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| Proposed Japanese invasion of Sichuan | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of theSecond Sino-Japanese War and thePacific Theater ofWorld War II | |||||||
 The map showing the proposed Operation 5 | |||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||
 China |  Japan | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
 Chiang Kai-shek | Hideki Tojo | ||||||
| Units involved | |||||||
 National Revolutionary Army |  Imperial Japanese Army | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 200,000 troops, 300 planes | 140,000 troops, 300 tanks, 500 planes | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| Unknown | Unknown | ||||||
Theproposed Japanese invasion of Sichuan[a] was theImperial Japanese Army's failed plan to destroy theRepublic of China during theSecond Sino-Japanese War. It was to be a stepping stone for theEmpire of Japan's final control of the Chinese mainland.
The operation started in spring of 1942, after the first phase of operations had been concluded in south China, and continued through spring of 1943. The operation is noted for Japan's sustained bombing of cities in central west China.
The basic plan was to make a multi-front breakthrough to Sichuan from northernShanxi, centralHubei and southernHunan. Heavy aerial support and bombing of Chongqing was to support the advance of theJapanese Army and theirCollaborationist Chinese Army puppets.Japanese Navy patrol boats from theYangtze river were to provide further bombardment.Chiang Kai-shek discussed the invasion in his bookSoviet Russia in China, stating:
TheImperial General Headquarters sent the order for drawing down 16 divisions and logistics support units from Japan reserves,Manchukuo and Southern Areas (includingNew Guinea andSolomon islands also) to reinforce the Japanese expeditionary forces in central China area, to prepare the principal force of ten divisions in southShanshi and other support group conformed by six Divisions ofIchang inHubei amongst other Divisions located inChangde, inHunan, for striking Sichuan and the occupation of Chongqing in September 1942.[1]
By coincidence, September 1942 was also the time when theGermanWehrmacht wasclosing in on Stalingrad. The invasion phase was to involve Japanese units first occupyingWanxian, from where the Japanese could advance to Chongqing-proper inechelon. To cut off the escape routes of Chinese refugees, the occupation of NorthGuizhou was planned, which could be used to stage an attack onChengdu throughYibin.
The north Japanese army division would have had the option to either advance towards southShaanxi to captureXi'an, or towardsHanzhong to take Chengdu directly. Alternatively, Japan could have utilizedairborne forces to cut off Chinese escape routes and take the Chongqing metropolitan area directly.
BothChiang Kai-shek andChiang Wei-kuo suspected that the intensebombing of Chongqing by theJapanese Navy and theJapanese Air Force was to support the diversionary Japanese operations against metropolitan Chongqing, as part of the invasion of Sichuan. It was also possible that the Japanese army hoped that a terror campaign against Chongqing would force the Chinese authorities to break from theAllies and make a separate peace with Japan.
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According to GeneralChiang Wei-kuo, should the invasion be successful, the Japanese might have intended to putWang Jingwei'spuppet regime in charge of Chongqing. The Japanese might also have persuadedChiang Kai-shek to join Japan'sGreater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere and to even assist in a future Japanese offensive against theSoviet Union inSiberia andCentral Asia. Another possibility was the installation of a Japanese civilian or militaryGovernor-General to administer the area as an Imperial Japanese Armyfief in mainlandAsia, which could later be expanded to includeTibet andXinjiang as well.
Due to opposition against Japan from other Allied countries, the Sichuan invasion was not enthusiastically carried out. In particular, theUnited States' counter-offensive against Japan heavily undermined the possibility of an invasion. Chiang Kai-shek stated:
But in June 1942, Japanese forces suffered the humiliating defeat in the Battle of Midway, and in August the U.S. forces initiated the counteroffensive against theSolomon Islands, with a landing atTenaru River, Guadalcanal (Operation Watchtower). The Japanese suffered frequent losses at the end of September 1942, and decided to delay the implement of invasion plan for Sichuan. Later in November, the Japanese forces having been totally defeated in Guadalcanal, (Battle of Guadalcanal,Battle of Tassafaronga andBattle of Rennel), the situation was turned around, with Japan losing all possibility to transfer with impunity its forces in the area (the Japanese were obliged to use all disposable vessels in their retreat, "Operation KE" during the night of February 1–2, 1943, the last part of the so-called "Tokyo Express"). At the end of 1942, the planning for the Sichuan Invasion was suspended.[1]
However, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters was still in favor of an invasion. Hence the JapaneseChina Expeditionary Army produced a new plan for the capture ofSichuan, which was based on the previous 1942 plan. The May 1943 "Battle of West Hubei" was part of this new attempt to advance to Sichuan.
Nevertheless, by then the Nationalist Chinese armies had the support of the "Flying Tigers" (A.V.G.) of the United States, which was commanded by GeneralClaire Chennault. In subsequent battles, the Japanese army suffered defeats at the hands of the Nationalist Chinese armies. In light of these defeats, the Japanese forces had to abandon a new offensive. During this period the Chinese Army sent seven Army envoys to Yunnan andIndia to clear the China–Burma route.
In fear of Chinese reinforcements through the cleared route and having sustained much losses in theBattle of Changde, the Japanese army switched their attention toYunnan to prevent future Chinese counter-offensives from that area.
