| Project Islero | |
|---|---|
| Proyecto Islero | |
 José María Otero de Navascués (second from left) and Guillermo Velarde, December 27, 1958 | |
| Active | 1963–1981 |
| Disbanded | 1987 |
| Country | Spain |
| Branch | Defence High Command |
| Type | Nuclear Weapons Project |
| Headquarters | Vandellós,Tarragona |
| Commanders | |
| Notable commanders | Luis Carrero Blanco Agustín Muñoz Grandes Guillermo Velarde [es] Manuel Díez-Alegría |
Project Islero was an attemptedSpanish nuclear program. Named afterIslero, the bull which fell the famous bullfighterManolete, the program was created by GeneralsAgustín Muñoz Grandes andGuillermo Velarde [es] in 1963. Although Spain possessed the second largest uranium deposits in the world at the time,[1] it was not until thePalomares Incident of 1966 that Spain would gain the technological breakthrough to conduct serious hydrogen bomb research. By reverse-engineering theTeller-Ulam process, the project was able to shift to usage ofplutonium-239. Yet, in 1966,Franco paused the military research, shifting efforts to nuclear reactor construction and plutonium production. However, the program was resumed in 1971, with help fromCharles de Gaulle's France to refine the material and fund the nuclear facilities.[1]: 497–498
Lasting from themiddle stages [es] ofFrancisco Franco's rule into the beginning of thedemocratic transition, the project was prematurely cancelled due to American pressures in 1981,[2] although it only formally ended in 1987 underFelipe González. Although the project never developed anuclear weapon, the country possessed the capabilities to both design and manufacture the necessary components needed for ahydrogen bomb, with the Spanish Foreign Minister,José María de Areilza, declaring in 1976 that Spain would be able to manufacture the bomb "in seven or eight years if we set our minds to it."[3][4]
In September 1948, by means of a secret decree,Francisco Franco created theJunta de Investigaciones Atómicas (JIA), or Board for Nuclear Research. Constituted on October 8,[5] the board was formed byJosé María Otero de Navascués [es] (general director and president until 1974),Manuel Lora-Tamayo,Armando Durán Miranda [es] andJosé Ramón Sobredo y Rioboo [es].[6] In 1951, the secret phase was declared over, and the JIA was renamed the Junta de Energía Nuclear (JEN), or Board of Nuclear Energy,[7] inaugurated in theUniversity City of Madrid under the presidency of GeneralJuan Vigón[8] and with Otero de Navascués as general director. The purpose of the JEN was to work "as a research center, as an advisory body to the Government, as an institute in charge of safety andprotection against the danger ofionizing radiation, and as a driving force for industrial development in the field of nuclear energy applications".
On 1 April 1939, the United States lifted the embargoes placed on Spain after theSpanish Civil War, providing limited recognition to the Spanish State,[9]: 16 and the embassy to Spain, previously in Barcelona, now headed by aChargé d'Affaires ad interim, was moved back to Madrid on the 13th.[10] Yet with Spain acting as all buta member of the Axis powers, there was much skepticism among the Western world as to whether or not they should be allowed to join the organs of the newinternational order such as the United Nations. Public opinion of the Spanish State was low.[11] At theSan Francisco Conference, Spain was barred, while prominentSpanish Republican leaders were in attendance, exerting a notorious influence on several delegations, extended to the conditions of entry into the United Nations.[12][11]
As well, at thePotsdam Conference, the question of how to proceed with post-war Spain was one of the first to be dealt with. In this sense,Stalin was, in a certain way, seeking revenge against the Francoist State, due in part to the fact that the State had sent theBlue Division (volunteers fighting with the German armed forces) to the Soviet Union duringWorld War II,[11] with a joint statement from theBig Three reading:
The Three Governments feel bound however to make it clear that they for their part would not favour any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish Government, which, having been founded with the support of the Axis Powers, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor States, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership.
Yet as theCold War began, and with Spanish agents, US military officials, and US businessmen lobbying for the opening of relations, popular opinion shifted. The appointment of a US ambassador to Madrid was announced on 27 December 1950. In July 1951, negotiations started for an alliance which would eventually become thePact of Madrid, and thus in 1955, amidst warming of relations between Spain and the United States as well as Spanish ascension to the UN, Francisco Franco and PresidentDwight D. Eisenhower signed an agreement of nuclear cooperation as part of theAtoms for Peace initiative, opening up nuclear research to civilians and countries that had not previously possessed nuclear technology.[13] Eisenhower, a proponent of non-proliferation, sought to stop the spread of military use of nuclear weapons. Although the nations that already had atomic weapons kept their weapons and grew their supplies, the program was designed to prevent other countries from developing similar weapons. The program also created regulations for the use of nuclear power, aiming to shape the use of nuclear power into a solely positive means.
This would not necessarily work towards the desired results;[a] in fact, it would be this very program which enabled GeneralFranco, accompanied by the Minister of the Presidency of the Government,Luis Carrero Blanco, to inaugurate theJuan Vigón National Nuclear Energy Center at its facilities in theUniversity City of Madrid on December 27, 1958.[3][4] Together with the 1959Stabilization Plan and the subsequentSpanish miracle, Spain was able to begin shifting away from the previousautarky, allowing for the beginning of a fledgling civilian nuclear sector which would lay the foundations for Project Islero.
In 1956, Morocco would declare independence from France under the rule ofMohammed V. Subsequently, they would demand all land under theGreater Morocco label, including all Spanish territories in Africa. While Spain would retrocede theSpanish protectorate in Morocco, they would keep hold ofCeuta,Melilla,Ifni, theSpanish Sahara, andCape Juby. This was not enough, and in 1957 Morocco would declarewar on Spain, bitterly asserting the young state's proclaimed sovereignty overSpanish West Africa.[3] The fighting would continue until 1958, and although under theTreaty of Angra de Cintra Spain would keepSidi Ifni (until 1969 when the territory was retroceded), bothCape Juby and surrounding parts ofIfni itself would be lost to Morocco. From then on, theDefense High Command began to theorize the possibility of armed deterrence in the face of any further potential conflict, and in 1963, they began to put forth the idea of a Spanish atomic bomb, commissioning a secret report on the possibility of constructing it without alerting the international community.[citation needed]
The idea of a Spanish atomic bomb was first envisioned byAgustín Muñoz Grandes. A hardlineFalangist, Muñoz Grandes aspired to break from the previousatlanticism promoted during the 50s to make the country independent of bothNATO and the United States.[1]: 496–497 In 1963, he approached general director of the JEN,José María Otero de Navascués [es], about preparing a Spanish foray into atomic weaponry.[17] This new project, christened after thebull which fell the famous bullfighterManolete,[18] would be helmed bySpanish Air Force generalGuillermo Velarde [es], selected for possessing the scientific background and acumen necessary to conduct the project's research. Velarde was a major general and pilot in theSpanish Air Force, as well as president of the Nuclear Fusion Institute of thePolytechnic University of Madrid. He joined the Theoretical Physics Section of the Nuclear Energy Board, where he would remain as Director of Technology until 1981. He had studied Nuclear Energy at bothPennsylvania State University and theArgonne National Laboratory of theUniversity of Chicago.[b][19][20]
The work was divided into two phases: the atomic bomb project itself, and the construction of a nuclear reactor, the fuel of which would be extracted for plutonium in order to construct the bombs. While the reactors could be built with help from the French —General de Gaulle supported the idea of an atomic Spain – the matter of what material to use for the bombs themselves, as well as how to actually construct them, was one of consideration. The first results were a fiasco. The JEN specialists, all military, declared themselves incapable of knowing both the technical details for manufacturing the device and, above all, how to obtain the necessary plutonium.[citation needed]
Their question was answered on January 17, 1966, when in what would later be known as thePalomares incident, a B-52G bomber from the United States accidentally crashed while carrying fourB28FI Mod 2 Y1thermonuclear (hydrogen) bombs,[21][22][23] Three were found on land near the small fishing village ofPalomares in the municipality ofCuevas del Almanzora,Almería, Spain. The non-nuclear explosives in two of the weapons detonated upon impact with the ground, resulting in thecontamination of a 0.77-square-mile (2 km2) area with radioactiveplutonium. The fourth, which fell into theMediterranean Sea, was recovered intact after a search lasting two and a half months.[24] The Spanish state would undergo secret research on the debris zones of the incident, with technicians led by Velarde finding remains of the bomb and the detonators in the area. In doing so, Velarde was able to rediscover theTeller-Ulam process. This enabled to the project to useplutonium-239 — a boon due to its relative cheapness – and meant that the bombs constructed by Project Islero would bethermonuclear.
Yet later that year, Franco would hold a meeting with Velarde in which he ordered to postpone indefinitely the physical, but not theoretical, development of the project due to fears that it would be impossible to keep a secret, and with the recent creation of theInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), publicity would lead to increased economic sanctions on Spain. He did, however, allow the research to go ahead, albeit detached from the Armed Forces; as well Franco pledged not to sign an international agreement being negotiated at the time to prohibit the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Thus on July 1, 1968, when almost fifty countries signed theTreaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Spain did not number among them. Meanwhile, Spain began to embrace the power of the atom elsewhere. InGuadalajara, the construction of Spain's first nuclear power plant, theJosé Cabrera Nuclear Power Station was underway, and JEN installed the first Spanish reactor with capacity to produce plutonium for the bombs, Coral-I, able to operate with either plutonium-239 or with 90% enriched uranium (U-235), although with waste still containing almost as much fuel as is consumed. Nevertheless, in 1969, the first grams of Spanish plutonium – the only ones in the world not under IAEA authority – were obtained.[4]
In 1971, at the insistence ofManuel Díez-Alegría, chief of the High General Staff, Velarde resumed Project Islero. TheCentro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa Nacional [es] (CESEDEN) would conduct a confidential report which concluded that "Spain could successfully implement the military nuclear option." The plutonium would be produced discreetly at theVandellòs Nuclear Power Plant, with theSpanish Sahara as a planned test site. All together, the process would cost about 8.7 billion Spanish pesetas, or US$57 million.[4] At the same time, Muñoz Grandes,José María Otero de Navascués [es] and the General Director of JENAntonio Colino [es] entered into negotiations withde Gaulle's France to obtain a natural uraniumgraphite and gas-fired nuclear reactor for Spain. Obtaining enough plutonium to build the bomb (6 kilos), in a country whose subsoil contained the second largest natural uranium reserves in Europe, was no longer considered a dream with the help of the French, who themselves did not allow the IAEA to inspect their plants. Both GeneralCharles De Gaulle andGeorges Pompidou, his successor asPresident of France, were in favor of the project from the outset; the presence of an allied nuclear power on the continent was seen as a means of increasing French independence from both the United States and NATO.[3] To this end, theHispano Francesa de Energía Nuclear S.A. (HIFRENSA) was set up, and in 1972 the Vandellòs-I plant was inaugurated with an agreement betweenLuis Carrero Blanco andCharles De Gaulle.[1]: 497–498
On December 15, 1973, Velarde communicated toLieutenant-GeneralManuel Díez-Alegría — who, as head of the High Command in the early 1970s, had encouraged him to pursue his investigations – and to his trusted confidant,Brigadier GeneralManuel Gutiérrez Mellado, that Spain had the capacity to manufacture three plutonium bombs a year. Díez-Alegría ordered him to put his findings in writing.[25] However, the secrecy surrounding the Spanish nuclear program did not bode well with their American allies. Although the Spanish projects had aroused particular interest among theCIA, with the ascension of Carrero Blanco toPrime Minister of Spain, this interest quickly turned to concern. Although a convincedAnti-Communist, Carrero Blanco had little inclination for the United States and even less for Israel, being in favor of a better understanding with theArab World. Above all else, Carrero Blanco proposed to revise relations between Spain and the United States, demanding that the two nations be treated as equals, that Spain be supplied with advanced military technology, and that the United States would enter into a commitment to defend Spain – all prerequisites for authorization to continue using military bases on Spanish territory.[3] As well, according to some confidential reports declassified by the US Military Intelligence Service, Spain was storing plutonium to manufacture a nuclear bomb, diverting it from IAEA controls; something completely out of line for an American ally, an action on par with arogue state. The CIA informed U.S. Secretary of State,Henry Kissinger that Project Islero would soon bear fruit, and with tensions between Spain and America on the rise due to the1973 Oil Crisis andYom Kippur War, a meeting was soon called with Carrero Blanco.
Four days after the Velarde report, Carrero Blanco met the then Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, and told him that the Spanish government wanted the United States to pledge its support to Spain in the event of aggression. When Kissinger refused, Carrero Blanco showed him Velarde's report, which caused the Secretary of State much distress. Kissinger, although failing to acquire Spanish adhesion to theNPT, did convey a clear message: the confirmation of Franco's desire for military nuclear devices made a "tight control" necessary over these activities.[4][26] That same day, Kissinger left Madrid in a hurry, and the very next morning on December 20, 1973, Carrero Blanco would bemurdered. Involvement of the CIA in the attack has been suggested by certain scholars, with a potential motivation being the desire to remove Carrero Blanco and to put an end to the program.[3][27]
Soon after, the project began to falter whenGregorio López-Bravo blocked its completion. The minister had spoken toFranco to convince him to put an end to it, arguing that the Americans would eventually get wind of the project and that this would cause Spain an endless series of problems.[1]: 499 Muñoz Grandes, already very ill at the time, failed to convince Franco of his plans to use the atomic bomb and French alliance as a way to gain greater independence from the United States, as Franco saw it as a costly operation involving a challenge to Washington, whose support he considered more important than having his own bomb or drawing closer to France. Franco put an end to the heated discussions by ordering a halt to the research and forbidding the military project to be set in motion, informing Velarde that "Spain could not support a new international blockade unleashed by the United States, and the benefits of having a small arsenal did not outweigh the damage".[1]: 500–501
Yet neither Carrero Blanco's death, nor the abrupt dismissal ofDíez-Alegría on June 13, 1974, nor even Franco's death on November 20, 1975, would bring the project to a halt. Carrero Blanco's successor,Carlos Arias Navarro, wanted to give a new impetus to the Islero project,[25] and indeed, even though it was struggling to develop – not least because of continued pressure from the United States[3] and its PresidentJimmy Carter for Spain to sign theNPT — in 1976, the Spanish Foreign Minister,José María de Areilza, would declare that Spain would be able to manufacture the bomb "in seven or eight years if we set our minds to it. We do not want to be the last on the list." Even with theSpanish transition to democracy and arrival of PresidentAdolfo Suárez and theUnion of the Democratic Centre (UCD) in 1976, the project would continue on with internal support. Suárez, who advocated a policy of neutrality and friendship towards the Arab world to prevent problems in theCanary Islands,Ceuta, andMelilla, supported the idea of a Spanish atomic bomb as a final deterrent against any armed aggression. Tensions with the USA increased further in 1977, when it became public knowledge of the technological capabilities of the nuclear facilities planned for the Soria Nuclear Research Center (Centro de Investigación Nuclear de Soria, abbreviated to CINSO) in Cubo de la Solana. American investigators were alarmed to discover that the plant designed to convert uranium into plutonium could produce 140 kilos of plutonium per year, sufficient to manufacture 23 annual bombs.[3][4]
While internally the project was well underway, externally, American pressures continued to mount; during his four-year rule, PresidentJimmy Carter had launched a campaign against the states that had not signed the NPT.[2] In addition, the already nervous United States became obsessed with the IAEA inspecting suspicious Spanish facilities: if this inspection was prevented, the US would freeze enriched uranium exports to Spain, which would mean the industrial halt of civilian nuclear power plants that were already operating. Thus, on February 23, 1981, theUCD-ledCalvo-Sotelo Government agreed to subject the materials to inspection by theIAEA, the same day as the1981 Spanish coup d'état attempt.[4] However, this decision did not yet mean the definitive end of Project Islero, since the UCD still continued to lightly advocate it.[3] On the other hand, theSpanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) had already resolved to abandon the Spanish nuclear project and remain inNATO, in return for Spain's integration into theEuropean Economic Community (EEC), and following the1986 Spanish NATO membership referendum and subsequentgeneral election, González began to finalize the end of Project Islero. On October 13, 1987, the Spanish representative to the UN,Fernando Morán of thePSOE-ledGonzález Government, signed theNPT, bringing an official end to the project.[18][28]
Today, Spain has more than enough capacity to develop an atomic bomb in a relatively short period of time, with studies conducted in 2004[citation needed] revealing that Spain has sufficient technology and resources to develop a nuclear program capable of producing several bombs a year. As well, the advances made under Project Islero have continued to manifest in Spanish life, with 7 nuclear fission reactors operating in the country, utilizing uranium deposits to produce a fifth of the energy consumed in Spain, as well as aENUSA [es] nuclear fuel factory inJuzbado,Salamanca, and a low and medium activity radioactive waste storage center in El Cabril,Córdoba in the heart of theSierra Morena.
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