friday sermon the establishment of an Islamic emirate in the Palestinian territories attacking the ruling authority, theIslamist groupHamas, for failing to enforceSharia law. Hamas forces responded to his sermon by surrounding hisIbn Taymiyyah mosque complex and attacking it. In the fighting that ensued, 24 people (including Sheikh Abdel Latif Moussa himself) were killed and over 130 were wounded.[99]
In 2011, Salafist jihadists were actively involved with protests againstKing Abdullah II of Jordan,[100] and the kidnapping and killing of Italianpeace activistVittorio Arrigoni inHamas-controlledGaza Strip.[101][102]
In the North Caucasus region of Russia, theCaucasus Emirate replaced the nationalism of Muslim Chechnya and Dagestan with a hard-line Salafist-takfiri jihadist ideology. They are immensely focused on upholding the concept oftawhid (purist monotheism), and fiercely reject any practice ofshirk,taqlid,ijtihad andbid‘ah. They also believe in the complete separation between the Muslim and the non-Muslim, by propagatingAl Wala' Wal Bara' and declaringtakfir against any Muslim who (they believe) is a mushrik (polytheist) and does not return to the observance of tawhid and the strict literal interpretation of the Quran and the Sunnah as followed byMuhammad and his companions (Sahaba).[103]
In Syria and Iraq bothJabhat al-Nusra andISIS[104] have been described as Salafist-jihadist.Jabhat al-Nusra has been described as possessing "a hard-line Salafi-Jihadist ideology" and being one of "the most effective" groups fighting the regime.[105] Writing after ISIS victories in Iraq, Hassan Hassan believes ISIS is a reflection of "ideological shakeup of Sunni Islam's traditional Salafism" since the Arab Spring, where salafism, "traditionally inward-looking and loyal to the political establishment", has "steadily, if slowly", been eroded by Salafism-jihadism.[104]
Boko Haram in Nigeria is a Salafi jihadism group[106] that has killed tens of thousands of people, displaced 2.3 million from their homes,[107]
In France, in 2015police say that salafism is represented in 90 out of 2500 investigated religious communities, which was double the number compared to five years earlier.[108] In November and December 2016, authorities closed four salafist mosque inEcquevilly, theEl Islah mosque in Villiers-sur-Marne and two inSeine-Saint-Denis (Clichy-sous-Bois andStains).[109]
In December 2017, a salafi-Jihadist mosque inMarseille was closed by authorities for preaching about violent jihad.[110] In August 2018, after theEuropean Court of Human Rights approved the decision, French authorities deported the salafi-Jihadist preacher Elhadi Doudi to his home countryAlgeria because of his radical messages he spread in Marseille.[111]
According toDeutsche Welle, Salafism is a growing movement inGermany whose aim of aCaliphate is incompatible with aWestern democracy.[112] According to the GermanFederal Agency for Civic Education, nearly allIslamist terrorists are Salafists, but not all Salafists are terrorists. Therefore, the agency evaluated the Salafist movement beyond the actions by Salafists and analysed the ideological framework of Salafism which is in conflict with the minimal foundations of a democratic and open society. Salafists calling for the death penalty forapostasy is in conflict with freedom of religion. The dualistic view on "true believers" and "false believers" in practice means people being treated unequally on religious grounds. The call for a religious state in the form of a caliphate means that Salafists reject therule of law and thesovereignty of the people's rule. The Salafist view on gender and society leads to discrimination and the subjugation of women.[113]
Estimates by Germaninterior intelligence service show that it grew from 3,800 members in 2011 to 7,500 members in 2015.[114] In Germany, most of the recruitment to the movement is done on the Internet and also on the streets,[114] a propaganda drive which mostly attracts youth.[114] There are two ideological camps, one advocatesSalafi-Activism and directs its recruitment efforts towards non-Muslims and non-Salafist Muslims to gain influence in society.[114] The other and minority movement, the jihadist Salafism, advocates gaining influence by the use of violence and nearly all identified terrorist cells in Germany came from Salafist circles.[114]
In 2015,Sigmar Gabriel,Vice-Chancellor of Germany, spoke out, saying "We needSaudi Arabia to solve the regional conflicts, but we must at the same time make clear that the time to look away is past. Wahhabi mosques are financed all over the world by Saudi Arabia. In Germany, many dangerous Islamists come from these communities."[115] In November 2016, nationwide raids were conducted on the Salafi-IslamistTrue Religion organization.[116][117][118]
According to the GermanFederal Office for the Protection of the Constitution inCologne, the number of Salafists in Germany grew from 9,700 in December 2016 to 10,800 in December 2017. In addition to the rise, the Salafist movement in Germany was increasingly fractured which made them harder to monitor by authorities.[112] According to the office, street distributions ofQuran took place less frequently which was described as a success for the authorities.[112] Radicalisation changed character, from taking place in mosques and interregional Salafist organisations to more often happening in small circles, which increasingly formed on the internet. A further development was a rise in participation of women.[112] According to the FFGI atGoethe University Frankfurt, wahhabist ideology is spread in Germany as in other European country mostly by an array of informal, personal and organisational networks, where organisations closely associated with the government of Saudi Arabia such as theMuslim World League (WML) and theWorld Association of Muslim Youth are actively participating.[119]
In February 2017, the German Salafist mosque organisationBerliner Fussilet-Moscheeverein was banned by authorities. Anis Amri, the perpetrator of the2016 Berlin truck attack, was said to be among its visitors. In March 2017, the German Muslim community organisationDeutschsprachige Islamkreis Hildesheim was also banned after investigators found that its members were preparing to travel to the conflict zone in Syria to fight for the Islamic State. According to theFederal Agency for Civic Education, these examples show that certain Salafist mosques not only concern themselves with religious matters, but also prepare serious crimes and terrorist activities.[120]
Representatives from the mosque inGävle arepromoting this variant of Islam, which is considered extreme in Sweden. According to researcher Aje Carlbom atMalmö University the organisation which is behind the missionary work is the Swedish United Dawah Center, abbreviated SUDC.[121] SUDC is characterised as a salafist group by a researcher ofreligious history atStockholm University and it has many links to the British MuslimAbdur Raheem Green.[121] According to professor Mohammed Fazlhashemi, salafi-Jihadists opposerational theology and they hateshia Muslims most of all.[121] Three Muslim community organisations in Malmö reportedly invitedantisemitic andhomophobic salafist lecturers such asSalman al-Ouda. One of the organisations, Alhambra is a student society atMalmö University.[122][undue weight? –discuss]
InHässleholm theLjusets moské (translated: "mosque of the light") is spreading salafi ideology and portrayshia Muslims as apostates and traitors insocial media while the atrocities of theIslamic state are never mentioned.[123] In 2009 the imam Abu al-Hareth at the mosque was sentenced to six years in jail for the attempted murder of a local shia Muslim from Iraq and another member set fire to a shia mosque inMalmö.[123] In 2017,Swedish Security Police reported that the number ofjihadists in Sweden had risen to thousands from about 200 in 2010.[124] Based on social media analysis, an increase was noted in 2013.[125] According to police in Sweden, salafist-Jihadists affect the communities where they are active.[126]
According to Swedish researcherMagnus Ranstorp, salafi-Jihadism is antidemocratic, homophobic and aims to subjugate women and is therefore opposed to a societal order founded on democracy.[126] According toAnas Khalifa [sv], the salafi movement is present at nearly every major mosque in Sweden "in some form".[127]
The report found that Middle Eastern nations are providing financial support to mosques and Islamic educational institutions, which have been linked to the spread of Salafi-Jihadist materials which expoused "an illiberal, bigoted" ideology.[128][129]
According toSeth G. Jones at theRAND Corporation, as of 2014, there were around 50 Salafist-jihadist groups in existence or recently in existence ("present" in the list indicates a group's continued existence as of 2014). (Jones defines Salafi-jihadist groups as those groups which emphasize the importance of returning to a "pure" form of Islam, the form of Islam which was practiced by theSalaf, the pious ancestors; and those groups which believe that violent jihad isfard ‘ayn (a personal religious duty).[8]
| Name of group | Base of operations | Years |
|---|---|---|
| Abdullah Azzam Brigades (Yusuf al-Uyayri Battalions) | Saudi Arabia | 2009–present |
| Abdullah Azzam Brigades (Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions) | Lebanon | 2009–present |
| Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) | Philippines | 1991–present |
| Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA) | Yemen | 1994–present |
| Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI) | Somalia,Ethiopia | 1994–2002 |
| Al-Qaeda (core) | Pakistan | 1988–present |
| Al-Qaeda in Aceh (a.k.a. Tanzim al Qa’ida Indonesia for Serambi Makkah) | Indonesia | 2009–2011 |
| Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia) | Saudi Arabia | 2002–2008 |
| Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen) | Yemen | 2008–present |
| al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM, formerly the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, GSPC) | Algeria | 1998–present |
| Al Takfir wal al-Hijrah | Egypt (Sinai Peninsula) | 2011–present |
| Al-Mulathamun (Mokhtar Belmokhtar) | Mali,Libya, Algeria | 2012–2013 |
| Al-Murabitun (Mokhtar Belmokhtar) | Mali, Libya, Algeria | 2013–2017 |
| Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia- Union of Islamic Courts (ARS/UIC) | Somalia,Eritrea | 2006–2009 |
| Ansar al-Islam | Iraq | 2001–present |
| Ansar al-Sharia (Egypt) | Egypt | 2012–present |
| Ansar al-Sharia (Libya) | Libya | 2012–2017 |
| Ansar al-Sharia (Mali) | Mali | 2012–present |
| Ansar al-Sharia (Tunisia) | Tunisia | 2011–present |
| Ansar Bait al-Maqdis (a.k.a. Ansar Jerusalem) | Gaza Strip, Egypt (Sinai Peninsula) | 2012–present |
| Ansaru | Nigeria | 2012–present |
| Osbat al-Ansar (AAA) | Lebanon | 1985–present |
| Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF, a.k.a. BIFM) | Philippines | 2010–present |
| Boko Haram | Nigeria | 2003–present |
| Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (Basayev faction) | Russia (North Caucasus) | 1994–2007 |
| East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM, a.k.a. Turkestan Islamic Party) | China (Xinjiang) | 1989–present |
| Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) | Egypt | 1978–2001 |
| Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen | Somalia | 2002–present |
| Harakat al-Shuada'a al Islamiyah (a.k.a. Islamic Martyr's Movement, IMM) | Libya | 1996–2007 |
| Harakat Ansar al-Din | Mali | 2011–2017 |
| Hizbul al Islam | Somalia | 2009–2010 |
| Imarat Kavkaz (IK, or Caucasus Emirate) | Russia (North Caucasus) | 2007–2015 |
| Indian Mujahedeen | India | 2005–present |
| Islamic Jihad Union (a.k.a. Islamic Jihad Group) | Uzbekistan | 2002–present |
| Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) | Uzbekistan,Kyrgyzstan | 1997–present |
| Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) | Iraq, Syria | 2004–present |
| Jabhat al-Nusrah | Syria | 2011–present |
| Jaish ul-Adl | Iran | 2013–present |
| Jaish al-Islam (a.k.a. Tawhid and Jihad Brigades) | Gaza Strip, Egypt (Sinai Peninsula) | 2005–present |
| Jaish al-Ummah (JaU) | Gaza Strip | 2007–present |
| Jamaat Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis | Egypt (Sinai Peninsula) | 2011–present |
| Jamaat Ansarullah (JA) | Tajikistan | 2010–present |
| Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) | Indonesia | 2008–present |
| Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) | Indonesia,Malaysia, Philippines,Singapore | 1993–present |
| Jondullah | Pakistan | 2003–present |
| Jund al-Sham | Lebanon, Syria, Gaza Strip, Qatar,Afghanistan | 1999–2008 |
| Khalifa Islamiyah Mindanao (KIM) | Philippines | 2013–present |
| Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT, a.k.a. Mansoorian) | Pakistan (Kashmir) | 1990–present |
| Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) | Libya | 1990–present |
| Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) | Morocco,Western Europe | 1998–present |
| Movement for Tawhid and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) | Mali | 2011–2013 |
| Muhammad Jamal Network (MJN) | Egypt | 2011–present |
| Mujahideen Shura Council | Gaza Strip, Egypt (Sinai Peninsula) | 2011–present |
| Salafia Jihadia (As-Sirat al Moustaquim) | Morocco | 1995–present |
| Tawhid wal Jihad | Iraq | 1999–2004 |
| Tunisian Combat Group (TCG) | Tunisia, Western Europe | 2000–2011 |
In several places and times, jihadis have taken control of an area and they have ruled it as anIslamic state, such asISIL in Syria and Iraq.
Among jihadists, establishing an uncompromising form ofsharia law is a core value and goal, but strategies differ over how quickly this should be done. Observers such as the journalist Robert Worth have described jihadis as being torn between wanting to build a truly Islamic order gradually from the bottom up in order to avoid alienating non-jihadi Muslims (the desire ofOsama bin Laden), and not wanting to wait for the creation of an Islamic state.[130]
In Zinjibar, Yemen, AQAP established an "emirate" which lasted from May 2011 until the summer of 2012. It emphasized (and publicized with a media campaign) "uncharacteristically gentle" good governance over its conquered territory rather than strict enforcement of sharia law—rebuilding infrastructure, quashing banditry, and resolving legal disputes.[131] One jihadi veteran of Yemen described its approach towards the local population:
You have to take a gradual approach with them when it comes to religious practices. You can't beat people for drinking alcohol when they don't even know the basics of how to pray. We have to first stop the great sins, and then move gradually to the lesser and lesser ones. ... Try to avoid enforcing Islamic punishments as much as possible unless you are forced to do so.[131]
However AQAP's "clemency drained away under the pressure of war",[131] and the area was taken back by the government. The failure of this model (according toNew York Times correspondentRobert Worth), may have "taught" jihadis a lesson on the need to instill fear.[131]
ISIS is believed to have used a manifesto which is titled "The Management of Savagery" as its model. The manifesto emphasizes the need to create areas of "savagery"—i.e., lawlessness—in enemy territory. Once the enemy was too exhausted and weakened from the lawlessness (particularly terrorism) to continue to try to govern its territory, the nucleus of a new caliphate could be established in its place.[132] The author of "The Management of Savagery", did not place a lot of emphasis on winning the sympathy of local Muslims, instead, he placed a lot of emphasis on the use of extreme violence, writing that: "One who previously engaged in jihad knows that it is naught but violence, crudeness, terrorism, frightening [others] and massacring – I am talking about jihad and fighting, not about Islam and one should not confuse them."[132] (Social-media posts from ISIS territory "suggest that individual executions happen more or less continually, and mass executions occur every few weeks", according to journalistGraeme Wood.[133])
In recent years, the Salafi methodology has come to be associated with the jihad of extremist groups that advocate the killing of innocent civilians. TheEuropean Parliament, in a report commissioned in 2013, claimed thatWahhabi and Salafi-Jihadi groups are involved, mainly viaSaudi charities, in the support and supply of arms to rebel groups around the world.[134] Some Salafi scholars appear to support violent extremism. The Egyptian Salafi-Jihadist cleric Mahmoud Shaaban "appeared on a religious television channel calling for the deaths of main opposition figuresMohammed ElBaradei – aNobel Peace Prize laureate – and former presidential candidateHamdeen Sabahi".[135][136] Some other Islamic groups, particularly amongstSufis, have also complained about extremism among some Salafi.
According to the British Researcher Anabel Inge:
"While aspects of their purist creed are shared by Jihadi groups, most—probably the vast majority of—Salafis in Europe are explicitly against terrorism. ... In Britain, the 'Salafi' label has been associated with non-violent, often quietist groups. ... One preacher, for instance, encouraged his online followers to 'mass distribute' an anti-ISIS leaflet he had written, in which he urged anyone with information about terrorist plots to 'inform the authorities'. That same preacher reported receiving death threats from ISIS sympathizers. ... I found no evidence of so-called brainwashing. On the contrary, I found that the Salafi conversion process was largely intellectual, rather than based on social or other pressures."
Traditional Salafis have rejected the use of violence by Salafi-Jihadists. The Saudi scholarMuhammad ibn al Uthaymeen considered suicide bombing to be unlawful[138][139] and the scholar Abdul Muhsin al-Abbad wrote a treatise entitled:According to which intellect and Religion is Suicide bombings and destruction considered Jihad?.[138]Muhammad Nasiruddin al-Albani stated that "History repeats itself. Everybody claims that the Prophet is their role model. Our Prophet spent the first half of his message makingdawah, and he did not start it with jihad".[140] The vast majority of Salafis reject violence, viewing most Salafi-Jihadist groups as deviants, and are amongst their most vehement critics.[141] It has been noted that the Western association of Salafism with violence stems from writings "through the prism of security studies" that were published in the late 20th century and that continue to persist.[142]
Many Muslim leaders,scholarly figures and dozens of Islamic councils have denounced Salafi jihadism as deviant. Numerous Islamic scholars, of both Salafi and non-Salafi persuasions, have written treatises in which they have compared certain Salafi Jihadists groups likeIslamic State toKharijites.[143] Some scholars, Western policy institutes, and political scientists have asserted that Salafi-Jihadism can be a gateway to violent extremism and terrorism.[144][145][146][147][148][149][150][151][152][153][154]
According to Western analysts, obstacles in countering Salafi jihadism are funding fromoil-rich Gulf nations and private donations which are difficult to track,[155][156][157] Saudi efforts to propagate Salafiyya movement throughout the Muslim world,[158] resentment for Western hegemony, authoritarian Arab regimes, feeling defenseless against foreign aggression and that "Muslim blood is cheap,"[159] weak governance, extremist Salafi preaching that counters moderate voices, and other challenges.[160]
Dutchpolitical scientistAlex P. Schmid states:
"Salafist Jihadism (al-Salafiyya al-Jihadiyya) has managed to establish itself as the dominant ideology of rebellion in the early 21st century, just asFascism andCommunism had been the most violent ideologies of the twentieth century. For a brief moment in 2011, theArab Spring with its non-violent mass demonstrations, seemed to offer an alternative model of rebellion in the absence of democratic regimes but when these mass uprisings were crushed in all countries except Tunisia,jihadism as a non-mass based method of fighting repression and foreign intervention gained the upper hand in the minds of many militant youths."[161][162]
As for uprisings and revolutions against the rulers who are in the Islamic lands, then this is not the way of rectification. And the way of rectification is teaching the Muslims the Book of their Lord and the Sunnah of their Prophet and teaching them the biography of the Prophet (صلى اللهُ عليه وسَلَّم) and the biography of his companions and how they had patience with the poverty, not having (enough) clothes, leaving their homelands and the infectious diseases which befell them in al-Madeenah after they emigrated. Therefore, it is imperative that we nurture the people in being close (to the way) of the companions, and I do not think that we are able to do that (in its entirety) but at least (it should be) close to the way of the companions.
It is impermissible to oppose and rebel against the leader of Muslim affairs. Rather, it is an obligation to obey him and forbidden to oppose him due to what that entails of bloodshed, disunity, and the ruining and alienation of a nation. And you all witness now those lands in which people revolted against their leaders. You see the results such as fighting and killing, bloodshed, and the loss of safety and security when some of these leaderships are not Muslim governments. But when people rebel against their leaders, the same thing occurs – that which occurred in Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and every other place. What if the ruler is Muslim? It is not allowed to oppose him due to what that will result in of bloodshed, the loss of security, the opportunity for non-Muslims to gain control over Muslims, and dissension and division among Muslims.
The noble scholar Shaikh al-Albānī (rahimahullaah, died 1420H) was asked, 'Is that which is known nowadays as a military coup against the ruler mentioned in the Religion or is it an innovation?' So the Shaikh answered: 'There is no basis for these acts in Islām. And it is in opposition to the Islamic manhaj (methodology) with respect to the daʿwah (Islamic call) and creating the right atmosphere for it. Rather it is an innovation introduced by the innovators which has affected some Muslims. This is what I have stated and explained in my notes to al-Aqeedah at-Tahāwiyyah' The great scholar Ibn Bāz (died 1420AH) was asked, 'Is it from the methodology of the Salaf [to] criticize the rulers from the pulpits? And what is the methodology of the Salaf in advising the rulers?' So he answered: 'It is not from the methodology of the Salaf to criticize the rulers from the pulpits, because that would incite chaos, and it would involve not listening and obeying in that which is good. And this would mean becoming engrossed in that which harms and does not benefit. However, the way of advising that the Salaf followed was to write to the ruler, or to convey the advice to the Scholars who would then convey it to him, until he has been directed towards good. So opposing the evil can be done without mentioning the doer. So adultery, intoxicants and interest can be opposed without mentioning the one who is involved in them. And it is enough of an opposition to sins that they be warned against without mentioning that so and so is involved in them, whether it is the ruler, or other than the ruler.' Shaikh Sālih al-Fawzān was asked: 'Respected Shaikh, yourself and your brothers who are scholars in this country are Salafīs – and all praise is due to Allāh – and your method in advising the rulers is that of the Sharīʿah and as the Prophet has explained, yet there are those who find fault with you due to your neglect in openly rejecting the various oppositions [to the Sharīʿah] that have occurred. And yet others make excuses for you by saying that you are under the control and pressure of the state. So do you have any words of direction or clarification to these people?' So Shaikh al-Fawzān answered with clear and unambiguous words: 'There is no doubt that the rulers, just like people besides them, are not infallible. Advising them is an obligation. However, attacking them in the gatherings and upon the pulpits is considered to be the forbidden form of backbiting. And this evil is greater than that which occurred from the ruler since it is backbiting and because of what results from backbiting such as the sowing of the seeds of discord, causing disunity and affecting the progression of daʿwah (the call to Islām). Hence what is obligatory is to make sure advice reaches the rulers by sound and trustworthy avenues, not by publicizing and causing commotion. And as for reviling the Scholars of this country, that they do not give advice [to the rulers], or that they are being controlled in their affairs, this is a method by which separation between the Scholars, the youth and the society is desired, until it becomes possible for the mischief-maker to sow the seeds of his evil. This is because when evil suspicions are harbored about the Scholars, trust is no longer placed in them and then the chance is available for the biased partisans to spread their poison. And I believe that this thought is actually a schemed plot that has come into this country, and those who are behind it are foreign to this country. It is obligatory upon the Muslims to be cautious of it.'
Shaykh Ibn ʿUthaymīn said: And rebelling against the ruler, there is no doubt it is from the most corrupt of innovations, the most vile of them and the most evil of them. The ummah was not torn to pieces except due to rebelling against its rulers.
{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)French academics have put the term into academic circulation as 'jihadist-Salafism.' The qualifier of Salafism – an historical reference to the precursor of these movements – will inevitably be stripped away in popular usage.
Another interesting aspect of Salafi Jihadism is that the traditional Salafi scholars debunk it as a Salafi hybrid and that it is far removed from the traditional Salafism.
al Qaeda is no longer seen as an existential threat to the West ... the hysteria over a global conspiracy against the West has faded.
Terrorism – most of it arising from domestic groups – was a much bigger problem in the United States during the 1970s than it has been since the Twin Towers were toppled.
As for uprisings and revolutions against the rulers who are in the Islamic lands, then this is not the way of rectification. And the way of rectification is teaching the Muslims the Book of their Lord and the Sunnah of their Prophet and teaching them the biography of the Prophet (صلى اللهُ عليه وسَلَّم) and the biography of his companions and how they had patience with the poverty, not having (enough) clothes, leaving their homelands and the infectious diseases which befell them in al-Madeenah after they emigrated. Therefore, it is imperative that we nurture the people in being close (to the way) of the companions, and I do not think that we are able to do that (in its entirety) but at least (it should be) close to the way of the companions.
It is impermissible to oppose and rebel against the leader of Muslim affairs. Rather, it is an obligation to obey him and forbidden to oppose him due to what that entails of bloodshed, disunity, and the ruining and alienation of a nation. And you all witness now those lands in which people revolted against their leaders. You see the results such as fighting and killing, bloodshed, and the loss of safety and security when some of these leaderships are not Muslim governments. But when people rebel against their leaders, the same thing occurs – that which occurred in Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and every other place. What if the ruler is Muslim? It is not allowed to oppose him due to what that will result in of bloodshed, the loss of security, the opportunity for non-Muslims to gain control over Muslims, and dissension and division among Muslims.
The noble scholar Shaikh al-Albānī (rahimahullaah, died 1420H) was asked, 'Is that which is known nowadays as a military coup against the ruler mentioned in the Religion or is it an innovation?' So the Shaikh answered: 'There is no basis for these acts in Islām. And it is in opposition to the Islamic manhaj (methodology) with respect to the daʿwah (Islamic call) and creating the right atmosphere for it. Rather it is an innovation introduced by the innovators which has affected some Muslims. This is what I have stated and explained in my notes to al-Aqeedah at-Tahāwiyyah' The great scholar Ibn Bāz (died 1420AH) was asked, 'Is it from the methodology of the Salaf [to] criticize the rulers from the pulpits? And what is the methodology of the Salaf in advising the rulers?' So he answered: 'It is not from the methodology of the Salaf to criticize the rulers from the pulpits, because that would incite chaos, and it would involve not listening and obeying in that which is good. And this would mean becoming engrossed in that which harms and does not benefit. However, the way of advising that the Salaf followed was to write to the ruler, or to convey the advice to the Scholars who would then convey it to him, until he has been directed towards good. So opposing the evil can be done without mentioning the doer. So adultery, intoxicants and interest can be opposed without mentioning the one who is involved in them. And it is enough of an opposition to sins that they be warned against without mentioning that so and so is involved in them, whether it is the ruler, or other than the ruler.' Shaikh Sālih al-Fawzān was asked: 'Respected Shaikh, yourself and your brothers who are scholars in this country are Salafīs – and all praise is due to Allāh – and your method in advising the rulers is that of the Sharīʿah and as the Prophet has explained, yet there are those who find fault with you due to your neglect in openly rejecting the various oppositions [to the Sharīʿah] that have occurred. And yet others make excuses for you by saying that you are under the control and pressure of the state. So do you have any words of direction or clarification to these people?' So Shaikh al-Fawzān answered with clear and unambiguous words: 'There is no doubt that the rulers, just like people besides them, are not infallible. Advising them is an obligation. However, attacking them in the gatherings and upon the pulpits is considered to be the forbidden form of backbiting. And this evil is greater than that which occurred from the ruler since it is backbiting and because of what results from backbiting such as the sowing of the seeds of discord, causing disunity and affecting the progression of daʿwah (the call to Islām). Hence what is obligatory is to make sure advice reaches the rulers by sound and trustworthy avenues, not by publicizing and causing commotion. And as for reviling the Scholars of this country, that they do not give advice [to the rulers], or that they are being controlled in their affairs, this is a method by which separation between the Scholars, the youth and the society is desired, until it becomes possible for the mischief-maker to sow the seeds of his evil. This is because when evil suspicions are harbored about the Scholars, trust is no longer placed in them and then the chance is available for the biased partisans to spread their poison. And I believe that this thought is actually a schemed plot that has come into this country, and those who are behind it are foreign to this country. It is obligatory upon the Muslims to be cautious of it.'
Shaykh Ibn ʿUthaymīn said: And rebelling against the ruler, there is no doubt it is from the most corrupt of innovations, the most vile of them and the most evil of them. The ummah was not torn to pieces except due to rebelling against its rulers.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link){{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location (link){{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)Salafi Jihadist preachers such as Abu Hamza al-Masri and Omar Bakri Muhammad help inspire thousands of Muslim youth to develop a cultlike relationship to martyrdom in mosques
11 August 1988 Al-Qaeda is formed at a meeting attended by Bin Laden, Zawahiri and Dr Fadl in Peshawar, Pakistan.
Salafisten sind Anhänger einer fundamentalistischen Strömung des Islam, die einen mit der westlichen Demokratie unvereinbaren Gottesstaat anstreben.
Die beiden Verbote zeigen, dass in salafistischen Moscheen nicht nur auf religiöse Art rekrutiert und agiert wird, sondern in einigen von ihnen schwere Straftaten bis hin zu terroristischen Aktionen geplant wurden.
Many Salafi scholars including Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdul Aziz have issued statements calling Salafi Jihadist groups like Daesh as an extension of Kharijites. The self-proclaimed pious strand of Islam is thus considered by many as following the practices of a completely deviant strand; it is not surprising that many traditional Muslim scholars have written treatises comparing Salafi Jihadist with Kharijites.
{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: DOI inactive as of September 2025 (link)