Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter | |
|---|---|
.jpg) | |
| 3rdDirector of Central Intelligence | |
| In office May 1, 1947 – October 7, 1950 | |
| President | Harry Truman |
| Deputy | Edwin K. Wright |
| Preceded by | Hoyt Vandenberg |
| Succeeded by | Walter B. Smith |
| Personal details | |
| Born | Roscoe Henry Hillenkoetter (1897-05-08)May 8, 1897 St. Louis, Missouri, U.S. |
| Died | June 18, 1982(1982-06-18) (aged 85) New York City, U.S.] |
| Resting place | Arlington National Cemetery |
| Spouse | Jane Clark |
| Education | United States Naval Academy(BS) |
| Military service | |
| Allegiance | United States |
| Branch/service | United States Navy |
| Years of service | 1915–1957 |
| Rank | Vice Admiral |
| Commands | Commanding Officer,USS Missouri Commander, 1st Cruiser Division Commander, 3rd Naval District |
| Battles/wars | World War I World War II Korean War |
Roscoe Henry Hillenkoetter (May 8, 1897 – June 18, 1982) was the third director of the post–World War IIUnited States Central Intelligence Group (CIG), the thirdDirector of Central Intelligence (DCI), and the first director of theCentral Intelligence Agency created by theNational Security Act of 1947. He served as DCI and director of the CIG and the CIA from May 1, 1947, to October 7, 1950, and, after his retirement from theUnited States Navy, was a member of the board of governors ofNational Investigations Committee On Aerial Phenomena (NICAP) from 1957 to 1962.
Born inSt. Louis, Missouri on May 8, 1897, Hillenkoetter graduated from theUnited States Naval Academy atAnnapolis, Maryland, in 1919. He served with theAtlantic Fleet duringWorld War I and joined theOffice of Naval Intelligence in 1933. He served several tours innaval intelligence, including as assistantnaval attaché to France, Spain, and Portugal. During theSpanish Civil War, he coordinated the evacuation of Americans from the country. After the German invasion of France, Hillenkoetter enteredVichy France and aided the underground movement. As executive officer of theUSS West Virginia (BB-48), he was wounded during theattack on Pearl Harbor, and afterwards was officer in charge of intelligence onChester W. Nimitz'sPacific Fleetstaff until 1943. He briefly served as commander of the destroyer tenderUSSDixie before joining theBureau of Naval Personnel in 1944.
After the war, then-Captain Hillenkoetter commanded theUSS Missouri in 1946 before returning to his pre-war posting as naval attaché inParis before becoming head of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) in May 1947.[1]
President Truman persuaded a reluctant Hillenkoetter, then arear admiral, to becomeDirector of Central Intelligence (DCI), and run theCentral Intelligence Group (September 1947). Under theNational Security Act of 1947 he was nominated and confirmed by theU.S. Senate as DCI, now in charge of the newly establishedCentral Intelligence Agency (December 1947). At first, theU.S. State Department directed the new CIA'scovert operations component, andGeorge F. Kennan choseFrank Wisner to be its director. Hillenkoetter expressed doubt that the same agency could be effective at both covert action and intelligence analysis.[2]
As DCI, Hillenkoetter was periodically called to testify beforeCongress. One instance concerned the CIA's first majorSoviet intelligence failure, the failure to predict the Sovietatomic bomb test (August 29, 1949). In the weeks following the test, but prior to the CIA's detection of it, Hillenkoetter released the September 20, 1949National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) stating, "the earliest possible date by which the USSR might be expected to produce an atomic bomb is mid-1950 and the most probable date is mid-1953."[3] Hillenkoetter was called before theJoint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) to explain how the CIA not only failed to predict the test, but also how they did not even detect it after it occurred. JCAE members were steaming that the CIA could be taken by such surprise.[4] Hillenkoetter imprecisely replied that the CIA knew it would take the Soviets approximately five years to build the bomb, but the CIA misjudged when they started:
We knew that they were working on it, and we started here, and this organization [CIA] was set up after the war and we started in the middle and we didn't know when they had started and it had to be picked up from what we could get along there. That is what I say: this thing of getting a fact that you definitely have on the exploding of this bomb has helped us in going back and looking over what we had before, and it will help us in what we get in the future. But you picked up in the mid-air on the thing, and we didn't know when they started, sir.[5]
The JCAE was not satisfied with Hillenkoetter's answer, and his and the CIA's reputation suffered among government heads in Washington, even though the press did not write about the CIA's first Soviet intelligence failure.[6]
TheU.S. government had no intelligence warning ofNorth Korea's invasion (June 25, 1950) of South Korea. DCI Hillenkoetter convened an ad hoc group to prepare estimates of likelycommunist behavior on the Korean peninsula; it worked well enough that his successor institutionalized it.
Two days prior to North Korea's invasion of South Korea, Hillenkoetter went before Congress (theHouse Foreign Affairs Committee) and testified that the CIA had good sources in Korea, implying that the CIA would be able to provide warning before any invasion.[7] Following the invasion, the press suspected the administration was surprised by it,[8] and wondered whether Hillenkoetter would be removed.[9] The DCI was not influential with PresidentHarry S. Truman, but Hillenkoetter insisted to the President that as the Director of Central Intelligence, it would be politically advantageous to testify before Congress to try to remedy the situation. After the testimony, some Senators told the Washington Post that Hillenkoetter confused them when explaining the CIA did not predict when North Korea would invade by saying it was not the CIA's job to analyze intelligence, just to pass it on to high-ranking policymakers.[10] Even though most senators believed Hillenkoetter ably explained the CIA's performance, many at the CIA were embarrassed by the news reports, and by mid-August the rumors of Hillenkoetter's removal were confirmed when President Truman announced that GeneralWalter Bedell "Beetle" Smith would replace him as DCI.[11]
President Truman installed a new DCI in October.Nebraska CongressmanHoward Buffett alleged that Hillenkoetter's classified testimony before theSenate Armed Services Committee "established American responsibility for theKorean outbreak," and sought to have it declassified until his death in 1964.[12]
Admiral Hillenkoetter returned to the fleet, commanding Cruiser Division 1 of the Cruiser-Destroyer Force,Pacific Fleet from October 1950 to August 1951 during theKorean War. He then commanded theThird Naval District with headquarters inNew York City from July 1952 to August 1956 and was promoted to the rank ofvice admiral on 9 April 1956.[13]
His last assignment was asInspector General of the Navy from 1 August 1956 until his retirement from the Navy on 1 May 1957.[14]
The National Investigations Committee On Aerial Phenomena was formed in 1956, with the organization's corporate charter being approved October 24.[15] Hillenkoetter was onNICAP'sboard of governors from about 1957 until 1962.[16]Donald E. Keyhoe, NICAP director and Hillenkoetter's Naval Academy classmate, wrote that Hillenkoetter wanted public disclosure ofUFO evidence.[17] Perhaps Hillenkoetter's best-known statement on the subject was in 1960 in a letter to Congress, as reported inThe New York Times: "Behind the scenes, high-ranking Air Force officers are soberly concerned about UFOs. But through official secrecy and ridicule, many citizens are led to believe the unknown flying objects are nonsense."[18]
Hillenkoetter lived inWeehawken, New Jersey, following his retirement from the Navy, until his death on June 18, 1982, atNew York City'sMount Sinai Hospital.[19][20]
ActorLeon Russom portrayed Hillenkoetter in an episode ofDark Skies, a 1996 television series presenting a story based conspiracies related toUFOs.
 | ||
 | ||
 |  |  |
  |  |  |
 |  |  |
 |  |  |
 |  |  |
 |  |  |
| Ensign | Lieutenant junior grade | Lieutenant | Lieutenant commander |
|---|---|---|---|
| O-1 | O-2 | O-3 | O-4 |
 |  |  |  |
| 7 June 1919 | 7 June 1922 | 7 June 1925 | 30 June 1934 |
| Commander | Captain | Rear admiral | Vice admiral |
|---|---|---|---|
| O-5 | O-6 | O-7, O-8 | O-9 |
 |  |  |  |
| 1 July 1939 | 18 June 1942 | 29 November 1946 | 9 April 1956 |
1952–1956 RADM Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter July 1952
1956–1958 RADM Milton E. Miles August 1956
He resigned from NICAP in February 1962 and was replaced on the NICAP Board by a former covert CIA high official, Joseph Bryan III, the CIA's first Chief of Political & Psychological Warfare (Bryan never disclosed his CIA background to NICAP or Keyhoe).
Washington, February 27 (UPI) – The Air Force has sent its commands a warning to treat sightings of unidentified flying objects as "serious business" directly related to the nation's defense, it was learned today.
| Military offices | ||
|---|---|---|
| Preceded by | Commanding Officer of theUSS Missouri 1945–1946 | Succeeded by |
| Preceded by | Commander of the 3rd Naval District 1952–1956 | Succeeded by |
| Government offices | ||
| Preceded by | Director of Central Intelligence 1947–1950 | Succeeded by |
| International | |
|---|---|
| National | |
| Other | |
CIA Biographical Link
