In political science, aproxy war is an armed conflict where at least one of the belligerents is directed or supported by an external third-party power. In the termproxy war, a belligerent with external support is theproxy; both belligerents in a proxy war can be considered proxies if both are receiving foreign military aid from a third-party country. Acting either as anation-state government or as aconventional force, a proxy belligerent acts in behalf of a third-party state sponsor.[1]
A proxy war is characterised by a direct, long-term, geopolitical relationship between the third-party sponsor states and theirclient states or non-state clients,[2] thus the political sponsorship becomes military sponsorship when the third-party powers fund the soldiers and their materiel to equip the belligerent proxy-army to launch and fight and sustain a war to victory, and government power.[2] However, the relationship between sponsors and proxies can be characterized byprincipal-agent problems whereby the sponsor may be unable to control the actions of the proxy. A proxy war also can be acivil war, as in theKorean War and theVietnam War during theCold War.[3][4]
Duringclassical antiquity and theMiddle Ages, many non-state proxies were external parties that were introduced into an internal conflict and aligned themselves with a belligerent to gain influence and to further their own interests in the region.[5][6] Proxies could be introduced by an external or local power and most commonly took the form of irregular armies which were used to achieve their sponsor's goals in a contested region.[6] Some medieval states like theByzantine Empire used proxy warfare as a foreign-policy tool by deliberately cultivating intrigue among hostile rivals and then backing them when they went to war with each other.[2] Other states regarded proxy wars as merely a useful extension of a pre-existing conflict, such asFrance andEngland during theHundred Years' War, both of which initiated a longstanding practice of supportingprivateers, which targeted the other's merchant shipping.[7] France used England's turmoil of theWars of the Roses from their victory as a proxy, siding with the Lancastrians against the Yorkists who were backed by theBurgundian State. TheOttoman Empire likewise used theBarbary pirates as proxies to harass Western European powers in theMediterranean Sea.[8]
Frequent application of the term "proxy war" indicates its prominent place in academic research on international relations. Distinct implementations of soft power and hard power have proved to be unsuccessful in recent years. Accordingly, great failures in classic wars increased the tendency to use proxy wars.[9] Since the early twentieth century, proxy wars have most commonly taken the form of states assuming the role of sponsors to non-state proxies and essentially using them asfifth columns to undermine adversarial powers.[2] That type of proxy warfare includes external support for a faction engaged in a civil war, terrorists,national-liberation movements, and insurgent groups, or assistance to a national revolt against foreign occupation.[2] For example, theBritish government partially organized and instigated theArab Revolt to undermine the Ottoman Empire during theFirst World War.[5] Many proxy wars began assuming a distinctive ideological dimension after theSpanish Civil War, which pitted thefascist political ideology ofItaly andNazi Germany against thecommunist ideology of theSoviet Union without involving these states in open warfare with each other.[10] Sponsors of both sides also used the Spanish conflict as a proving ground for their own weapons and battlefield tactics.[10]
During theCold War, proxy warfare was motivated by fears that an armed conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union byconventional warfare would result innuclear holocaust, which rendered the use of ideological proxies a safer way to conduct hostilities.[11] The Soviet government found that supporting parties antagonistic to the U.S. and otherWestern nations was a cost-effective way to combatNATO's influence compared to direct military engagement.[12] Additionally, the proliferation of televised media and its impact on public perception made the U.S. public especially susceptible towar-weariness and being skeptical of risking life abroad.[13] That encouraged the American practice of arming insurgent forces, such as the funnelling of supplies to themujahideen during theSoviet–Afghan War.[14] Other examples of proxy war include theKorean War[15] and theVietnam War.[16]
The governments of some nations, particularly liberaldemocracies, may choose to engage in proxy warfare (despite their military superiority) if most of their citizens oppose declaring or entering a conventional war.[17] That featured prominently in US strategy following theVietnam War because of the so-called "Vietnam Syndrome" of extremewar weariness among the American population. That was also a significant factor in motivating the US to enter conflicts such as theSyrian Civil War by proxy actors after a series of costly drawn-out direct engagements in theMiddle East spurred a recurrence of war weariness, the "War on Terror syndrome."[17]
Nations may also resort to proxy warfare to avoid potential negative international reactions from allied nations, profitable trading partners, or intergovernmental organizations such as theUnited Nations. That is especially significant when standing peace treaties, acts of the alliance or other international agreements ostensibly forbid direct warfare. Breaking such agreements could lead to a variety of negative consequences due to either negative international reaction (see above), punitive provisions listed in the prior agreement, or retaliatory action by the other parties and their allies.
In some cases, nations may be motivated to engage in proxy warfare because of financial concerns: supporting irregular troops, insurgents, non-state actors, or less-advanced allied militaries (often with obsolete or surplus equipment) can be significantly cheaper than deploying national armed forces, and the proxies usually bear the brunt of casualties and economic damage resulting from prolonged conflict.[18]
Another common motivating factor is the existence of asecurity dilemma. A nation may use military intervention to install a more favorable government in a third-party state. Rival nations may perceive the intervention as a weakened position to their own security and may respond by attempting to undermine such efforts, often by backing parties favorable to their own interests (such as those directly or indirectly under their control, sympathetic to their cause, or ideologically aligned). In that case, if one or both rivals come to believe that their favored faction is at a disadvantage, they will often respond by escalating military and/or financial support.[19] If their counterpart(s), perceiving a material threat or desiring to avoid the appearance of weakness or defeat, follow suit, a proxy war ensues between the two powers. That was a major factor in many of the proxy wars during theCold War between theUnited States and theSoviet Union,[20] as well as in the ongoing series of conflicts betweenSaudi Arabia andIran, especially inYemen andSyria.[21][22][23]
Proxy wars can have a huge impact, especially on the local area. A proxy war with significant effects occurred between the United States and the Soviet Union during theVietnam War.[citation needed]Operation Rolling Thunder, a U.S bombing campaign inNorth Vietnam destroyed significant amounts of infrastructure. Many bombs were also dropped on North Vietnamese supply routes inCambodia andLaos.[24] Equally, if not more, significant was theSoviet–Afghan War, which saw the U.S. fund the Afghan mujahideen against the invading Soviet forces (seeOperation Cyclone). This war cost hundreds of thousands of lives and billions of dollars,[25] bankrupting theSoviet Union and contributing to itscollapse.[12]
In general, lengths, intensities, and scales of armed conflicts are often greatly increased if belligerents' capabilities are augmented by external support. Belligerents are often less likely to engage in diplomatic negotiations, peace talks are less likely to bear fruit, and damage to infrastructure can be many times greater.[31][32]
^Gaston, E. L. (2024).Illusions of control: dilemmas in managing U.S. proxy forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. Columbia University Press.ISBN978-0-231-21012-6.
^abWilliams, Brian Glyn (2012). Innes, Michael (ed.).Making Sense of Proxy Wars: States, Surrogates & the Use of Force. Washington DC: Potomac Books. pp. 61–63.ISBN978-1-59797-230-7.
^abCarr, Mike (2016). France, John; Rogers, Clifford; De Vries, Kelly (eds.).Journal of Medieval Military History, Volume 10. Woodbridge: The Boydell Press. pp. 163–166.ISBN978-1-78327-130-6.
^Heebøll-Holm, Thomas (2013).Ports, Piracy and Maritime War: Piracy in the English Channel and the Atlantic, c. 1280-c. 1330. Leiden: Brill. p. 8.ISBN978-9004235700.
^Watson, William (2003).Tricolor and Crescent: France and the Islamic World. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Books. pp. 17–19.ISBN978-0275974701.
^S. A. Hashemi and M. Sahrapeyma, "Proxy war and US's smart power strategy (The case of Syria, 2011-2016)," Q. J. Polit. Stud. Islam. World, vol. 6, no. 24, p. 1, 2018.http://psiw.journals.ikiu.ac.ir/article_1351.html
^"The Korean War, 1950–1953".U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian. Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, United States Department of State. Archived fromthe original on 2 July 2015. Retrieved7 July 2015.
^"Operation Rolling Thunder." History. A&E Television Networks, LLC., n.d. Web. 28 April 2015.[2]Archived 8 April 2015 at theWayback Machine
^"The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the U.S. Response, 1978–1980." U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian. U.S. Department of State, 31 October 2013. Web. 28 April 2015.[3]Archived 2 May 2015 at theWayback Machine
^Sheridan, Kerry. "War-related deaths near 500,000 in Iraq." Your Middle East. Your Middle East, 16 October 2013. Web. 28 April 2015.[4]Archived 18 May 2015 at theWayback Machine
^Total death toll | Over 606,000 people killed across Syria since the beginning of the "Syrian Revolution", including 495,000 documented bySOHR
^"Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003–2015." SATP. SATP, 26 April 2015. Web. 28 April 2015.[5]Archived 7 January 2016 at theWayback Machine
Graham Allison, "The Myth of the Liberal Order: From Historical Accident to Conventional Wisdom",Foreign Affairs, vol. 97, no. 4, 2018, pp. 124–133.
Tom Stevenson, "In the Grey Zone" (review of Eli Berman and David A. Lake,Proxy Wars: Suppressing Violence through Local Agents, Cornell, 2019,ISBN978 1 50173 306 2; Tyrone L. Groh,Proxy War: The Least Bad Option, Stanford, 2019,ISBN978 1 5036 0818 4; Andreas Krieg and Jean-Marc Rickli,Surrogate Warfare: The Transformation of War in the 21st Century, Georgetown, 2019,ISBN978 1 62616 678 3),London Review of Books, vol. 42, no. 20 (22 October 2020), pp. 41–43. "Nuclear weapons – judged, for now at least, to be too powerful to be used – seem to preclude wars of destruction between major powers today." (p. 43.)