| Rapid Support Forces | |
|---|---|
| قوات الدعم السريع | |
 Emblem | |
| Commander | Hemedti |
| Deputy head | Abdul Rahim Dagalo[1] |
| East Darfur commander | Abdel Rahman Jumma |
| Spokesperson | Yousif Ibrahim Ismaeil (2021–2024) |
| Foundation | August 2013 |
| Allegiance | Government of Sudan (2013–2023) Government of Peace and Unity (2025–present) |
| Ideology | Arab supremacy[2] Secularism[3] Tribalism[4][5] |
| Notable attacks | Khartoum massacre Masalit massacres |
| Size | 100,000 (2023)[6] to 150,000[7] |
| Part of | National Intelligence and Security Service andSudanese Armed Forces (until 2023) |
| Allies | State allies: Sudan (before 2023) United Arab Emirates (alleged, denied by UAE)[8] Chad[9][10]Non-state allies: Tamazuj[11] Non RSF Janjaweed  SPLM-N (al-Hilu)(since 2025)[12] |
| Opponents | State opponents: Egypt[18] Ukraine[19]Non-state opponents:  Houthi movement[20][21] |
| Battles and wars | |
| Flag | .png) |
| Website | rapidsupportforce.com |
Preceded by Janjaweed | |
TheRapid Support Forces (RSF;Arabic:قوات الدعم السريع,romanized: Quwwāt ad-daʿm as-sarīʿ) are aparamilitary force formerly operated by thegovernment of Sudan. The RSF grew out of, and is primarily composed of, theJanjaweed militias which previously fought on behalf of the Sudanese government.[22][23]
RSF has been administered by theNational Intelligence and Security Service, while during military operations it has been commanded by theSudanese Armed Forces (SAF).[24] As of June 2019[update], the commander is GeneralHemedti (Muhamed Hamdan Dagalo).[25] During theSudanese political crisis of 2019, themilitary junta that took control of the country employed the RSF to violently crack down on pro-democracy demonstrators.[25] Along with other security forces, RSF carried out theKhartoum massacre on 3 June 2019.[26][27][28]
On 15 April 2023,fighting broke out between the RSF and the SAF after the RSF mobilized its forces in cities across Sudan, including in Darfur.[29] The SAF has designated the RSF a rebel group. RSF forces are now in control of territory across Sudan, mostly in the south and west. The Rapid Support Forces announced the formation of a parallelGovernment of Peace and Unity to administer the areas of Sudan under their control on 15 April 2025.[30]
Its actions inDarfur were deemedcrimes against humanity byHuman Rights Watch[31] and declared asgenocide by theUnited States.[32] It has committed or been accused of engaging in several crimes in different parts ofSudan such asDarfur,South Kordofan, andKhartoum, these violations include burning villages,[33] ethnic killings,[34]raping women,unlawful detention[35] of activists, and repurposing[36] hospitals and churches asshields. Many of these violations constitutewar crimes, and the RSF has been accused of a general policy ofethnic cleansing or evengenocide.[34]
RSF has its roots in theJanjaweed militias used by the Sudanese Government in its attempts to fight the anti-government insurgency during theWar in Darfur. RSF was officially formed in 2013, following a restructuring and reactivation of Janjaweed militias in order to combat rebel groups in Darfur region,South Kordofan, and the Blue Nile states, following joint attacks by Sudanese Revolutionary Front rebels in North and South Kordofan in April 2013.[1]
RSF is headed by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo ("Hemedti"), who has been its leader since it was created in 2013 or 2014.[37][25] As of September 2019[update], Hemedti's brotherAbdul Rahim Hamdan Dagalo is deputy head of RSF.[1]
RSF was estimated byHuman Rights Watch as having about 5,000–6,000 soldiers in February 2014 in Darfur.[31] In 2016–2017, RSF had 40,000 members participating in theYemeni Civil War. In late October 2019, 10,000 had returned to Sudan.[38] In July 2019, about 1,000 RSF soldiers were present in Libya, supporting theLibyan National Army commanded byKhalifa Haftar.[39]
According toReuters, as of 2023, the force numbers 100,000 people.[6]
In addition to its role in Darfur, RSF is deployed to patrol the border with Libya and round up Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees in response to theKhartoum process, which is an initiative between European and African states, including Sudan, to stem the flow of migrants to Europe.[40]
In November 2017, Hemedti used RSF to take over control of gold mines in the Darfur region, which led to him becoming one of the richest people in Sudan by 2019.[41] Hemedti's brother Abdul Rahim, deputy head of RSF, heads the Al Junaid (orAl Gunade) corporation involved in gold mining and trading in Sudan.[42]
In December 2019, aGlobal Witness investigation into RSF and Al Junaid argued that RSF and Al Junaid are closely linked in terms of financial transactions.Global Witness stated that "the RSF and [Al Junaid had] captured a swathe of the [Sudanese] gold industry and [were] likely using it to fund their operations." The General Manager of Al Junaid stated toThomson Reuters that there were no close links between the two.[42]
RSF has twofront companies calledGSK, a Sudanese technology company, andTradive General Trading LLC, a United Arab Emirates-based company, both controlled by Hemedti's brother Algoney Hamdan Dagalo.[42]
In April 2023, Al Jazeera reported that RSF had sought out Western public relations firms to burnish its image, including by editing Wikipedia pages.[43]
During the War in Darfur, in 2014 and 2015, RSF "repeatedly attacked villages, burned and looted homes, beating, raping and executing villagers," aided by air and ground support from the Sudanese Armed Forces.[31] RSF executions and rapes typically took place in villages after rebels had left. The attacks were systematic enough to qualify ascrimes against humanity according toHuman Rights Watch.[31]
The RSF maintains facilities in Amdjarass, Chad, including an airfield and hospital, used for logistical support and medical treatment. While Chad publicly denies supporting the RSF, reports indicate the UAE uses Chad to supply weapons to the RSF, and there are accusations from Sudan that Chad provides direct aid, like weapons and mercenaries.[44][45][46] Sudan has denied any ongoing diplomatic contacts with Chad to ease tensions over Khartoum’s accusations that N’Djamena is providing support to the paramilitary RSF.[47] Ethnic connections, particularly among Arab tribes, and poverty drive Chadian youth to join the RSF, adding to regional instability. This recruitment is a significant aspect of their relationship, often happening with or without formal government approval.[48]
Ethiopia’s relationship with the RSF is complex, with some evidence pointing to individual Ethiopian involvement. In January 2024, authorities in Gedaref State, Sudan, announced the arrest of six Ethiopian women accused of serving as snipers for the RSF, with reports indicating they had been operating within the group for over a year, leveraging sniping expertise gained in Ethiopia.[49] Ethiopia offers diplomatic backing to the RSF due to tensions with Egypt over theGrand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which aligns Ethiopia with actors opposing Egyptian interests.[50] Recently, Ethiopia has hosted peace initiatives, such as the February 2025High-Level Humanitarian Conference for the People of Sudan in Addis Ababa, organized by the UAE and attended by the African Union andIGAD, despite criticism from Sudan’s government.
On June 15, 2025, Bellingcat published an investigation revealing Kenyan-labelled ammunition crates found in an RSF depot near Khartoum. These crates, containing 14.5×114mm API cartridges and 82mm HE Mortar Bomb Type PP87, bore labels indicating delivery to the Kenyan Ministry of Defence in 2023-2024. Videos and images, geolocated to Salha, Omdurman, and posted between May 19–21, 2025, showed SAF soldiers with these crates, following the SAF's regain of control on May 20, 2025.[51][52]
On June 24, 2025, the Sudanese government has called on Kenya to immediately cease any form of assistance to the Rapid Support Forces. In a separate statement on June 16, Government Spokesperson Mwaura dismissed Sudan’s allegations as “false and misleading,” maintaining that Nairobi’s engagement with the warring parties is strictly within the framework of the IGAD peace process.[53]
The gold mined in Sudan was sent toDubai in theUnited Arab Emirates, where RSF leaderMohamed Hamdan Dagalo kept most of his money, which he used to fund his paramilitaries.[54][55][56] In 2019,Global Witness reported that UAE was a key supplier of military equipment to RSF.[42] Dagalo was funded by the United Arab Emirates and met with the leader of UAE, SheikhMohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, in February 2022.[57]
Despite strained Sudan-UАЕ relations, gold shipments flowed freely from Sudan to Dubаi, with exports facing no obstacles and operating with official approval inPort Sudan. Political tensions didn't disrupt the lucrative trade, which continued despite the December 2023 expulsion of diplomats and accusations of smuggling. Atef Ahmed, the Secretary-General of the Goldsmiths Union, affirmed the ongoing flow of shipments to the UАЕ and the processing of others.[58]
The UAE, which was supporting the RSF, conducted a covert operation under the pretence of aiding refugees. The operation involved supplying potent weapons and drones to the RSF, providing medical treatment to wounded fighters, and airlifting severe cases to one of its military hospitals. The operation was headquartered at an airfield and a hospital in Amdjarass in Chad.[10]
The hospital in Chad was set up by two charities controlled by the UAE’s Vice PresidentMansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan, who met Dagalo two months before the 2023 Sudanese civil war started.[59] According to Sudanese diplomats, Hemedti’s closest ally in the Emirates is Sheikh Mansour.[54] The Sudanese commander was also hosted by Mansour in the UAE at the 2021IDEX exhibition. The US intelligence intercepted multiple calls, identifying Dagalo’s direct connection with Mansour and Mohamed bin Zayed in the UAE. As perJeffrey D. Feltman, Sheikh Mansour was working in the background in Sudan.[59]
In December 2023, a group of Democratic members of the U.S. Congress called on the UAE to cease its backing of the RSF. In a letter dated 19 December 2023, these lawmakers expressed their concerns regarding the UAE's tangible support, encompassing the provision of weaponry and supplies to the RSF. The U.S. representatives called on the UAE to collaborate with both the United States and the international community in order to facilitate a resolution that brings an end to the ongoing conflict, emphasizing the importance of a solution that aligns with the best interests of the Sudanese people.[60]
In March 2024,Sudan's Permanent Representative to the UN, al-Harith Idriss al-Harith Mohamed wrote a letter condemning the UAE's support to RSF in the war including supplying weapons, equipment, and mercenaries. The 78 page complaint alleged that the UAE planned and supported the RSF's aggression against Sudanese military with assistance from Chad, which was accused of complicity in the Emirates' actions.[61] Sudan's government revealed that new supplies, including 1,200 four-wheel-drive vehicles, reached to the RSF militia from the UAE.[62] On 17 April 2024, the US envoy to Sudan, Tom Perriello said that the US is concerned about the UAE's financial support to RSF, and alleged the UAE and Iran of complicity in theatrocities committed in the Sudan war.[63]
In July 2024, a leaked 41-page document sent to the UN security council claimed that four Emirati passports were recovered from a wrecked vehicle in theOmdurman city. As per the documents, the passports belonged to the UAE nationals who had links to the RSF. A source alleged that they belonged to UAE intelligence officers.[64]
On 9 September 2024, HRW reported that the RSF newly obtained advanced foreign-made weapons and military equipment. On examination of photos and videos of weapons used in the conflict that were posted on social media, the rights group identified that the UAE-based companies were associated with the weapons provided to RSF. In September 2023, the militants used Kornet missiles against the SAF, which were supplied by the Emirates. In April 2024, SAF found six shipping crates of thermobaric munitions with markings indicating a shipment to the UAE under a contract with Adasi, a subsidiary of Edge group. A January 2024 report by the UN Panel of Experts on Sudan deemed the UAE's alleged support to the RSF as "credible", and claimed that the Emirati weapons transfer constituted violations of the arms embargo.[65][66]
On 29 September 2024, the UAE alleged the Sudanese army of causing "significant damage" to the Emirati ambassador's residence in Khartoum in a military aircraft attack. The Emirati foreign ministry said it would file a formal complaint with the United Nation and regional bodies.[67] On 14 October 2024, Sudan denied the allegations, saying it would take legal action against the UAE and compel it for a compensation for the crisis it is causing in their country by consistently backing the RSF. Sudanese Foreign Minister Hussein Awad expressed his disappointment over many countries echoing the "UAE's lie", stating that the Emirati allegations came from frustration over the disclosure of its support to the RSF militia.[68]
In October 2024, the RSF shot down anIlyushin Il-76 in Sudan's Malha region, mistaking it for a SAF aircraft that had been routinely bombing them. The aircraft belonged to New Way Cargo of Kyrgyzstan, and was previously identified supplying arms to the RSF from the UAE via Aéroport International Maréchal Idriss Deby in Amdjarass. Documents identified at the crash site included a Russian passport and an ID, belonging to Viktor Granov, who had links with a UAE-based company, Airline Transport Incorporation FZC.[69][70]
On 11 October 2024, Sudan wrote a letter to the UNSC, calling for an urgent action against the UAE's "continuous aggressive activities". The letter contained new proof of the UAE providing military, financial, and logistical support to the RSF. It also included images of artillery ammunition boxes, as well as Dubai-based trucks used for transporting arms and ammunition, which were later seized by the SAF. Sudan alleged the UAE of hiring mercenaries to fight for the RSF, and presented evidence indicating that the militia fighters received medical treatment at Zayed Military Hospital in Abu Dhabi. The letter urged the Security Council to condemn and hold the UAE responsible for its involvement in the conflict, claiming that the Emirati actions are against international law and the UN system.[71]
In November 2024,Chris Van Hollen andSara Jacobs filed a joint resolution of disapproval aimed at blocking arms sales to the UAE until it stops arming the RSF. The two U.S. lawmakers raised concerns about the government's decision to approve another weapons sale worth $1.2 billion to the UAE, while it is one of the primary foreign actors involved in intensifying the war in Sudan and warned that these arms could end up in the hands of the RSF.[72]
On 14 November 2024, an investigation by Amnesty International revealed thatNimr (armored personnel carrier), which are produced by theEDGE Group in the UAE and consolidated with the French Galix System, were being used by the RSF in Sudan.Agnès Callamard called it a violation of the UN arms embargo imposed on Sudan, and urged France to ensure that Lacroix Defense andKNDS France, which designed the Galix system, to halt the supply of such systems to the UAE.[73]
In March 2025, top DemocratGregory Meeks halted U.S. arms sales to the UAE due to its role in the Sudan war. He also introduced the "U.S. Engagement in Sudanese Peace Act", a bill that aimed to stop U.S. military aid to nations fueling the conflict. The bill also intended to impose sanctions on warring factions and allocating funds for a special envoy for Sudan.[74] On 11 March, other Democrats, includingChris Van Hollen andSara Jacobs, also reintroduced their own separate legislation– the "Stand Up for Sudan Act". It aimed to block U.S. arms sales to the UAE under the Arms Export Control Act, until it stops supporting the RSF. Citing the UAE’s complicity in a genocide in Sudan, the lawmakers stated that America should not arm nations which are profiting from these atrocities.[75]
On 23 March 2025, senior Sudanese army commanderYasir al-Atta warned that the airports of N’Djamena and Amdjarass in Chad would be considered a legitimate military target, and criticized the UAE for supplying weapons to the RSF. Sudan claimed the UAE provided RSF Chinese-made “Long Wang 2” strategic drones in December 2024, which were used in attacks launched from Chad. Al-Atta claimed to take a retaliatory action against Chad President Mohamed Kaka and the “corrupt centres of influence” in South Sudan, that is, the UAE. Calling the UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed “the devil of Arabs”, al-Atta said to pursue the UAE, a major supporter of the war.[76]
In April 2025, Sudanese diaspora-led groups called for consumer boycotts, accusing the UAE of inciting the crisis in Sudan and complicity in genocide. Investigations by journalists, human rights organizations and the UN experts revealed that the UAE provided material support to the RSF in exchange for access to Sudan’s resources. In the same month, the Sudanese government filed a case against the UAE at theInternational Court of Justice, accusing it of breaching the Genocide Convention. Nas Al Sudan, an organization leading advocacy work and mutual aid campaigns, also accused the UAE of fueling the conflict by backing the RSF. Moreover, Activists Tasneem and Rania, associated with London for Sudan and Madaniya, alleged that the UAE exports most of its gold from Sudanese mines controlled by the militia.[77]
In August 2025, mercenaries from Colombia were identified inside the Zamzam camp in Darfur. Nearly 400 former Colombian soldiers were hired by an Emirati security company and deployed to the “Desert Wolves” battalion to fight for the RSF militias. The Spanish-speaking mercenaries were tricked to sign up for a job to guard oil facilities, but ended up as the front liners in the war.[78]
According to a report byAl Araby TV, there are allegations of a connection between theWagner Group, a Russian paramilitary organization, and Hemedti. Leaked documents and sources reportedly indicate that the Wagner Group has provided training and equipment, including armored vehicles and helicopter gunships, to Hemedti's forces. The Russian company is alleged to have provided security services during Hemedti's visit to Russia in 2018.[79]
Hemedti's association with the Wagner Group may raise questions about his own involvement in human rights violations, particularly given his role in the crackdown on protesters duringSudan's 2019 revolution and as the founder of the Rapid Support Forces, a paramilitary group accused of committing human rights abuses in Darfur and elsewhere in Sudan.[79] The Sudanese government has denied any connection to the Wagner Group, and the reports suggest that Hemedti may be using his position in the Sovereign Council to establish ties with the Russian company.[80] BothMohamed Hamdan Dagalo and Sudan's military leaderAbdel Fattah al-Burhan had ties to thePutin regime in Russia. According toBusiness Insider, "The two generals helped Russian President Vladimir Putin exploit Sudan's gold resources to help buttress Russian finances against Western sanctions and fund his war in Ukraine."[81]
During the2019 Western Libya offensive phase of theSecond Libyan Civil War, in July 2019, about 1,000 RSF soldiers were present in Libya, supporting theLibyan National Army (LNA) commanded byKhalifa Haftar and based inTobruk, which was fighting against the internationally recognisedGovernment of National Accord (GNA) based inTripoli.[39]
RSF has participated in theYemeni Civil War (2015–present), supporting the pro-Hadi forces. RSF and other Sudanese security forces, participating in theSaudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen alongsideSaudi andEmirati forces,[82] have killed civilians and destroyed infrastructure, for which they are suspected of war crimes byHuman Rights Watch.[83][84][85][86] Saudi Arabia organised and financed this involvement, which brought financial resources to the RSF.[87]
In 2016–2017, RSF had 40,000 members participating in theYemeni Civil War. In October 2019, 10,000 had returned to Sudan.[38]
The RSF's activities in Yemen were multifaceted, focusing on military operations within the coalition's strategy. They supported efforts to create a buffer zone in northern Yemen, as reported byJamestown Foundation.[88] They were a lead force in capturing northwestern provinces, particularly Hajjah governorate, and played a role in the strategiccapture of Midi port in January 2017, believed to be a Houthi supply hub via maritime lines maintained by Iran'sIslamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Their deployment included ground operations, which faced tactical difficulties due to Yemen's mountainous terrain.
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On 15 April 2023, fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and RSF broke out after RSF mobilised in cities across Sudan. Fighting was reported at the presidential palace and army headquarters.[89][90]
The conflict resulted in RSF being designated as a rebel group by the Sudanese Armed Forces. On the day of the clashes, which included theBattle of Khartoum, both sides claimed control overKhartoum andMerowe airports and other sites.[91]
On 17 April 2023, theUnited States Secretary of StateAntony Blinken and RSF leaderMohamed Hamdan Dagalo held talks, and Dagalo agreed to a 24-hour armistice beginning on 18 April 2023 "to ensure the safe passage of civilians and the evacuation of the wounded".[92]
Another 72-hour nationwide ceasefire was announced to begin at midnight on 24 April 2023. The United States andSaudi Arabia had mediated the truce on humanitarian grounds. The fighting had caused the deaths of more than 500 people by 25 April 2023, and thousands were injured.[93] The Rapid Support Forces were supported by the Libyan militia leaderKhalifa Haftar and theUnited Arab Emirates.[citation needed] Footage ofthermobaric shells captured by the Sudanese military suggested that the weapons were supplied by the United Arab Emirates; Egypt had sent military support to the Sudanese army.[94][95]On 1 July 2024, the RSF took full control ofSinga. This surge in violence caused many civilians to flee towardsGedaref in eastern Sudan. On 30 June 2024, the army[which?] also targeted 17th Infantry Division headquarters, General Intelligence Service (GIS) buildings, and the guesthouse[where?]. The RSF's dominance extended over the entire city, including the deserted headquarters of the Sudanese Army's 65th Brigade. The RSF also secured theBlue Nile Bridge, hinting at a possible expansion towardsal-Dinder.[96]
The RSF has tried to re-employ officials from the pre-war civilian administration. But many civil servants have escaped both to avoid the fighting and having to work with RSF military personnel. This lack of effective RSF administration, alongside the complexity of Sudanese ethnic tensions and alliances shaped by the fighting, have seriously underminedHemedti's ambition to transcend hiswarlord persona.[97]
A report by The Wall Street Journal revealed that mercenaries were becoming a tool for foreign actors like the UAE and Egypt for attaining a strategic advantage in the Sudan war. In November 2024, Colombian fighters were seized from Darfur and were later identified as recruits of an Abu Dhabi-based firm Global Security Services Group (GSSG). The military contractors were hired through a Colombia-registered recruitment firm, International Services Agency (A4SI). They were first taken to the UAE, then toBenghazi inLibya, and were finally deployed to Sudan. The Colombian recruits were "duped" to support the UAE's efforts in bolstering RSF's position in the war.[98]
In February 2025, RSF and its allies signed a charter in Nairobi, Kenya, to form a parallel "Government of Peace and Unity" to govern RSF-controlled areas, potentially splitting Sudan further.[99][100] On 21 March, SAF retook the presidential palace in Khartoum, which now stands as a symbolic victory against the RSF.[101] On 26 March, SAF declared Khartoum "free" from RSF, completing the drive-out after nearly two years of occupation.[102]
On 18 April 2023, the RSF removed the word "Quds" (Arabic:قدس), an acronym of (Arabic:قوات الدعم السريع,romanized: Quwwāt ad-daʿm as-sarīʿ) ("Rapid Support Forces")—which happens to also be the spelling ofJerusalem—from its official logo.[103] The previous version of the RSF's slogan contained the word "Quds" below the arrow in the middle of the logo, possibly in reference to the city of Jerusalem. The revised version of the logo without the word "Quds"[104] was used in RSF's published statements, while the previous slogan remained on the RSF's Facebook and Twitter social media accounts. Prior to the logo change, the RSF describedHamas as a terrorist movement,[105] andIsrael attempted to mediate between RSF and SAF in thecurrent civil war in Sudan.[106]
During the dispersing of the peaceful sit-in inKhartoum, the Rapid Support Forces raped[107] dozens of women according to the testimonies of the victims.
RSF killed 100 protestors, injured 500, raped women and pillaged homes in theKhartoum massacre on 3 June 2019 during the2018–19 Sudanese protests.[26][27][28] During the first day ofEid al-Fitr in Sudan, in June 2019, there were reports that RSF tied bricks of cement to the bodies of dead protestors to make them sink to the bottom of the Nile and never be found.[108][109][110][26] The Central Committee of Medical Doctors stated that more than 100 people had been killed.[111] On 6 June 2019,Kumi Naidoo, the head ofAmnesty International, called for the "[immediate withdrawal of] all members of the Rapid Support Forces from policing and law enforcement anywhere in Sudan and especially in Khartoum".[111]
TheCentral Committee of Sudanese Doctors reported Janjaweed/RSF shooting dead nine people in the market of the village al-Dalij (or al-Delig) inCentral Darfur on 10[112] or 11/12[113] June 2019. The massacre and the burning down of the market were interpreted by locals as a response to civil disobedience.[113]
In addition to the killings in Khartoum, other human rights violations during the 2018–19 crisis have been attributed to RSF, including therape of 70 male and female protesters during the Khartoum massacre and the following days;[114][22] the targeting of peacefulsit-ins;[115] and attacks on hospitals.[115]
In December 2018, aNew York Times report exposed[116] that children were recruited by the militia and sent to fight in the frontline in the Yemen war.
During the2023 Sudan conflict, the militia members have reportedly committed crimes such as looting of houses and evicting their residents,[117] sexual violence,[118] and repurposing[36] churches and hospitals as shields. In a report released on 28 July 2024, Human Rights Watch documented widespread acts of sexual violence, including gang rape and forced marriages, committed by RSF in Khartoum since the onset of the conflict. The 89-page report, titled"Khartoum is Not Safe for Women", highlighted the severe impact on women and girls. Both the RSF and SAF obstructed humanitarian aid, exacerbating the survivors' plight. Despite the clear evidence of war crimes and crimes against humanity, neither party took meaningful steps to prevent or investigate these abuses. Human Rights Watch called for urgent international intervention to protect civilians, support survivors, and hold perpetrators accountable.[119] The RSF has been trying to rehabilitate its image as a 'killer militia' by disciplining some of its fighters and building civil administrations. Few observers take these efforts seriously as atrocities committed by its fighters are so widely documented.[97]
In July 2023, authorities reported at least 88 cases of sexual assault on women across the country, most of them blamed on the RSF.[120] NGOs estimated that the figure could possibly reach 4,400.[121]
On 12 November 2024, the U.S. sanctioned RSF commander in East DarfurAbdel Rahman Juma Barkalla over serious human rights violations, including allegations of harm to civilians in conflict, sexual violence, and ethnically motivated attacks.[122]
On 7 January 2025, the U.S. government officially accused Sudan's Rapid Support Forces (RSF) of committing genocide and imposed sanctions on the group's leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo. These sanctions, which include asset freezes and a travel ban, are intended to hold the RSF accountable for widespread violence, including ethnic killings, rape, and forced displacement. Additionally, seven RSF-owned companies based in the United Arab Emirates were also sanctioned.[123][34]
According to multiple media reports, the Rapid Support Forces abused[124] immigrants who are crossing Sudan to Europe. A report by Human Rights Watch revealed[125] the militia unlawfully detained dozens of citizens including political activists.
Analysts estimate the force numbers about 100,000, with bases and deployments across the country.
"Mr. Haftar, who is backed by Russia and the United Arab Emirates, sent at least one shipment of ammunition on Monday (17 April) from Libya to Sudan to replenish supplies for Gen. Dagalo," the people familiar with the matter said.
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