Political aspects of the religion ofIslam are derived from its religious scripture (theQuran holy book,ḥadīth literature of accounts of the sayings and living habits attributed to theIslamic prophetMuhammad, andsunnah),[1][2] as well as elements ofpolitical movements and tendencies followed byMuslims orIslamic states throughout itshistory.[3] Shortly after its founding, Islam's prophetMuhammad became a ruler of a state,[4] and the intertwining of religion and state in Islam (and the idea that "politics is central" to Islam),[5] is in contrast to the doctrine of rendering "unto Caesar what belongs to Caesar and to God what belongs to God",[5] of Christianity, its related and neighboring religion.[5][6]
Traditional political concepts in Islam which form an idealized model for Islamic rule, are based on therule of Muhammad in Mecca (629–632 CE) andhis elected or selected successors, known asrāshidūn ("rightly-guided")caliphs inSunnī Islam, and theImams inShīʿa Islam. Concepts include obedience to theIslamic law (sharīʿa); the supremacy of unity, solidarity and community, over individual rights and diversity;[7] thepledging of obedience by the ruled to rulers (al-Bayʿah), with a corresponding duty of rulers to rule justly and seekconsultation (shūrā) before making decisions;[8] and the ruled to rebuke unjust rulers.[9] Classical Islamic political thought focuses on advice on how to govern well, rather than reflecting "on the nature of politics".[10]
A sea change in the political history of theMuslim world was the rise of the West and the eventualdefeat and dissolution of the Ottoman Empire (1908–1922).[11][12][13] In themodern era (19th–20th centuries), common Islamic political themes have been resistance toWestern imperialism and enforcement ofsharīʿa law throughdemocratic ormilitant struggle.[11][14] Increasing the appeal of Islamic movements such asIslamism,Islamic democracy,Islamic fundamentalism, andIslamic revivalism, especially in the context of the globalsectarian divide and conflict between Sunnīs and Shīʿītes,[14][15][16] have been a number of events; the defeat of Arab armies in theSix-Day War and the subsequentIsraeli occupation of East Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank (1967), theIslamic Revolution in Iran (1979),[14] thecollapse of the Soviet Union (1992) bringing an end to theCold War and tocommunism as a viable alternative political system, and especially popular dissatisfaction withsecularist ruling regimes in the Muslim world.[15][17][18][19]
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Early Islam arose within the historical, social, political, economic, and religious context ofLate Antiquity in theMiddle East,[24] in the life and times of theIslamic prophetMuhammad and his successors.[25][a]According to thetraditional account,[30][31] theIslamic prophetMuhammad was born inMecca around the year 570 CE.[32] His family belonged to the Arab clan ofQuraysh, which was the chief tribe of Mecca and a dominant force in western Arabia.[31][33] To counter the effects of anarchy, they upheld the institution of "sacred months" when all violence was forbidden and travel was safe.[34] The polytheisticKaaba shrine in Mecca and the surrounding area was a popular pilgrimage destination, which had significant economic consequences for the city.[34][35]
While Muhammad's region had tribes, it did not have a state.[36] Unlike its neighboring major religion, Christianity, (whose adherents were a minority in their region and subject "to suspicion and often to persecution" among Israelites and Romans until the conversion of EmperorConstantine), Islam formed a state very early.[37]Daniel Pipes argues that it had little choice.
Muhammad founded a religious communityex nihilo. He lived in western Arabia, a stateless region where tribal affiliations dominated all of public life. A tribe protected its members (by threatening to take revenge for them), and it provided social bonds, economic opportunities, as well as political enfranchisement. An individual lacking tribal ties had no standing; he (she) could be robbed, raped, and killed with impunity. If Muhammad was to attract tribesmen to join his religious movement, he had to provide them with an affiliation no less powerful than the tribe they had left behind. Thus did Muslim leaders offer a range of services resembling those of tribal chiefs, protecting their followers, organizing them for wars of booty, dispensing justice, and so forth.[38]
The real intentions of Muhammad regarding the spread of Islam, its political undertone, and hismissionary activity (da’wah) during his lifetime are a contentious matter of debate, which has been extensively discussed both amongMuslim scholars andnon-Muslim scholars within the academic field ofIslamic studies.[39] Various authors, Islamic activists, and historians of Islam have proposed several understandings of Muhammad's intent and ambitions regarding his religio-political mission in the context of the pre-Islamic Arabian society and the founding of his own religion. Larry Poston asks,[39]
Was it in Muhammad's mind to produce a world religion or did his interests lie mainly within the confines of his homeland? Was he solely anArabnationalist—a political genius intent upon uniting the proliferation oftribal clans under the banner of a new religion—or was his vision a truly international one, encompassing a desire to produce a reformed humanity in the midst of a new world order? These questions are not without significance, for a number of the proponents of contemporary da’wah activity in the West trace their inspiration to the prophet himself, claiming that he initiated a worldwide missionary program in which they are the most recent participants. [...] Despite the claims of these and other writers, it is difficult to prove that Muhammad intended to found a world-encompassing faith superseding the religions ofChristianity andJudaism. His original aim appears to have been the establishment of a succinctly Arab brand ofmonotheism, as indicated by his many references to theQurʾān as anArab book and by his accommodations to other monotheistic traditions.[39]
Journalist historianThomas W. Lippman also points out the emphasis in the Quran on the "Arabness" of Muhammad's mission and of Muhammad's "professed intention" to bring a (holy) book to people who had none — "that is, to the Arabs".[40]
TheQurʾān is conceived in Islam to be the word ofGod as spoken to Muḥammad and passed on his followers and the rest of humanity "in exactly the same form as it was received".[41] Some commands did not extend past the life of Muhammad, such as ones to refer quarrels to Allah and Muhammad or not to shout at or raise your voice when talking to Muhammad.[42]Out of the approximately 6000 verses of the Quran, 250–300 deal withlegal aspects of "civil, criminal, moral, community, family and personal affairs",[43] and of these verses only a relatively small number concern issues of a "political nature".[44] Also limiting its political relevance is the fact that the Quran doesn't mention "any formal and continuing structure of authority", only orders to obey Muhammad,[42] and that its themes were of limited use when the success of Islam meant governance of "a vast territory populate mainly peasants, and dominate by cities and states" alien tonomadic life in thedesert.[45]HistorianThomas W. Lippman finds only the verse enjoying men to "conduct their affairs by mutual consent" as a general advice in the Quran on leading a community.[46]
While the Quran doesn't dwell on politics, it does make mention of concepts such as "the oppressed" (mustad'afeen), "emigration" (hijra), the "Muslim community" (Ummah), and "fighting" or "struggling" in the way of God (jihād), that can have political implications.[47] A number of Quranic verses (such as4:98) talk about themustad'afeen, which can be translated as "those deemed weak", "underdogs", or "the oppressed", how they are put upon by people such as thepharaoh, how God wishes them to be treated justly, and how they should emigrate from the land where they are oppressed (4:99).Abraham was an "emigrant unto my Lord" (29:25). War against "unbelievers" (kuffār) is commanded and divine aid promised, although some verses state this may be when unbelievers start the war and treaties may end the war. The Quran also devotes some verses to the proper division of spoils captured in war among the victors. War against internal enemies or "hypocrites" (munāfiḳūn) is also commanded.[47]
Most likely Muhammad was "intimately aware of Jewish belief and practices", and acquainted with theḤanīf[29][48] (pre-Islamic Arabians who wereAbrahamic monotheists). Like theḤanīf, Muhammad practicedTaḥannuth, spending time in seclusion atMount Hira and "turning away from paganism."[49][50] When he was about 40 years old, he began receiving at mount Hira' what Muslims regard as divine revelations delivered through theangelGabriel, which would later form theQuran. These inspirations urged him to proclaim a strictmonotheistic faith, as the final expression ofBiblical prophetism earlier codified in the sacred texts of Judaism and Christianity; to warn his compatriots of the impendingJudgement Day; and to castigate social injustices of his city.[b] Muhammad's messagewon over a handful of followers (theṣaḥāba) and was met withincreasing opposition from Meccan notables.[52][c] In 622 CE, a few years after losing protection with the death of his influential uncleʾAbū Ṭālib ibn ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib, Muhammad migrated to the city of Yathrib (subsequently called Medina) where he was joined by his followers.[53] Later generations would count this event, known as thehijra, as the start of the Islamic era.[54]
In Yathrib, where he was accepted as an arbitrator among the different communities of the city under the terms of theConstitution of Medina, Muhammad began to lay the foundations of the new Islamic society, with the help of new Quranic verses which provided guidance on matters of law and religious observance.[54] Thesurahs of this period emphasized his place among thelong line of Biblical prophets, but also differentiated the message of the Quran from the sacred texts of Christianity and Judaism.[54] Armed conflict with the Arab Meccans andJewish tribes of the Yathrib area soon broke out.[55] After a series of military confrontations and political manoeuvres, Muhammad was able tosecure control of Mecca and allegiance of the Quraysh in 629 CE.[54] In the time remaining untilhis death in 632 CE,tribal chiefs across the Arabian peninsula entered into various agreements with him, some under terms of alliance, others acknowledging his claims of prophethood and agreeing to follow Islamic practices, including paying thealms levy to his government, which consisted of a number of deputies, an army of believers, and a public treasury.[54]
In 622 CE, in recognition of his claims to prophethood, Muhammad was invited to rule the city ofMedina. At the time the local Arab tribes ofAus andKhazraj dominated the town, and were in constant conflict. Medinans considered Muhammad as an impartial outsider who could resolve the conflict. Muhammad and his followers thus moved to Medina, where about the same year as his arrival,[d][e][f][g] Muhammad drafted a document often called theConstitution of Medina. It constituted a formal agreement between Muhammad and all of the significant tribes and families ofYathrib (later known asMedina), includingMuslims,Jews,Christians,[62] andArab Pagans.[63][64][65] and dealt with tribal affairs during Muhammad's time inMedina[66]
The document was drawn up with the explicit concern of bringing to an end the bitter intertribal fighting between the clans of the Aws (Aus andKhazraj) within Medina. To this effect it instituted a number of rights and responsibilities for the Muslim, Jewish, Christian, and Pagan communities of Medina, bringing them within the fold of one community: theUmmah.[67]It formed the basis of theFirst Islamic State, a multi-religious polity under his leadership.[68][69][70][71] Many tribal groups are mentioned, including theBanu Najjar andQuraysh, as well as many tribal institutions, like vengeance,blood money,ransom, alliance, andclientage.[72]The laws Muhammad established during his rule, based on theQuran and his own doing, are considered by Muslims to besharīʿa or Islamic law, which Islamic movements seek to re-establish in the present day. Muhammad gained a widespread following and an army, and his rule expanded first to the city ofMecca and thenspread across theArabian peninsula through a combination of diplomacy andmilitary conquests.[25]
After thedeath of Muhammad in 632 CE, his community of Muslims needed to appoint a new leader. This leader became known ascaliph (Arabic:خَليفة,romanized: khalīfa,lit. 'successor'),[25][30][31] and the Islamic empires the caliph ruled as "caliphates".[30][31][73] The first series of caliphs—Abū Bakr (632–634),ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb (Umar І, 634–644),ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān (644–656), andʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib (656–661)—are known as therāshidūn ("rightly-guided")caliphs inSunnī Islam.[31] They oversaw the initial phase of theearly Muslim conquests, advancing throughPersia,the Levant,Egypt, andNorth Africa,[31] and along with Muhammad's rule in Medina are looked upon by Sunni as models to be followed.
Alongside the growth of theUmayyad Caliphate, the major political development within early Islam in this period was the sectarian split and political divide betweenSunnī,Shīʿa, andKharijiteMuslims; this had its roots in a dispute over the succession for the role of caliph.[30][74] Sunnīs believed the caliph was elective and any Muslim from the Arab clan ofQuraysh, the tribe of Muhammad, might serve as one.[75] Shīʿītes, on the other hand, believed the proper leadership of the Muslim community (known asImams) should be hereditary in thebloodline of Muhammad,[76] and thus all the caliphs (from the Shīʿa perspective), with the exceptions of Muhammad's cousin and son-in-lawʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib and his firstborn sonḤasan, were actually illegitimateusurpers.[75] However, the Sunnī sect emerged as triumphant in most regions of theMuslim world, with the exceptions ofIran andOman; thus, most modern Islamic political ideologies and movements are founded in Sunnī thought.Muhammad's closest companions (ṣaḥāba), the four "rightly-guided" caliphs who succeeded him, continued to expand the Islamic empire to encompassJerusalem,Ctesiphon, andDamascus, and sending Arab Muslim armies as far as theSindh region.[77] The early Islamic empire stretched fromal-Andalus (in modern day Spain) to thePunjab region (in modern day Pakistan) under the reign of theUmayyad dynasty.
The era of Muhammad's rule from Medina and the rule of his companions (theRashidun Caliphate) was the era that Sunni Muslims look to as a model for Muslims to follow, but was also an era when Islam began its rapid expansion over a vast geographical area—conquered the collapsingSasanian Persian Empire and most of theByzantine Empire.[25][30][73][31] In the centuries of islamic history to come this expansion was slowed (and even reversed in the era of Western colonization), nonetheless it was this era of military success that colored many rules offiqh/sharia in governance and relations with foreign non-Muslins lands (division of the world intoDar al-Islam andDar al-Harb, how to treat slaves captured from conquered people, how to divide up spoils from raids on the enemy, etc.).[78]
Western scholar of Islam,Fred Donner,[79][page needed] argues that the standard Arabian practice during theearly caliphates was for the prominent men of akinship group, or tribe, to gather after a leader's death and elect a political leader from amongst themselves, although there was no specified procedure for thisconsultation or consultative assembly (shūrā).[79] Candidates were usually from the same lineage as the deceased leader but they were not necessarily his sons.[79] Capable men who would lead well were preferred over an ineffectual direct heir, as there was no basis in the majoritySunnī view that the head of state or governor should be chosen based on lineage alone.[79][page needed]
An important Islamic concept concerning the structure of ruling is theconsultation (shūrā) with people regarding their affairs, which is the duty of rulers mentioned in twoQuranic verses:
"...those who answer the call of their Lord and establish the prayer, and who conduct their affairs by Shura. [are loved by God]"[42:38]
"...consult them (the people) in their affairs. Then when you have taken a decision (from them), put your trust in Allah"[3:159] (3:153)[80]
InSunnī Islam, the ideal selection process for the caliphs — who weresuccessors of Muhammad in political authority and heads of the caliphate—was to follow the "doctrine of elective succession", whereby the political representatives of the people, engaging inconsultation (shūrā), choose the new caliph.[81] The model for this was therāshidūn ("rightly-guided")caliphs —Abū Bakr (632–634),ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān (644–656), andʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib (656–661)[82] — who were elected, (at least in the parlance of Sunni jurists).[83] According to Bernard Lewis, the case for consultation as opposed to "arbitrary personal rule", is supported "by a considerable body of material" in Muslim literature - "by traditionist ... by commentators ... and by numerous later writers in Arabic, Persian and Turkish". But despite all this recommendation, the doctrine of consultation only reachesthe level of recommended (Mustahabb) not commanded (farḍ/wājib) in Islamicfiqh, and arbitrary rule is only condemned (Makruh), not forbidden (ḥarām/maḥzūr).[84]
Other requirements for the Caliph differ according to scholars and schools. According to one source,[85] the caliph should be a member of theQuraysh tribe (according toAl-Māwardī, a Sunnī Muslim jurist of theShāfiʿī school ofIslamic jurisprudence); or alternately that they should simply be elected from the majority (according toAbu Bakr al-Baqillani, anAshʿarī Sunnī Muslim scholar andMālikī jurist, andAbu Hanifa an-Nu‘man, the founder of the SunnīḤanafī school.)[85]
Traditional Sunnī Muslim jurists agree that theshura, loosely translated as "consultation", is a function of the Islamic caliphate. The phrase used to denote those qualified to appoint or depose a caliph or another ruler on behalf of the Ummah, wasAhl al-Ḥall wa’l-‘Aḳd (Arabic:أهل الحلّ والعقد,lit. 'those who are qualified to unbind and to bind' or sometimes 'the people of the solution and the contract').[86]Deliberations in the politics of the early caliphates, most notably theRāshidūn Caliphate, were not "democratic" in the modern sense of the term; rather, decision-making power laid with a council (Majlis ash-Shura) of notable and trustedcompanions of Muhammad (ṣaḥāba) and representatives of differentArab tribes (most of them selected or elected within their tribes).[87]
TheMajlis-ash-Shura advises the caliph. Al-Mawardi wrote that members of themajlis should satisfy three conditions: they must be just, they must have enough knowledge to distinguish a good caliph from a bad one, and must have sufficient wisdom and judgment to select the best caliph. Al-Mawardi also stated that in case of emergencies when there is no caliphate and nomajlis, the people themselves should institute a council ofmajlis, select a list of candidates for the role of caliph, then themajlis should select from the list of candidates.[85][unreliable source?]
After the "Islamic Golden Age" of the Rashidun, selection increasingly took the form of the ruler/caliph (as the representative of the community), nominating his successor, often leading to a caliphal dynasty.[88] As the caliphate moved away from its ideal, caliphs were often times not only not elected but not in charge, becoming figureheads,[89] (starting with the last centuries of the Abbasid Caliphate).[90]
Through the Islamic middle ages (with the exception of theFatimid Caliphate starting in the 10th century) there was only one caliph.[91] After the Ottoman empire conquered the Mamluk sultanate in 1517, the caliphate was reportedly transferred to Ottoman empire,[92] ending the age of the "universal caliphate".[93] In the 1774, however, in theTreaty of Küçük Kaynarca, the Ottoman empire claimed the title of "supreme religious head of Islam" for its caliph.[93]
Other sovereign titles used in the Muslim world includeamīr,sulṭān, king.[94][page needed] The first military figures who usurped power from the caliphs were the amirs of the provinces, by the 10th century amirs took power over even the capital.[95] Originally an abstract term for authority, Sulṭān was first used as a title for a ruler by theSeljuk dynasty in the 11th century.[96] Before too long regional rulers of much less power and distinction also used the title until it became the standard title for a monarch claiming to have no superior.[97]One type of ruler not part of the Islamic ideal was theking, which was disparaged in the Quranic mentions of thePharaoh, "the prototype of the unjust and tyrannical ruler" (18:70,18:79) and elsewhere (28:34).[80] It was used by the monarch of Egypt and Morocco to indicate their independence from European kings.[98]
Practically, for hundreds of years after the fall of theRāshidūn Caliphate (7th century CE) and until the twentieth century, Islamic states tended to follow a system of government based on the coexistence ofsultan andulama following the rules of thesharia. This system has been compared (byNoah Feldman) to Western governments that possess anunwritten constitution (like theUnited Kingdom), and that possess separate, countervailing branches of government (like theUnited States) — which providedSeparation of powers in governance. Unlike thethree branches of government of the United States (and some other systems of government) — executive, legislative and judicial — Islamic states had two — thesultan and theulama.[99] Feldman believes a symbol of the success of this system is the current popularity of the Islamist movement which seeks to restore the Islamist state.[99]
Olivier Roy also talks about a de facto separation of religious and non-religious "political power" in Islamic states, though he designates the caliph, not ulama, as the religious power center and the sultans and emirs as the "political power". This division was "created and institutionalized ... as early as the end of the first century ofthe hegira." No positive law was developed outside of sharia. The sovereign's religious function was to defend the Muslim community against its enemies, institute the sharia, ensure the public good (maslaha). The state was an instrument to enable Muslims to live as good Muslims and Muslims were to obey thesultan if he did so. The legitimacy of the ruler was "symbolized by the right to coin money and to have the Friday prayer (Jumu'ahkhutba) said in his name."[100]
According to Feldman, the legislative power of the caliph (or later, thesultan) was always restricted by the scholarly class, theulama, a group regarded as the guardians ofIslamic law. Since thesharia law was established and regulated by theschools of Islamic jurisprudence, this prevented the caliph from dictating legal results.Sharia-compliant rulings were established as authoritative based on theijma (consensus) of legal Muslim scholars, who theoretically acted as representatives of the entireUmmah (Muslim community).[101] After law colleges (madrasa) became widespread beginning with the 11th and 12th century CE, students of Islamic jurisprudence often had to obtain anijaza-t al-tadris wa-l-ifta ("license to teach and issue legal opinions") in order to issue valid legal rulings.[102] In many ways, classical Islamic law functioned like aconstitutional law.[101]
British lawyer and journalistSadakat Kadri argues that rather than countering the power of the rulers, a large "degree of deference" was shown to them by the ulama and this was at least at times "counterproductive". During much of the Abbasid caliphate, caliphs were figureheads serving at the mercy of the Sultans, who the ulama also feared:
When CaliphAl-Mutawakkil had been killed in 861, jurists had retroactively validated his murder with afatwa. Eight years later, they had testified to the lawful abdication of a successor, after he had been dragged from a toilet, beaten unconscious, and thrown into a vault to die. By the middle of the tenth century, judges were solemnly confirming that the onset of blindness had disqualified a caliph, without mentioning that they had just been assembled to witness the gouging of his eyes.[89]
According toNoah Feldman, the Muslim legal scholars and jurists eventually lost their control over Islamic law due to thecodification ofsharia by theOttoman Empire in the early 19th century:[103]
How the scholars lost their exalted status as keepers of the law is a complex story, but it can be summed up in the adage that partial reforms are sometimes worse than none at all. In the early 19th century, the Ottoman empire responded to military setbacks with an internal reform movement. The most important reform was the attempt to codify Shariah. This Westernizing process, foreign to the Islamic legal tradition, sought to transform Shariah from a body of doctrines and principles to be discovered by the human efforts of the scholars into a set of rules that could be looked up in a book. [...] Once the law existed in codified form, however, the law itself was able to replace the scholars as the source of authority. Codification took from the scholars their all-important claim to have the final say over the content of the law and transferred that power to the state.
Classical Islamic thought (according toOlivier Roy[h]) is "overflowing with treatises on governing, advice to sovereigns, and didactic tales", but has little or nothing to say that reflects "on the nature of politics" in general.[10]
Bernard Lewis also writes about an "immense " literature from the classical Islamic age produced by government bureaucrats concerning the "art of government", practical issues in politics and governance, known asadab, and distinct from Islamic jurisprudence, known asfiqh, which also concerns governing.[104]
Lewis finds three major themes in the political literature of jurists and bureaucrats.
According to scholar Moojan Momen, the verse
is "one of the key statements in the Qur'an around which much of the exegesis" on the issue of what Islamic doctrine has to say about who should be in charge is based.Bernard Lewis calls the verse (along with related hadith and tafsir) "the starting point" of most Islamic "teaching about politics".[106]
The importance of obedience to rulers has also been emphasized by
For Sunnīs, the expression "those who have been given authority" (uulaa al-amr) refers to the rulers (caliphs, sultans, kings); for Shīʿa these are usurpers not rulers, and the true authorities are the Imams.[114]
Theimportance of obedience to political rulers, and the belief that it is duty of the Muslim population to practice piety, prayer, religious rituals, and personal virtue, rather than questioning their authority[115] is known as Quietism.
However, there are also Quranic injunctions to "enjoin good and forbid evil" (al-amr bi-l-maʿrūf wa-n-nahy ʿani-l-munkar, found inQuran 3:104,Quran 3:110, and other verses).Bernard Lewis writes that the Quranic obedience verse (Q.4:59) was
elaborated in a number of sayings attributed to Muhammad. But there are also sayings that put strict limits on the duty of obedience. Two dicta attributed to the Prophet and universally accepted as authentic are indicative. One says, "there is no obedience in sin"; in other words, if the ruler orders something contrary to the divine law, not only is there no duty of obedience, but there is a duty of disobedience. This is more than theright of revolution that appears in Western political thought. It is a duty of revolution, or at least of disobedience and opposition to authority. The other pronouncement, "do not obey a creature against his creator," again clearly limits the authority of the ruler, whatever form of ruler that may be.[116]
Ibn Taymiyya also interprets "there is no obedience in sin" to mean that Muslims should ignore the order of the ruler if it would disobey the divine law. However, they should not use this as excuse for revolution because violence would mean the spilling of Muslim blood.[111]Ibn Ḥazm (994–1064) also agreed with total obedience unless theQuran orSunnī population are violated, but asserts that an authority who does violate them should be prevented, punished and if that cannot be done, removed.[117][j]
Starting from the late medieval period, Sunnifiqh elaborated the doctrine ofsiyasa shar'iyya, which literally means governance according tosharia, and is sometimes called the political dimension of Islamic law. Its goal was to harmonize Islamic law with the practical demands of statecraft,[119] on the grounds that non-formalist application of Islamic law was sometimes required by expedience and utilitarian considerations (Islamic law rejected circumstantial evidence, for example). The doctrine created exceptions to the use ofqadi courts and their strict sharia enforcement, includingmazalim courts administered by the ruler's council that applied "corrective"discretionary punishments for petty offenses; their jurisdiction was expanded under theMamluk sultanate, to commercial and family law; broader use ofMaslaha (public interest) as a basis of Islamic law—the Ottoman rulers promulgating a body of administrative, criminal, and economic laws known asqanun.[120]
Shīʿa Muslims, who believe thatʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib and his descendants (Imams) should have been the leaders of the Muslim community, evolved from a political party to a religious sect after the massacre of Ali's sonHusayn and his followers by an Umayyad force atKarbala in 680 CE. The tragedy of the event — with its themes of "martyrdom and persecution ... sacrifice, guilt and expiation" around the suffering of those killed, wickedness of those who did the killing, the penitence of those who failed save the victims — are commemorated annually by Shia.[121] Along with their status through the centuries as religious minorities under rulers they regard as usurpers, this created a difference not only in outlook but in "political attitudes and behavior" from the Sunni.[121]
While there have been severalShi'i dynasties over the course of Islamic history, with a short exception of Ali's rule, the Shi'i Imam's never ruled. (In the largest Shi'i sect, Twelvers, the last Imam—Muḥammad al-Mahdī al-Ḥujjah—went into occultation", i.e. disappeared in 878.) Consequently, inShīʿa Islam, the attitude towards non-Imam rulers (i.e. what Shia considered usurpers) tended towards three approaches — political cooperation with the ruler, political activism challenging the ruler, and aloofness from politics. The "writings of Shi'i ulama through the ages" showed "elements of all three of these attitudes."[122]
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Islamic extremism dates back to theearly history of Islam with the emergence of theKharijites in the 7th century CE.[74] The Kharijites broke away from both the Shīʿa and the Sunnīs during theFirst Fitna (the first Islamic Civil War);[74] they were particularly noted for adopting a radical approach totakfīr (excommunication), whereby they declared both Sunnī and Shīʿa Muslims to be eitherinfidels (kuffār) orfalse Muslims (munāfiḳūn), and therefore deemed themworthy of death for their perceivedapostasy (ridda).[74][123][124]
The Islamic tradition traces the origin of the Kharijites to thebattle between ʿAlī and Muʿāwiya at Siffin in 657 CE. When ʿAlī was faced with a military stalemate and agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration, some of his party withdrew their support from him. "Judgement belongs to God alone" (لاَ حُكْكْ إلَا لِلّهِ) became the slogan of these secessionists.[74] (Kharijites believing the victor in combat would be God's choice.) They also called themselvesal-Shurat ("the Vendors"), to reflect their willingness to sell their lives inmartyrdom.[125]
The original Kharijites opposed both ʿAlī andMuʿāwiya, and appointed their own leaders. They were decisively defeated by ʿAlī, who was in turn assassinated by a Kharijite. They engaged inguerrilla warfare against theUmayyads, but only became a movement to be reckoned with during theSecond Fitna (the second Islamic Civil War) when they at one point controlled more territory than any of their rivals. The Kharijites were, in fact, one of the major threats to ʿAbd Allāh bin al-Zubayr's bid for the caliphate; during this time they controlled thecentral region of Yamama and most ofSouthern Arabia, and captured theoasis town of al-Ṭāʾif.[125]
TheAzāriḳa, an extremist faction of the Kharijites founded by Nāfiʿ bin al-Azraḳ al-Ḥanafī al-Ḥanẓalī inBasra (683 CE), controlled parts ofWestern Iran under the Umayyads until they were finally overthrown in 699 CE.[126] According toal-Ashʿarī, their leader Nāfiʿ bin al-Azraḳ was the first to cause disputes among the Kharijites by supporting the thesis according to which all adversaries should beput to death together with their women and children (istiʿrāḍ).[126] Because of their readiness to declare any opponent asapostate, the Kharijite movement was divided and started to fragment into smaller groups, from which theIbāḍites derived.[126] The more moderateIbāḍi Kharijites were longer-lived, continuing to wield political power inNorth andEast Africa, and inEastern Arabia during theAbbasid period, and are the only Kharijite group to survive into modern times.
By the time thatIbn al-Muqaffa' wrote his political treatise early in theAbbasid period, the Kharijites were no longer a significant political threat, at least in theIslamic heartlands. The memory of the menace they had posed to Muslim unity and of the moral challenge generated by their pious idealism still weighed heavily on Muslim political and religious thought, however. Even if the Kharijites could no longer threaten, their ghosts still had to be answered.[125]
From the 16th to the 20th centuries the Muslim world felt the external impact of European colonialism that brought a new era. Unlike the 7th century Byzantine Greeks andSasanian Persians, the 18th and 19th century British, French, Russian, etc. were conquerors, and unlike the medieval Turks and Mongols that had also conquered large areas of Muslim land, the Europeans had little interest in conversion to Islam or adopting Muslim ways.[127]
In the early modern period between 1453 and 1526, three major states were founded by Muslim dynastic monarchies—in the Mediterranean (Ottoman), Iran (Safavid), and South Asia (Mughal). They were known as theGunpowder empires[128][129] for their use and development of the newly inventedfirearms, especiallycannon and small arms, which allow them to expand and centralize their empires. By the early 17th century, the descendants of their founders controlled much of the Muslim world, stretching from theBalkans andNorth Africa to theBay of Bengal, with a combined population estimated at between 130 and 160 million.[130][131]
The empires all benefited from alliances between rulers and religious officials.[129] Ottoman rulers relied onIslamic judges (qāḍī)[129] andassumed the title of caliph (within the borders of their empire) in the 14th century. After theirconquest ofMamluk Egypt in 1517, they gained control of the cities ofMecca (thebirthplace of Islam and site of theḤajj pilgrimage) andMedina. Abolishing the Mamluk-controlledAbbasid Caliphate, the Ottoman sultans declared themselves to be protectors of the two holy cities and expanded their claim to caliphate to the entire Muslim world. The SafavidShāhIsmā'īl I established theTwelverShīʿa Islam as theofficial religion of the newly-founded Persian Empire.[132] The MuslimMughal dynasty ruled amajority-Hindu population along with smallerreligious minorities, and were necessarily tolerant of other faiths.[129]
Islam, unlikeother religions, began not persecuted or struggling but conquering, growing from strength to strength; within less than a century of its founding it had become an empire spanning from thePyrenees Mountains andAtlantic Ocean to the borders of theChinese Empire andMedieval India.[133] Much of the territory it gained (theBalkans,North Africa, and theLevant) came from the land ofan older, related Abrahamic religion to the north, i.e.Christianity.[12] For most of Islamic history, which covers theMedieval period entirely,[134]Christendom was poorer and less sophisticated; its attempts to gain back lost territory from the Muslim world mostly unsuccessful for many centuries.[k]
TheOttoman Empirebegan its expansion into Europe by invading the European portions of theByzantine Empire in the 14th and 15th centuries up until thecapture of Constantinople in 1453, establishing Islam as the state religion of the newly-founded empire. TheOttoman Turks further expanded intoSoutheastern Europe and consolidated their political power by invading and conquering huge portions of theSerbian Empire,Bulgarian Empire, and the remaining territories of theByzantine Empire in the 14th and 15th centuries. The empire reached its xenith of territorial expansion in Europe in the 16th century.[134] Theslave trade in the Ottoman Empire supplied the ranks of theOttoman army between the 15th and 19th centuries.[136][137] They were useful in preventing both theslave rebellions and thebreakup of the Empire itself, especially due to therising tide of nationalism among European peoples in its Balkan provinces from the 17th century onwards.[136] Along with the Balkans, theBlack Sea Region remained a significant source of high-value slaves for theOttoman Turks.[138]
European kingdoms began establishing embassies and diplomatic missions to theOttoman Empire between the 15th and 16th centuries in order to create closer, and more friendly, relationships with theOttoman Turks (see also:Franco-Ottoman alliance).[139][140]
The fear ofOttoman expansion and its implications onreligion in Europe finally dissipated by the 17th century.[139][141] Starting in the second half of the 17th century, with the end of theBattle of Vienna and theTreaty of Karlowitz (1699), this changed;[142] Ottoman rulestarted to decline in Southeastern Europe.[12][143] Ottoman expansionism ended with their defeat in theGreat Turkish War (1683–1699).[142] The Ottoman Empire, for centuries the mightiest Muslim state and referred to as the "cruel Turk" among Europeans,[12][144][145][146] now was looked down upon by the other European countries as the "Sick man of Europe",[12][139] as it was widely held thatthe Ottoman Empire was a stagnant nation and incapable of modernizing.[12][139] During the last hundred years of the Ottoman Empireit gradually lost almost all of its European territories, until it wasdefeated and eventually collapsed in 1922.[147]
The other two Muslim gunpowder empires also retreated before Europe and advance. TheMughal Empire inIndia fell (1857),Russia made incursions into theCaucasus (1828), andCentral Asia (1830-1895). By the 19th and early 20th centuries,European Great Powers had “annexed or occupied much of theMiddle East and penetrated or influenced the rest.“[148] This included theFrench conquest of Algeria (1830). as well. TheFirst World War brought thedefeat anddismemberment of the Ottoman Empire,[11] to which the Ottoman officer andTurkish revolutionary statesmanMustafa Kemal Atatürk had an instrumental role in ending and replacing it with theRepublic of Turkey, amodern,secular democracy[147] (see also:Abolition of the Caliphate,Abolition of the Ottoman sultanate,Kemalism, andSecularism in Turkey).[147] In order to explain its downfall, theOttoman decline thesis was used throughout most of the 20th century as the basis of both Western andRepublican Turkish[149] understanding ofOttoman history. However, by 1978, historians had begun to reexamine the fundamental assumptions of the Ottoman decline thesis.[150]
In addition to military advances, the economic development and worldwide colonization and exploration of Europeans and westerners meant their merchants had a vast array of products and commodities from across the world to sell to Muslims—including products (sugar, coffee, paper) that had originally been Muslim export products but that Westerners could now grow more cheaply in their colonies.[151] Furthermore, the middlemen handling and profiting from the new western imports were usually not Muslims but foreigners or religious minorities (usually Christians), “seen and treated” as marginal.[152] After World War II, colonies in Africa and Asia were freed but the new decolonized states were fragmented, no longer empires, and Western economic influence remained, and went well beyond commodities.[citation needed]
The fight for Islamic resurgence against Western encroachment might be divided into two contrasting approaches: meeting the enemy on its own terms and fighting "him with his own weapons",[153] on the battlefield, in politics and in general by "modernizing".[154] Or alternately with religious revival, since Islam is by definition superior to all faiths, failures and defeats in the temporal world must mean that those defeated Muslims are practicing authentic Islam and their states are not authentic Islamic states. Muslims must then return to the pure authentic Islam of the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions, discarding innovations and accretions to achieve victory over disbelievers.[155]
The first Muslim reaction to European colonization was of "peasant and religious", not urban origin. "Charismatic leaders", generally members of theulama or leaders of religious orders, launched the call forjihad and formed tribal coalitions.Islamic law (sharīʿa), in defiance of local common law, was imposed to unify tribes. Examples includeAbd al-Qadir inAlgeria,Muhammad Ahmad inSudan,Shamil in the Caucasus, theSenussi inLibya andChad, Mullah-i Lang inAfghanistan, theAkhund of Swat in India, and later,Abd al-Karim inMorocco. Despite "spectacular victories" such as theannihilation of the British army in Afghanistan in 1842 and the taking ofKharoum in 1885, all these movements eventually failed[156]
The second Muslim reaction to European encroachment later in the century and early 20th century was not violent resistance but the adoption of some Western political, social, cultural and technological ways. Members of the urban elite, particularly inEgypt,Iran, andTurkey, advocated and practiced "Westernization".[157] The failure of the attempts at political Westernization, according to some, was exemplified by theTanzimat reorganization of the Ottoman state.Islamic law (sharīʿa) wascodified intocivil law (which was called theMecelle) and an elected legislature was established to make law. These steps took away theulama's role of "discovering" the law and the formerly powerful scholar class weakened and withered into religious functionaries, while the legislature was suspended less than a year after its inauguration and never recovered to replace theulama as a separate "branch" of government providingseparation of powers.[157] The "paradigm of the executive as a force unchecked by either the sharia of the scholars or the popular authority of an elected legislature became the dominant paradigm in most of the Sunni Muslim world in the 20th century."[158]
Pan-Islamism (in the sense of "Islamic unity or at least cooperation")[159] was promoted in theOttoman Empire during the last quarter of the 19th century by the Ottoman sultanAbdul Hamid II[160] for the purpose of preventing secession movements of the Muslim peoples within the empire's territories and mobilizing Muslim opinion in support of "the faltering Ottoman state".[159] The claim that the head of the last Muslim state of any size and power independent of Europe was "the head of all Islam",[l] served as a rallying point for Sunni Muslims until the 1924 abolition of the Ottoman caliphate.[161]
The major leaders of the Pan-Islamist movement were the triad ofJamal al-Din Afghani (1839–1897),Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), andSayyid Rashid Rida (1865–1935). All were active inanti-colonial efforts to confront European penetration of Muslim lands, believed Islamic unity to be the strongest force to mobilize Muslims against imperial domination.[162]
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (who was actually fromIran, notAfghanistan, and brought upShīʿa, notSunnī)[163][164] was an Islamic political activist who travelled throughout theMuslim world during the late 19th century urgingpan-Islamic unity incolonial India against theBritish Empire.[165][166] Al-Afghani's ideology has been described as a welding of "traditional" religious antipathy toward non-Muslims "to a modern critique ofWestern imperialism and an appeal for the unity of Islam", urging the adoption of Western sciences and institutions that might strengthen Islam.[167] He was thought to not have any deep faith in Islam,[168] nor in aconstitutional government—which he doubted was a viable political alternative in the Islamic world[169]—but was very interested in the overthrow of any Muslim rulers he saw as lax and/or subservient and their replacement with ones who were strong and patriotic.[170]
Muhammad Abduh, anEgyptianIslamic scholar,[171]judge,[171] andGrand Mufti of Egypt,[172][1][173][174] was a central figure of the ArabNahḍa (awakening), andIslamic Modernism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.[11][175] Twice exiled by the British, he was a devoted follower of Al-Afghani,[176] he helped publish a newspaper in Paris with him calling for a return to the original principles and ideals of Islam, and greater unity among Islamic peoples. As aqāḍī in Egypt, he was involved in many decisions, some of which were considered quite liberal, such as calling for Muslims to accept interest on loans and meat butchered bynon-Muslims.[177] He promoted both religious and scientific education.[178]
Islamic juristMuhammad Rashid Rida—a student of Abduh and Afghani—positioned himself as the successor to those two pan-Islamists and anti colonialists. He called for a unified Islam based on revival of the Islamic caliphate led byArabs and thereformation of Muslims.[179] Inspired by stories of the purity of the early eras of Muhammad and the Rashidun, he was more interested inWahhabism thanmodernism, and preached for a puritanical Islam whereIslamic law (sharīʿa) was implemented. According to Rida, the state-sponsored scholars neglected the revival of early Islamic traditions in theMuslim community (Ummah). His influential Islamic journalAl-Manār promotedanti-British revolt, as well as Islamic revivalism based on the tenets ofSalafism (Salafiyya).
The era between World War I and World War II was perhaps the nadir of Islamic power. TheOttoman caliphate had been abolished by theGrand National Assembly of Turkey in 1924 (seeAtatürk's reforms), and only two Muslim-majority countries were "genuinely independent"—Iran andTurkey. But rather than providing a model of Islamic independence, both of these country's rulers—Reza Shah andMustafa Kemal Atatürk, respectively—were secular, nationalist, modernizing, Westernizing.[180] Into the void left by came a succession of claimants to the caliphate—Hussein bin Ali, King of Hejaz in 1924, King Abdulaziz bin Abdul RahmanIbn Saud in 1926 (both in Arabia),King Fuad in 1926, andKing Faruq "at various times" (both in Egypt).[180]
Hussein bin Ali, theSharif and Emir of Mecca from 1908-1924,[181] enthroned himself asKing of the Hejaz after proclaiming theGreat Arab Revolt against theOttoman Empire,[11] and continued to hold both of the offices of Sharif and King from 1916 to 1924.[181] At the end of his reign he also briefly laid claim to the office ofSharifian Caliph; he was a37th-generation direct descendant ofMuhammad, as he belongs to theHashemite family.[181] In 1916, with the promise of British support for Arab independence, he proclaimed the Great Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire, accusing theCommittee of Union and Progress of violating tenets of Islam and limiting the power of the sultan-caliph. Shortly after the outbreak of the revolt, Hussein declared himself "King of the Arab Countries". However, hispan-Arab aspirations were not accepted by theAllies, who recognized him only as King of the Hejaz. In theaftermath of World War I, Hussein refused to ratify theTreaty of Versailles, in protest at theBalfour Declaration and the establishment of British and Frenchmandates inSyria,Iraq, andPalestine. He later refused to sign the Anglo-Hashemite Treaty and thus deprived himself of British support when his kingdom was attacked byIbn Saud. After the Kingdom of Hejaz was invaded by theAl Saud-Wahhabi armies of theIkhwan, on 23 December 1925 King Hussein bin Ali surrendered to the Saudis, bringing both the Kingdom of Hejaz and the Sharifate of Mecca to an end.[182]
FollowingWorld War I, thedefeat and dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, and the subsequentabolition of the Caliphate by the Turkish nationalist and revolutionaryMustafa Kemal Atatürk, founder of the modernRepublic of Turkey,[147] many Muslims perceived that the political power of their religion was in retreat.[183] There was also concern thatWestern ideas and influence were spreading throughout Muslim societies due toWestern colonialism; this led to considerable resentment of the influence of the European powers.[183] TheMuslim Brotherhood emerged in theKingdom of Egypt as a politico-religious movement aimed to resistBritish colonial efforts and opposeWestern cultural influence in theMENA region.[183]
FollowingJamal al-Din Afghani,Muhammad Abduh, andSayyid Rashid Rida were Sunni Islamist thinkers/leaders Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood leaderHasan al-Banna, Brotherhood editor authorSayyid Qutb and Indian journalist and politicianAbul A'la Maududi who sought Muslim strength and unity under sharia law.
Al-Banna emphasised that "Islam considers the government one of its pillars and relies on enforcement as much as on persuasion. ... The Prophet made 'government' one of the essential bonds of Islam and it is viewed in our books of jurisprudence as a part of the doctrineosul (fundamental) and not as a subsidiaryforu. Islam consists of rule and execution, as well as of legislation and preaching. Neither part can be separated from the other."[184]Qutb and Maududi followed the rejectionist Islamic view ofMuhammad Rashid Rida, condemning imitation of foreign ideas, includingWestern democracy, which they distinguished from the Islamic doctrine ofshura (consultation between ruler and ruled). This perspective, which stresses comprehensive implementation ofsharia, was widespread in the 1970s and 1980s among various movements seeking to establish anIslamic state, but its popularity has diminished in recent years.
Nostalgia for the days of successful Islamic empires simmering under laterWestern colonialism[183] played a major role in the Islamist political ideal of theIslamic state, a state in which Islamic law is preeminent.[185] The Islamist political program generally begins by re-shaping the governments of existing Muslim nation-states; but the means of doing this varies greatly across movements and circumstances. Manypolitical Islamist movements, such as theJamaat-e-Islami andMuslim Brotherhood, focus on vote-getting and coalition-building with other political parties.
Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian Islamist ideologue and prominent figurehead of theMuslim Brotherhood in Egypt, was influential in promoting thepan-Islamistideology in the 1960s.[190] When he was executed by theEgyptian government under theregime of Gamal Abdel Nasser,Ayman al-Zawahiri formed the organizationEgyptian Islamic Jihad to replace the government with an Islamic state that would reflect Qutb's ideas for theIslamic revival that he yearned for.[191] TheQutbist ideology has been influential onjihadist movements andIslamic terrorists that seek to overthrow secular governments, most notablyOsama bin Laden andAyman al-Zawahiri ofal-Qaeda,[193] as well as theSalafi-jihadi terrorist groupISIL/ISIS/IS/Daesh.[19] Moreover, Qutb's books have been frequently been cited by Osama bin Laden andAnwar al-Awlaki.[200]
Sayyid Qutb could be said to have founded the actual movement ofradical Islam.[188][190][192] Radical Islamic movements such as al-Qaeda and theTaliban embrace the militant Islamist ideology, and were prominent for being part of theanti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan during the 1980s.[175] Both of the aforementioned militant Islamist groups had a role to play in theSeptember 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, presenting both "near" and "far" enemies as regional governments and the United States respectively.[175] They also took part in thebombings in Madrid in 2004 andLondon in 2005. The recruits often came from the ranks ofjihadists, fromEgypt,Algeria,Saudi Arabia, andMorocco.[175]
Jihadism has been defined otherwise as aneologism formilitant, predominantlySunnī Islamic movements that useideologically-motivated violence to defend theUmmah (the collectiveMuslim world) from foreignNon-Muslims and those that they perceive asdomestic infidels.[201] The term "jihadist globalism" is also often used in relation toIslamic terrorism as aglobalist ideology, and more broadly to theWar on Terror.[202] The Austrian-American academicManfred B. Steger, Professor ofSociology at theUniversity of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa, proposed an extension of the term "jihadist globalism" to apply to all extremely violent strains of religiously influenced ideologies that articulate the global imaginary into concrete political agendas and terrorist strategies; these includeal-Qaeda,Jemaah Islamiyah,Hamas, andHezbollah, which he finds "today's most spectacular manifestation of religious globalism".[203]
Following Ibn Saud'sconquest of the Arabian Peninsula, pan-Islamism would be bolstered across theIslamic world. During the second half of the 20th century, pan-Islamistscompeted againstleft-wing nationalist ideologies in theArab world such asNasserism andBa'athism.[204][205] At the height of theCold War in the 1960s and 1970s, Saudi Arabia and allied countries in the Muslim world led the Pan-Islamist struggle to fight the spread ofcommunist ideology and curtail the risingSoviet influence in the world.[206]
As Saudi Arabia became an enormously wealthy petroleum exporter, it used its funds to propagate the Wahhabi school of Islam through the Muslim world, spending over $75 billion from 1982 to 2005 via international organizations such asMuslim World League, theWorld Assembly of Muslim Youth, theInternational Islamic Relief Organization, etc.[m] to establish/build 200 Islamic colleges, 210 Islamic centers, 1,500 mosques, and 2,000 schools for Muslim children in Muslim and Non-Muslim majority countries.[209][210] Mosque funding was combined with persuasion to propagate thedawah Salafiyya;[17][208] schools were "fundamentalist" in outlook and formed a network "from Sudan tonorthern Pakistan".[211][212][213] Supporting proselytizing or preaching of Islam[n] has been called "a religious requirement" for Saudi rulers that cannot [or could not] be abandoned "without losing their domestic legitimacy" as protectors and propagators of Islam.[207]
The first attempt at an inter-Islamic conference began in the later 19th century and "led nowhere". In the post World War II era, an informal bloc of Muslim countries worked together sometimes at the United Nations.[214] In 1954 a conference was convened in Mecca under PresidentGamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt but was also unsuccessful.[215] A permanent, inter-Islamic body was successfully initiated in 1969, in 1971 the "Organisation of Islamic Cooperation" (now called theOrganization of the Islamic Conference) was "first mooted", and in 1974 a summit conference was held atLahore Pakistan.[214] As of the 1990s it had a permanent headquarters, a secretariat, and a number of subsidiary bodies, and was involved in religious, cultural, and economic matters. But on "politics or even diplomacy" it had "remarkably" little impact.[214]
While international pan-Islamic cooperation has gone much further than anything like it in the Christian world, an example of how the limited its results have been (according to historianBernard Lewis), was the failure of Muslim states to unite in opposition to the 1979-1989Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Despite the aggression of the Soviets in crossing an international border into a Muslim country, executing its leader, and causing considerable death and destruction among the civilian population, the best that Muslim states working together could accomplish (thanks to the lobbying by Soviet allies the PLO, Syria, Algeria, Libya, etc.), were mildly worded resolutions passed at international conferences and theUnited Nations General Assembly, "requesting" that "foreign troops" (the Soviets were never mentioned by name) leave the country.[216] (Individual Muslims Muslim states were more assertive in aiding the Afghan population.)
Lewis argues that the true power of Islamic religiosity is found not in Pan-Islamism but in spontaneous movements within countries, two examples being the resistance to irreligious moves by Muslim state leaders.Tunisian PresidentHabib Bourguiba announced in 1960 that the loss of work and production during the month longRamadān fast was a luxury that an underdeveloped country like Tunisia could not afford. Since fasting is suspended duringjihad, he called for a "jihad" (i.e. struggle) to "obtain economic independence by development". Bourguiba was unable to obtain afatwa from a religious leader for his "jihad", and the overwhelming majority of Tunisians ignored it in favor of the Ramadān fast.[217] Another failure of a Muslim majority state to move pious Muslims away from religion was the reaction to an article in the Syrian official army weeklyJaysh al-Sha'b in April 1967. It called for the formation of a "new Arab Socialist Man" who in the building of the new Arab civilization would dismiss not only capitalism and feudalism but religion and belief in heaven and hell. While prior to this the Syrian population had submitted to the authoritarian government's radical changes and abolition of constitutional rights, the article led to strikes and protests of tens of thousands. Unable to quell the uprising with force, the government felt compelled to confiscate all copies of the journal issue, blame the article on an "American-Israeli" conspiracy, and sentence the author to life in prison.[218]
Ideologies coming from Europe that had for a time influence in the Muslim world included patriotism and liberalism in the 19th century.[221] In the 1920, when Kemal Ataturk won the first major Muslim victory against a Christian power for centuries, defeating the Greeks and "facing down the mighty British Empire", he went on to secularize his country, converting what was left of the Ottoman Empire into the Turkish Republic, abolishing the caliphate, replacingsharia law, withSwiss Civil Code,Arabic script with theLatin alphabet, and adopting a range of European practices, Westernizing his country.[222] At first Ataturk's victory resounded throughout the Muslim world,[223] though he was later reviled as a traitor.[224]
Arabism as a "common nationality" was first launched in the "late 19th and early 20th centuries".[225] In the 1920s and 30s "nationalist leaders still dominated the political scene" in Muslim countries, and nationalist discourse alone was heard in public debate".[226]
However, with patriotism's fragmentation and liberalism's failure, others replaced them—fascism in the 1930s, communism from the 1950s to the 1980.[221]
Between the 1950s and the 1960s, the predominant ideology within theArab world waspan-Arabism, which de-emphasized religion and encouraged the creation ofsocialist,secular states based onArab nationalist ideologies such asNasserism andBaathism rather than Islam,[227][204][205] and called for a unified (very large) Arab state. Increasingly, the borders of these states were seen as artificial colonial creations - which they were, having literally been drawn on a map by European colonial powers.
Coups that overthrew conservative regimes, (usually monarchies), establishing revolutionary republican governments (nationalist and/or leftist) occurred in several Arab countries—Egypt (1952), Iraq (1958),North Yemen (1962) and Libya (1969).
However, governments based on Arab nationalism have found themselves facingeconomic stagnation and disorder. The quick and decisive defeat of the Arab countries (who had pledged to annihilated Israel) in the 1967 Arab-IsraeliSix-Day War, "seriously undermined the ideological edifice" of Arab nationalism. Few years later the Islamist philosophy—hitherto confined to small circles of Muslim Brothers—came into this political vacuum.[228]
By the 1990s, the secular ideologies of "liberalism, nationalism, capitalism, socialism, communism" had "failed utterly" to resolve the problems of the Muslim world (according to Bernard Lewis);[229] and in the realm of political dissent in Muslim society, "from Cairo to Tehran, the crowds that in the 1950s demonstrated" against colonialism, and imperialism, were now simply anti-Westernism, and marched beneath the green banner of Islam, no longer "the red or national flag" (according to Olivier Roy).[230] Ataturk's secularism was in retreat in Turkey.[231]
Dissenting from the orthodoxy that the Quran, Muhammad or the Rashidun had much to say about governance (or that Shura is a "pillar of Islam"), are someIslamic Modernists.
Taha Hussein (1889-1973) writes:
Government in the time of the Prophet was not delegated from heaven in its details; people were left free to manage their affairs as they wish within the limits of fairness and justice. Furthermore, the Quran did not propose, in general terms or in detail, a political system, and the Prophet did not indicate who should be his successor either orally or in written form.[232]
Jebran Chamieh also argues that while it is true Muhammad exercised the executive power, commanded armies, controlled the finances and revenues, made legal judgements, he created no organized system for these functions.
"Moreover, the Prophet had ample time before his death to organize the Moslem community politically. The most pressing measure was to establish a system for the legal transmission of power. He was aware of the rivalry among his followers over the succession and could have delegated his authority to prevent dissensions among them. But he did not. These observations lend credence to those who argue that the Prophet never intended to form a state and that his mission was purely religious."[233]
Chamieh also points out that this practice (or lack thereof) was followed by theRashidun caliphate, who never established a "police force to keep law and order". When "the rebels attacked Caliph Othman in his house and assassinated him, no security measures were available to protect him. The caliphs did not establish an administration, a fiscal system, or a budget ... In the conquered lands, they retained the previous Byzantine and Persian administrative systems and kept the local employees to administer the country."[234]
Jebran Chemiah also notes that the two general comments on shura in the Quran say nothing further than that it is a good practice. The modality of the process, when, where and how shura should be used, whether the advise given must be followed, is not explained. Hadith, where obscure Quranic references are often explained when a theme from the Quran is thought worthy of explaining, say little or nothing. There is no evidence Muhammad held regular shura meetings with companions or ever felt their advice was binding on him when they gave it.[o]
Muslih and Browers identify three major Islamic theories on socio-political organization by prominent Islamic thinkers that conform to Islamic values and law. One Islamist view rejects democracy, but at least one other accommodates it:[238]
As of the late 20th century (1988) scholar Bernard Lewis testifies to the popular power of Islam, which
for the masses in most Muslim countries ... is still the ultimate criterion of group identity and loyalty. It is Islam which distinguishes between self and other, between insider and outsider, between brother and stranger ... Muslims find their basic identity in the religious community; that is to say, in an entity defined by Islam rather than by ethnic origin, language or country.[239]
Polls conducted byGallup andPew Research Center inMuslim-majority countries indicate that most Muslims see no contradiction between democratic values and religious principles, desiring neither atheocracy, nor asecular democracy, but rather a political model where democratic institutions and values can coexist with the values and principles ofsharia.[240][241][242] Opinions in the polls varied by country.
Based on the Pew and Gallup opinion polls, Western scholarsJohn Esposito andNatana J. DeLong-Bas distinguish four attitudes toward sharia and democracy prominent among Muslims, as of 2018:[244]
With the 1979Iranian Islamic Revolution, the traditionalTwelverShia Islamic attitude towards politics (either political cooperation with the ruler, political activism challenging the ruler, or aloofness from politics)[122] shifted strongly towards political activism. (The revolution's leaderRuhollah Khomeini proclaiming "Islam is the religion of politics with its all dimensions. It is very clear for those who have the least knowledge of political, economic and social aspects of Islam.")[245][p]
The largest, wealthiest and most solidly Shi'i country (Iran) had an Islamist revolution and its radical change in ideology affected the rest of the Shi'i world.[15]
The new revolutionary regime was based on AyatollahRuhollah Khomeini's principle of applyingGuardianship of the Islamic Jurist (Wilāyat al-Faqīh) towards government. Twelvers believe that in theabsence of (what Twelvers believe is) the religious and political leader of Islam—the "infallibleImam", who Shi'a believe will reappear sometime beforeJudgement Day) -- righteous Shi'i jurists (faqīh),[247] should administer "some" of the "religious and social affairs" of the Shi'i community. In its "absolute" form—the form advanced by theAyatollahRuhollah Khomeini[248] and the basis of government inIslamic Republic of Iran—the state and society are ruled by an Islamic jurist (Ali Khamenei as of 2022).
The theory was a variant ofIslamism, holding that sincesharia law has everything needed to rule a state (whether ancient or modern),[249] and any other basis of governance will lead to injustice and sin,[250] a state must be ruled according to sharia and the person who should rule is an expert in sharia.[251]
The theory ofsovereignty of the Guardianship of the Jurist (in fact of all Islam) explained by at least one conservative Shi'i scholar (Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi), is contrasted with the theory of sovereignty in "most of the schools of political philosophy and other cultures". Non-Muslim cultures hold that "every man is free", and in democratic cultures in particular, "sovereignty ... belongs to the people". A ruler and government must have the consent of the governed to havepolitical legitimacy. Whereas in fact, sovereignty is God's. The "entire universe and whatever in it belongs to God ... the Exalted, and all their movements and acts must have to be in accordance with the command or prohibition of the Real Owner". Consequently, human beings "have no right to rule over others or to choose someone to rule", i.e. choose someone to rule themselves.[252] In an Islamic state, rule must be according to God's law and the ruler must be best person to enforce God's law. The people's "consent and approval" are valuable for developing and strengthening the Islamic government but irrelevant for its legitimacy.[252]
According to theIranian-American academicVali Nasr,[q] political tendencies ofShīʿa andSunnī Islamic ideologies began to differ significantly following theIranian Revolution.Sunnī fundamentalism "inPakistan and much of theArab world" was not "politically revolutionary". Rather than trying to change the political system through revolutionary struggle, it was primarily focused on attempting toIslamicize the political establishment. Iran, however was very interested in exporting its revolutionary ideas, and its conception ofpolitical Islam involvedRuhollah Khomeini's ideas on fighting oppression of the poor and class war, which characterized the success of theIslamic Revolution inIran:[15]
With theShia awakening of Iran, the years of sectarian tolerance were over. What followed was a Sunni-versus-Shia contest for dominance, and it grew intense. [...] The revolution even moved leftists inMuslim-majority countries such asIndonesia,Turkey, andLebanon to look at Islam with renewed interest. After all, in Iran, Islam had succeeded where leftist ideologies had failed. [...] But admiration for what had happened in Iran did not equal acceptance of Iranian leadership. Indeed, Islamic activists outside of Iran quickly found Iranian revolutionaries to be arrogant, offputting, and drunk on their own success. Moreover,Sunni fundamentalism inPakistan and much of theArab world was far from politically revolutionary. It was rooted in conservative religious impulses and the bazaars, mixing mercantile interests with religious values. As the French scholar of contemporary IslamGilles Kepel puts it, it was less to tear down the existing system than to give it a fresh, thick coat of "Islamic green" paint.Khomeini'sfundamentalism, by contrast, was "red"—that is, genuinely revolutionary.[15]
The Americanpolitical analyst and authorGraham E. Fuller, specialized in the study ofIslamism andIslamic extremism, has also noted that he found "no mainstream Islamist organization (with the exception of [Shīʿa] Iran) with radical social views or a revolutionary approach to the social order apart from the imposition of legal justice."[253]
Some common political currents in Islam include: Sunni Traditionalism, Fundamentalist reformism,Salafi jihadism,Islamism,Liberalism and progressivism within Islam. Of these, only Liberal/progressivism and Islamism embrace political action.
Khaled Abou El Fadl argues that in the late twentieth and early twenty first centuries a unique and "major shift" in governance has taken place in much of the Muslim world,[270] namely that "the traditional institutions that once sustained and propagated Islamic orthodoxy -- have been dismantled". Prior to the twentieth century, the governments Islamic states tended to follow a system based on a balanced coexistence ofsultan andulama where the Islamic legal scholars made sure the rules of thesharia were adhered to. But modern Muslim states have much more power than pre-colonial states vis-a-vis the Islamic clergy, who have been "transformed" by the modern states "into salaried employees". The private endowments (awqaf) of the clergy, that gave them independence, have been taken over by the state.[270] Also contributing to the weakening of thejuristic scholarly class and their moderating influence in Islam has been theinternational propagation of Wahhabism and allied conservative schools of Islam by Saudi Arabian petroleum exporting funds. It has led to the growth of expressions of puritanical intolerance (Abou El Fadl argues), includingSalafi Jihadism with its terror attacks on civilians.[270]Legal scholar Noah Feldman credits the beginning of this process with the Tanzimat reforms of the Ottoman Empire that codified Sharia into law [called the Mecelle] replacing Islamic legal jurists.[271] Feldman believes it is no coincidence that the collapse of the influence of independent scholars of Islamic law has coincided with the rise of Islamist movements calling for enforcement of Islamic (sharia) law.[99]
Some modern political interpretations regarding the role of theMajlis ash-Shura include those expressed by the Egyptian Islamist author and ideologueSayyid Qutb, prominent member of theMuslim Brotherhood, and the Palestinian Muslim scholar and propagandistTaqiuddin al-Nabhani, founder of thepan-Islamist political partyHizb ut-Tahrir.[272] In an analysis of theshura chapter of the Quran, Qutb argued that Islam requires only that the ruler consult with at least some of the ruled (usually the elite), within the general context ofdivine laws that the ruler must execute. Al-Nabhani argued that theshura is important and part of "the ruling structure" of the Islamic caliphate, "but not one of its pillars", and may be neglected without the caliphate's rule becoming un-Islamic. However, these interpretations formulated by Qutb and al-Nabhani are not universally accepted in the Islamic political thought, andIslamic democrats consider theshura to be an integral part and important pillar of the Islamic political system.[272]
Today (2005-2020), manyIslamist andIslamic democraticpolitical parties exist in mostMuslim-majority countries, alongside numerousinsurgentIslamic extremist,militantIslamist, andterrorist movements and organizations.[3][187][273][274][269] Both of the following terms,Islamic democracy andIslamic fundamentalism, lump together a large variety of political groups with varying aims, histories, ideologies, and backgrounds.
{{cite news}}:Missing or empty|title= (help)For Shiʿi Muslims,Muhammad not only designatedʿAlī as his friend, but appointed him as hissuccessor—as the "lord" or "master" of the newMuslim community. ʿAlī andhis descendants would become known asthe Imams, divinely guided leaders of the Shiʿi communities, sinless, and grantedspecial insight into the Qurʾanic text. The theology of the Imams that developed over the next several centuries made little distinction between the authority of the Imams to politically lead the Muslim community and their spiritual prowess; quite to the contrary, their right to political leadership was grounded in their special spiritual insight. While in theory, the only just ruler of the Muslim community was the Imam, the Imams were politically marginal after the first generation. In practice, Shiʿi Muslims negotiated varied approaches to both interpretative authority overIslamic texts and governance of the community, both during the lifetimes of the Imams themselves and even more so following thedisappearance of thetwelfth and final Imam in the ninth century.
{{cite encyclopedia}}:ISBN / Date incompatibility (help){{cite encyclopedia}}:ISBN / Date incompatibility (help)... the high point of Ottoman power was passed by the time that [Suleiman] had died on campaign in ... 1566. Four generations of Europeans by this time had lived in fear of Turkish power and of the fanaticism of Islamic warriors, and the place of the 'cruel Turk' in the Western European mentality was assured.
.. [Abduh became] a member of the Council of al-Azhar in 1895 and Chief Mufti (Legal Official) in 1899.
To this day, the regime funds numerous international organizations to spread fundamentalist Islam, including theMuslim World League, theWorld Assembly of Muslim Youth, theInternational Islamic Relief Organization, and various royal charities such as the Popular Committee for Assisting the Palestinian Muhahedeen, led by PrinceSalman bin Abdul-Aziz, now minister of defense, who often is touted as a potential future king. Supporting da'wah, which literally means `making an invitation` to Islam, is a religious requirement that Saudi rulers feel they could not abandon without losing their domestic legitimacy as protectors and propagators of Islam. Yet in the wake of9/11, American anger at the kingdom led the U.S. government to demand controls on Saudi largesse to Islamic groups that fundedterrorism.
The Kingdom's 70 or so embassies around the world already featured cultural, educational, and military attaches, along with consular officers who organized visas for the hajj. Now they were joined by religious attaches, whose job was to get new mosques built in their countries and to persuade existing mosques to propagate thedawah wahhabiya.
... money that brought Wahabis power throughout the Arab world and financed networks of fundamentalist schools from Sudan to northern Pakistan.
A former US Treasury Department official is quoted by Washington Post reporter David Ottaway in a 2004 article [Ottaway, DavidThe King's Messenger New York: Walker, 2008, p.185] as estimating that the late king [Fadh] spent `north of $75 billion` in his efforts to spread Wahhabi Islam. According to Ottaway, the king boasted on his personal Web site that he established 200 Islamic colleges, 210 Islamic centers, 1500 mosques, and 2000 schools for Muslim children in non-Islamic nations. The late king also launched a publishing center in Medina that by 2000 had distributed 138 million copies of the Koran worldwide.
founded in 1962 as a counterweight to Nasser's propaganda, opened new offices in every area of the world where Muslims lived. The league played a pioneering role in supporting Islamic associations, mosques, and investment plans for the future. In addition, the Saudi ministry for religious affairs printed and distributed millions of Korans free of charge, along with Wahhabite doctrinal texts, among the world's mosques, from the African plains to the rice paddies of Indonesia and the Muslim immigrant high-rise housing projects of European cities. For the first time in fourteen centuries, the same books ... could be found from one end of the Umma to the other... hewed to the same doctrinal line and excluded other currents of thought that had formerly been part of a more pluralistic Islam.
Strong support for Shariah, despite examples past and present of its abuse, is reflected in the Gallup World Polls in 2006 and 2007, which found that large majorities of Muslims, both women and men, in many and diverse Muslim countries from Egypt to Malaysia, wanted Shariah as "a" source of law. While they did not want a theocracy, they did want a more democratic government that also incorporated Islamic values.
On democracy in the Middle East, the role of Islamist political parties, and the War on Terrorism:
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