In aparliamentary orsemi-presidential system ofgovernment, areserve power, also known asdiscretionary power, is a power that may be exercised by thehead of state (or their representative) without the approval of another branch or part of the government. Unlike in apresidential system of government, the head of state (or their representative) is generally constrained by thecabinet or thelegislature in a parliamentary system, and most reserve powers are usable only in certain limited circumstances.
Inmonarchies with either anuncodified or partly unwritten constitution (such as theUnited Kingdom orCanada) or a wholly written constitution that consists of a text augmented by additional conventions, traditions,letters patent, etc., the monarch generally possesses reserve powers.
Typically these powers are: to grantpardon; to dismiss aprime minister; to refuse todissolveparliament; and to refuse or delayroyal assent to legislation (towithhold royal assent amounts to aveto of a bill, while toreserve royal assent, in effect, amounts to neither granting nor refusing assent, but to delay making a decision for an undetermined period). There are usually strict constitutional conventions concerning when these powers may be used, and these conventions are enforced by public pressure. Using these powers in contravention of tradition would generally provoke aconstitutional crisis.
Most constitutional monarchies employ a system that includes the principle ofresponsible government. In such an order, the reserve powers are thought to be the means by which the monarch and his or herviceregal representatives can legitimately exist as "constitutional guardians" or "umpires", tasked with guaranteeing thatCabinet and parliament adhere to the fundamental constitutional principles of therule of law and responsible government itself.[1] Some constitutional scholars, such asGeorge Winterton, have stated that reserve powers are a good thing in that they allow for a head of state to handle an unforeseen crisis[2] and that the use of convention to limit the use of reserve powers allows for more gradual and subtle constitutional evolution than is possible through formal amendment of a written constitution. Others, such asHerbert Evatt, believe or believed that reserve powers are vestigial and potentially open to abuse.[2][3] Evatt felt that the reserve powers could be codified and still serve their intended function in a responsible government system,[3] as they do in Ireland, Japan, and Sweden.[2]
TheBelgian constitution has an explicit provision stating no act of themonarch is valid without the signature of a member or members of the government, which thereby becomes solely responsible, hence excluding any reserve power for the crown. In legal terminology, a competence vested in 'the King' thus very often means the government, as opposed to formal laws which require a (sometimes qualified) parliamentary majority.
Constitutional precedence has even established the unwritten but binding rule that the monarch must give assent to any parliamentary decision, regardless of any other considerations (which can only be advanced in private audience with government members, not imposed), as soon as the government presents it for royal signature and thus assumes full political responsibility.
In 1990, when a law liberalising Belgium'sabortion laws was approved by parliament, KingBaudouinrefused to give his royal assent, only the second time in Belgium's history a monarch had done so. Instead, he requested cabinet to declare him unable to reign for a day, which it did and thus assumed the king's constitutional powers. All members of the government then signed the bill, passing it into law. The bicameralBelgian Federal Parliament approved a proposition that Baudouin was capable of reigning again the next day.
Within theDominions, until the 1920s, most reserve powers were exercised by agovernor-general on the advice of either the local or theBritish government, though the latter took precedence. After theBalfour Declaration was produced by the1926 Imperial Conference, formally establishing the autonomy and equal status of Commonwealth governments, governors-general ceased to be advised in any way by the British government. For example, the firstGovernor-General of the Irish Free State,Tim Healy, was instructed by the British Dominions Office in 1922 to withhold the royal assent on any bill passed by the two houses of theOireachtas (the Irish parliament) that attempted to change or abolish theOath of Allegiance. However, no such bill was introduced during Healy's period in office. By the timethe oath was abolished by the Irish Parliament in 1933, the Irish governor-general was formally advised exclusively by the Irish government.
While the reserve power to dismiss a government has not been used in the United Kingdom since 1834, this power has been exercised more recently in Australia, on two occasions:
In both cases an election was held very soon afterwards and, again in both cases, the dismissed government was massively defeated bypopular vote.
In Queensland in 1987, during a tense period of leadership succession, theGovernor of Queensland,Sir Walter Campbell, exercised reserve power in declining to follow the advice of thePremier, SirJoh Bjelke-Petersen. Campbell initially refused to redistribute ministerial portfolios on the sole advice of the premier, who lacked the confidence of his cabinet. Subsequently, during a period when Queensland had a "Premier who is not leader" and the governing party had a "Leader who is not Premier",[4] there was speculation on the potential exercise of viceregal reserve power by Campbell, in dismissing the premier in the absence of a parliamentarymotion of no confidence. Ultimately, Campbell was praised for his handling of the undesirable situation.[5]
These are among several exercises of the reserve powers in Australia in the 20th century at both state and federal levels.[6]
The reserve powers in Canada fall within theroyal prerogative and belong specifically tothe monarch, as theConstitution Act, 1867, vests all executive power in the country's sovereign.[7] KingGeorge VI in 1947 issuedLetters Patent permitting thegovernor general "to exercise all powers and authorities lawfully belonging to Us [the monarch] in respect of Canada."[8]
The reserve power of dismissal has never been used in Canada, although other reserve powers have been employed to force theprime minister to resign on two occasions: The first took place in 1896, when the Prime Minister, SirCharles Tupper, refused to step down after his party did not win a majority in theHouse of Commons duringthat year's election, leading Governor Generalthe Earl of Aberdeen to no longer recognize Tupper as prime minister and disapprove of several appointments Tupper had recommended. On the second occasion in 1925, which came to be known as theKing–Byng affair, Prime MinisterWilliam Lyon Mackenzie King, facing anon-confidence motion in the House of Commons,advised the Governor General,the Viscount Byng of Vimy, todissolve the new parliament, but Byng refused.
At the provincial level, on 29 June 2017Lieutenant Governor ofBritish ColumbiaJudith Guichon used her reserve powers to deny the request of PremierChristy Clark to dissolve the legislature and call a new election only 51 days after the recent provincial election. Clark had advised Guichon to dissolve the legislature as, in her view, the appointment of a Speaker would have resulted in frequent tie votes and an untenable position. Guichon refused this advice and instead askedJohn Horgan to form a government, becoming the new premier.[9]
No modern governor general hasdisallowed a bill, thoughprovincial lieutenant governors have.[10]
Peter Hogg, a constitutional scholar, has opined that "a system ofresponsible government cannot work without a formal head of state who is possessed of certain reserve powers."[11] Further,Eugene Forsey stated "the reserve power is indeed, under our Constitution, an absolutely essential safeguard of democracy. It takes the place of the legal and judicial safeguards provided in the United States by written Constitutions, enforceable in the courts."[12]
New Zealand's early governors, the predecessors of today'sgovernors-general, exercised considerable power, with exclusive authority over some matters such as foreign andMāori affairs. They also had a real choice in selecting premiers – parliaments of the period being composed of independent members who formed loose and shifting factions – and were not always obliged to act on the advice of their ministers. As New Zealand's political system matured, theColonial Office increasingly instructed the governors to follow the advice of local ministers, and the powers of the office have continually shrunk. Important remnants of these early powers remain. The governor-general has a number of reserve powers, which may be used on behalf of KingCharles III.[13] SirKenneth Keith describes the use of these powers as based on the principle that "TheQueen reigns, but the government rules, so long as it has the support of the House of Representatives".[14]
The most visible reserve powers are the power to appoint aprime minister and the related power to accept a prime minister's resignation. This power is exercised every time a general election results in a change of government, most recentlyin 2023. It may also be exercised if a prime ministerloses the confidence of Parliament and resigns instead of advising a dissolution of Parliament; the last such occasion wasin 1911. Finally, it may happen if a Prime Minister is maneuvered out of their position by their own party, retires or resigns for personal reasons, or dies in office. Though the power of appointment is listed among the reserve powers, in fact the governor-general abides by strict conventions, and has always appointed the leader of the dominant faction in theHouse of Representatives. The governor-general retains the theoretical power to appoint as prime minister a member of the House of Representatives who clearly does not have the support of a majority of MPs, but no governor-general has sought to use this power since New Zealand gainedresponsible government, though some cabinets in the 19th century proved extremely short-lived. In earlier times, if a prime minister died, became incapacitated, or resigned unexpectedly, a governor-general might be able to choose a temporary prime minister from among several senior ministers, while the governing party decided on a new leader who would then be duly appointed prime minister. Today, however, the practice of appointing – on prime-ministerial advice – a permanent deputy prime minister, who becomes acting prime minister when needed, has largely removed even this discretion from the governor-general.[citation needed]
The governor-general has a number of other legal powers.[15] They may dismiss an incumbent prime minister andCabinet, an individualminister, or any other official who holds office "during theKing's pleasure" or "during the Governor-General's pleasure".[14] Conventionally, the governor-general follows the advice of the prime minister or another appropriate minister in matters of appointment and dismissal. Likewise, by convention, the Government as a whole remains in office as long as it keeps the confidence of the House.
The governor-general can also dissolve Parliament and call elections without prime-ministerial advice. Dissolving Parliament and calling for elections is part of the governor-general's normal duties; every parliamentary dissolution and subsequent general election in New Zealand's history has been called by the governor or governor-general. However, all elections since responsible government was introduced, includingsnap elections, have been requested by the incumbent premier or prime minister, and are accordingly not examples of use of the reserve powers. A prime minister who has lost the confidence of the House will conventionally either advise adissolution of Parliament and new elections, or tender their resignation. If a defeated prime minister refuses to do either of these two things, the governor-general could use the reserve powers to either dismiss the prime minister (see above), or dissolve Parliament without the prime minister's advice. Likewise, if the prime minister tenders their resignation, the governor-general could theoretically refuse to accept it, and dissolve Parliament against the Prime Minister's advice.
A governor-general can also refuse a prime minister's request to dissolve Parliament and hold elections. If a prime minister has been defeated by a vote of no confidence, a refusal by the governor-general to dissolve Parliament would, in effect, force the prime minister to resign and make way for a successor. See theLascelles Principles for factors which might guide the governor-general in making a decision on whether or not to grant a dissolution in those circumstances. A governor-general could also legally refuse a request for asnap election from a prime minister in whom the House has confidence, but such a refusal would be extremely unlikely.
The power to withhold royal assent to Bills is controversial. Many constitutional commentators believe that the governor-general (or thesovereign) no longer has the power to refuse royal assent to any bill properly passed by the House of Representatives – former law professor and Prime Minister SirGeoffrey Palmer and ProfessorMatthew Palmer argue any refusal of royal assent would lead to a constitutional crisis.[16] Others, such as Professor Philip Joseph, believe the Governor-General does retain the power to refuse royal assent to Bills in exceptional circumstances - such as the abolition of democracy.[17] A similar controversial power is the ability to refuse to make Orders and regulations advised by the Government or by individual Ministers.
There have been a handful of occasions when reserve powers were used, or at least considered.
In the 1890s, PremierJohn Ballance advised the Governor to make several new appointments to the (since abolished)Legislative Council. Two successive Governors,the Earl of Onslow andthe Earl of Glasgow, refused to make the appointments, until the Colonial Office intervened in Ballance's favour. This incident markedly reduced the discretionary powers of the Governor. Though these remained the same in law for the time being, later Governors and governments considered that there would be far fewer scenarios in which their use would be appropriate.
Almost a century later, in 1984, there was a briefconstitutional crisis. The outgoing Prime Minister, SirRob Muldoon, had just lost an election, but refused to advise the Governor-General,Sir David Beattie, to make urgent regulations desired not only by the incoming Prime Minister,David Lange, but also by many in Muldoon's own party and cabinet. At the time, the option of Beattie dismissing Muldoon and replacing him, without waiting for Muldoon's resignation, was reportedly discussed. Muldoon eventually relented under pressure from his own cabinet, making the use of Beattie's reserve powers unnecessary.
A constitutional crisis occurred inSaint Kitts and Nevis in 1981, when thegovernor, SirProbyn Inniss, used his reserve powers to refuse assent to a bill passed by the government of SirKennedy Simmonds, the country'spremier. Inniss believed that the bill was unconstitutional, and would soon be struck down by theWest Indies Associated States Supreme Court. The situation was resolved when Queen Elizabeth II, at the request of Simmonds, terminated Inniss's commission as governor.[18]
TheConstitution of Tuvalu provides, in article 52, that theGovernor-General exercises his powers "only in accordance with the advice of (a) the Cabinet; or (b) the Prime Minister [...] except where he is required to act (c) in accordance with the advice of any other person or authority [...] or(e) in his own deliberate judgment (in which case he shall exercise an independent discretion)".
In 2013, Governor-General SirIakoba Italeli was requested by the Opposition to act without (and indeed against) the Prime Minister's advice. On 28 June, Prime MinisterWilly Telavi's government had losta crucial by-election, which gave the Opposition a majority of one in Parliament. The Opposition immediately called for the government to reconvene Parliament, so that amotion of no confidence could be introduced, and a new government formed.[19] Prime Minister Telavi responded that, under the Constitution, he was only required to convene Parliament once a year (for a vote on the budget), and was thus under no obligation to summon it until December.[20] The Opposition turned to the Governor-General. On 3 July, Italeli exercised his reserve powers in ordering Parliament to convene, against the Prime Minister's wishes, on 30 July.[21]
In the end, the Governor-General dismissed the Prime Minister from office.
In the United Kingdom, the monarch has numerous theoreticalpersonal prerogatives, but beyond the appointment of a prime minister, there are in practice few circumstances in modern British government where these prerogatives could be justifiably exercised;[citation needed] they have rarely been exercised in the last century. In October 2003 the Government made public the following prerogatives but it said at the time that a comprehensive catalogue of prerogative powers could not be supplied:[22]
These powers could be exercised in an emergency such as aconstitutional crisis (such as surrounded thePeople's Budget of 1909) or in wartime. They would also be very relevant in the event of ahung parliament.
For example, in the hung parliament in 1974, Prime MinisterEdward Heath attempted to remain in power but was unable to form aworking majority. The Queen then askedHarold Wilson, leader of theLabour Party, which had the largest number of seats in the Commons but not an overall majority, to attempt to form a government. Subsequently, Wilson asked that if the government were defeated on the floor of the House of Commons, the Queen would grant a dissolution, which she agreed to.[26]
Unlike most other constitutional monarchs, theEmperor of Japan has no reserve powers. FollowingJapan's defeat inWorld War II, the Emperor's role is defined in Chapter I of the 1947Constitution of Japan, as decided byforeign powers that had defeated the country. It states that sovereignty rests with the Japanese citizenry, not the Emperor who is merely the symbol of the State and the unity of the people.
TheYang di-Pertuan Agong (the elective, supreme federal ruler, commonly glossed as “King”) has no reserve powers. Article 40 of theMalaysian constitution specifies only three powers of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong: to reject a request to dissolveParliament; to convene a meeting of theConference of Rulers; and to appoint thePrime Minister, whom he has no power to dismiss.[27]
TheSpanish Constitution of 1978 does not specifically grantemergency powers to the government, though does state in Article 56 that themonarch "arbitrates and moderates the regular functioning of the institutions", and invests the monarch with the responsibility of overseeing that the forms of the constitution are observed.[28][29] It is through this constitutional language that wider "reserve powers" are granted to the monarch. It is through this clause and his position as commander-in-chief of theSpanish Armed Forces thatKing Juan Carlos I undermined the attempted23-F militarycoup in 1981.
Title II, Articles 56
The King is Head of State, the symbol of its unity and permanence. He arbitrates and moderates the regular functioning of the institutions, assumes the highest representation of the Spanish State in international relations, especially with the nations of its historical community, and exercises the functions expressly conferred on him by the Constitution and the laws.[28][29]
The Spanish Constitution of 1978, Title IIThe Crown, Article 62, delineates the powers of the monarch, while Title IVGovernment and Administration, Article 99, defines the monarch's role in government.[28][29][30] Title VIJudicial Power, Article 117, Articles 122 through 124, outlines the monarch's role in the country's independentjudiciary.[31] However, byconstitutional convention established by Juan Carlos I, the monarch exercises prerogatives after having solicited government advice, while remaining politicallynon-partisan and independent. Receiving government advice does not necessarily bind the monarch into executing said advice, except where prescribed by the Constitution.
It is incumbent upon the King:
- a. To Sanction and promulgate the laws
- b. To summon and dissolve theCortes Generales and to call for elections under the terms provided for in the Constitution.
- c. To Call for a referendum in the cases provided for in the Constitution.
- e. To appoint and dismiss members of theGovernment on thePresident of the Government's proposal.
- f. To issue the decrees approved in theCouncil of Ministers, to confer civil and military honours and distinctions in conformity with the law.
- g. To be informed of the affairs of State and, for this purpose, to preside over the meetings of the Council of Ministers whenever, he sees fit, at the President of the Government's request.
- h. To exercise supreme command of theArmed Forces
- i. To exercise the right of clemency in accordance with the law, which may not authorize general pardons.
- j. To exercise the High Patronage of the Royal Academies.[28][29]
Once aGeneral Election has been announced by the monarch, political parties nominate their candidates to stand for the presidency of the government.
Following the General Election of theCortes Generales (Cortes), and other circumstances provided for in the Constitution, the monarch meets with and interviews thepolitical party leaders represented in the Congress of Deputies, and then consults with theSpeaker of the Congress of Deputies (officially, Presidente de Congreso de los Diputados de España, who, in this instance, represents the whole Cortes Generales) before nominating his candidate for the presidency, according to Section 99 of Title IV.[30] Often minor parties form part of a larger major party, and through that membership it can be said that the monarch fulfills the constitutional mandate of consulting with party representatives with Congressional representation.
Title IV Government and AdministrationSection 99(1) & (2)
- (1)After each renewal of the Congress and the other cases provided for under the Constitution, the King shall, after consultation with the representatives appointed by the political groups with parliamentary representation, and through the Speaker of the Congress, nominate for the Presidency of the Government.
- (2)The candidate nominated in accordance with the provisions of the foregoing subsection shall submit to the Congress the political program of the Government he or she intends to form and shall seek the confidence of the House.[30]
TheSpanish Constitution of 1978 explicitly says[32] the monarch is not subject to any responsibility but for his acts to be valid must be endorsed by the Government and will not be valid without such an endorsement. The only exception[33] is that the monarch is free to appoint and remove the members of private and military advisors (Casa Real).
Title IV of the Constitution invests the monarch with sanction (Royal Assent) and promulgation (publication) of laws, while Title IIIThe Cortes Generals, Chapter 2Drafting of Bills outlines the method by which bills are passed. According to Article 91, within fifteen days that a bill has been passed by the Cortes Generales, the monarch shall give assent and publish the new law. Article 92 invests the monarch with the right to call for a referendum on the advice of the president and the previous authorization of Congress.
No provision within the Constitution invests the monarch with the ability to veto legislation directly, however no provision forbids the denial of royal assent – effectively, a veto. When the media asked KingJuan Carlos I if he would endorse the bill legalizinggay marriages, he answered "Soy el Rey de España y no el de Bélgica" ("I am the King of Spain, and not that of Belgium") – inreference to KingBaudouin I of Belgium who in 1990 had refused to sign the Belgian law legalisingabortion.[34] The King gave his royal assent to Law 13/2005 on 1 July 2005; the law wasgazetted in theBoletín Oficial del Estado on 2 July, and came into effect on 3 July 2005.[35]
Much like the Emperor of Japan, theKing of Sweden does not have any constitutional responsibility for the governance of the Realm, with strictly ceremonial and representative functions remaining. Under the1974 Instrument of Government, the supreme executive authority is theGovernment (composed of thePrime Minister and other cabinet ministers), which is responsible to theRiksdag. The King, however, is not subordinate to the Government and thus could play an independent role as moral authority, but the prevailing convention, expressed in the preparatory works of the 1974 Instrument of Government, is that the King should stay away from anything which could reasonably be interpreted aspartisan politics or criticism of the Government in office.
Reserve powers can also be written into a republican constitution that separates the offices ofhead of state andhead of government. This was the case in Germany under theWeimar Republic and is still the case in theFrench Fifth Republic, theItalian republic, and theRepublic of Ireland. Reserve powers may include, for instance, the right to issueemergency legislation or regulation bypassing the normal processes. In most states, the head of state's ability to exercise reserve powers is explicitly defined and regulated by the text of the constitution.
ThePresident of Bangladesh must consult with thePrime Minister for all decisions except the appointment of the Prime Minister and the Chief Justice.[36] However, the President has the authority to dissolve the government or parliament, grant pardon to criminals,[36] block bills/budgets by the legislature[36] or declare an emergency.[37]
During the regime of thecaretaker government, the President's power expanded dramatically;[37] effectively (s)he is no longer a ceremonial head of state.
Article 16 of theConstitution of France allows thePresident of the Republic to exercise exceptional powers in case of a national emergency. During this time, the President may not use his prerogative to dissolve theNational Assembly and call early elections. He must still consult the Prime Minister, the leaders of both houses of Parliament and theConstitutional Council.
The inspiration for this disposition in the Constitution was the institutional chaos and lack of government authority which contributed to the French debacle in theBattle of France in 1940. On a larger scale, this is consistent with a tradition of theRoman Republic (which has always been an inspiration for the successive French Republics), to give six months of dictatorial power to a citizen in case of an imminent danger of invasion.
Article 16 rule has only been exercised once, in 1961, during a crisis related to theAlgerian War in whichCharles de Gaulle needed those emergency powers to foil a military plot to take over the government.[38] In 1962, theCouncil of State ruled itself incompetent to judge measures of a legislative nature issued by the President under Article 16.
In his book,Le Coup d'État permanent (The PermanentCoup),François Mitterrand criticized Article 16 for allowing an ambitious politician the opportunity to become a dictator. However, he made no move to put away his reserve powers after he himself became president.
TheGerman constitution limits the powers available to thePresident to prevent a situation in which the executive could effectively rule without legislative approval, which was the case in theWeimar Republic. In particular, the president cannotrule by decree. However, in case of a "legislative emergency" the German President can accept legislation without approval of the "Bundestag" (parliament). Article 81 of the German constitution states the possibility that the President can by this means keep a government capable of action even in case of loss of a constructive majority in the Bundestag.
Furthermore, the German President can dissolve theBundestag (parliament) if the Chancellor loses amotion of confidence and asks the President to do so. The German President has exercised this right four times since the founding of the Federal Republic in 1949. PresidentGustav Heinemann dissolved theBundestag at the request of ChancellorWilly Brandt in 1972, and in 1982 PresidentKarl Carstens did so at the request of ChancellorHelmut Kohl. Both Brandt and Kohl were reelected with larger majorities. On 1 July 2005, PresidentHorst Köhler dissolved theBundestag at the request of ChancellorGerhard Schröder. Schröder unexpectedly lost theelection that followed. Most recently, on 27 Dec 2024, PresidentFrank-Walter Steinmeier dissolved theBundestag after theTraffic light coalition collapsed, and chancellorOlaf Scholz lost the motion of confidence according to plans to call for an early election.[39]
The President has the right to refuse his signature to laws passed by the parliament (veto) in certain circumstances. These may be formal errors in the law-making process or violations of theBasic Law inherent to the new law. This reserve power has been used 8 times as of May 2013.[note 1]
The President nominates the first candidate for Chancellor put to vote in theBundestag. The president can also dissolve the Bundestag if no candidate won the absolute majority of the members of parliament after three votes.
The President has the right to pardon criminals for federal crimes with the countersignature of a member of the cabinet. The refusal of a pardon does not need a countersignature.
ThePresident of Ireland does not possess executive powers: executive powers are held by the Government, which is headed by aTaoiseach (Prime Minister), who is chosen by and accountable toDáil Éireann (House of Representatives).
The President's powers are principally defined by Article 13 of theConstitution of Ireland. For the most part, these ceremonial duties may be performed only on the authority, and with the binding advice, of the Government.
However, the President has certain reserve powers, also known as "discretionary powers" in Ireland, which can be exercised by the President at his or her discretion – without, or even contrary to, the Government's advice.
The two most politically important discretionary powers are:
The first of these means that a Taoiseach who has been defeated by avote of no-confidence cannot automatically expect to appeal to the people by calling a general election. The question of whether or not the Taoiseach has lost the confidence of the Dáil could be a discretionary matter for the President to decide – in principle, the President could refuse to dissolve the Dáil on the advice of a Taoiseach who has not yet been defeated in a vote of no-confidence, but who appears likely to be defeated were such a vote to be held. This power has not so far been used, but it could be a crucial power in the event of the collapse of a governing coalition.
By the second of these powers, the President may refuse to assent to legislation passed by Parliament when he or she considers it to be unconstitutional. The President refers the matter to the Supreme Court, which makes the final decision. This power has been used several times by various Presidents.
In addition to these powers, the President has various other discretionary powers in the Constitution, which are of lesser political significance (in normal circumstances). The President may decide to call a referendum on legislation "of great national significance". This power, granted by Article 27 of the Constitution, has not so far been used. The President cannot initiate a referendum, but must wait for an application by a majority of the Seanad (Senate) and one-third of the Dáil. Generally, owing to the way in which the Seanad is elected, the Government's coalition controls a majority of the seats, and strong party discipline means that Senators rarely go against their own party, so getting Seanad support for a referendum is difficult. If the Seanad were to be reformed, this power could potentially become much more significant. Similarly, the President has a latent role in resolving disputes between the Dáil and the Seanad. The President may convene a special committee to resolve questions of privilege between the Dáil and the Seanad with regard toMoney Bills, and with regard to speeding the passage of urgent bills through the Seanad. Again, owing to the method by which the Seanad is elected, disputes of this nature tend not to emerge in practice.
The exercise of these powers is entirely at the President's discretion, for which the President is neither legally nor politically responsible. However, prior to their exercise, the President is bound, in most cases, to consult theCouncil of State, an advisory body consisting of a mixture of senior ex-officio and nominated members.
ThePresident of the Italian Republic's powers are defined by articles 87 through 90 of theConstitution of Italy. The President of the Republic:
The President of the Republic can refuse to sign laws he deems clearly against the Constitution, while less obvious cases are dealt with later on by the Constitutional Court. If the rejected law is passed again by a majority in theParliament, however, the President must sign it.
Given his monocratic nature, this organ joins in itself prerogatives that in all other collegial organs are attributed collectively.[note 2]
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: archived copy as title (link).Donald Markwell, "Griffith, Barton and the early governor-generals: aspects of Australia's constitutional development",Public Law Review, 1999.{{cite journal}}:Cite journal requires|journal= (help)
| |||||||||||||||||
| |||||||||||||||||
| |||||||||||||||||
| |||||||||||||||||
.svg)
