In December 2009, Timur Lakhonin, the head of theNational Central Bureau of Interpol withinRussia, stated that "Certainly, there is crime involving our former compatriots abroad, but there is no data suggesting that an organized structure of criminal groups comprising former Russians exists abroad" on the topic of international Russian criminal gangs.[3] In August 2010,Alain Bauer, a criminologist fromFrance, said that the Russian mafia "is one of the best structured criminal organizations inEurope, with a quasi-military operation" in their international activities.[4]
The Russian mafia, according toMark Galeotti, an expert in modern Russia, is a highly organized and global criminal network that emerged and expanded significantly after the collapse of theSoviet Union in the 1990s. During this time, Russian criminals sought to establish themselves on the international stage, anticipating political instability and economic collapse in Russia. Their activities initially focused on the illicit trade of goods, such asAfghanheroin, which they transported across Europe to sell to local gangs rather than directly selling on the streets. Over the years, Russian gangsters evolved into skilled intermediaries, working alongside other major criminal organizations, adapting to local markets and focusing on providing services rather than attempting to control entire territories. While the Russian mafia remains focused on making money, their relationships with the state have evolved over time. The Russian government has used criminal networks as a geopolitical tool, leveraging their capabilities for state interests. However, Galeotti emphasizes that the connection between the Russian government and organized crime is not one of direct control, but rather a pragmatic approach where the state sets boundaries for these groups and occasionally enlists their services. This reflects a broader shift from the 1990s, when the political elite and organized crime were more intertwined, to the present day, where the state is attempting to distance itself from direct associations with criminal groups while still utilizing them when necessary.[5]
The term "Russian mafia" is a general label used to describe a broad and complex network oforganized crime groups that originated inRussia and other former Soviet republics. While this term is widely recognized in both public discourse and media portrayals, particularly in the Western world, it does not reflect the nuanced internal classifications and terminology employed within these criminal structures or by law enforcement and criminologists. In summary, "Russian Mafia" is a convenient umbrella term, the actual structure is more like a loose network of autonomous criminal organizations with their own codes, leaders, and spheres of influence.[6]
A central concept in the nomenclature of Russian organized crime is "Vory v Zakone", which translates to "Thieves in Law". This designation refers to a high-ranking, elite status within the criminal hierarchy. Individuals who hold this title are bound by a strict moral code and are expected to reject cooperation with state authorities. Their role is both symbolic and practical, often acting as arbiters and authority figures within the criminal community. They are typically identified by extensive and symbolically significant tattoos that represent their status, personal history, and adherence to the code.[7][8]
In contrast, the term "Bratva", meaning "brotherhood," is more colloquial and is commonly used within the criminal environment to refer to fellow group members or associates. It does not denote a specific hierarchical status but rather conveys solidarity and group affiliation.[9]
Law enforcement agencies, particularly in Russia and former Soviet states, use more technical terminology. Notably,OPG (Organizovannaya Prestupnaya Gruppa) andOPS (Organizovannoye Prestupnoye Soobshchestvo) are formal terms that translate to "organized crime group" and "organized crime community," respectively. These terms are often employed in legal and investigative contexts to classify and prosecute criminal organizations.[10]
Moreover, many of these groups are named according to their regional origins, such as theSolntsevskaya Bratva (from theSolntsevo District inMoscow), theTambovskaya Bratva (fromTambov Oblast), the Izmaylovskaya gang (from theIzmaylovo District), among other. While they may operate independently, these groups often maintain alliances or engage in competition, depending on their economic interests.[11]
The main form of organized criminal activity up until the 1930s in Russia was political banditry, represented in the 17th and 18th centuries by peasant gangs led by bandit chieftains, likeStenka Razin andYemelyan Pugachev, and in the 19th and early 20th centuries by groups pursuing revolutionary and later counter-revolutionary goals, such as theBolsheviks,Socialist Revolutionary gangs andCounter-revolutionary gangs. The authorities in power always sought to suppress them completely, sometimes using very brutal methods.[12][13]
By the early 1930s, the activity of politically organized criminal groups had been suppressed by harsh repressive measures. The curtailment of theNEP policy led to the virtual disappearance of economic criminals, who were equated with state criminals and were also subjected to repression. A new criminal world was formed, in which the main unifying force was the tendency for non-political opposition and disobedience to authority, the elite of which were the so-called "Thieves in law", who called themselves the guardians of the criminal traditions of pre-revolutionary Russia.[12]
At the same time, a subculture of a criminal society was formed with its own language ("fenya" or "blatnaya muzyka"), code of conduct, customs and traditions, which included a complete rejection of social norms and rules, including those related to the family (a thief in law should under no circumstances have permanent relationships with women) and an equally complete ban on any cooperation with government agencies: both in the form of participation in public events held by them, and assistance to judicial and investigative bodies in the investigation of crimes.[14]
In the 1940s, these traditions eventually led to the "beginning of the end" of this criminal society: during theGreat Patriotic War, many of the criminals responded to the authorities' offer to join theRed Army in order to defend their homeland from the Nazi threat. After the victory over the Nazis, they returned to the camps, where the so-called "Bitch Wars" began between them and the "thieves in law" who did not deviate from the traditions of the criminal environment, as a result of which both sides suffered extremely significant losses. The difficult economic situation in post-war society led to an increase in banditry and crime in general, as a result of which the criminal world was replenished with fresh blood, and the new prisoners no longer considered it necessary to honor the old criminal traditions, creating their own codes of conduct that did not exclude mutually beneficial cooperation with the state.[15]
The factor that determined the entry of crime into a new stage was the economic situation of the 1950s and 1960s, when the first signs of the inability of theSoviet planned economy to function within the legal framework given to it began to appear. In order to ensure the necessary economic indicators, methods such asblat (obtaining the necessary goods and services through personal connections) andeyewash (deliberate deception) began to be used; the need arose for so-calledpushers—specialists in concluding favorable contracts and "knocking out" scarce goods, raw materials and equipment; phenomena such as shortages,"nesuny" (practically universal petty theft) andspeculation became common.[16]
The first signs indicating the emergence of organized crime as a social phenomenon appeared in the mid-1960s, when the weakening of control in the economic sphere led to the emergence of opportunities for individuals ("Tsekhovik") to concentrate large sums of money in their hands, investing them in illegal production structures; at the same time, traditional professional criminals began to parasitize on these shadow entrepreneurs, and later, to assist them in their activities, receiving their share of the income and thus forming a symbiotic criminal structure.[17]
During this period, a kind of symbiosis arose between the political elite and the criminal world: the political elite used the criminal world to obtain goods and services that were not available legally, in exchange for providing patronage and protection fromlaw enforcement agencies; this symbiosis was partially exposed during the anti-corruption campaign launched byYuri Andropov after his election asGeneral Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, but this was only the tip of the iceberg.[18]
The rise to power ofMikhail Gorbachev coincided with a new crisis in the Soviet economy. In order to accelerate economic growth by increasing labor productivity, a campaign against alcohol consumption was launched, which led to a rapid growth in the illegal production and sale of alcohol, providing a large number of "entrepreneurs" working in this area with money.[19]
In the late 1980s, during the period of "perestroika" of social relations, these phenomena were further developed as a result of the political and economic reforms undertaken by the state (in particular, laws on state enterprises and cooperatives) making it possible to legalize and protect criminal capital, and to use the media and other public structures to protect the interests of organized criminal groups. All this was facilitated by the fact that, in the context of the economic crisis and constant reforms, the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies significantly decreased, as a result of which a significant portion of citizens began to turn to "shadow" sources of income. In the early 1990s, these trends only intensified due to the fact that opportunities for cross-border interaction opened up, including through illegal trade and the export of capital abroad, and methods were developed for corrupting state and public structures, and for criminals to promote their own people to government positions.[20][21]
Organized crime of this period mainly ensured its existence through organizedracketeering; in addition, it began to master various forms of legal, semi-legal and illegal economic activity: the hotel business,gambling,prostitution, export of raw materials, and so on. Nevertheless, during this period, crime had not yet subjugated political and social institutions, remaining in a vulnerable position before state bodies.[22]
However, the trends of its development were negative: one of the theses of the economic reform program also played a role here, according to which one of the main sources of resources for the reform should be the conversion and legalization of shadow capital. The activities of foreign states related to the use of criminal groups to protect their interests in the Russian Federation for the formation of a certain socio-political system also had a negative impact. At the same time, "assistance" in the fight against organized crime was expressed in the intensification of the activities of foreign special services on the territory of Russia, in the desire to take the decision on the fate of the leaders of Russian criminal groups outside the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation.[23]
Organized crime became politicized in the 1990s. Organized criminal groups sought to "promote" their trusted persons to government positions of varying importance: for example, during the1999 legislative election, several hundred cases were identified in which criminal groups nominated their own candidates and provided financial and organizational support to political parties and movements. Where it was not possible to directly promote their people to government positions, organized crime achieved its goals by corrupting government and other employees, including by paying them regular salaries without specifying the services that might be required of them.[24][25]
There was a merger of legitimate and criminal capital. In the Resolution of theState Duma "On Overcoming the Crisis in the Economy of the Russian Federation and on the Strategy for the Economic Security of the State" adopted in March 1998, it was noted that criminal groups controlled up to 40% of enterprises based on private ownership, 60% of state enterprises and up to 85% of banks. In general, by the beginning of the 21st century, organized crime began to be built on the so-calledoligarchic model, striving for the maximum degree of legalization: armed units of criminal organizations received legal registration as detective and security agencies, funds were stored in banks controlled by criminal organizations, and their source became "roof" controlled enterprises.[26]
During the early 1990s, Russian crime groups began to expand their involvement in more illegal activities, which included drug and arms trafficking, extortion, contract killings, prostitution, and money laundering, but also deeply invested in legal businesses such as banks, oil, casinos, real estate, and import/export ventures. Some groups controlled entire sectors, like theTambovskaya’s grip onSaint Petersburg’s energy market orSolntsevskaya’s dominance overMoscow’s casinos and transportation hubs. These organizations were known for their extreme violence, internal power struggles, and sophisticated methods of infiltrating politics and law enforcement. Leaders likeSemion Mogilevich, Sergei "Sylvester" Timofeev, and Alexander Khabarov forged ties with politicians, police, and even intelligence agencies. TheUralmash gang, for example, openly supported political candidates and formed a public movement to gain legitimacy.[27][28][29]
Initially operating only within Russia and soon after in other countries of the former Soviet Union, some of the Russian criminal organizations quickly expanded their reach in the 1990s. Taking advantage of open borders and the increasing globalization of markets, they extended their operations beyond the former Soviet republics, establishing strongholds in Western European countries such as United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Germany and France, as well as in Hungary and Israel and Czech Republic. Their presence abroad was often facilitated by connections with local political and economic elites, the use of front companies, and infiltration into legitimate markets, making their operations particularly difficult to detect and dismantle.[30][31][32][33][34]
In 1992, it was agreed thatVyacheslav "Yaponchik" Ivankov would be sent toBrighton Beach, U.S., allegedly because he was killing too many people in Russia and also to take control of Russian organized crime in North America.[35] Within a year, he built an international operation that included but was not limited tonarcotics,money laundering, and prostitution and made ties with theAmerican Mafia and Colombiandrug cartels, eventually extending to Miami, Los Angeles, andBoston.[36] Prior to Ivankov's arrival, Balagula's downfall left a void for America's nextvory v zakone. Monya Elson, leader of Monya'sBrigada (a gang that similarly operated from Russia to Los Angeles to New York), was in a feud with Boris Nayfeld, with bodies dropping on both sides.[37] Ivankov's arrival virtually ended the feud, although Elson would later challenge his power as well, and a number of attempts were made to end the former's life.[38] Nayfield and Elson would eventually be arrested in January 1994 (released in 1998)[39] and in Italy in 1995, respectively.[40]
According toFBI reports, the crime bossSemion Mogilevich had alliances with theCamorra, in particular with Salvatore DeFalco, a lower-echelon member of theGiuliano clan. Mogilevich and DeFalco would have held meetings inPrague in 1993.[41][42] Semion Mogilevich's net worth is estimated to be 10 billion dollars.[43]
Ivankov's reign also ended in June 1995 when a $3.5 million extortion attempt on two Russian businessmen, Alexander Volkov and Vladimir Voloshin, ended in an FBI arrest that resulted in a ten-year maximum security prison sentence.[44][36] Before his arrest and besides his operations in America, Ivankov regularly flew around Europe and Asia to maintain ties with his fellow mobsters (like members of theSolntsevskaya Bratva), as well as reinforce ties with others. This did not stop other people from denying his growing power. In one instance, Ivankov allegedly attempted to buy out Georgian boss Valeri "Globus" Glugech's drug importation business. Soon after the latter refused the offer, he and his top associates were shot dead. A summit held in May 1994 inVienna rewarded him with what was left of Glugech's business. Two months later, Ivankov got into another altercation with drug kingpin and head of theOrekhovskaya gang, Segei "Sylvester" Timofeyev, ending with the latter murdered a month later.[45]
In 1995, theCamorra cooperated with the Russian mafia in a scheme in which the Camorra would bleach out US$1 bills and reprint them as $100s. These bills would then be transported to the Russian mafia for distribution in 29 post-Eastern Bloc countries and former Soviet republics. In return, the Russian mafia paid the Camorra with property (including a Russian bank) and firearms, smuggled into Eastern Europe and Italy.[46]
A report by the United Nations in 1995 placed the number of individuals involved in organized crime in Russia at 3 million, employed in about 5,700 gangs.[47]
In May 1995,Semion Mogilevich held a summit meeting of Russian mafia bosses in his U Holubu restaurant inAnděl, a neighborhood ofPrague. The excuse to bring them together was that it was a birthday party for Victor Averin, the second-in-command of the Solntsevskaya Bratva. However, Major Tomas Machacek of the Czech police got wind of an anonymous tip-off that claimed that the Solntsevskaya were planning to assassinate Mogilevich at the location (it was rumored that Mogilevich and Solntsevskaya leaderSergei Mikhailov had a dispute over $5 million), and the police successfullyraided the meeting. 200 guests were arrested, but no charges were put against them; only key Russian mafia members were banned from the country, most of whom moved to Hungary.[48] One person who was not there was Mogilevich himself. He claimed that, "[b]y the time I arrived at U Holubu, everything was already in full swing, so I went into a neighboring hotel and sat in the bar there until about five or six in the morning."[49][50] Mikhailov would later be arrested in Switzerland in October 1996 on numerous charges,[38] including that he was the head of a powerful Russian mafia group, but was exonerated and released two years later after evidence was not enough to prove much.[51][52]
The global extent of Russian organized crime was not realized untilLudwig "Tarzan" Fainberg was arrested in January 1997, primarily because of arms dealing. In 1990, Fainberg moved from Brighton Beach to Miami and opened up a strip club called Porky's, which soon became a popular hangout for underworld criminals. Fainberg himself gained a reputation as an ambassador among international crime groups, becoming especially close to Juan Almeida, a Colombian cocaine dealer. Planning to expand his cocaine business, Fainberg acted as an intermediary between Almeida and the corruptRussian military. He helped him get six Russian military helicopters in 1993, and in the following year, helped arrange to buy asubmarine for cocaine smuggling. Unfortunately for the two of them, federal agents had been keeping a close eye on Fainberg for months. Alexander Yasevich, an associate of the Russian military contact and an undercoverDEA agent, was sent to verify the illegal dealing, and in 1997, Fainberg was finally arrested in Miami. Facing the possibility of life imprisonment, the latter agreed to testify against Almeida in exchange for a shorter sentence, which ended up being 33 months.[36][35]
TheFreeLance Bureau (FLB.ru) [ru] published a website in 2000 containingPhilipp Bobkov's MOST Group Security Database along with files from RUOP and other departments and special services.[53]
Vanuatu was a preferred location for Russian mafia laundering money.[54]
As the 21st century dawned, the Russian mafia remained after the death of Aslan Usoyan. New mafia bosses sprang up, while imprisoned ones were released. Among the released were Marat Balagula andVyacheslav Ivankov, both in 2004.[55][56] The latter was extradited to Russia, but was jailed once more for his alleged murders of two Turks in a Moscow restaurant in 1992; he was cleared of all charges and released in 2005. Four years later, he was assassinated by a shot in the stomach from a sniper.[56] Meanwhile, Monya Elson and Leonid Roytman were arrested in March 2006 for an unsuccessful murder plot against twoKyiv-based businessmen.[57]
In 2009, FBI agents in Moscow targeted[clarification needed] two suspected mafia leaders and two other corrupt businessmen. One of the leaders is Yevgeny Dvoskin, a criminal who had been in prison with Ivankov in 1995 and was deported in 2001 for breaking immigration regulations; the other is Konstantin "Gizya" Ginzburg, who was reportedly the current "big boss" of Russian organized crime in America before his reported assassination in 2009,[58] it being suspected that Ivankov handed over control to him.[59][60]
In the same year,Semion Mogilevich was placed on theFBI Ten Most Wanted Fugitives list for his involvement in a complex multimillion-dollar scheme that defrauded investors in the stock of his company YBM Magnex International, swindling them out of $150 million.[61] He was indicted in 2003 and arrested in 2008 in Russia on tax fraud charges, but because the US does not have an extradition treaty with Russia, he was released on bail.[62] Monya Elson said, in 1998, that Mogilevich is the most powerful mobster in the world.[63]
Russian organized crime was reported to have a strong grip in theFrench Riviera region and Spain in 2010; and Russia was branded as a virtual "mafia state" according to theWikiLeaks cables.[4][64]
On 7 June 2017, 33 Russian mafia affiliates and members were arrested and charged by the FBI, US Customs and Border Protection and NYPD for extortion, racketeering, illegal gambling, firearm offenses, narcotics trafficking, wire fraud, credit card fraud,identity theft, fraud on casino slot machines using electronic hacking devices; based in Atlantic City and Philadelphia, murder-for-hire conspiracy and cigarette trafficking.[66] They were also accused of operating secret and underground gambling dens based inBrighton Beach, Brooklyn, and using violence against those who owed gambling debts, establishing nightclubs to sell drugs, plotting to force women associates to rob male strangers by seducing and drugging them withchloroform, and trafficking over 10,000 pounds of stolenchocolate confectionery; the chocolate was stolen from shipment containers.[67][68] It is believed that 27 of the arrested are connected to the Russian mafia Shulaya clan which are largely based in New York.[69]
On 26 September 2017, as part of a 4-year investigation, 100Spanish Civil Guard officers carried out 18 searches in different areas ofMálaga, Spain, related to Russian mafia large scale money laundering.[70] The raids resulted in the arrests of 11 members and associates of the Solntsevskaya and Izmailovskaya clans. Money, firearms and 23 high-end vehicles were also seized. The owner ofMarbella FC, Alexander Grinberg, and manager of AFK Sistema, a Spanish football club in Málaga, were among those arrested.[71]
On 19 February 2018, 18 defendants were accused of laundering over $62 million through real estate, including with the help ofVladislav Reznik, former chairman ofRosgosstrakh, one of Russia's largest insurance companies. The accused stood trial in Spain.[72] TheTambov and Malyshev Russian mafia organisations were involved.[73]
In September 2025, a record cocaine seizure in Russia has highlighted the country’s growing role as a key destination for drug shipments originating fromEcuador, now the world’s largest exporter of cocaine. Russian authorities recently confiscated over 1.5 metric tons of cocaine hidden in banana crates from Ecuador, reflecting a broader trend identified by international organizations such as CIMCON and theWorld Customs Organization (WCO). These reports indicate a sharp increase in cocaine trafficking to Russia, largely through banana shipments, as traffickers adapt to stricter controls in Western Europe. Russia, now the largest single-country importer of Ecuadorian bananas, is increasingly seen as both a rising consumer market and a transit point for cocaine heading to Europe.[76]
TheBratva is not a strictly hierarchical organization like other criminal groups. While it has ranks and respected roles, its structure is often decentralized and fluid. Power is distributed across various regional groups and leaders, and influence is earned through reputation, loyalty, and connections rather than fixed titles. This flexible setup makes the Bratva more adaptable and harder for law enforcement to dismantle. However, it still employs certain titles and roles that are commonly recognized within its ranks.[77]
At the top of the organization is thePakhan (Пахан), the supreme boss who oversees the entire operation. He rarely involves himself in day-to-day activities, preferring to stay behind the scenes to avoid law enforcement attention. Other important role in the Bratva's structure if that of theObshchak (Общак) or treasurer, who is responsible for managing the group’s finances. TheObshchak controls the communal fund, which is used to support various criminal activities, pay off officials, finance legal defense, and support the families of imprisoned or deceased members.[78][79]
Below the leadership level, theBratva is divided into operational units calledbrigades. Eachbrigade is led by anAvtoritet (Авторитет), who reports directly to thePakhan or an intermediary. TheAvtoritet manages a team ofBoeviks (Бойцы) who carry out criminal operations such as drug trafficking, smuggling, and illegal gambling. TheBoeviks swear loyalty to theirBrigadier, and through him, to thePakhan.[80][81]
At the lowest level are theShestyorka (Шестерка), or "sixes." These are junior associates or errand boys who perform minor tasks, run errands, deliver messages, or gather intelligence. They are often in a probationary stage, not yet full members of the organization, and are expected to prove their loyalty and usefulness.[82]
A unique and important role within theBratva is that of the"Vor v zakone". This is a prestigious title awarded to highly respected and influential members of the criminal underworld. Not everyBratva member is aVor, but those who are hold significant moral and strategic authority. They are the guardians of the criminal code, mediators of serious disputes, and often wield influence that transcends individualbrigades. The title is not self-appointed; it must be granted by othervors, making it a symbol of deep respect within the criminal world.[7]
TheBratva operates under a strict code of conduct, especially among its upper ranks. Loyalty, silence, and never cooperating with law enforcement are essential principles. While the structure is hierarchical, its decentralization allows it to adapt quickly and survive even when individual cells or leaders are taken down.[83]
Semion Mogilevich (born 1946): described by agencies in the European Union and United States as the "boss of all bosses" of most Russian Mafia syndicates in the world.[88]
Aslan Usoyan (1937–2013): according to operational data and media materials, he was the leader of Caucasian criminal groups, in particular, the "Tbilisi" and "Yazidis" clans, as well as one of the most powerful criminal leaders andthieves in law in Russia.[89][better source needed]
Tariel Oniani (born 1952): believed to be the leader of the "Kutaisi gang", considered the most influential organized crime group in Russia.[90]
Lom-Ali Gaitukayev (1958–2017): Chechen crime boss and businessman, a defendant in a number of high-profile criminal cases.[93]
Valery Dlugach (1955–1993): once one of the leaders of the Moscow criminal world, a thief in law, and the leader of the Bauman organized crime group. In the early 1990s, he was one of the five most influential criminal authorities in Moscow.[94]
Leonid Zavadskiy (1947–1994): Russian crime boss who controlled most of Moscow's prostitution scene in the early 1990s.[95]
Sergei Ivannikov (1954–1993): Russian crime boss, the founder and leader of theUralmash gang, one of the most influential organized crime groups in the city ofYekaterinburg in the 1990s.[96]
Otari Kvantrishvili (1948–1994): one ofMoscow's leading organised crime figures during the early 1990s.
Amiran Kvantrishvili (1944–1993): well-known crime boss of the early 1990s, the older brother of Otari Kvantrishvili.[97]
Anton Malevsky (1967–2001): was a Russian crime boss, multimillionaire, nicknamed the "aluminum king of Russia", and the leader of theIzmaylovo gang since the late 1980s.[98]
Sergei Mamsurov (1959–1995): well-known Moscow crime boss of the first half of the 1990s.[99]
Yuri Pichugin (born 1965): influential Russian crime boss, thief in law, repeatedly convicted of theft and robbery, was one of the leaders of the criminal world of theKomi Republic, where he acted as a "criminal judge" in the analysis of various conflicts.[100]
Dmitry Ruzlyaev (1963–1998): Russian crime boss from the city ofTolyatti, nicknamed "Dima Bolshoi", leader of the famous "Volgovskaya gang", one of the main players in the notoriousTolyatti crime war.[101]
Kamo Safaryan (born 1961): influential crime boss, thief in law, who had criminal interests in Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod and Crimea (especially in the Greater Yalta region ), as well as extensive connections in the criminal world of most of the former Soviet republics.[102]
Vladimir Tyurin (born 1958): thief in law, and considered one of the most important russian crime bosses active inSpain.[103]
Sergei Tsapkov (1976–2014): leader of the Tsapkov gang, based inKushchyovskaya. Tsapkov was sentenced to life imprisonment and died in prison.[104]
Lasha Shushanashvili (born 1961): thief in law, who had significant influence in the criminal world ofMoscow,Moscow Oblast,Chuvashia,Kirov Oblast, Ukraine and Spain. Shushanashvili is considered one of the most important ethnic Georgian members of the Russian mafia.[105]
TheOrekhovskaya gang: founded by Sergei "Sylvester" Timofeyev, this group reached its height in Moscow in the 1990s. When Timofeyev died, Sergei Butorin took his place. However, he was sentenced to jail for life in 2011.[106][107]
Lyuberetskaya Bratva (Russian:Люберецкая ОПГ) or Lyubery (Russian:Люберы): one of the largest criminal groups with around 3,000 members in late 1990s until today. Based in (and originating from)Lyubertsy district of Moscow. Led by Denis Sergin (Fraser) since the 2000s.
TheIzmaylovskaya gang [ru]: one of Russia's oldest modern gangs, it was started in the mid- to late-1980s by Oleg Ivanov; it has around 200–500 members in Moscow alone, and is named after theIzmaylovo District.[110] Izmailovskaya has good relations with the Podolskaya gang.[111][112][113]Anton Malevsky was the leader until his death in 2001.[114] The Ismailovskaya mafia is closely associated withOleg Deripaska, Matvey Yozhikov,Andrey Bokarev [ru],Michael Cherney, andIskander Makhmudov through their Switzerland based "Blonde Investment Company" and is closely associated withOleg Andreevich Kharchenko (Russian:Олег Андреевич Харченко)[115][116] andVladimir Putin's SP AG (Russian:Санкт-Петербургское общество недвижимости и долевого участия,lit. 'Saint-Petersburg Agency Group'). Liechtenstein police proved that Rudolf Ritter (brother toMichael Ritter, a Financial Minister[117]) a Liechtenstein-based lawyer, jurist who practiced in offshore businesses (identification evasion), and financial manager for the accounts of both Putin's SPAG and the Ismailovskaya mafia and that Alexander Afanasyev ("Afonya") was connected to both SPAG and the Ismailovskaya mafia through his Panama registered Earl Holding AG.[118][119] Also, Rudolf Ritter signed for Earl Holding, Berger International Holding, Repas Trading SA and Fox Consulting.[120] TheColombia-basedCali KGB Cartel supplied cocaine to the Ismailovskaya mafia, too. Rudolf Ritter was arrested in May 2020 on money laundering charges.[121][122]
ThePodolskaya gang [ru]: was one of the most notorious gangs in Russia, active primarily in thePodolsk region and surrounding areas of Moscow in the 1990s. Led by Sergey "Lalak" Lalakin, the gang was involved in a wide range of criminal activities, including extortion, kidnapping, robbery, and contract killings. It controlled several major businesses, both legal and illegal, such as car service centers, real estate development, and the oil industry. The gang had strong connections to both legitimate commercial enterprises and underground operations. For instance, they were known to have exploited the Soviet-era economic structure, and their criminal influence extended to the film industry, where they laundered money through production companies. At the height of their power, the Podolsk gang had control over most of the businesses in the area, making it a significant criminal entity within Moscow and its suburbs. In addition to their involvement in various illegal enterprises, the gang engaged in brutal power struggles with other criminal groups, resulting in a series of violent clashes and murders. These internal conflicts, including the death of key figures like Sergey "Psych" Fedyaev, allowed for shifts in power within the group, and members such as Nikolai "Sobol" Sobolev and others competed for dominance. Despite the ongoing violence, Lalakin's influence expanded, and he managed to secure connections with politicians, businessmen, and even high-ranking members of the Russian military. In the late 1990s, after several legal issues and an arrest in 1995, Lalakin distanced himself from the criminal world, focusing on legal business ventures like sports clubs and charity work. However, his past remained tied to the group's legacy.[123][124]
Groups based in other parts of Russia and the former Soviet Union:
The Dolgoprudnenskaya gang.[109] Originally from the City ofDolgoprudny.
TheTambov gang of Saint Petersburg is very closely aligned withNikolai Aulov [ru], who is the head of the Federal Drug Control Service;Alexander Bastrykin, who is the head of the Investigative Committee; Japaneseyakuza fromKobe andOsaka; and with the political rise ofVladimir Putin.[125][126][127] Putin's long time personal body guard,Victor Zolotov is very close to this group as well. the man most associated with them is Vladimir Kumarin.[110]
The Komarovskaya organized criminal group (leader - Komar) controls the St. Petersburg-Vyborg highway (A181) calledScandinavia or the Russia part of theEuropean highway E18, which includes everything along the road (hotels, repair garages, cafes and restaurants, etc.) and the transportation process as well as St. Petersburg's trucking businesses. Komarovskaya OPG steal automobiles, commit robberies, provide protection racketeering, and receive strong support from the Usvyatsov-Putyrsky gang and its AOZT "Putus" to organize the supply ofcocaine from South America into Russia, Finland, Scandinavia and Europe and the trade in counterfeit dollars.[128][129][130]
The Usvyatsov-Putyrsky gang (AOZT "Putus") led by Vladimir Putyrsky (Vova-One-armed) and Leonid Ionovich Usvyatsov (Lenya-Sportsman) organizes both the supply ofcocaine from South America into Russia, Finland, Scandinavia and Europe and the trade in counterfeit dollars and works closely with the Komarovskaya organized criminal group. Both Putyrsky and Usvyatsov have large estates in theCzech Republic where they enjoy hunting. During the 1980s, sambo coach "Trud" Usvyatsov, who was imprisoned for rape, robbery and theft, coachedVladimir Putin,Arkady Rotenberg,Boris Rotenberg and Nikolai Kononov.[129]
The Uzbek criminals inLitvinenko's Uzbek file, including Michael Cherney,Gafur Rakhimov,Vyacheslav Ivankov, andSalim Abduvaliev (also spelledSalim Abdulaev); are Uzbek origin KGB and later FSB officers at Moscow including Colonel Evgeny Khokholkov; were organized by Vladimir Putin while Putin was Deputy Mayor for Economic Affairs of St Petersburg in the early 1990s; and controlAfghanistan origin drug trade through St Petersburg, Russia, and then to Europe.Boris Berezovsky told Litvinenko to brief his Uzbek file about corrupt FSB officers to the future Head of theFSB Putin, which Litvinenko did on 25 July 1998 and, later, Litvinenko was imprisoned.[131][132]Robert Eringer, head of Monaco's Security Service, confirmed Litvinenko's file about Vladimir Putin as a kingpin in Europe's narcotics trade.[133] TheColombia-basedCali KGB Cartel supplied cocaine to this network, too.
TheSlonovskaya gang was one of the strongest and violent criminal groups in CIS in the 1990s. It was based inRyazan city. It had a long-term bloody wars with other active criminal groups in the city (Ayrapetovskaya, Kochetkovskie, etc.) with which it initially coexisted peacefully. The gang virtually disappeared by 2000 as its members were getting hunted down and imprisoned by local Russian Police.
TheChechen mafia is one of the largest ethnic organized crime groups operating in the former Soviet Union next to established Russian mafia groups.
TheGeorgian mafia is regarded as one of the biggest, powerful and influential criminal networks in Europe, which has produced the biggest number ofthieves in law in all former USSR countries.
TheMkhedrioni was a paramilitary group involved in organised crime[134] led by a thief in lawJaba Ioseliani in Georgia in the 1990s.
The city ofKazan was known for its gang culture, which later progressed into more organised, mafiaesque groups. This was known as theKazan phenomenon.
Groups based in other areas:
TheBrothers' Circle: headed by Temuri Mirzoyev, this multi-ethnictransnational group is "composed of leaders and senior members of several Eurasian criminal groups largely based in countries of the former Soviet Union but operating in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America". In 2011, US PresidentBarack Obama and his administration named it one of four transnational organized crime groups that posed the greatest threat to US national security, and sanctioned certain key members and froze their assets. A year later, he extended the national emergency against them for another year.
TheSemion Mogilevich organization: based inBudapest, Hungary and headed by the crime boss of the same name, this group numbered approximately 250 members as of 1996. Its business is often connected with that of the Solntsevskaya Bratva and the Vyacheslav Ivankov Organization. Aleksey Anatolyevich Lugovkov is the second-in-command, and Vitaly Borisovich Savalovsky is the "underboss" to Mogilevich.[135]
^Состояние и тенденции преступности в Российской Федерации: Криминологический и уголовно-правовой справочник (in Russian). Экзамен. 2007. pp. 26–27.ISBN978-5-377-00024-2.
^Dolgova, Azalia Ivanovna.Криминология: Учебник для юрид. вузов (in Russian). pp. 223–226.
^Behar, Richard (12 June 2000)."Capitalism in a cold climate".Fortune (in Russian).Archived from the original on 19 October 2014. Retrieved19 August 2021.The story of Trans World's aluminum empire is filled with bribes, shell companies, profiteers, and more than a few corpses. Then again, in today's Russia, that's pretty much par for the course.Archived as Капитализм в холодном климате in Russian at compromat.ru on 21 June 2000.
^Иванидзе, Владимир (Ivanidze, Vladimir); Шихаб, Софи (Shihab, Sophie) (28 November 2002)."Владимир Путин в окружении мафии" [Vladimir Putin surrounded by the mafia].Le Monde (in Russian). Retrieved29 November 2023.{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)[dead link]Alt URL This is a Russian translation of a French article in Le Monde.
^Захаров, А. (Zakharov, A.) (3 June 2014)."Крупнейшие преступные сообщества и группировки Санкт-Петербурга" [The largest criminal communities and groups in St. Petersburg].Falculty of Law Saint Petersberg State University (in Russian). Archived fromthe original on 25 June 2014. Retrieved25 September 2021.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
^abКанев, Сергей (Kanev, Sergey) (7 October 2019).""Бандитский Ротенберг", или За кого не стыдно Владимиру Путину" ["Gangster Rothenberg", or for whom Vladimir Putin is not ashamed].МБХ медиа (in Russian). Archived fromthe original on 8 December 2019. Retrieved25 September 2021.The author Sergey Kanev is from Центр «Досье» (dossier.center).{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)Archived on compromat.ru on 9 October 2019 as Как расцвел "Путус" Вовы-Однорукого и Лени-Спортсмена: История питерского "авторитета" Владимира Путырского и бывшего тренера Путина дзюдоиста-рецидивиста Леонида Усвяцова (How Vova-One-Armed and Leni-Sportsman's "Putus" blossomed: The story of the St. Petersburg "authority" Vladimir Putyrsky and the former coach of Putin, the judoka-recidivist Leonid Usvyatsov).
Galeotti, Mark. 2018.The Vory. Yale University Press.
Mironova, Vera (2023).Criminals, Nazis, and Islamists: Competition for Power in Former Soviet Union Prisons. Oxford University Press.ISBN9780197645680.
Morcillo, Cruz; Muñoz, Pablo (26 October 2010).Palabra de Vor: Las mafias rusas en España (in Spanish). Espasa Forum.ISBN978-8467034356.
Varese, Federico (2005).The Russian Mafia. Oxford University Press.ISBN978-0198297369.
