Raymond Nicolas Landry Poincaré (French:[ʁɛmɔ̃pwɛ̃kaʁe]; 20 August 1860 – 15 October 1934) was a French statesman who served asPresident of France from 1913 to 1920, and three times asPrime Minister of France. He was a conservative leader, primarily committed to political and social stability.[1]
Trained in law, Poincaré was elected as a Deputy in 1887 and served in the cabinets ofDupuy andRibot. In 1902, he co-founded theDemocratic Republican Alliance, the most important centre-right party under theThird Republic, becoming prime minister in 1912 and serving as President of the Republic for 1913-20. Attempting to exercise influence from a traditionally figurehead role, he visited Russia in 1912 and 1914 to repair relations with Russia which had been strained by the Bosnian Crisis of 1908 and theAgadir Crisis of 1911. He likewise played an important role during theJuly Crisis of 1914 which ultimately led to France's participation inWorld War I. From 1917 onward, he exercised less influence after his political rivalGeorges Clemenceau had become prime minister. At theParis Peace Conference, he favoured Allied occupation of theRhineland.
In 1922 Poincaré returned to power as prime minister. In 1923 he ordered theOccupation of the Ruhr to enforce payment of German reparations. By this time Poincaré was seen, especially in the English-speaking world, as an aggressive figure (Poincaré-la-Guerre) who had helped to cause the war in 1914 and who now favoured punitive anti-German policies. His government was defeated by theCartel des Gauches at the elections of 1924. He served a third term as prime minister in 1926–1929.
Born inBar-le-Duc, Meuse, France, Raymond Poincaré was the son of Nanine Marie Ficatier, who was deeply religious[4] andNicolas Antonin Hélène Poincaré, a distinguished civil servant andmeteorologist. Raymond was also the cousin ofHenri Poincaré, the famous mathematician. Educated at theUniversity of Paris, Raymond was called to the Paris Bar, and was for some time law editor of theVoltaire. He became at the age of 20 the youngest lawyer in France[5] and was appointed Secrétaire de laConférence du Barreau de Paris. As a lawyer, he successfully defendedJules Verne in a libel suit presented against the famous author by the chemist,Eugène Turpin, inventor of the explosivemelinite, who claimed that the "mad scientist" character in Verne's bookFacing the Flag was based on him.[6] At the age of 26, Poincaré was elected to theChamber of Deputies, making him the youngest deputy in the chamber.[5]
Poincaré had served for over a year in the Department of Agriculture when in 1887 he was elected deputy for theMeuse département. He made a great reputation in the Chamber as an economist, and sat on the budget commissions of 1890–1891 and 1892. He was minister of education, fine arts and religion in the first cabinet (April – November 1893) ofCharles Dupuy, and minister of finance in the second and third (May 1894 – January 1895). InAlexandre Ribot's cabinet, Poincaré became minister of public instruction. Although he was excluded from the Radical cabinet which followed, the revised scheme ofdeath duties proposed by the new ministry was based upon his proposals of the previous year. He became vice-president of the chamber in the autumn of 1895 and, in spite of the bitter hostility of the Radicals, retained his position in 1896 and 1897.
Along with other followers of "Opportunist"Léon Gambetta, Poincaré founded theDemocratic Republican Alliance (ARD) in 1902, which became the most important centre-right party under theThird Republic.In 1906, he returned to the ministry of finance in the short-livedSarrien ministry. Poincaré had retained his practice at the Bar during his political career, and he published several volumes of essays on literary and political subjects.
"Poincarism" was a political movement over the period 1902–20. In 1902, the term was used byGeorges Clemenceau to define a young generation of conservative politicians who had lost the idealism of the founders of the republic. After 1911, the term was used to mean "national renewal" when faced with the German threat. After the First World War, "Poincarism" refers to his support of business and financial interests.[1] Poincaré was noted for his lifelong feud with Georges Clemenceau. Clemenceau and Poincaré absolutely detested one another and engaged in one of the longest running feuds in French politics. The British historian, Anthony Adamthwaite, described Poincaré as having an "obsession with Clemenceau verging on paranoia" and as a "cold fish whose one passion was cats".[7]
Poincaré becamePrime Minister in January 1912, and began a policy meant to block Germany's ambitions for "world power status", and worked to restore ties with France's ally,Russia.[8] During theBosnian Crisis of 1908-1909, the Franco-Russian alliance had been badly strained when France refused to support Russia afterAustria-Hungary, supported by Germany, threatened war. During theSecond Moroccan Crisis in 1911, Russia refused to support France when Germany threatened war. The lack of French interest in supporting Russia during the Bosnia crisis was the nadir of Franco-Russian relations withTsar Nicholas II making no effort to hide his displeasure at the lack of support from what was supposed to be his number one ally.[9] At the time, Nicholas seriously considered abrogating the alliance, and was only stopped by the lack of an alternative.[10] Russia's refusal to support France during the Second Moroccan Crisis in 1911 reflected the enduring bitterness caused in St. Petersburg by France's refusal to support Russia during the Bosnia crisis which ended with humiliation. Poincaré believed a rift in the Franco-Russian alliance could only benefit Germany. Germany would be encouraged to think that it was possible to threaten war with France as the Russians might not honour the alliance.[11] In August 1912, Poincaré visited Russia to meet Tsar Nicholas in order to strengthen diplomatic ties.[12] Poincaré believed therapprochement would deter Germany from risking ademarche to war, and thus avoid a repeat of the Second Moroccan crisis.[12] Tsarist Russia, despite its Francophilia, was generally disdainful of most of the leaders of the Third Republic, but Poincaré was an exception, regarded in St. Petersburg as a strong leader who meant what he said.[13] The Russian Foreign Minister,Sergey Sazonov, in a report to Nicholas wrote that, after meeting Poincaré: "Russia possesses a sure and faithful friend, endowed with a political spirit above the line and an inflexible will.".[14]
At the same time, Poincaré hoped to pursue an expansionist policy at the expense of Germany's unofficial ally, theOttoman Empire.[8] For historical, economic and religious reasons, the French had traditionally been very interested in theLevant region of the Middle East. France had for centuries been the protector of theMaronite Christians, most recently in 1860, when France had threatened war following the massacres of the Maronites by local Muslims andDruze, while the Ottoman authorities did nothing. In the early years of the 20th century, there was an influential Levantine lobby within France to argue that it was France's mission to take overOttoman Syria (roughly what is now modern Syria,Lebanon,Israel,Jordan, theWest Bank and theGaza Strip). Poincaré was a leading member of theComité de l'Orient, the main group that advocated French expansionism in the Middle East.[5] Poincaré's willingness to begin arapprochement with Imperial Germany in order to allow France to pursue its ambitions in the Middle East was strengthened by the outcome of theFirst Balkan War, whereBulgaria - whose army had been trained by a French military mission - rapidly defeated the Sultan's army - whose forces had been trained by the German military.[8] Bulgaria's swift victory over the Ottomans was a great blow to German prestige, and correspondingly boosted French confidence, something that allowed Poincaré to approach Berlin from a position of strength.[8]
Poincaré believed that the best policy was one of "firmness" where France would assert its interests forcefully while not excluding the possibility of better foreign relations.[8] After defeat in theFranco-Prussian War of 1870–71, French elites concluded that France could never hope to defeat Germany on its own, and the only way to defeat Germany would be with the help of another great power.[15] Besides its military superiority, Germany had demographic superiority with 70 million people compared with France's 40 million people (not including the colonies) together with economic superiority as the German economy was three times larger than France's. Poincaré therefore rejected Caillaux's proposal for a Franco-German alliance, arguing that Paris would be the junior partner, thus tantamount to ending France's status as a great power.[16] By contrast, the Treaty powers known as theTriple Entente being between two more or less equal powers, would preserve the currentstatus quo ante bellum.[16] Poincaré's foreign policy was essentially defensive as he wished to maintain France as a great power in face of Germany's demands forWeltpolitik ("World politics") under which Germany sought to become the world's dominant power.[16] Poincaré's entire foreign policy was based on the old Roman sayingsi vis pacem, para bellum ("if you want peace, prepare for war"). He wanted to strengthen both France and Russia to such a point that they presented such a decisive margin of superiority as to deter Germany from going to war with either power, but at same time his foreign policy was not relentlessly anti-German.[16] Although he rejected Caillaux's ideas, he was prepared to improve Franco-German relations on specific issues.[16] Afiscal conservative, Poincaré was deeply concerned about the financial effects of an ever more costlyarms race. Being fromLorraine, whether he was arevanchard (revanchist) is disputed.[17] His family house was requisitioned for three years during the war.[18] His speeches warned of the "German menace" and believed Caillaux's policy of rapprochement with Berlin would create an impression of French weakness inWilhelm II's mind, being a man who only respected the strong.[16] The Canadian historians,Holger Herwig andRichard Hamilton, described Poincaré as: "Typically for a man on the right side of the republican center, Poincaré was anti-clerical, but not anti-religious, nationalist, but not bellicose, a defender of property rights, free markets and small government. No ideologue, he was a practical politician willing to work with any true Frenchmen but adamant in defending France from the Socialist Left, the Catholic Right and, of course, Germany".[16]
Poincaré won election asPresident of the Republic in 1913, in succession toArmand Fallières. The strong-willed Poincaré was the first president of the Third Republic sinceMacMahon in the 1870s to attempt to make that office into a site of power rather than an empty ceremonial role. He asserted his personality and took a special interest in foreign policy.[5] On 20 January 1914, he became the first French president to visit the German embassy in Paris, a gesture clearly meant to show that he wanted to continue a policy of trying to improve German understanding of French aims.[8]
In early 1914, Poincaré found himself caught up in scandal when the leftist politicianJoseph Caillaux threatened to publish letters showing that Poincaré was engaged in secret talks with the Vatican using the Italian government as an intermediary, which would have outraged anti-clerical opinion in France. Caillaux refrained from publishing the documents after the President pressuredGaston Calmette, editor ofLe Figaro, not to publish documents showing that Caillaux had been unfaithful to his first wife, was involved in questionable financial dealings implicating a pro-German foreign policy. The matter might have remained settled had not the second Madame Caillaux, upset that Calmette might publish love letters written to her while her husband was still married to her predecessor, gone to Calmette's office on 16 March 1914 and shot him dead. The resulting scandal known as theCaillaux affair was the major French news story of the first half of 1914 causing Poincaré to joke that from now on he might send outMadame Poincaré to murder his political enemies since this method was working so well for Caillaux.[19]
On 28 June 1914, Poincaré was at theLongchamps racetrack when he received news of theassassination of theArchduke Franz Ferdinand inSarajevo, at 17:30 by his assistance.[20] The President remarked that the assassination was a tragedy, ordered an aide to draft a message of condolence to the people of Austria-Hungary and stayed on to enjoy the rest of the races.[20] The American historian,David Fromkin, has noted that the term "July Crisis" is actually a misnomer as it suggests that Europe was plunged into a crisis with the assassination of Franz Ferdinand on 28 June, but in fact the July crisisonly began with the Austro-Hungarianultimatum toSerbia, containing terms patently intended to inspire rejection, on 23 July 1914. The crisis was caused not by the assassination but rather by the decision in Vienna touse it as a pretext for a war with Serbia that many in the Austro-Hungarian government had long advocated.[21]
In 1913, it had been announced that Poincaré would visit St. Petersburg in July 1914 to meet TsarNicholas II. The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister,Count Leopold von Berchtold, decided it was too dangerous for Austria-Hungary to present the ultimatum while the Franco-Russian summit was in progress and decided to wait until Poincaré was on board the battleshipFrance that would take him home.[22] Accompanied by PremierRené Viviani, Poincaré went to Russia for the second time (but for the first time as president) to reinforce theFranco-Russian Alliance. The transcripts of the St. Petersburg summit have been lost, but the surviving documentary evidence suggests that neither Nicholas nor Poincaré were particularly concerned about the situation in the Balkans.[23] At the time of the St. Petersburg summit, there were rumours, but little hard evidence, that Vienna might use the assassination to start a war with Serbia. When the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was presented to Serbia on 23 July, the French government was in the hands ofJean-Baptiste Bienvenu-Martin, Minister of Justice and acting Premier. Bienvenu-Martin's inability to make decisions was especially exasperating toPhilippe Berthelot, the most senior man in the Quai d'Orsay present in Paris, who complained that France was doing nothing while Europe was threatened with the prospect of war.[24] Furthermore, Poincaré's attempts to communicate with Paris were blocked by the Germans who jammed the radio messages between his ship and Paris.[23]
It was not until Poincaré had arrived back in Paris on 30 July 1914 that he finally learned of the crisis, and immediately attempted to stop matters from escalating into war.[25] With Poincaré's full approval, Viviani sent a telegram to Nicholas affirming that:
in the precautionary measures and defensive measures to which Russia believes herself obliged to resort, she should not immediately proceed to any measure which might offer Germany a pretext for a total or partial mobilization of her forces.[25]
Additionally, orders were given for French forces to pull back six miles from the frontier with Germany.[25]
The next day, 31 July, the German ambassador in Paris, CountWilhelm von Schoen, presented to Viviani an ultimatum warning that, if Russian mobilisation continued, Germany would attack both France and Russia within the next 12 hours.[26] The ultimatum also demanded that France abrogate at once the alliance with Russia, allow German troops to march into France unopposed and turn over the fortresses in Verdun and Toul to the Germans to be occupied as long as Germany was at war with Russia.[27] In response, the French government ordered its ambassador in St. Petersburg,Maurice Paléologue, to find what was going on in Russia while refusing a request from GeneralJoseph Joffre to order French mobilisation.[28]
However, the German ultimatum of 31 July 1914 left the French with two options: either to accept the humiliation of accepting the ultimatum, which would be the effective end of France as an independent nation, or go to war with Germany.[27] The American historianLeonard V. Smith, together with the French historiansAnnette Becker and Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, wrote that France had no option but to go to war as the prospect of accepting Schoen's ultimatum was too humiliating for the vast majority of the French people.[29] After Germany declared war on France following the rejection of the ultimatum, Poincaré appeared before the National Assembly to announce that France was now at war forming the doctrine of theunion sacrée in which he announced that: "nothing will break theunion sacrée in the face of the enemy."[29][a]
Poincaré became increasingly sidelined after the accession to power ofGeorges Clemenceau as prime minister in 1917. He believed theArmistice happened too soon and that the French Army should have penetrated far deeper into Germany.[30] At theParis Peace Conference of 1919, negotiating theTreaty of Versailles, he wanted France to wrest theRhineland from Germany to put it under Allied military control.[31][32]
Ferdinand Foch urged Poincaré to invoke his powers as laid down in the constitution and take over the negotiations of the treaty due to worries that Clemenceau was not achieving France's aims.[33] He did not, and when the French Cabinet approved of the terms which Clemenceau obtained, Poincaré considered resigning, although again he refrained.[34]
In 1920, Poincaré's term as president came to an end, and two years later he returned to office as prime minister. Once again, his tenure was noted for its strong anti-German policies.[35]
Frustrated at Germany's unwillingness to pay reparations, Poincaré hoped for joint Anglo-French economic sanctions against it in 1922, while opposing military action. In April 1922, Poincaré was greatly alarmed by theTreaty of Rapallo, the beginning of a German-Soviet challenge to the international order established by the Treaty of Versailles. He was disturbed that British Prime MinisterDavid Lloyd George did not share the French viewpoint, instead almost welcoming Rapallo as a chance to bring Soviet Russia into the international system.[36] Poincaré came to believe by May 1922 that if Rapallo could not convince the British that Germany was out to undercut the Versailles system by whatever means necessary, then nothing would, in which case France would just have to act alone.[37] Further adding to Poincaré's fears was the worldwide propaganda campaign started in April 1922 blaming France for World War I as a means of disprovingArticle 231 of the Treaty of Versailles, which would thereby undermine the French claim to reparations.[38]
In the German-Soviet propaganda of the 1920s, theJuly Crisis of 1914 was portrayed asPoincaré-la-guerre (Poincaré's war), in which Poincaré put into action the plans he had allegedly negotiated with EmperorNicholas II in 1912 for the dismemberment of Germany.[39] The French Communist newspaperL'Humanité ran a front-page cover-story accusing Poincaré and Nicholas II of being the two men who plunged the world into war in 1914.[40] ThePoincaré-la-guerre propaganda proved to be very effective in the 1920s.[39]
Throughout the spring and summer of 1922, the British continued to spurn Poincaré's offers of an alliance with Britain.[37][41] Poincaré's attempt to compromise with the British on German reparations failed in 1922.[42] By December 1922 Poincaré was faced with British-American-German hostility and saw coal for French steel production and money for reconstructing the devastated industrial areas draining away.[43]
Poincaré decided tooccupy the Ruhr on 11 January 1923, to extract the reparations himself. This, according to historianSally Marks, "was profitable and caused neither the German hyperinflation, which began in 1922 and ballooned because of German responses to the Ruhr occupation, nor the franc's 1924 collapse, which arose from French financial practices and the evaporation of reparations."[44] The profits, after Ruhr-Rhineland occupation costs, were nearly 900 million gold marks.[45] During the Ruhr crisis, Poincaré made a failed attempt to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.[46][47] Poincaré lost the1924 French legislative election "more from the franc's collapse and the ensuing taxation than from diplomatic isolation."[48]
Hines H. Hall argues that Poincaré was not a vindictive nationalist. Despite his disagreements with Britain, he desired to preserve the Anglo-French entente. When he ordered the French occupation of the Ruhr valley in 1923, his aims were moderate. He did not try to revive Rhenish separatism. His major goal was the winning of German compliance with the Versailles treaty. Poincaré's inflexible methods and authoritarian personality led to the failure of his diplomacy.[49]
A 1932 electoral leaflet supporting Raymond Poincaré's achievements
Financial crisis brought him back to power in 1926, and he once again became prime minister and finance minister until his retirement in 1929. As prime minister, he enacted a number of franc stabilization policies, retroactively known as the Poincaré Stabilization Law.[50][51] His popularity as prime minister rose considerably following his return to the gold standard, so much so that his party won the April 1928 general election.[52]
As early as 1915, Raymond Poincaré introduced a controversialdenaturalization law which was applied to naturalizedFrench citizens with "enemy origins" who had continued to maintain their original nationality. Through another law passed in 1927, the government could denaturalize any new citizen who committed acts contrary to French "national interest".[citation needed]
Due to his ill health, Poincaré resigned as prime minister in July 1929, refusing to serve another term as prime minister.[52] He died in Paris on 15 October 1934 at the age of 74.
His brother,Lucien Poincaré (1862–1920), a physicist, became inspector-general of public instruction in 1902. He is the author ofLa Physique moderne (1906) andL'Électricité (1907).
Jules Henri Poincaré (1854–1912), an even more distinguished physicist and mathematician, was his first cousin.
^Quotation: "In the coming war, France will be heroically defended by all her sons, whose sacred union will not be broken in the face of the enemy". French:Dans la guerre qui s'engage, la France […] sera héroïquement défendue par tous ses fils, dont rien ne brisera devant l'ennemi l'union sacrée
Citations
^abJ. F. V. Keiger,Raymond Poincaré (Cambridge University Press, 2002) p126
^"Raymond Poincare".American Academy of Arts & Sciences. 9 February 2023. Retrieved4 October 2023.
^↑ a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i et j Rémy Porte, "Raymond Poincaré, le président de la Grande Guerre", Nouvelle Revue d'Histoire, no 88 de janvier-février 2017, p. 44-46
^A letter which Verne later sent to his brother Paul seems to suggest that, though acquitted due to Poincaré's spirited defence, Verne did intend to defame Turpin.
^Adamthwaite, Anthony Review ofRaymond Poincaré by J. F. V. Keiger pages 491-492 fromThe English Historical Review, Volume 114, Issue 456, April 1999 page 491.
^Tomaszewski, Fiona "Pomp, Circumstance, and Realpolitik: The Evolution of the Triple Entente of Russia, Great Britain, and France" pages 362-380 fromJahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Volume 47, Issue # 3, 1999 pages 369-370.
^Tomaszewski, Fiona "Pomp, Circumstance, and Realpolitik: The Evolution of the Triple Entente of Russia, Great Britain, and France" pages 362-380 fromJahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Volume 47, Issue # 3, 1999 page 370.
^Tomaszewski, Fiona "Pomp, Circumstance, and Realpolitik: The Evolution of the Triple Entente of Russia, Great Britain, and France" pages 362-380 fromJahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Volume 47, Issue # 3, 1999 pages 372-373.
^abTomaszewski, Fiona "Pomp, Circumstance, and Realpolitik: The Evolution of the Triple Entente of Russia, Great Britain, and France" pages 362-380 fromJahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Volume 47, Issue # 3, 1999 pages 373-374.
^Tomaszewski, Fiona "Pomp, Circumstance, and Realpolitik: The Evolution of the Triple Entente of Russia, Great Britain, and France" pages 362-380 fromJahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Volume 47, Issue # 3, 1999 page 373.
^Tomaszewski, Fiona "Pomp, Circumstance, and Realpolitik: The Evolution of the Triple Entente of Russia, Great Britain, and France" pages 362-380 fromJahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Volume 47, Issue # 3, 1999 page 374.
^↑ a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i et j Rémy Porte, « Raymond Poincaré, le président de la Grande Guerre », Nouvelle Revue d'Histoire, no 88 de janvier-février 2017, p. 44-46
^Keiger, JohnRaymond Poincaré, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002 pp. 291–293.
^Leopold Schwarzschild,World in Trance (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1943), p. 140.
^Sally Marks, '1918 and After. The Postwar Era', in Gordon Martel (ed.),The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered. Second Edition (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 26.
^Carley, Michael Jabara "Episodes from the Early Cold War: Franco-Soviet Relations, 1917-1927" 1275-1305 fromEurope-Asia Studies, Volume 52, Issue #7, November 2000 pp. 1278-1279
^Carley, Michael Jabara "Episodes from the Early Cold War: Franco-Soviet Relations, 1917-1927" 1275-1305 fromEurope-Asia Studies, Volume 52, Issue #7, November 2000 p. 1279
^Hines H. Hall, III, "Poincare and Interwar Foreign Policy: 'L'Oublie de la Diplomatie' in Anglo-French Relations, 1922-1924,"Proceedings of the Western Society for French History (1982), Vol. 10, pp. 485–494.
^Makinen, Gail; Woodward, G. Thomas (1989). "A Monetary Interpretation of the Poincaré Stabilization of 1926".Southern Economic Journal.56 (1): 191.doi:10.2307/1059066.JSTOR1059066.
Adamthwaite, Anthony (April 1999). "Review of Raymond Poincaré by J. F. V. Keiger".The English Historical Review.114 (456):491–492.doi:10.1093/ehr/114.456.491.
Herwig, Holger & Richard Hamilton.Decisions for War, 1914-1917 (2004)
Keiger, J. F. V. (1997).Raymond Poincaré. Cambridge University Press.ISBN0-521-57387-4.,review
Maisel, Ephraim (1994).The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1919-1926. Sussex Academic Press. pp. 122–23.
Marks, Sally '1918 and After. The Postwar Era', in Gordon Martel (ed.),The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1999)
Mombauer, Annika (2002).The Origins of the First World War. London: Pearson.
Bernard, Philippe, Henri Dubief & Thony Forster,The Decline of the Third Republic, 1914–1938, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, oclc:894680106
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