| Republican Protection League | |
|---|---|
| Republikanischer Schutzbund | |
 Emblem of the Schutzbund | |
| Founders | Social Democratic Party of Austria |
| Foundation | 1923 |
| Dissolved | 1934 |
| Headquarters | Vienna |
| Active regions | Austria |
| Ideology | |
| Political position | Left-wing Factions: Far-left |
| Status | Defunct |
| Size | 100,000 (peak in 1925)[3] |
| Opponents | |
TheRepublikanischer Schutzbund (German:[ʁepubliˈkaːnɪʃɐˈʃʊtsˌbʊnt]ⓘ, "Republican Protection League") was an Austrianparamilitary organisation established in 1923 by theSocial Democratic Workers' Party of Austria to defend theAustrian Republic[4] in the face of rising political radicalisation afterWorld War I. TheSchutzbund, whose membership peaked at about 100,000 men in 1925, was armed and organised on military lines. In theJuly Revolt of 1927 it worked with government authorities to try to prevent the spread of violence, but it largely sat out the Pfrimer Putsch in September 1931 because it had failed so quickly.
Under the right-wing authoritarian government ofEngelbert Dollfuss, theSchutzbund was banned on 31 March 1933,[5] and the Austrian police began arresting its members and searching for weapons. When they attempted to enter the Social Democrat's headquarters inLinz on 12 February 1934 to look for arms, localSchutzbund members opened fire and sparked theAustrian Civil War. TheSchutzbund was quickly defeated by the superior numbers and weaponry of the police andAustrian Army. ManySchutzbund members were arrested and nine men were executed, a number of whom were prominent in theSchutzbund. The Social Democratic Party was banned, and with it theRepublikanischer Schutzbund came to an end.
Due to the political and administrative disorder in immediate post-war Austria, public safety could not be guaranteed by the state alone. In order to defend armament and other large factories against potential marauders and also to protect the general population, improvised civil police forces were formed throughout Austria. The most significant of the forces were established by the socialists in November 1918 to safeguard the founding of theFirst Austrian Republic.[6]
In response to the large-scale creation of right-wingmilitias, the workers’ militias (Arbeiterwehren) were maintained after the re-establishment of basic public order. They formed the organisational core of the laterSchutzbund.[6]
In 1920, theSocial Democratic Party of Austria (SDAPÖ) officially sanctioned the merger and extension of the various workers’ militias into a single unified, but for the time being unarmed, militia. The decision was a response to the dangers posed by the newHorthy government inHungary and the right-wing "gangs crossing the border fromBavaria". In the clashes with Hungarian militiamen over the status ofBurgenland, the consolidated workers’ militia received arms from the Austrian state.[7]
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In 1921,Julius Deutsch of the SDAPÖ – who had previously been Austrian minister for the army – pushed for the development of Austria's only fundamentally unified workers’ militia into a consolidated and properly organised party militia. After intra-party talks, Deutsch in 1922 proposed the creation of aRepublikanischer Schutzbund, which was officially registered with the federal government as an association in 1923.[8]
During the four years of development of socialist militia activities, armaments and degree of military organisation were the most controversial questions discussed by the socialists. Most in favour of regular arms for theSchutzbund were the Communists. Despite its relative unpopularity, theCommunist Party of Austria still had influence in various workers’ organisations, among others those tasked with the development of theSchutzbund. Julius Deutsch likewise favoured consistent armament, although he attempted to delay it in 1923 due to potential complications with theEntente powers over re-armament questions.[9] Despite confiscations of weaponry by the Entente and some arms sales for funds, the consolidated workers’ militia in 1921 possessed roughly 26,000 rifles, 225 machine guns, 2.5 million rounds of ammunition and several artillery pieces.[10]
The years from 1923 to 1927 saw various clashes between the main political actors of the time and their paramilitaries – socialists with theSchutzbund and the conservativeChristian Social Party with theHeimwehren (Home Guards) or other paramilitary organisations. TheAustrian National Socialists also grew in importance, clashing with both socialists and Christian conservatives.
The small town ofSchattendorf in the recently annexed, previouslyHungarian state of Burgenland had been the site of several violent clashes between socialists and conservatives. Particularly after 1926, Hungarianirredentists and land-owning farmers, representing a significant share of local conservatives, clashed on a regular basis with the majority of the population sympathising with the socialists, who were mostly factory workers and peasants.[11] In January 1927,Schutzbund members from Schattendorf confronted members of the right-wing andHeimwehr-associated Front-line Fighters' Association (Frontkämpfervereinigung), which led to a minor skirmish. After it had died down and both parties were leaving, members of theFrontkämpfervereinigung shot from ambush at theSchutzbund members, wounding five and killing two – a six-year old boy and an adult war veteran.[12]
The murders of Schattendorf, as they were known, led to protests across all of Austria, particularly inVienna, where they climaxed in a brief strike.
Three men were charged with murder in Schattendorf and tried before a jury. The three, locals of Schattendorf, considered their actions to be self-defence against alleged gunshots coming from theSchutzbund members. The jury acquitted the three on all counts.[13][14]
The socialists had originally introduced and popularised the concept of jury trials as part of their political programme and considered it propagandistically unwise to organise a formal protest against the verdict. As a result, while news of the acquittal led to immediate protests across Vienna in the early hours of 15 July 1927, they were spontaneous and unplanned. The protests were later unwittingly directed by police riot control action to thePalace of Justice, where the protests reached their height. Given its lack of interest in organising a protest, party leadership had not activated theSchutzbund in advance. It was called to action when it was clear that large masses of workers had filled the streets to take part in the protest and when the Viennese police asked them for help. At that point, the majority ofSchutzbund members received an order to mobilise, although some refused the order and remained part of the protesting masses. By 1 PM, roughly 2,400Schutzbund men had arrived at the scene, armed and in uniform, where they faced tens of thousands of protesters.[15]
TheSchutzbund, together with Vienna's mayorKarl Seitz andTheodor Körner, chair of theFederal Council, attempted to pacify the masses in order to prevent further violence. After the Palace of Justice was set ablaze,Schutzbund members successfully opened a corridor among the protesters to make way for firefighters and saved a few dozen guards from the flames.[16]
Eventually, Viennese police chiefJohannes Schober ordered the police to open fire on the protesters. 84 were killed and more than one thousand wounded, including 11 dead and 34 wounded among theSchutzbund.[17]
Immediately following theJuly Revolt and further militarisation of right-wing militias, SDAPÖ leadership recognised the need forSchutzbund reforms in order to guarantee its military capabilities. Party leadership instituted a reform committee – among its members were Julius Deutsch,Otto Bauer and Theodor Körner – to work out a concrete reform programme. The lack of discipline among theSchutzbund men was a particular problem, and Körner forced strict military discipline for the post-reformSchutzbund. As Deutsch said, theSchutzbund was finally to become the "guard of the party and the trade unions". Körner from then on openedSchutzbund meetings not in a comradely way, but by ordering "Attention!"[18]
NewSchutzbund recruits had to sign a declaration of commitment and swear an oath, candidates were screened more thoroughly, and they were required to have been members of the party for at least two years. “Technical” (military) and administrative organisation were strictly divided, as was common in militaries. TheSchutzbund also received a more stringent hierarchy consisting of groups, platoons, companies and battalions in ascending order by members. Körner was appointed one of the lead strategists of the Technical Committee and Rudolf Löw as his secretary. Alexander Eifler was appointed commander of allSchutzbund formations in Vienna.[19]
In the years following the July Revolt, there was a lessening of the constant threat of violence under which Austrian politics had existed. TheHeimwehr went through a period of stagnation, even organisational degeneration. Despite their unity on some central ideals, the movement had always been relatively heterogeneous and riddled with strife. Following various unsuccessful attempts at furthering their influence on Austrian politics as well as the temporary resignation of long-time, more moderateHeimwehr leaderErnst Rüdiger Starhemberg,Walter Pfrimer, a radicalTyroleanHeimwehr leader, felt that a coup akin toMussolini'sMarch on Rome was necessary to realise the political aims of theHeimwehr. The result was thePfrimer putsch [de] in 1931.[20] The coup attempt started in the evening of 12 September 1931, when some 14,000Heimwehr men spread out across most ofStyria, arresting mayors and public officials. In order to replicate the March on Rome, Pfrimer and 600 moreHeimwehr men made their way toAmstetten, after which they planned to march to Vienna. They were easily stopped by theAustrian Armed Forces in Amstetten and arrested.[20]
SDAPÖ andSchutzbund leadership were informed of the coup attempt shortly after the Army and police, which allowed theSchutzbund to mobilise its forces in Styria as quickly as possible. Party leadership, however, ordered theSchutzbund not to use force against the putschists, as they were already reported to be retreating.[20]
The coup attempt was easily repelled, most putschists were able to return to their homes and received only mild punishments for their participation. Pfrimer fled Austria for a few months.[20]
The climax of theSchutzbund as a party paramilitary was theAustrian Civil War that lasted from 12 to 15 February 1934. It was the prime type of situation for which theSchutzbund had originally been organised.
The Austrian political situation had become more divided in the two years preceding the Civil War. The Pfrimer putsch proved socialist fears that theHeimwehr movement was not just theoretically but also practically willing to stage a coup. Likewise, the mild response by Federal Army and police forces had shown a clear lack of willingness from the conservative Austrian government to oppose such actions decisively.Emil Fey, the radical VienneseHeimwehr leader, stated in an interview in February 1932 that a new coup was in the works, this time originating from Vienna, which would force the current government either to accept their conditions for political change or to resign.Heimwehr leaders were called into government by ChancellorEngelbert Dollfuss in May 1932. Emil Fey assumed the post of Minister for Public Security in early 1933, which gave him control of the Austrian police and gendarmerie. At the same time, theHeimwehr was declared an “assistant force” to the Austrian police and army.[21]
The change in the political situation resulted in the need for a fundamental strategic reorientation in theSchutzbund, which until then had aimed in general to aid the Austrian police and army in case of a coup.[22] Starting in 1932, the government intensified its searches for weapons at known socialist sites, and the success of the operation greatly reduced the weaponry available to theSchutzbund. The weapons searches led to a propaganda campaign by the socialists in which they made an intense effort to recruit newSchutzbund members and gather more weapons. Deutsch and Körner attempted to negotiate a disarmament agreement with the government, but to no avail. TheHeimwehr, as part of the government, was unwilling to give up their weapons.[23]
Following Chancellor Dollfuss’elimination of the Austrian Parliament in March 1933, theSchutzbund was put on high alert. Parts of the
Schutzbund, particularly theUpper Austrian division led by Richard Bernaschek headquartered inLinz, were pressing to finally decide on the use violence and warned of mutinies. Party leadership, however, was still unwilling to give the order and instead continued to focus on negotiations despite the physical and psychological readiness of theSchutzbund to enter combat.[24]
This showed Fey as Minister of Public Security the weakness of the socialists and motivated him to push further for the official dissolution of theSchutzbund. Decrees to disband specific units were issued, some of which were met with little resistance or surprise, particularly inTyrol,Carinthia andBurgenland, and some with immediate protests, particularly in Vienna andLower Austria. Weapons searches and confiscations went on as well.[25][26]
After it was officially banned on 31 May 1933, theSchutzbund remained active illegally. Members met without uniform in different locations, usually only as small groups rather than in large formations, and discussed further actions.[27]
Most of the formerSchutzbund membership was transformed into the so-called "Propaganda Division", with the new leadership of the "Propaganda Division" the same as the formerSchutzbund leadership. The signs of a comingfascist revolution marked the months before the Civil War in early 1934. Otto Bauer of the SDAPÖ had laid out in late 1933 the four cases in which theSchutzbund would take up arms: any infraction of therights of the City of Vienna or the recalling of its mayor; the forced dissolution of the trade unions; the forced dissolution of the party; or the introduction of a fascist constitution or the abolition of free elections.[28]
Following intra-party discussions on strategy, an action committee in Vienna consisting of party leadership and others, among them Alexander Eifler, decided to reintroduce military organisation to theSchutzbund. It drafted and decreed preliminary principles for clandestine military operations. A resolution on tactics stated: "The party must intensify its struggle against the bourgeois dictatorship and use any potential for offensive action." The new clandestine military activities were to take place within the confines of the socialist sports association ASKÖ. Despite its losses in membership, the illegalSchutzbund had retained roughly 40,000 to 50,000 members.[29]
In January 1934, the socialists again decided to try to start negotiations; Deutsch forwarded letters to Dollfuss, who was thoroughly uninterested. He considered the socialists to have become entirely irrelevant. Bauer concluded in early January that "now, a resolution of this matter cannot be reached in any other way than a violent one".[30]
Eifler tried to finish theSchutzbund's final preparations for war, advising its leaders to go into hiding but stay in contact for orders. MostSchutzbund leaders ignored the advice, and they were rounded up and arrested in the following weeks, including Eifler himself, who was arrested on 2 February.[31] Julius Deutsch was advised to flee the country and went toCzechoslovakia.[31]
Many documents ofSchutzbund strategy – among them Eifler's general strategy – were found by government forces. This allowed police and military to develop specific reaction plans.
On 12 February 1934, the police were ordered to search for weapons in theHotel Schiff in Linz, the base of Richard Bernaschek'sSchutzbund division. Since Bernaschek had declared many times that he had had enough and that the next provocation by government forces would mean defensive action by his troops, the weapons search triggered theSchutzbund in the Hotel Schiff to fight back. A coded telegram to Bernaschek from the SDAPÖ's leaders that warned him urgently against any action and instructed him to await the decision of party leadership had been intercepted by the authorities and never reached him.[32] Bernaschek sent orders to other Schutzbund formations inUpper Austria and triggered skirmishes there. OnceSchutzbund formations in the other Austrian states heard that Bernaschek and his men were fighting back, many voluntarily decided to do the same and tried to take over police stations in their respective areas. In Vienna, some of the party and the remainingSchutzbund leadership – Deutsch, Schorsch, Pollak, Körner,Helmer and someSchutzbund commanders – met and decided to declare ageneral strike.[33][34]
In the following hours, SDAPÖ leadership met to shape the orders to be given out to allSchutzbund formations, none of which was taken seriously at that point, as mostSchutzbund formations, disappointed by the lack of input from Vienna, took matters into their own hands. Particularly those in Vienna, Lower Austria, Upper Austria and Styria took up arms on their own initiative, while the formations in the other states resigned themselves to waiting for more orders or were left leaderless.
AllSchutzbund formations were overpowered within the next four days, marking the end of the Civil War. According to a comprehensive 2018 study by historian Kurt Bauer, between 350 and 370 people lost their lives in the fighting – about 130 of them uninvolved civilians and 110 each among the government forces and members of theSchutzbund.[35][36]
The party leadership's inability to decide quickly enough to issue an order to fight was later considered byOtto Bauer the "gravest of our mistakes".[37]
TheSchutzbund was formed at the behest of the SDAPÖ's large left-wing faction, represented by members including Otto Bauer, Julius Deutsch andMax Adler. Unlike in Germany, the Austrian socialists had kept their party largely united until 1934, with theCommunist Party of Austria (KPÖ) never gaining any significant traction as compared to theKPD or theUSPD in Germany. The KPÖ resembled much more an ultra-left splinter group, which allowed the left wing of the SDAPÖ to utilise the KPÖ's much more extensive party resources and membership base, giving theSchutzbund a considerably more pronounced left-wing background than its sister organisation, the GermanReichsbanner. Unlike theReichsbanner, theSchutzbund had a more tolerant relationship with communists in its own ranks, as well as with the Austrian Communist Party, particularly in the early 1920s and from 1930 onwards.
Its ultimate aim remained the defence of parliamentary democracy and the Austrian Republic against fascism, rather than the violent introduction of socialist policies or adictatorship of the proletariat modelled afterSoviet Russia. Factions within theSchutzbund and its leadership were, however, open to the possibility of utilising violence to overcome a fascist coup not only while it was in progress but also after it had happened, ultimately aiming either to safeguard or restore parliamentary democracy.
TheSchutzbund was organised along military lines, particularly after 1927. Alexander Eifler, as theSchutzbund's chief of staff, favoured a streamlined, classic military organisation with a rigid rank structure and strict discipline. At its peak in 1925, it counted some 100,000 members and had access to a considerable number of small arms and explosives as well as some artillery.[38] By 1928, after its reorganisation, it counted roughly 80,000 men, with more than 60,000 of them in Vienna, Lower Austria and Styria.[39]
TheSchutzbund's "Technical Committee" (Technischer Ausschuss) was its military-strategic centre. Its members devised the fundamental strategic structure of theSchutzbund and worked out all necessary orders for its subordinate formations, in essence representing its general staff. The Technical Committee was dominated by Alexander Eifler and Theodor Körner, both formerImperial Austrian Army officers, with diametrically opposed views on strategy. While Eifler favoured a streamlined, classic military organisation to fight in conventional battles, Körner considered the role of theSchutzbund to be that of the spearhead of a large workers' movement during a necessary general strike, utilising guerilla rather than conventional combat tactics.[40]
Particularly in the beginning, the workers' militia and the laterSchutzbund were not able to provide standard uniforms, instead relying on red armbands. Later, the armbands displayedthree arrows in a circle, the symbol of the SDAPÖ after 1932. After 1927, theSchutzbund received more regular uniforms, with most members wearing a brown-green high-collar jacket and dark pants, usually with aSam Browne belt. The red armband was worn on the left upper arm. Some formations also wore patches that showed their organisational affiliation with roman numerals corresponding to theirSchutzbund district in the upper half, together with the traditional socialist "hands of brothers" (Bruderhände, a depiction of a handshake) in its lower half. The best known uniform symbol of theSchutzbund was its cap withSchutzbund and SDAPÖ insignia.
TheSchutzbund rank system referred to immediate positions of command, with the commander of each formation holding a certain rank. Because theSchutzbund was organised in groups, platoons, companies, battalions and sometimes regiments,Schutzbund members could hold up to five ranked positions. The positions of command were denoted by white stripes below or on the red armband or theSchutzbund patch, one for group leaders, two for platoon leaders, three for company leaders, four for battalion leaders. For district leaders, it depicted a "BL" for "district leadership" (Bezirksleitung). The ranks were tied to a position of command and would be lost when leaving the position.
TopSchutzbund leaders, members of the central leadership (Zentralleitung) wore armbands that bore the abbreviation of their group: "ZL".
TheSchutzbund was an association formally independent of the SDAPÖ, made up of various sections (formally independent component associations) delineated by districts. Its statutes were tied to agreements with the SDAPÖ, as were decisions to mobilise and the like. Two spheres of organisation were recognised, the administrative and the "technical" (military). Administrative organisation dealt with acquiring weaponry and other equipment, general finances and the like, whereas the "technical" organisation dealt with staff work, tactics and training. The supreme organ was the "Federal Leadership" (Bundesleitung), consisting of the "Central Leadership" (including the "Technical Committee"), its auditing office and other organs of central organisation. The Federal Leadership was elected at party conventions of the SDAPÖ or appointed by SDAPÖ leadership. General strategy was worked out in the Technical Committee, with the Central Leadership acting as theSchutzbund's general staff. Militarily, theSchutzbund was subject to orders of the Central Leadership, which were responded to by a chain of command in descending order by the provincial and district leaders, then regimental or battalion, company, platoon and group leaders.
Until 1927, theSchutzbund was organised as follows:[41]
| 1923–1924 | |
|---|---|
| District commands Bezirkskommanden | |
| District | No. |
| Vienna | 1 |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |
| Wiener Neustadt | 7 |
| Bruck an der Leitha | 8 |
| St. Pölten | 9 |
| Korneuburg | 10 |
| Amstetten | 11 |
| Krems an der Donau | 12 |
| Kapfenberg | 13 |
| Graz | 14 |
| Linz | 15 |
| Steyr | 16 |
| Wels | 17 |
| Salzburg | 18 |
| Innsbruck | 19 |
| Klagenfurt | 20 |
| 1924–1927 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Districts Kreise | Battalions | |
| District | No. | |
| Vienna (I, VI, VII, VIII, IX) | 1 | 201-211 |
| Vienna (III, IV, V) | 2 | 193-200 |
| Vienna (X, XI) | 3 | 179-192 |
| Vienna (XII, XIII, XIV, XV) | 4 | 212-223 |
| Vienna (XVI, XVII) | 5 | 224-235 |
| Vienna (XVIII, XIX, XX) | 6 | 236-245 |
| Vienna (II, XXI) | 7 | 172-179 246-252 |
| Viertel unter dem Wienerwald | 8 | 69-100 |
| Viertel ober dem Wienerwald | 9 | 101-124 |
| Viertel ober dem Manhartsberg | 10 | 125-145 |
| Viertel unter dem Manhartsberg | 11 | 146-171 |
| Upper Austria | 12 | 27-59 |
| Salzburg,Tirol,Vorarlberg | 13 | 1-26 |
| Carinthia | 14 | 60-68 |
| Styria | 15 | 253-281 |
| Burgenland | 16 | 282-289 |
McLoughlin, Finbarr (1990).Der Republikanische Schutzbund und gewalttätige politische Auseinandersetzungen in Österreich 1923–1934(PDF) ([The Republican Protection League and Violent Political Conflicts in Austria 1923–1934] PhD thesis). University of Vienna.
On 12 April 1923 the statutes of the Schutzbund were formally approved by the federal Ministry for Internal Affairs and Education. In the statutes the purpose of the Schutzbund was clearly stated. Its aim was to defend the constitution, to help the authorities maintain law and order and to protect the government against any attempted putsch, to provide assistance in the event of natural catastrophes and to protect meetings held by republican organisations. The statutes further claimed that the Schutzbund was a non-military organisation devoted to the development of the minds and bodies of its members, placing a particular emphasis on marches and band music [...]. [...] Through the means of a complex organisational structure the Schutzbund was gradually to become the private army of the Social Democratic Party [...].
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| National | |
| Other | |
