| Operational Group of Russian Forces in Transnistria | |
|---|---|
| Оперативная группа российских войск в Приднестровье | |
.jpg) | |
| Active | 1995–present |
| Country |  Russia |
| Branch |  Russian Ground Forces |
| Type | Task force |
| Size | 1,500 soldiers |
| Part of | Moscow Military District |
| Headquarters | Tiraspol |
TheOperational Group of Russian Forces in Transnistria (OGRF;Romanian:Grupul Operativ al Trupelor Ruse din Transnistria,GOTR;Russian:Оперативная группа российских войск в Приднестровье,romanized: Operativnaya gruppa rossiyskikh voysk v Pridnestrovye,ОГРВ) is a sizable overseas militarytask force of theRussian Armed Forces. It serves as part of the tri-lateralJoint Control Commission (JCC) in the region with around 350 soldiers provided to the JCC.
1,500 soldiers of the military force are based at the former decommissionedSoviet-eraammunition depot atCobasna, where it guards around 22,000 tons of military equipment and ammunition.[1][2][3][4] The core of the OGRF consists of 70 to 100 Russian officers, with the rest being Transnistrian locals employed as soldiers. Troops of the OGRF are rotated once every six months.[5]
ThisRussian military presence in Transnistria dates back to 1992, when the14th Guards Army intervened in theTransnistria War in support of the Transnistrian separatist forces. Following the end of the war, which ended in a Russian-backed Transnistrian victory and in thede facto independence of the region, the Russian forces stayed in a purportedly peacekeeping mission and reorganized in 1995 into the OGRF. On 15 March 2022, theParliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe recognized Transnistria as Moldovan territory occupied by Russia.[6]
Russia agreed to withdraw its 14th Army from Moldovan territory in an agreement signed 21 October 1994 and acknowledged in the December Budapest declaration of theConference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.[7] The OSCE expressed concern over the lack of progress in its 1996 Lisbon Document.[8] At theOSCE Istanbul summit in November 1999, Russia again promised to withdraw its forces from Moldova (and from Georgia), this time with a firm commitment to a deadline of 31 December 2002 written into the summit documents.[9] These promises were not fulfilled.
TheSoviet Army's14th Guards Army (Russian:14-я гвардейская армия) was formed in November 1956 inChișinău as one of the only formation of theOdessa Military District to be stationed in theMoldovan SSR. The army headquarters was moved toTiraspol, the capital ofPridnestrovian Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic in the early 1980s.[10][11][12] At the start of theTransnistrian War, soldiers of the 14th Guards Army who were sympathetic to thePMR cause "defected" with total military structure and commanding system, and remained under Moscow command, and, with some assistance of the Transnistrian Republican Guard, created the strongest local military force, despite theRussian government's official declaration of neutrality.[13] On 23 June 1992, Major GeneralAlexander Lebed of the 14th Guards Army, who had orders to evacuate the locallogistics center, began an over two week battle which ended in an artillery strike on 3 July 1992 on a Moldovan unit in a forest nearBender (Tighina). It is generally accepted that this strike led to the strategic victory of the Transnistrian/Russian military and the tactical setbacks of themilitary of Moldova, creating a Moscow-controlled occupational zone, and a Moldovan government had lost control over a part of Moldova.[14]
After the war, the 14th Army was split between theUkrainian Armed Forces and the Russian Army, with most of the Russian contingent being absorbed intoWestern Military District. The conclusion of the conflict in acease-fire resulted in the beginning of trilateral negotiations between the governments and militaries ofRussia,Transnistria andMoldova, which eventually led to the discussion of a joint peacekeeping force.[15] In June 1995, the Operational Group of Russian Forces in Transnistria was founded by order of theGeneral Staff of the Russian Armed Forces.[16] In 2005, the force consisted of the 8th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade, the 1162ndAnti-Aircraft Rocket Regiment, 15th Signals Regiment, as well as other support units.[17]
The 14th Guards Army itself was reformed in April 1995 into theOperational Group of Russian Forces (OGRF) which came under the command of theMoscow Military District and was charged with guarding the Cobasna ammunition depot.[18] Another more recent source gives the disbandment date of the 14th Guards Army as 25 June 1995.[19] The59th Guards Motor Rifle Division became the 8th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade on 1 June 1997.[20]
According toKommersant-Vlast in 2005, the force consisted of the 8th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade, the 1162ndAnti-Aircraft Rocket Regiment, 15th Signals Regiment, and other support units.[21]
On 27 June 2016, the Transnistrian government passed new law which penalized any actions or public statements that criticize the OGRF. The punishment for committing this crime is 3–7 years in jail.[22]
The operational group was as of June 2019[update] commanded by Colonel Dmitry Zelenkov of Russia and numbered 1,500 troops. It served alongside the Joint Control Commission.[23] Around 350–400 troops with the operational force report directly to the JCC and can be assigned to it at any given time.[24]
The OGRF ostensibly remains in Transnistria to guardthe ammunition depot atCobasna.[25] In recent years, the OGRF has taken part inVictory Day Parades onSuvorov Square, to condemnation from Chisinau.[26]
Since its introduction, the OGRF has been met with criticism from both Moldovan and Western officials and observers, all of whom claim that the Russian military presence is either illegal or unnecessary. In November 2008, theNATO Parliamentary Assembly adopted a resolution, urging Russia to withdraw the force in accordance with its commitments at the1999 Istanbul summit of theOrganization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.[27]
On 7 April 2016, Russia announced it would withdraw its troops from Moldova once the problem of liquidating the 14th Army's armament depots was solved. Complicating the withdrawal is the necessity to transit the armaments throughUkraine, which has had ahostile relationship after theRussian annexation of Crimea and theRussian invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014.[28][better source needed]
On 27 June 2016, a new law entered in force in Transnistria, punishing actions or public statements, including through the usage of mass media, networks of information and telecommunications or internet criticizing the so-called peacekeeping mission of the Russian Army in Transnistria, or presenting interpretations perceived to be "false" by the Transnistrian government of the Russian Army's military mission. The punishment is up to three years of jail for ordinary people or up to seven years of jail if the crime was committed by a person of responsibility or a group of persons by prior agreement.[29][better source needed]
In June 2018,United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution (document A/72/L.58), which essentially called on theRussian Federation to withdraw the OGRF from Moldovan territory immediately. While the Moldovan government led byPavel Filip supported it, PresidentIgor Dodon condemned the resolution, saying that the Russian presence led to the "creation of conditions for a political process of negotiations".[30][31]
In 2020, Moldovan president-electMaia Sandu declared that OGRF should withdraw from the breakawayTransnistria, saying to theRBK that although they guard ammunition depots, "there are no bilateral agreements on the OGRF and on the weapons depots.” She also stated that its her position that the "mission should be transformed into anOSCE civilian observer mission.”[32]
Moldova continued to request the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Transnistria, such as in 2021.[33] Furthermore, in 2022, amid an increase in tensions between Ukraine and Russia which served as aprelude to theRussian invasion of Ukraine, allegations by Ukrainian intelligence appeared that said Russia was trying to prepare "provocations" against the Russian soldiers in Transnistria in order to create a pretext for an invasion of Ukraine.[34]
In 2022, as theRussian invasion of Ukraine was taking place, theChief Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine reported that residents in Transnistria were refusing to sign contracts with the Operational Group of Russian Forces despite being promised "high cash payments, social packages, and likely housing". The report also said that there were being several cases of desertion in the military unit and that there were not enough necessary resources to search for and recover soldiers.[35] In 2022, Moldova continued blocking the rotation of soldiers with Russia and stopping new weapons being brought in, saying the soldiers are there illegally. Previously Russians had entered Transnistria via Ukraine, this issue affects the 70-100 Russian officers.[5]
The following generals commanded the unit:
| Background | |||||||
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| Transnistria War | |||||||
| Post-war developments | |||||||
| Resolution attempts |
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| Participants and figures |
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| See also | |||||||
