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Innuclear strategy, afirst strike orpreemptive strike is apreemptive surprise attack employing overwhelming force.First strike capability is an attacking country's ability to significantly cripple anothernuclear power'ssecond strike retaliatory capacity. The preferred methodology is to attack the opponent'sstrategic nuclear weapon facilities (missile silos, submarine bases, bomber airfields), command and control sites (adecapitation strike), and storage depots first. The strategy is calledcounterforce.
During the 1950s, first strike strategy requiredstrategic bomber sorties taking place over hours and days. In the 1960s, the deployment ofintercontinental ballistic missiles cut the first strike duration to 30 minutes. Also during theCold War,medium- andintermediate-range ballistic missiles, such as those involved in theCuban Missile Crisis andEuromissile Crisis, as well assubmarine-launched ballistic missiles, reduced the time even further, often below 10 minutes.
Second strike countermeasures toeffectively deter first strikes includeearly warning systems,launch on warning for missile silos, continuousnuclear-capable submarine stealth patrols, and continuousairborne patrols.
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First-strike attack, the use of a nuclear first strike capability, was greatly feared during theCold War betweenNATO and theSoviet Bloc. At various points, fear of a first strike attack existed on both sides. Misunderstood changes in posture and well understood changes in technology used by either side often led to speculation regarding the enemy's intentions.
In the aftermath ofWorld War II, the leadership of the Soviet Union feared the United States would use its nuclear superiority to initiate afull-scale attack, as from 1945 to 1948 the U.S. was the only state possessing nuclear weapons and until the late 1960s preserved an overwhelming superiority. The USSR countered by rapidly developing their own nuclear weapons, surprising the US with theirfirst test in 1949. In turn, the U.S. countered by developing the vastly more powerfulthermonuclear weapon, testing their first hydrogen bomb in 1952 atIvy Mike, but the USSR quickly countered by testing their own thermonuclear weapons, with a test in 1953 of a semi-thermonuclear weapon of theSloika design, and in 1956, with the testing ofSakharov's Third Idea – equivalent to theCastle Bravo device. Meanwhile, tensions between the two nations rose as 1956 sawSoviet invasion of Hungary; the U.S. and European nations drew certain conclusions from that event, while in the U.S., a powerful social backlash was afoot, prompted by SenatorJoseph McCarthy, theHouse Un-American Activities Committee, andJulius and Ethel Rosenberg, U.S. citizens executed in 1953 after conviction of espionage. This atmosphere was further inflamed by the 1957 launch ofSputnik, which led to fears of Communists attacking fromouter space, as well as concerns that if the Soviets could launch a device into orbit, they could equally cause a device to re-enter the atmosphere and impact any part of the planet. John F. Kennedy capitalized on this situation by emphasizing thebomber gap and themissile gap, areas in which the Soviets were (inaccurately) perceived as leading the United States, while heated Soviet rhetoric added to political pressure. The1960 U-2 incident, involvingFrancis Gary Powers, as well as theBerlin Crisis, along with the test of theTsar Bomba, escalated tensions still further.
This escalating situation came to a head with theCuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The arrival of Soviet missiles inCuba was conducted by the Soviets on the rationale that the US already had nuclear missiles stationed inTurkey, as well as the desire byFidel Castro to increase his power, his freedom of action, and to protect his government from US invasion, such as had been attempted during theBay of Pigs Invasion in April 1961. During the crisis,Fidel Castro wrote Khrushchev a letter about the prospect that the "imperialists" would be "extremely dangerous" if they responded militarily to the Soviet stationing of nuclear missiles aimed at US territory, less than 90 miles away in Cuba. The following quotation from the letter suggests that Castro was calling for a Soviet first strike against the US if it responded militarily to the placement of nuclear missiles aimed at the US in Cuba:
If the second variant takes place and the imperialists invade Cuba with the aim of occupying it, the dangers of their aggressive policy are so great that after such an invasion the Soviet Union must never allow circumstances in which the imperialists could carry out a nuclear first strike against it. I tell you this because I believe that the imperialists' aggressiveness makes them extremely dangerous, and that if they manage to carry out an invasion of Cuba—a brutal act in violation of universal and moral law—then that would be the moment to eliminate this danger forever, in an act of the most legitimate self-defense. However harsh and terrible the solution, there would be no other.[1]
TheCuban Missile Crisis resulted inNikita Khrushchev publicly agreeing to remove the missiles from Cuba, whileJohn F. Kennedy secretly agreed to remove his country's missiles from Turkey. Both sides in the Cold War realized how close they came to nuclear war over Cuba, and decided to seek a reduction of tensions, resulting in US-Sovietdétente for most of the 1960s and 1970s.
Nonetheless, this reduction of tensions only applied to the US and the USSR. Recently[when?] declassified interviews with high level former Soviet nuclear and military–industrial planners reveal that Fidel Castro continued to favour nuclear options, even during the later Cold War – according to former Soviet General Andrian Danilevich, "(...in the early 1980s...) Cuban leader Fidel Castro pressed the USSR to take a tougher line against the United States, including possible nuclear strikes. The Soviet Union, in response, sent experts to spell out for Castro the ecological consequences for Cuba of nuclear strikes on the United States. Castro, according to the general, quickly became convinced of the undesirability of such outcomes."[2]
However, tensions were inflamed again in the late 1970s and early 1980s with theSoviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviet deployment of theSS-20 Saber and theSS-18 Satan, and the decision of NATO to deploy the newPershing IIIRBM as well as theTomahawkGround Launched Cruise Missile, along with U.S. PresidentRonald Reagan's talk of 'limited' nuclear war. This increased Soviet fears that NATO was planning an attack. NATO's deployment of these missiles was a response to the Soviet deployment of theSS-20 Saber, which could hit most European NATO bases within minutes of launch. These mutual deployments led to a destabilizing strategic situation, which was exacerbated by malfunctioning U.S. and Soviet missile launch early warning systems, a Soviet intelligence gap that prevented the Soviets from getting a "read" on the strategic intentions of U.S. leaders, as well as inflammatory U.S. rhetoric combined with classical Soviet mistrust of the NATO powers. This culminated in a war scare that occurred during 1983 due to the inopportune timing of a NATO exercise calledAble Archer, which was a simulation of a NATO nuclear attack on the Soviet Union; this exercise happened to occur during a massive Soviet intelligence mobilization calledVRYAN, that was designed to discover intentions of NATO to initiate a nuclear first-strike. This poor timing drove the world close to nuclear war, possibly even closer than the Cuban Missile Crisis over 20 years before.[citation needed]
Because of the low accuracy (largecircular error probable) of early generationintercontinental ballistic missiles (and especiallysubmarine-launched ballistic missiles), counterforce strikes were initially only possible against large, undefended targets like bomber airfields and naval bases. Later generation missiles with much improved accuracy made counterforce attacks against the opponent's hardened military facilities (like missile silos and command and control centers) possible. This is due to theinverse-square law, which predicts that the amount of energy dispersed from a single point release of energy (such as a thermonuclear blast) dissipates by the inverse of the square of distance from the single point of release. The result is that the power of a nuclear explosion to rupture hardened structures is greatly decreased by the distance from the impact point of the nuclear weapon. So a near-direct hit is generally necessary, as only diminishing returns are gained by increasing bomb power.
Anymissile defense system capable of wide-area (e.g., continental) coverage, and especially those enabling destruction of missiles in the boost phase, is a first-strike-enabling weapon because it allows for a nuclear strike to be launched with reduced fear ofmutual assured destruction. Such a system has never been deployed, although a limited continental missile defense capability has been deployed by the U.S., but it is capable of defending against only a handful of missiles.
This does not apply, in general, to terminal missile defense systems, such as the former U.S.Safeguard Program or the RussianA-35/A-135 systems. Limited-area terminal missile defense systems, defending such targets as ICBM fields, or C4ISTAR facilities may, in fact, be stabilizing, because they ensure survivable retaliatory capacity, and/or survivable de-escalation capacity.
This also might not apply to a "non-discriminatory" space-based missile defense system, even if it is—actually, precisely because it is—of global reach. Such a system would be designed to destroy all weapons launched by any nation in a ballistic trajectory, negating any nation's capability to launch any strike with ballistic missiles, assuming the system was sufficiently robust to repel attacks from all potential threats, and built to open standards openly agreed upon and adhered to. No such system has yet been seriously proposed.
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According to the theories of nuclear deterrence and mutual assured destruction, fullcountervalue retaliation would be the likely fate for any state that unleashed a first strike. To maintain credible deterrence, nuclear-weapons states have taken measures to give their enemies reason to believe that a first strike would lead to unacceptable results.
The main strategy relies on creating doubt among enemy strategists regarding nuclear capacity, weapons characteristics, facility and infrastructure vulnerability, early warning systems, intelligence penetration, strategic plans, and political will. In terms of military capabilities, the aim is to create the impression of the maximum possible force and survivability, which leads the enemy to make increased estimates of the probability of a disabling counterstrike, and in terms of strategy and politics, the aim is to cause the enemy to believe that such a second strike would be forthcoming in the event of a nuclear attack.
One of the main reasons to deter a first strike is the possibility of the victim of the first-strike launching a retaliatory second strike on the attacker.
Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) carryingsubmarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), commonly known as "boomers" in the US and "bombers" in the UK, are widely considered the most survivable component of thenuclear triad. The depths of the ocean are extremely large, and nuclear submarines are mobile, quiet, have virtually unlimited range, and can generate their own oxygen and potable water. In essence, their undersea endurance is limited only by food supply. It is unlikely that any conceivable opponent of any nuclear power deploying ballistic missile submarines can locate and neutralize every ballistic missile submarine before it launches a retaliatory strike in the event of war. Therefore, to increase the percentage of nuclear forces surviving a first strike, a nation can simply increase SSBN deployment and the deployment of reliable communications links with SSBNs.
In addition, land-based ICBM silos can be hardened. Nomissile launch facility can really defend against a direct nuclear hit, but a sufficiently hardened silo could defend against a near miss, especially if the detonation is not from a multimegatonthermonuclear weapon. In addition, ICBMs can be placed on road or rail-mobile launchers (RT-23 Molodets,RT-2PM2 Topol-M,DF-31,Agni 5,Agni 6,MGM-134 Midgetman), which can then be moved around. As an enemy has nothing fixed at which to aim, that increases its survivability.
The effectiveness of a first strike is contingent upon the aggressor's ability to deplete its enemy's retaliatory capacity immediately to a level that would make a second strike impossible, mitigable, or strategically undesirable. Intelligence and early warning systems increase the probability that the enemy has the time to launch its own strike before its warmaking capacity has been significantly reduced, which renders a first strike pointless. Alert states such asDEFCON conditions, apart from serving a purpose in the internal management of a country's military, can have the effect of advising a potential aggressor that an escalation towards first strike has been detected and therefore that effective retaliatory strikes could be made in the event of an attack.
Looking Glass,Nightwatch, andTACAMO are US airborne nuclear command posts and represent survivable communication links with US nuclear forces. In the event of significant political-military tensions between the nuclear powers, they would take to the skies and provide survivable communications in the event of enemy attack. They are capable of the full exercise of all availableMAOs (Major Attack Options), as well as the fullSIOP, in the event of a first strike or the destruction of theNCA. They can directly initiate launch of all American ICBMs via radio and satellite communication, signal SLBMs to launch and send bombers on their strike missions. In addition to those airborne assets, theUS government has several command and controlbunkers, the most famous of which is that ofNORAD, which is tunneled a few thousand feet into thegranite ofCheyenne Mountain Complex, outsideColorado Springs,Colorado. It is believed to be able to withstand and to continue to operate after a nuclear direct hit. Other US C4ISTAR bunkers include an installation calledSite R, located atRaven Rock,Pennsylvania, which is believed to bethe Pentagon's relocation site ifWashington, DC, is destroyed, as well asMount Weather, located inVirginia, which is believed to be the relocation site for topexecutive branch officials.The Greenbrier, located inWest Virginia, was once the site of theSupreme Court of the United States andCongress's relocation bunker, but it is no longer a secret but is now a tourist attraction.
The Russians have a system calledSPRN (СПРН), which can detect nuclear launches and providing early warning so that any such strike would not be undetected until it is too late. However, their unique and special capability can be found with theirDead Handfail-deadly computerized nuclear release system,[3] which is based atKosvinsky Kamen in theUrals. Apparently, Dead Hand, named for either thedead man's hand in poker or thedead man's switch in dangerous or deadly machinery, can be turned on whenever the Russian leadership fears a nuclear attack. Allegedly, once Dead Hand is activated, if it detects a loss of communications with Moscow as well as nuclear detonations inside Russian territory, it can give final authority for the release of nuclear weapons to military officers in a bunker under Kosvinsky Kamen, who can then, if they so determine, launch Russia's arsenal.
Instead of relying on sophisticated communications links and launch-on-warning postures, the French, the British, and the Chinese have chosen to assume different nuclear postures more suited to minimum credible deterrence or the capability to inflict unacceptable losses to prevent the use of nuclear weapons against them, rather than pursuing types of nuclear weapons suitable to first-strike use.[citation needed]
China is believed to pursue aminimum credible deterrent/second strike strategy with regards to the US. That may or may not be true with regards to China's stance with regard to Russia, as few Chinese nuclear platforms are intercontinental, and most of the platforms are deployed on the Russian-Chinese border. Unlike relations of the US and China, Russia and China have had military conflicts in the past. In recent years, China has improved its early warning systems and has renovated certain of its platforms for intercontinental strike, which may or may not be due to the US missile defense system. In general, it appears[according to whom?] that China's leaders do not greatly fear a first strike, because of their posture of inflicting unacceptable losses upon an adversary, as opposed to the American and Russian policy of trying to "win" a nuclear war. The Chinese arsenal is considered to suffice in ensuring that such a first strike would not go unavenged.
The United Kingdom and France have sophisticated nuclear weapons platforms, and their nuclear strategies are minimum credible deterrent-based. Both haveballistic missile submarines, armed with intercontinentalsubmarine-launched ballistic missiles, to ensure asecond-strike retaliation anywhere in the world. France also has a number of nuclear capable fighter aircraft. Both have nuclear policies that are believed to be effective deterrence towards a would-be nuclear strike against themselves, NATO,European Union members, and other allies.
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MIRVed land-based ICBMs are generally considered suitable for a first strike or a counterforce strike, due to:
Unlike adecapitation strike or acountervalue strike, acounterforce strike might result in a potentially more constrained retaliation. Though the Minuteman III of the mid-1960s was MIRVed with 3 warheads, heavily MIRVed vehicles threatened to upset the balance; these included theSS-18 Satan which was deployed in 1976, and was considered to threatenMinuteman III silos, which led someneoconservatives ("Team B") to conclude aSoviet first strike was being prepared for. This led to the development of the aforementionedPershing II, theTrident I andTrident II, as well as theMX missile, and theB-1 Lancer.
MIRVed land-basedICBMs are considered destabilizing because they tend to put a premium on striking first. When a missile is MIRVed, it is able to carry multiplewarheads (up to 8 in existing U.S. missiles, limited byNew START, though Trident II is capable of carrying up to 12[4]) and deliver them to separate targets. If it is assumed that each side has 100 missiles, with 5 warheads each, and further that each side has a 95 percent chance of neutralizing the opponent's missiles in their silos by firing 2 warheads at each silo, then the attacking side can reduce the enemy ICBM force from 100 missiles to about 5 by firing 40 missiles with 200 warheads, and keeping the rest of 60 missiles in reserve. As such, this type of weapon was intended to be banned under theSTART II agreement, however the START II agreement was never activated, and neither Russia nor the US has adhered to the agreement.
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Any defense system against nuclear missiles such as SDI will be more effective against limited numbers of missiles launched. At small numbers of targets, each defensive asset will be able to take multiple shots at each warhead, and a high kill ratio could be achieved easily. As the number of targets increases, the defensive network becomes "saturated" as each asset must target and destroy more and more warheads in the same window of time. Eventually the system will reach a maximum number of targets destroyed and after this point all additional warheads will penetrate the defenses. This leads to several destabilizing effects.
First, a state that is not building similar defenses may be encouraged to attack before the system is in place, essentially starting the war while there is no clear advantage instead of waiting until they will be at a distinct disadvantage after the defenses are completed. Second, one of the easiest ways to counter any proposed defenses is to simply build more warheads and missiles, reaching that saturation point sooner and hitting targets through a strategy of attrition. Third, and most importantly, since defenses are more effective against small numbers of warheads, a nation with a defense system is actually encouraged to engage in a counterforce first strike. The smaller retaliatory strike is then more easily destroyed by the defense system than a full attack would be. This undermines the doctrine of MAD by discrediting a nation's ability to punish any aggressor with a lethal retaliatory second strike.
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