 | This articleneeds additional citations forverification. Please helpimprove this article byadding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. Find sources: "Politics of Hong Kong" – news ·newspapers ·books ·scholar ·JSTOR(October 2020) (Learn how and when to remove this message) |
 |
| Politics andgovernment ofHong Kong |
|
|
Court of Final Appeal
Special courts and tribunals: |
Chief Executive Elections |
Documents Consular missions in Hong Kong
|
Related topics Hong Kong portal |
Thepolitics of Hong Kong takes place in a framework of a political system dominated by its quasi-constitutional document, theHong Kong Basic Law, itsown legislature, theChief Executive as thehead of government and of theSpecial Administrative Region and of a politically constrainedmulti-partypresidential system.[1] The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China is led by theChief Executive, thehead of government.
TheBasic Law, Hong Kong's constitutional document, was approved in March 1990 byNational People's Congress of China, and entered into force on 1 July 1997, whensovereignty of Hong Kong was transferred toChina (PRC), ending over one and a half centuries ofBritish rule.Hong Kong became aSpecial Administrative Region (SAR) of the PRC with a high degree of autonomy in all matters except foreign affairs and defence, which are responsibilities of the PRC government. In accordance with Article 31 of theConstitution of the People's Republic of China, Hong Kong'sSpecial Administrative Region status provides constitutional guarantees for implementing the policy of "one country, two systems".[2]
According to theSino-British Joint Declaration (1984) and the Basic Law, Hong Kong was to retain its political, economic and judicial systems and unique way of life and continue to participate in international agreements and organisations as a dependent territory for at least 50 years afterretrocession. For instance, theInternational Olympic Committee has recognised Hong Kong as a participating nation under the name, "Hong Kong, China", separate from the delegation from thePeople's Republic of China.
TheEconomist Intelligence Unit rated Hong Kong a "Hybrid regime" in 2023.[3]
Since 2021,universal suffrage is only granted in elections for 20 out of 90 seats of the Legislative Council and 88 out of 470 seats of thedistrict councils. The head of the government (Chief Executive of Hong Kong) is elected through anelectoral college with the majority of its members elected by a limited number of voters mainly within business and professional sectors.
| 香特別行政區政府 | |
 | |
| Formation | 1 July 1997; 28 years ago (1997-07-01) |
|---|---|
| Founding document | Hong Kong Basic Law |
| Jurisdiction | Hong Kong |
| Website | gov.hk |
| Legislative branch | |
| Legislature | Legislative Council |
| Meeting place | Legislative Council Complex |
| Executive branch | |
| Leader | Chief Executive |
| Appointer | Premier,State Council of China |
| Headquarters | Central Government Complex |
| Main organ | Executive Council |
| Departments | 13 (full list) |
| Judicial branch | |
| Court | Court of Final Appeal |
| Seat | Court of Final Appeal Building |
TheChief Executive (CE) is the head of the special administrative region, and is also the highest-ranking official in the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and is the head of the executive branch.
The Chief Executive is elected by a 1200-member Election Committee drawn mostly from the voters in thefunctional constituencies but also from religiousorganizations and municipal and central government bodies. The CE is legally appointed by thePremier of the People's Republic of China. TheExecutive Council, the top policy organ of the executive government that advises on policy matters, is entirely appointed by the Chief Executive.[4]
In accordance with Article 26 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, permanent residents of Hong Kong are eligible to vote in direct elections for the 20 seats representing geographical constituencies. Some of the permanent residents who have specific occupational backgrounds are eligible to vote in the 30 seats fromfunctional constituencies in the 90-seat, unicameralLegislative Council (LegCo).[5]
Within functional constituencies, the franchise for the 30 seats is limited to about 230,000 voters in the other functional constituencies (mainly composed of business and professional sectors).
The 1,500-member election committee of Hong Kong will vote for the remaining 40 seats to enter the Legislative Council as the sector of Election Committee.
The Judiciary consists of a series of courts, of which thecourt of final adjudication is theHong Kong Court of Final Appeal.
While Hong Kong retains thecommon law system, theStanding Committee of the National People's Congress of China has the power of final interpretation of national laws affecting Hong Kong, including the Basic Law, and its opinions are therefore binding on Hong Kong courts on a prospective and often retrospective basis and may not be in line with common law principles.
According to theSino-British Joint Declaration (1984),Hong Kong was to retain its political, economic and judicial systems and unique way of life and continue to participate in international agreements and organizations as a dependent territory for at least 50 years afterretrocession. TheInternational Olympic Committee has recognized Hong Kong as a participating nation under the name, "Hong Kong, China", separate from the delegation from thePeople's Republic of China.
In March 1990, theNational People's Congress of China approved theBasic Law, Hong Kong's constitutional document, which entered into force on 1 July 1997, whensovereignty of Hong Kong was transferred toChina (PRC). This ended over one and a half centuries ofBritish rule. Hong Kong became aSpecial Administrative Region (SAR) of the PRC with a high degree of autonomy in all matters except foreign affairs and defense, which are responsibilities of the PRC government. In accordance with Article 31 of theConstitution of the People's Republic of China, Hong Kong'sSpecial Administrative Region status provides constitutional guarantees for implementing the policy of "one country, two systems".[2]
| This sectiondoes notcite anysources. Please helpimprove this section byadding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged andremoved.(October 2020) (Learn how and when to remove this message) |
On 29 January 1999, the Court of Final Appeal, the highest judicial authority in Hong Kong interpreted several Articles of theBasic Law, in such a way that the Government estimated would allow 1.6 millionMainland China immigrants to enter Hong Kong within ten years. This caused widespread concerns among the public on the social and economic consequences.
While some in the legal sector advocated that theNational People's Congress (NPC) should be asked to amend the part of the Basic Law to redress the problem, theGovernment of Hong Kong (HKSAR) decided to seek an interpretation to, rather than an amendment of, the relevant Basic Law provisions from theStanding Committee of the National People's Congress (NPCSC). in June 1999, the NPCSC issued an interpretation in favour of the Hong Kong Government thereby overturning parts of the court decision. While the full powers of NPCSC to interpret the Basic Law was provided for in the Basic Law itself, some critics argued this underminedjudicial independence.
The Hong Kong 1 July March has been an annual protest rally led by theCivil Human Rights Front since the 1997 handover on theHKSAR establishment day. However, it was only in 2003 when it drew large public attention by opposing the bill of Article 23. It has become the annual platform for demanding universal suffrage, calling for observance and preservation ofcivil liberties such asfree speech, venting dissatisfaction with theHong Kong Government or the Chief Executive, rallying against actions of the Pro-Beijing camp.
In 2003, the HKSAR Government proposed to implement Article 23 of the Basic Law by enactingnational security bill against acts such astreason,subversion,secession andsedition.[4] However, there were concerns that the legislation would infringe upon human rights by introducing the mainland's concept of "national security" into the HKSAR. Together with the general dissatisfaction with the Tung administration, about 500,000 people participated in this protest. Article 23 enactment was "temporarily suspended".[6]
Towards the end of 2003, the focus of political controversy shifted to the dispute of how subsequent Chief Executives get elected. TheBasic Law's Article 45 stipulates that the ultimate goal isuniversal suffrage; when and how to achieve that goal, however, remains open but controversial. Under the Basic Law, electoral law could be amended to allow for this as soon as2007 (Hong Kong Basic Law Annex .1, Sect.7). Arguments over this issue seemed to be responsible for a series of mainland Chinese newspapers commentaries in February 2004 which stated that power over Hong Kong was only fit for "patriots."
The interpretation of the NPCSC to Annex I and II of the Basic Law, promulgated on 6 April 2004, made it clear that theNational People's Congress' support is required over proposals to amend the electoral system under Basic Law. On 26 April 2004, the Standing Committee of National People's Congress denied the possibility of universal suffrage in 2007 (for the Chief Executive) and 2008 (for LegCo).
The NPCSC interpretation and decision were regarded as obstacles to the democratic development of Hong Kong by the democratic camp, and were criticized for lack of consultation with Hong Kong residents. On the other hand, the pro-government camp considered them to be in compliance with the legislative intent of the Basic Law and in line with the 'One country, two systems' principle, and hoped that this would put an end to the controversies on development of political structure in Hong Kong.
Mid December 2007 Chief Executive SirDonald Tsang requested that Beijing allow direct elections for the Chief Executive. He referred to a survey in which more than half of the citizens of Hong Kong wanted direct elections by 2012. However, he said waiting for 2017 may be the best way to get two-thirds of the support of Legislative Council.[7] End of December Donald Tsang announced that the NPC said, it planned to allow the2017 Chief Executive Elections and the2020 Legislative Council elections to take place by universal suffrage.[8]
In 2013, public concern was sparked that the election process for the Chief Executive would involve a screening process that selects for candidates deemed suitable for the position by Beijing, incited by a comment made by a Deputy of the National People's Congress at anoff-the-record gathering.[9]
On 12 March 2005, the Chief Executive,Tung Chee-hwa, resigned. Immediately after Tung's resignation, there was dispute over the length of the term of the Chief Executive. To most local legal professionals, the length is obviously five years, under whatever circumstances.[10] It should also be noted that the wording of the Basic Law on the term of the Chief Executive is substantially different from the articles in the PRC constitution concerning the length of term of the president, premier, etc. Nonetheless, legal experts from the mainland said it is a convention a successor will only serve the remainder of the term if the position is vacant because the predecessor resigned. TheStanding Committee of the National People's Congress affirmed that the successor would only serve the remainder of the term. Many in Hong Kong saw this as having an adverse impact on one country, two systems, as theCentral People's Government interpret the Basic Law to serve its need, that is, a two-year probation for Tsang, instead of a five-year term.[10]
On 4 December 2005, people in Hong Kong demonstrated against SirDonald Tsang's proposed reform package, before a vote on 21 December. According to the organizers,[5] an estimated 250,000 turned out into the streets. The police supplied a figure of 63,000, and Michael de Golyer of Baptist University estimated between 70,000 and 100,000.[11]
The march sent a strong message to hesitant pro-democracy legislators to follow public opinion. The pro-government camp claimed to have collected 700,000 signatures on a petition backing Tsang's reform package. This number, however, was widely seen as too small to influence pro-democracy lawmakers. The Reform Package debate saw the return of key political figure and former Chief SecretaryAnson Chan, raising speculations of a possible run up for the 2007 Chief Executive election, though she dismissed having a personal interest in standing for the next election.
In an attempt to win last minute votes from moderate pro-democracy lawmakers, the government amended its reform package on 19 December 2005 by proposing a gradual cut in the number ofdistrict council members appointed by the Chief Executive. Their number was to be reduced from 102 to 68 by 2008. It was to be decided in 2011 whether to scrap the remaining seats in 2012 or in 2016.The amendment was seen as a reluctant response by Sir Donald Tsang to give satisfaction to the democratic demands made by demonstrators on 4 December. The move was qualified "Too little, too late" by pan-democrats in general.
On 21 December 2005, the political reform package was vetoed by pro-democracy lawmakers. Chief SecretaryRafael Hui openly criticized pro-democracyMartin Lee andBishop Zen for blocking the proposed changes.
As of 2008, the 24 non-civil service positions under the political appointment system comprised 11 undersecretaries and 13 political assistants.[12]
In May 2008, the government named eight newly appointedUndersecretaries and nine Political Assistants. The posts were newly created, ostensibly to work closely with bureau secretaries and top civil servants in implementing the Chief Executive's policy blueprint and agenda in an executive-led government. Donald Tsang described the appointments as a milestone in the development of Hong Kong's political appointment system.[13] In June 2008 controversies arose with the disclosure of foreign passports and salaries.[14] Pressure for disclosure continued to mount despite government insistence on the right of the individuals to privacy: on 10 June 2008, newly appointed Undersecretaries and political assistants, who had previously argued were contractually forbidden from disclosing their remuneration, revealed their salaries. The Government news release stated that the appointees had "voluntarily disclosed their salaries, given the sustained public interest in the issue."[15]
On 16 July 2008,Donald Tsang announced some "extraordinary measures for extraordinary times",[16] giving a total of HK$11 billion in inflation relief to help families' finances. Of which, the Employee Retraining levy on the employment ofForeign domestic helpers would be temporarily waived,[17] at an estimated cost of $HK2 billion.[16] It was intended that the levy would be waived for a two-year period on all helpers' employment contracts signed on or after 1 September 2008, but would not apply to ongoing contracts. The Immigration Department said it would not reimburse levies, which are prepaid half-yearly or yearly in advance. The announcement resulted in chaos and confusion, and uncertainty for the helpers as some employers deferred contracts or had dismissed helpers pending confirmation of the effective date, leaving helpers in limbo.[18]
In July 2008,Secretary for Labor and WelfareMatthew Cheung announced the waiver commencement date would be brought forward by one month. The Immigration Department would relax its 14-day re-employment requirement for helpers whose contracts expired.[19] On 30 July, theExecutive Council approved the measures. After widespread criticism of the situation, the government also conceded that maids having advanced renewal of contract would not be required to leave Hong Kong through the discretion exercised by theDirector of Immigration, and employers would benefit from the waiver simply by renewing the contract within the two-year period, admitting that some employers could benefit from the waiver for up to 4 years.[20] The administration's poor handling of the matter was heavily criticized. The administrative credibility and competence were called into question by journals from all sides of the political spectrum,[16] and by helpers and employers alike.
In August 2008, the appointment ofLeung Chin-man as deputy managing director and executive director ofNew World China Land, subsidiary ofNew World Development (NWD), was greeted with uproar amidst widespread public suspicion that job offer was aquid pro quo for the favors he allegedly granted to NWD. Leung was seen to have been involved with the sale of theHung Hom PeninsulaHome Ownership Scheme (HOS)public housing estate to NWD at under-value in 2004.[21]
After a 12-month 'sterilization period' after retirement, Leung submitted an application to the government on 9 May for approval to take up employment with New World China Land.[22] TheSecretary for the Civil Service,Denise Yue Chung-yee, signed off on the approval for him to take up the job after his request passed through the vetting committee.[23]
Controversies surrounded not only the suspicions of Leung's own conflict of interest, but also of the insensitivity of the committee which recommended the approval for him to take up his lucrative new job less than two years after his official retirement.[21] New World argued that they hired Leung in good faith after government clearance.
On 15 August, theCivil Service Bureau issued the report requested by Donald Tsang, where they admitted that they had neglected to consider Leung's role in the Hung Hom Peninsula affair.[24] Donald Tsang asked the SCS[clarification needed] to reassess the approval, and submit a report to him.[25] New World Development announced in the early hours of 16 August that Leung had resigned from his post, without any compensation from either side or from the government, for the termination.[26]
The next day, Donald Tsang confirmed that Denise Yue would not have to resign. He was satisfied with her apology and with the explanations offered by her. Tsang ordered a committee, of which Yue was to be a member, to be set up to perform a sweeping review of the system to process applications for former civil servants.[27]
In January 2010, five pan-democrats resigned from theLegislative Council of Hong Kong to trigger a by-election in response to the lack of progress in the move towards universal suffrage.
They wanted to use the by-election as a de facto referendum for universal suffrage and the abolition of thefunctional constituencies.
TheUmbrella Revolution erupted spontaneously in September 2014 in protest of a decision by China'sStanding Committee of the National People's Congress (NPCSC) onproposed electoral reform.[28]
Theausterity package provoked mobilization by students, and the effects became amplified into theUmbrella Movement a political movement involving hundreds of thousands of Hong Kong citizens provoking heavy-handed policing and government tactics.[29]
In February 2019, the Legislative Council proposed a bill to amend extradition rights between Hong Kong and other countries. This bill was proposed because of an incident in which a Hong Kong citizen killed his pregnant girlfriend on vacation in Taiwan. However, there is no agreement to extradite to Taiwan, so he was unable to be charged in Taiwan. The bill proposed a mechanism for transfers of fugitives not only for Taiwan, but also for mainland China and Macau, which are not covered in the existing laws. The2019–20 Hong Kong protests were a series of protests against the bill, such as on 9 June 2019 and 16 June 2019, which were estimated to number one million and two million protesters, respectively. Police brutality and subsequent further oppression of the protesters by the government have led to even more demonstrations, including the anniversary of the handover on 1 July 2019, which saw thestorming of the Legislative Council Complex, and subsequent protests throughout the summer spreading to different districts.
On 15 June 2019, Chief ExecutiveCarrie Lam decided to indefinitely suspend the bill in light of the protests, but also made it clear in her remarks that the bill was not withdrawn. On 4 September 2019, Lam announced that the government would "formally withdraw" the Fugitive Offenders Bill, as well as enacting a number of other reforms.[30]
The 2019 Hong Kong District Council election was held on 24 November, the first poll since the beginning of the protests, and one that had been billed as a "referendum" on the government. More than 2.94 million votes were cast for a turnout rate of 71.2%, up from 1.45 million and 47% from the previous election. This was the highest turnout in Hong Kong's history, both in absolute numbers and in turnout rates. Theresults were a resoundinglandslide victory for the pro-democracy bloc, as they saw their seat share increased from 30% to almost 88%, with a jump in vote share from 40% to 57%. The largest party before the election, DAB, fell to third place, with its leader's vote share cut from a consistent 80% to 55%, and their three vice-chairs losing. Among those who were also legislators, the overwhelming majority of the losing candidates were from the pro-Beijing bloc. Commenting on the election results,New Statesman declared it "the day Hong Kong's true "silent majority" spoke.
After the election, the protests slowly became quiet due to theCOVID-19 pandemic and government crackdown.
Before and after thehandover, the People's Republic of China has recognized ethnic Chinese people in Hong Kong as itscitizens. The PRC issuesHome Return Permits for them to entermainland China. As of 2007, Hong Kong issued theHKSAR passport through its Immigration Department[35] to all PRC citizens who were permanent residents of Hong Kong fitting theright of abode rule.
The HKSAR passport is not the same as the ordinaryPRC passport, which is issued to residents ofmainland China. Only permanent residents of Hong Kong who are PRC nationals are eligible to apply. To acquire the status of permanent resident one has to have "ordinarily resided" in Hong Kong for a period of seven years and adopted Hong Kong as their permanent home. Therefore, citizenship rights enjoyed by residents of mainland China and residents Hong Kong are differentiated even though both hold the same citizenship.
New immigrants from mainland China (who possess Chinese Citizenship) to Hong Kong are denied from getting a PRC passport from the mainland authorities, and are not eligible to apply for an HKSAR passport. They usually hold theDocument of Identity (DI) as the travel document, until the permanent resident status is obtained after seven years of residence.
Naturalization as a PRC Citizen is common among ethnic Chinese people in Hong Kong who are not PRC Citizens. Some who have surrendered their PRC citizenship, usually those who have emigrated to foreign countries and have retained the permanent resident status, can apply for PRC citizenship at the Immigration Department, though they must renounce their original nationality in order to acquire the PRC citizenship.[36]
Naturalization of persons that are not of Chinese ethnicity is rare because China does not allow dual citizenship and becoming a Chinese citizen requires the renouncement of other passports. A notable example isMichael Rowse, a permanent resident of Hong Kong and the current Director-General of Investment Promotion of Hong Kong Government, naturalized and became a PRC citizen, for the offices of secretaries of thepolicy bureaux are only open to PRC citizens.
In 2008, a row erupted overpolitical appointees. Five newly appointedUndersecretaries declared that they were in the process of renouncing foreign citizenship as at 4 June 2008, citingpublic opinion as an overriding factor, and one Assistant had initiated the renunciation process. This was done despite there being no legal or constitutional barrier for officials at this level of government to have foreign nationality.[37]
Hong Kong residents who were born in Hong Kong in the British-administered era could acquire the British Dependent Territories citizenship. Hong Kong residents who were not born in Hong Kong could also naturalize as aBritish Dependent Territories Citizen (BDTC) before the handover. To allow them to retain the status of British national while preventing a possible flood of immigrants from Hong Kong, the United Kingdom created a new nationality status,British National (Overseas) that Hong Kong British Dependent Territories citizens could apply for. Holders of theBritish National (Overseas) passport - BN(O) - have no right of abode in the United Kingdom. SeeBritish nationality law and Hong Kong for details.
British National (Overseas) status was given effect by the Hong Kong (British Nationality) Order 1986. Article 4(1) of the Order provided that on and after 1 July 1987, there would be a new form of British nationality, the holders of which would be known as British Nationals (Overseas). Article 4(2) of the Order provided that adults and minors who had a connection to Hong Kong were entitled to make an application to become British Nationals (Overseas) byregistration.
Becoming a British National (Overseas) was therefore not an automatic or involuntary process and indeed many eligible people who had the requisite connection with Hong Kong never applied to become British Nationals (Overseas). Acquisition of the new status had to be voluntary and therefore a conscious act. To make it involuntary or automatic would have been contrary to the assurances given to the Chinese government which led to the words "eligible to" being used in paragraph (a) of the United Kingdom Memorandum to theSino-British Joint Declaration. The deadline for applications passed in 1997. Any person who failed to register as a British Nationals (Overseas) by 1 July 1997 and were eligible to become PRC citizens became solely PRC citizens on 1 July 1997. However, any person who would be rendered stateless by failure to register as a British Nationals (Overseas) automatically became a British Overseas citizen under article 6(1) of the Hong Kong (British Nationality) Order 1986.
After theTiananmen Square protests of 1989, people urged the British Government to grant full British citizenship to all Hong Kong BDTCs – but this request was never accepted. However, it was considered necessary to devise aBritish Nationality Selection Scheme to enable some of the population to obtain British citizenship. The United Kingdom made provision to grant citizenship to 50,000 families whose presence was important to the future of Hong Kong under theBritish Nationality Act (Hong Kong) 1990.[38]
After handover, all PRC citizens with the right of abode in Hong Kong (holding Hong Kong permanent identity cards) are eligible to apply for the HKSAR passport issued by the Hong Kong Immigration Department. As the visa-free-visit destinations of the HKSAR passport are very similar with that of a BN(O) passport and the application fee for the former is much lower (see articlesHKSAR passport andBritish passport for comparison and verification), the HKSAR passport is becoming more popular among residents of Hong Kong.
Hong Kong residents who were not born in Hong Kong (and had not naturalized as a BDTC) could only apply for theCertificate of identity (CI) from the colonial government as travel document. They are not issued (by neither the British nor Chinese authorities) after handover. Former CI holders holding PRC Citizenship (e.g. born in mainland China or Macau) and are permanent residents of Hong Kong are now eligible for the HKSAR passports, making the HKSAR passports more popular.
According to The Hong Kong (British Nationality) Order 1986 No. 948 § 6:[39] A baby born in Hong Kong, who has at least one parent with British national origin, shall have the right to submit an application for duel-citizenship between Hong Kong and the UK.
Hong Kong political parties in thepro-establishment camp support the policies of the PRC's central government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government.[40]: 124 Supporters of the pro-establishment camp generally have a strong sense of Chinese identity.[40]: 124 As of at least 2024, the pro-establishment camp is the governing coalition in Hong Kong politics.[40]: 124
Political parties in thepan-democratic camp view the principle of One Country, Two Systems as standing for democracy in Hong Kong.[40]: 124 They support universal suffrage.[40]: 124 Supporters of the pan-democratic camp generally have a strong sense of Hong Kong identity.[40]: 124
 | This article needs to beupdated. Please help update this article to reflect recent events or newly available information.(June 2016) |
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link){{cite news}}:|last2= has generic name (help)| Communist Party | .svg) | ||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Central government | |||||||||||
| United front | |||||||||||
| Politics of province-level divisions (current leaders) |
| ||||||||||
| |||||||||||
| Sovereign states |
|
|---|---|
| States with limited recognition | |
| Dependencies and other territories | |
| Sovereign states |
|
|---|---|
| States with limited recognition | |
| Dependencies and other territories | |
