Movatterモバイル変換


[0]ホーム

URL:


Jump to content
WikipediaThe Free Encyclopedia
Search

Polish–Russian War of 1792

This is a good article. Click here for more information.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
War between the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Russian Empire
For other Polish–Russian conflicts, seePolish–Russian Wars.

Polish–Russian War of 1792
Part of thePolish–Russian Wars

Polish–Russian War of 1792
Date18 May – 27 July 1792
(2 months and 9 days)
Location
Central and eastern parts of thePolish–Lithuanian Commonwealth
ResultRussian victory
Territorial
changes
Second Partition of Poland
Belligerents
Russian Empire
Polish–Lithuanian CommonwealthTargowica Confederates
 Poland–Lithuania
Commanders and leaders
Russian EmpireMikhail Krechetnikov
Russian EmpireMikhail Kakhovsky
Russian EmpireWilhelm Derfelden
Russian EmpireIvan Fersen
Russian EmpireMikhail Kutuzov
Russian EmpireBoris Mellin [pl]
Irakly Morkov [ru]
Polish–Lithuanian CommonwealthStanisław Szczęsny Potocki
KingStanisław August Poniatowski
PrinceJózef Poniatowski
Tadeusz Kościuszko
Michał Wielhorski
Józef Judycki
Stanisław Mokronowski
Strength
98,000 men[1]70,000 men[2]

ThePolish–Russian War of 1792 (also,War of the Second Partition,[3] and in Polish sources,War in Defence of the Constitution[a][4]) was fought between thePolish–Lithuanian Commonwealth on one side, and theTargowica Confederation (conservative nobility of the Commonwealth opposed to the newConstitution of 3 May 1791) and theRussian Empire underCatherine the Great on the other.[3]

The war took place in two theaters: a northern inLithuania and a southern in what is nowUkraine. In both, the Polish forces retreated before the numerically superior Russian forces, though they offered significantly more resistance in the south, thanks to the effective leadership of Polish commanders PrinceJózef Poniatowski andTadeusz Kościuszko. During the three-month-long struggle several battles were fought, but no side scored a decisive victory.[5] The largest success of the Polish forces was the defeat of one of the Russian formations at theBattle of Zieleńce on 18 June; in the aftermath of the battle the Polish highest military award,Virtuti Militari, was established. The Russians' greatest success in this war was theBattle of Mir on 11 June (O.S. 31 May). The war ended when the Polish KingStanisław August Poniatowski decided to seek a diplomatic solution, asked for aceasefire with the Russians and joined the Targowica Confederation, as demanded by the Russian Empire.[6]

Background

[edit]

Decline of the Commonwealth

[edit]

By the early 18th century, themagnates of Poland and Lithuania controlled the state – or rather, they managed to ensure that no reforms would be carried out that might weaken their privileged status (the "Golden Freedoms").[7] Through the abuse of theliberum veto rule which enabled any deputy to paralyze theSejm (Commonwealth's parliament) proceedings, deputies bribed by magnates or foreign powers or those simply content to believe they were living in an unprecedented "Golden Age", paralysed the Commonwealth's government for over a century.[8][9]

The idea of reforming the Commonwealth gained traction from the mid-17th century;[10] it was however viewed with suspicion not only by its magnates but also by neighboring countries, which had been content with the deterioration of the Commonwealth and abhorred the thought of a resurgent and democratic power on their borders.[11] With theCommonwealth Army reduced to around 16,000, it was easy for its neighbors to intervene directly (TheImperial Russian Army numbered 300,000 troops overall; ThePrussian Army andImperial Army of the Holy Roman Empire, 200,000 each).[12]

Attempts at reform

[edit]

A major opportunity for reform presented itself during the "Great Sejm" of 1788–92. Poland's neighbors were preoccupied with wars and unable to intervene forcibly in Polish affairs. TheRussian Empire andArchduchy of Austria were engaged in hostilities with theOttoman Empire (theRusso-Turkish War, 1787–1792 and theAustro-Turkish War, 1787–1791); the Russians also found themselves simultaneously fighting in theRusso-Swedish War, 1788–1790.[13][14][15][16]A new alliance between the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and Prussia seeming to provide security against Russian intervention, and on 3 May 1791 thenew constitution was read and adopted to overwhelming popular support.[13][17][18][19]

With the wars betweenTurkey and Russia andSweden and Russia having ended,Tsarina Catherine was furious over the adoption of the document, which she believed threatened Russian influence in Poland.[15][16][20] Russia had viewed Poland as ade facto protectorate.[21] "The worst possible news have arrived from Warsaw: the Polish king has become almost sovereign" was the reaction of one of Russia's chief foreign policy authors,Alexander Bezborodko, when he learned of the new constitution.[22] TheKingdom of Prussia was also strongly opposed to the new Polish constitution, and Polish diplomats received a note that the new constitution changed the Polish state so much that Prussia did not consider its obligations binding.[23] Just like Russia, Prussia was concerned that the newly strengthened Polish state could become a threat and the Prussian Foreign Minister, Friedrich Wilhelm von Schulenburg-Kehnert, clearly and with rare candor told Poles that Prussia did not support the constitution and refused to help the Commonwealth in any form, even as a mediator, as it was not in Prussia's interest to see the Commonwealth strengthened so that it could threaten Prussia in the future.[23] The Prussian statesmanEwald Friedrich von Hertzberg expressed the fears of European conservatives: "The Poles have given thecoup de grâce to the Prussian monarchy by voting a constitution", elaborating that a strong Commonwealth would likely demand the return of the lands Prussia acquired in theFirst Partition.[22][24]

The Constitution was not adopted without dissent in the Commonwealth itself, either. Magnates who had opposed the constitution draft from the start, namelyFranciszek Ksawery Branicki,Stanisław Szczęsny Potocki,Seweryn Rzewuski, andSzymon andJózef Kossakowski, asked Tsarina Catherine to intervene and restore their privileges such as the Russian-guaranteedCardinal Laws abolished under the new statute.[19] To that end these magnates formed theTargowica Confederation.[19] The Confederation's proclamation, prepared inSaint Petersburg in January 1792, criticized the constitution for contributing to, in their own words, "contagion of democratic ideas" following "the fatal examples set in Paris".[25][26] It asserted that "The parliament ... has broken all fundamental laws, swept away all liberties of the gentry and on the third of May 1791 turned into a revolution and a conspiracy."[27] The Confederates declared an intention to overcome this revolution. We "can do nothing but turn trustingly to Tsarina Catherine, a distinguished and fair empress, our neighboring friend and ally", who "respects the nation's need for well-being and always offers it a helping hand", they wrote.[27] The Confederates aligned with Tsarina Catherine and asked her for military intervention.[19] On 18 May 1792, the Russian ambassador to Poland,Yakov Bulgakov, delivered a declaration of war to the Polish Foreign MinisterJoachim Chreptowicz.[28] Russian armies entered Poland and Lithuania on the same day, starting the war.[1][19]

Opposing forces

[edit]
Soldiers of the 3rd Lithuanian Infantry Regiment in 1792

The Russian army numbered nearly 98,000.[1] It was commanded bygenerals-in-chiefMikhail Krechetnikov andMikhail Kakhovsky.[28] The Russians also had an advantage in combat experience.[1] The Russian plan called for Kakhovsky to advance through Ukraine, takingKamieniec Podolski,Chełm andLublin, and approach Polish capital ofWarsaw from the south.[29] Krechetnikov was to advance throughMinsk,Vilnius,Brześć Litewski andBiałystok, and approach Warsaw from the north, where he was to link with Kakhovsky.[29] Whereas the Russians had good intelligence network in Poland, and were mostly aware of Polish army distribution and strength; the Poles had much less intelligence, receiving contradictory and often erroneous reports, and unsure whether the war would even start up to the point the Russian troops crossed the border.[29][30]

Stanisław August Poniatowski, King of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, was thecommander-in-chief of the Polish forces, but in practice he delegated this position to his nephew, PrinceJózef Poniatowski.[28] Poniatowski had in theory at his disposal a 48,000 strongCrown army and theLithuanian army more than half that size to confront them.[31] In practice, Polish forces, still forming following the reforms of the Constitution of 3 May (which specified an army size of 100,000) numbered only 37,000.[2] The army was reorganizing, with key documents on unit numbers and composition passed as recently as in April; it was also short on equipment and experienced personnel.[28]

In the southeast corner of the country – the Ukrainian lands – the Polish forces were initially concentrated separately in three regions of the expected front, underTadeusz Kościuszko,Michał Wielhorski and Prince Poniatowski himself.[31] The Polish Crown army in Ukraine, led by Prince Poniatowski, and supported by Kościuszko, was about 17,000,[1] 21,000[32] or 24,000[31] strong (Derdej distinguishes between the primary force of 17,000 and PrinceMichał Lubomirski's reserve division, of 4,500[33]). In the southeastern war theater, they faced a nearly four times larger enemy army under General Mikhail Kakhovsky, who had about 64,000 men under his command.[1][31] Kakhovsky's forces were divided into four corps: 1st, 18,000 strong, under the command of GeneralMikhail Golenishchev-Kutuzov, 2nd, under GeneralIvan Dunin, 3rd, under GeneralWilhelm Derfelden, and 4th, under GeneralAndrei Levanidov.[33] The Targowica Confederates did not represent any real strength; and their attempts to gather popular support in Poland upon crossing borders failed miserably, with only few dozens joining at first; later the number would grow but not significantly, and even the Russians saw them as not having any military value, keeping them from the frontlines.[34]

In Lithuania, the Commonwealth Lithuanian Army numbered about 15,000, with an additional Crown detachment of about 3,000.[35] They were commanded byDuke Louis of Württemberg.[28] Württemberg made no plans for the war, and the troops were not readied for action by the time the war started.[28] The Russian army in that theatre under General Mikhail Krechetnikov was 33,700 strong[36] or 38,000 strong.[35] The Russian army was also divided into four corps: 1st under one of Targowica Confederate leaders,Szymon Kossakowski 7,300 strong, 2nd under GeneralBoris Mellin, 7,000 strong, 3rd under GeneralYuri Dolgorukov, 15,400 strong, and 4th under GeneralIvan Fersen, 8,300 strong.[35]

Additional Polish forces, about 8,000 strong, were to concentrate in Warsaw under the command of King Poniatowski as a reserve.[37]

Tadeusz Kościuszko proposed a plan where the entire Polish army would be concentrated and would engage one of the Russian armies, to assure numerical parity and to boost the morale of mostly inexperienced Polish forces with a quick victory; this plan was however rejected by Prince Poniatowski.[1] (Only a few months before, however, both commanders had the opposite idea – Poniatowski wanted the troops concentrated, and Kościuszko, dispersed).[1][38] Poniatowski also planned to avoid serious engagements in the first phase of the war, hoping to receive the expected Prussian reinforcements of 30,000 which would bring parity to the two sides.[37]

War

[edit]

Southern theater

[edit]

The first Russian forces crossed the border in Ukraine on the night of 18/19 May 1792.[1][39] The Russians in that theater would encounter significantly more resistance than they expected, as Commonwealth's top commanders, Prince Poniatowski and Kościuszko were stationed there.[1] Kościuszko joined Prince Poniatowski near Janów on 29 May.[40] The Crown Army was judged too weak to oppose the four columns of enemy armies advancing into West Ukraine and began a fighting withdrawal to the western side of theSouthern Bug River, towardsLubar andPołonne, with Kośiuszko commanding the rear guard.[40][41] Poniatowski, in the face of significant numerical inferiority of his forces, and promised reinforcements by King Poniatowski, decided to abandon Ukraine and move toVolhynia, where Połonne was to be fortified as a major defensive point, and where Lubomirski was tasked with gathering supplies.[42]

After theBattle of Zieleńce, byWojciech Kossak

On 14 June Wielhorski's unit was defeated at theBattle of Boruszkowce.[43] On 17 June Poniatowski finally received awaited reinforcements, about 2,000 troops led by Michał Lubomirski.[44] Next day the Poles, led by Prince Poniatowski, defeated one of the Russian formations of generalIrakly Morkov at theBattle of Zieleńce on 18 June.[41][45] The victory was celebrated by King Poniatowski, who sent the newVirtuti Militari medals for the campaign leaders and soldiers, as "the first sinceJohn III Sobieski".[46]

The Russian forces, however, kept advancing. Under the command of Józef Poniatowski, the Polish army retreated in good order, yielding to the more powerful enemy as necessary to avoid annihilation.[47] In early July, nearDubno, Prince Poniatowski and Kościuszko were betrayed by Michał Lubomirski, who was tasked with King Poniatowski with resupplying the troops; instead Lubomirski joined the Russian side and either hid the supplies for the Polish army, or outright passed them to the Russians.[42][48] Lubomirski, however, was a powerful magnate, and it took until late May for the King officially to relieve him of his command.[49] Within about a month of the Russian invasion, the Poles had mostly retreated from Ukraine.[41] On 7 July Kościuszko's forces fought a delaying battle with the Russians atVolodymyr-Volynskyi (Battle of Włodzimierz).[40] Meanwhile, Poniatowski's army retreated to theBug River, where Kościuszko's units on 18 July fought theBattle of Dubienka, which was a draw.[47] With about 5,300 troops Kościuszko defeated the attack of 25,000 Russians under GeneralMikhail Kakhovsky.[50] Kośicuszko then had to retreat from Dubienka, as the Russians begun flanking his positions crossing the nearby Austrian border.[50] Although the Poles had to retreat from the Bug River line, they were not defeated so far, and a decisive battle or battles at more favorable locations closer to Warsaw were expected.[47][51]

Northern theater

[edit]

In theGrand Duchy of Lithuania the Russians crossed the Commonwealth border four days later than in the south, on 22 May.[52] Poland's ally, theKingdom of Prussia, broke its alliance with Poland and the Prussian commander of the Lithuanian army, Duke Württemberg, betrayed the Polish-Lithuanian cause by refusing to fight the Russians.[5][53] He never reached the frontlines, feigned illness inWołczyn, and issued contradictory orders to his troops.[53]

Thus the Army of Lithuania did little to oppose the advancing Russians, and kept withdrawing before their advance.[5][53] Minsk was abandoned, after some skirmishes, on 31 May.[53] Only after a change of commander on 4 June, did the Army, now under GeneralJózef Judycki, try to stand and fight the Russians.[5][53] The Russians however defeated Judycki at theBattle of Mir on 11 June and kept advancing through the Grand Duchy.[5] The Commonwealth army retreated towardsGrodno.[54] On 14 June the Russians took Wilno, after only a small skirmish with local garrison; on 19 June, incompetently defendedNieśwież; and on 20 June,Kaunas, this time without any opposition.[55] Judycki, disgraced, was replaced byMichał Zabiełło on 23 June.[5] Nonetheless, since Mir, no decisive engagements occurred in the northern theater, as Polish army withdrew in relative order towards Warsaw, after minor defeat atZelva,[56] eventually taking defensive positions along theBug river nearBrest.[5][57] Russians took Grodno on 5 July[56] and Białystok on 17 July.[57] On 23 July the Russians took Brest, defeating the local garrison, but on 24 they were defeated nearKrzemień-Wieś; this last battle was the first significant Commonwealth victory on the northern front.[58]

War ends

[edit]

While Prince Poniatowski and Kościuszko considered the outcome of the war still open and were planning to use the combined Polish-Lithuanian forces to defeat the still separate Russian forces,[59] King Poniatowski, with the consent of theGuardians of the Laws (cabinet of ministers) decided to ask for a ceasefire.[60][61] Tsarina Catherine demanded that King Poniatowski join the pro-Russian aristocratic faction, the Targowica Confederation; with his cabinet split, he gave in to her demand around 22–23 July, which effectively forced Prince Poniatowski to terminate military resistance.[61][62] The last military confrontation of the war was fought on 26 July atMarkuszów in Lublin province, where an enemy attack was repelled by Polish cavalry led by Poniatowski.[62]

At the time King Poniatowski decided to sue for peace, the Polish army was still in a good fighting condition not having suffered from any major defeat nor lack of supplies. King Poniatowski thought that due to Russian numerical superiority defeat was nonetheless imminent, and more could be gained through negotiations with the Russians, with whom he hoped a new alliance could be formed. Although subsequent events would prove him wrong, the question of whether this could have been foreseen, and prevented through continued military resistance, has beensubject to much debate among historians.[19][61][63][64]

The Polish military was widely dissatisfied with the ceasefire; Kościuszko, Prince Poniatowski and many others would criticize the King's decision and many, including Kościuszko, would resign their commission in the coming weeks.[65] Prince Poniatowski even considered rebelling against his uncle's orders, and even issued orders to bring the King to the army's camp by force if necessary, as was postulated by the more radical faction. Ultimately he decided not to continue fighting against his uncle's will, and the order was rescinded at the last moment before the departure of the group charged with capturing the King.[62]

Aftermath

[edit]

Most Polish historians agree that the Polish capitulation was a mistake both from the military perspective, and the political one.[66] In the realm of military, the Poles had reasonable chances to defend theVistula river line, and exhaust the Russian invading forces.[66][67] From the political one, showing a willingness to fight could have persuaded the partitioning powers that their plan was too costly.[66]

King Poniatowski's hopes that the capitulation would allow an acceptable diplomatic solution to be worked out were soon dashed. With new deputies bribed or intimidated by the Russian troops, a new session of parliament, known as theGrodno Sejm, took place in fall 1793.[19][68] On 23 November 1793, it concluded its deliberations under duress, annulling the constitution and acceding to theSecond Partition.[69][70] Russia took 250,000 square kilometres (97,000 sq mi) of the Commonwealth's territory, while Prussia took 58,000 square kilometres (22,000 sq mi).[68] This event reduced Poland's population to a third of what it was before the First Partition. The rump state was garrisoned by Russian troops and its independence was strongly curtailed.[19][26][68]

This outcome came as a surprise to most of the Targowica Confederates, who had wished only to restore thestatus quo ante bellum (Commonwealth magnate-favoring Golden Freedoms) and had expected that the overthrow of the 3 May Constitution would achieve that end, and nothing more.[71] The last bid to restore the reformed Commonwealth came with theKościuszko Uprising in 1794. The uprising failed and resulted in theThird Partition in 1795, in which the country lost all its remaining territories and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth ceased to exist.[67][68][72]

List of battles

[edit]

See also

[edit]
Wikimedia Commons has media related toPolish-Russian war 1792.


Notes

[edit]
  1. ^Polish:Wojna w obronie Konstytucji 3 maja

References

[edit]
  1. ^abcdefghijAlex Storozynski (January 2011).Kościuszko Książe chłopów [Kosciuszko Prince of Peasants] (in Polish). W.A.B. p. 223.ISBN 978-83-7414-930-3. Retrieved2 January 2013.
  2. ^abJuliusz Bardach; Boguslaw Lesnodorski; Michal Pietrzak (1987).Historia panstwa i prawa polskiego [History of Polish State and Law] (in Polish). Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe. p. 317.OCLC 654549824.
  3. ^abNorman Davies (1982).God's Playground, a History of Poland: The origins to 1795. Columbia University Press. p. 535.ISBN 978-0-231-05351-8. Retrieved26 April 2012.
  4. ^Wojciech Mikuła (1995).Zieleńce Dubienka: z dziejów wojny w obronie Konstytucji 3 maja [Zieleńce Dubienka: From the History of the War in Defense of the 3 May Constitution] (in Polish). Ajaks.ISBN 978-83-85621-02-7. Retrieved25 October 2012.
  5. ^abcdefgJerzy Łojek (1986).Geneza i obalenie Konstytucji 3 maja [Genesis and Fall of the 3 May Constitution] (in Polish). Wydawn. Lubelskie. pp. 304–306.ISBN 978-83-222-0313-2. Retrieved17 December 2011.
  6. ^Jerzy Skowronek (1986).Książę Józef Poniatowski [Prince Józef Poniatowski] (in Polish). Wrocław:Ossolineum. pp. 58, 60.ISBN 83-04-02321-0.
  7. ^Norman Davies (30 March 2005).God's Playground: The origins to 1795. Columbia University Press. p. 274.ISBN 978-0-231-12817-9. Retrieved13 August 2011.
  8. ^Francis Ludwig Carsten (1 January 1961).The new Cambridge modern history: The ascendancy of France, 1648–88. Cambridge University Press. pp. 561–562.ISBN 978-0-521-04544-5. Retrieved11 June 2011.{{cite book}}:ISBN / Date incompatibility (help)
  9. ^Jacek Jędruch (1998).Constitutions, elections, and legislatures of Poland, 1493–1977: a guide to their history. EJJ Books. p. 156.ISBN 978-0-7818-0637-4. Retrieved13 August 2011.
  10. ^Józef Andrzej Gierowski (1986).Historia Polski, 1764–1864 [History of Poland, 1764–1864] (in Polish). Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe. pp. 60–63.ISBN 978-83-01-03732-1. Retrieved18 June 2012.
  11. ^John P. LeDonne (1997).The Russian empire and the world, 1700–1917: the geopolitics of expansion and containment. Oxford University Press. pp. 41–42.ISBN 978-0-19-510927-6. Retrieved5 July 2011.
  12. ^Krzysztof Bauer (1991).Uchwalenie i obrona Konstytucji 3 Maja [Passing and defense of the Constitution of 3 May] (in Polish). Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne. p. 9.ISBN 978-83-02-04615-5. Retrieved2 January 2012.
  13. ^abGeorge Sanford (2002).Democratic government in Poland: constitutional politics since 1989. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 11–12.ISBN 978-0-333-77475-5. Retrieved5 July 2011.
  14. ^Jacek Jędruch (1998).Constitutions, elections, and legislatures of Poland, 1493–1977: a guide to their history. EJJ Books. p. 176.ISBN 978-0-7818-0637-4. Retrieved13 August 2011.
  15. ^abRobert Bideleux; Ian Jeffries (28 January 1998).A history of eastern Europe: crisis and change. Psychology Press. p. 160.ISBN 978-0-415-16111-4. Retrieved11 September 2011.
  16. ^abJerzy Lukowski (3 August 2010).Disorderly liberty: the political culture of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the eighteenth century. Continuum International Publishing Group. p. 226.ISBN 978-1-4411-4812-4. Retrieved23 September 2011.
  17. ^Piotr Stefan Wandycz (2001).The price of freedom: a history of East Central Europe from the Middle Ages to the present. Psychology Press. p. 128.ISBN 978-0-415-25491-5. Retrieved5 July 2011.
  18. ^Jacek Jędruch (1998).Constitutions, elections, and legislatures of Poland, 1493–1977: a guide to their history. EJJ Books. pp. 172–173.ISBN 978-0-7818-0637-4. Retrieved13 August 2011.
  19. ^abcdefghJacek Jędruch (1998).Constitutions, elections, and legislatures of Poland, 1493–1977: a guide to their history. EJJ Books. pp. 184–185.ISBN 978-0-7818-0637-4. Retrieved13 August 2011.
  20. ^Paul W. Schroeder (1996).The transformation of European politics, 1763–1848. Oxford University Press. p. 84.ISBN 978-0-19-820654-5. Retrieved5 July 2011.
  21. ^Jerzy Lukowski; Hubert Zawadzki (2001).A concise history of Poland. Cambridge University Press. p. 84.ISBN 978-0-521-55917-1. Retrieved5 July 2011.
  22. ^abKrzysztof Bauer (1991).Uchwalenie i obrona Konstytucji 3 Maja [Passing and Fall of the 3 May Constitution] (in Polish). Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne. p. 16.ISBN 978-83-02-04615-5. Retrieved2 January 2012.
  23. ^abJerzy Łojek (1986).Geneza i obalenie Konstytucji 3 maja [Genesis and Fall of the 3 May Constitution] (in Polish). Wydawn. Lubelskie. pp. 325–326.ISBN 978-83-222-0313-2. Retrieved17 December 2011.
  24. ^Hon. Carl L. Bucki (3 May 1996)."Constitution Day: May 3, 1791". Polish Academic Information Center. Archived fromthe original on 5 December 2008. Retrieved21 September 2008.
  25. ^Robert Howard Lord (1915).The second partition of Poland: a study in diplomatic history. Harvard University Press. p. 275.OCLC 579571081. Retrieved22 September 2011.
  26. ^abMichal Kopeček (2006).Discourses of collective identity in Central and Southeast Europe (1770–1945): texts and commentaries. Central European University Press. pp. 282–284.ISBN 978-963-7326-52-3. Retrieved22 September 2011.
  27. ^abMichal Kopeček (2006).Discourses of collective identity in Central and Southeast Europe (1770–1945): texts and commentaries. Central European University Press. pp. 284–285.ISBN 978-963-7326-52-3. Retrieved22 September 2011.
  28. ^abcdefJadwiga Nadzieja (1988).Od Jakobina do księcia namiestnika [From Jacobin to Prince Namestnik] (in Polish). Wydawnictwo "Śląsk". pp. 38–39.ISBN 978-83-216-0682-8.
  29. ^abcPiotr Derdej (2008).Zieleńce – Mir – Dubienka 1792 (in Polish). Bellona. pp. 35–36.ISBN 978-83-11-11039-7. Retrieved1 July 2013.
  30. ^Piotr Derdej (2008).Zieleńce – Mir – Dubienka 1792 (in Polish). Bellona. p. 52.ISBN 978-83-11-11039-7. Retrieved1 July 2013.
  31. ^abcdJerzy Skowronek (1986).Książę Józef Poniatowski [Prince Józef Poniatowski] (in Polish). Wrocław:Ossolineum. pp. 50–51.ISBN 83-04-02321-0.
  32. ^Jerzy Łojek (1986).Geneza i obalenie Konstytucji 3 maja [Genesis and Fall of the 3 May Constitution] (in Polish). Wydawn. Lubelskie. p. 298.ISBN 978-83-222-0313-2. Retrieved17 December 2011.
  33. ^abPiotr Derdej (2008).Zieleńce – Mir – Dubienka 1792 (in Polish). Bellona. p. 51.ISBN 978-83-11-11039-7. Retrieved1 July 2013.
  34. ^Piotr Derdej (2008).Zieleńce – Mir – Dubienka 1792 (in Polish). Bellona. pp. 55–57, 62.ISBN 978-83-11-11039-7. Retrieved1 July 2013.
  35. ^abcPiotr Derdej (2008).Zieleńce – Mir – Dubienka 1792 (in Polish). Bellona. p. 97.ISBN 978-83-11-11039-7. Retrieved1 July 2013.
  36. ^Jerzy Łojek (1986).Geneza i obalenie Konstytucji 3 maja [Genesis and Fall of the 3 May Constitution] (in Polish). Wydawn. Lubelskie. p. 299.ISBN 978-83-222-0313-2. Retrieved17 December 2011.
  37. ^abJerzy Łojek (1986).Geneza i obalenie Konstytucji 3 maja [Genesis and Fall of the 3 May Constitution] (in Polish). Wydawn. Lubelskie. p. 302.ISBN 978-83-222-0313-2. Retrieved17 December 2011.
  38. ^Alex Storozynski (January 2011).Kościuszko Książe chłopów [Kosciuszko Prince of Peasants] (in Polish). W.A.B. p. 222.ISBN 978-83-7414-930-3. Retrieved2 January 2013.
  39. ^Piotr Derdej (2008).Zieleńce – Mir – Dubienka 1792 (in Polish). Bellona. p. 50.ISBN 978-83-11-11039-7. Retrieved1 July 2013.
  40. ^abcHerbst, Stanisław (1969). "Tadeusz Kościuszko".Polski Słownik Biograficzny (in Polish). Vol. 14. Wrocław: Zakład narodowy im. Ossolińskich. p. 433.
  41. ^abcAlex Storozynski (January 2011).Kościuszko Książe chłopów [Kosciuszko Prince of Peasants] (in Polish). W.A.B. p. 224.ISBN 978-83-7414-930-3. Retrieved2 January 2013.
  42. ^abPiotr Derdej (2008).Zieleńce – Mir – Dubienka 1792 (in Polish). Bellona. p. 58.ISBN 978-83-11-11039-7. Retrieved1 July 2013.
  43. ^Piotr Derdej (2008).Zieleńce – Mir – Dubienka 1792 (in Polish). Bellona. pp. 63–65.ISBN 978-83-11-11039-7. Retrieved1 July 2013.
  44. ^Piotr Derdej (2008).Zieleńce – Mir – Dubienka 1792 (in Polish). Bellona. p. 67.ISBN 978-83-11-11039-7. Retrieved1 July 2013.
  45. ^Alex Storozynski (January 2011).Kościuszko Książe chłopów [Kosciuszko Prince of Peasants] (in Polish). W.A.B. p. 225.ISBN 978-83-7414-930-3. Retrieved2 January 2013.
  46. ^Jerzy Skowronek (1986).Książę Józef Poniatowski [Prince Józef Poniatowski] (in Polish). Wrocław:Ossolineum. pp. 56–57.ISBN 83-04-02321-0.
  47. ^abcJerzy Skowronek (1986).Książę Józef Poniatowski [Prince Józef Poniatowski] (in Polish). Wrocław:Ossolineum. p. 60.ISBN 83-04-02321-0.
  48. ^Alex Storozynski (January 2011).Kościuszko Książe chłopów [Kosciuszko Prince of Peasants] (in Polish). W.A.B. pp. 226–227.ISBN 978-83-7414-930-3. Retrieved2 January 2013.
  49. ^Piotr Derdej (2008).Zieleńce – Mir – Dubienka 1792 (in Polish). Bellona. pp. 79–83.ISBN 978-83-11-11039-7. Retrieved1 July 2013.
  50. ^abAlex Storozynski (January 2011).Kościuszko Książe chłopów [Kosciuszko Prince of Peasants] (in Polish). W.A.B. pp. 228–229.ISBN 978-83-7414-930-3. Retrieved2 January 2013.
  51. ^Piotr Derdej (2008).Zieleńce – Mir – Dubienka 1792 (in Polish). Bellona. p. 95.ISBN 978-83-11-11039-7. Retrieved1 July 2013.
  52. ^Piotr Derdej (2008).Zieleńce – Mir – Dubienka 1792 (in Polish). Bellona. p. 98.ISBN 978-83-11-11039-7. Retrieved1 July 2013.
  53. ^abcdePiotr Derdej (2008).Zieleńce – Mir – Dubienka 1792 (in Polish). Bellona. pp. 98–103.ISBN 978-83-11-11039-7. Retrieved1 July 2013.
  54. ^Piotr Derdej (2008).Zieleńce – Mir – Dubienka 1792 (in Polish). Bellona. p. 108.ISBN 978-83-11-11039-7. Retrieved1 July 2013.
  55. ^Piotr Derdej (2008).Zieleńce – Mir – Dubienka 1792 (in Polish). Bellona. pp. 108–110.ISBN 978-83-11-11039-7. Retrieved1 July 2013.
  56. ^abPiotr Derdej (2008).Zieleńce – Mir – Dubienka 1792 (in Polish). Bellona. pp. 115–116.ISBN 978-83-11-11039-7. Retrieved1 July 2013.
  57. ^abPiotr Derdej (2008).Zieleńce – Mir – Dubienka 1792 (in Polish). Bellona. p. 117.ISBN 978-83-11-11039-7. Retrieved1 July 2013.
  58. ^Piotr Derdej (2008).Zieleńce – Mir – Dubienka 1792 (in Polish). Bellona. pp. 118–119.ISBN 978-83-11-11039-7. Retrieved1 July 2013.
  59. ^Piotr Derdej (2008).Zieleńce – Mir – Dubienka 1792 (in Polish). Bellona. p. 130.ISBN 978-83-11-11039-7. Retrieved1 July 2013.
  60. ^Alex Storozynski (January 2011).Kościuszko Książe chłopów [Kosciuszko Prince of Peasants] (in Polish). W.A.B. p. 231.ISBN 978-83-7414-930-3. Retrieved2 January 2013.
  61. ^abcMichalski, Jerzy (2011). "Stanisław August Poniatowski".Polski Słownik Biograficzny (in Polish). Vol. 41. p. 628.
  62. ^abcJerzy Skowronek (1986).Książę Józef Poniatowski [Prince Józef Poniatowski] (in Polish). Wrocław:Ossolineum. pp. 60–62.ISBN 83-04-02321-0.
  63. ^Jerzy Łojek (1986).Geneza i obalenie Konstytucji 3 maja [Genesis and Fall of the 3 May Constitution] (in Polish). Wydawn. Lubelskie. pp. 293–296,306–307, 318, 418.ISBN 978-83-222-0313-2. Retrieved17 December 2011.
  64. ^Piotr Derdej (2008).Zieleńce – Mir – Dubienka 1792 (in Polish). Bellona. pp. 130–131,144–145.ISBN 978-83-11-11039-7. Retrieved1 July 2013.
  65. ^Alex Storozynski (January 2011).Kościuszko Książe chłopów [Kosciuszko Prince of Peasants] (in Polish). W.A.B. pp. 232–233.ISBN 978-83-7414-930-3. Retrieved2 January 2013.
  66. ^abcJerzy Łojek (1986).Geneza i obalenie Konstytucji 3 maja [Genesis and Fall of the 3 May Constitution] (in Polish). Wydawn. Lubelskie. p. 402.ISBN 978-83-222-0313-2. Retrieved17 December 2011.
  67. ^abPiotr Derdej (2008).Zieleńce – Mir – Dubienka 1792 (in Polish). Bellona. p. 160.ISBN 978-83-11-11039-7. Retrieved1 July 2013.
  68. ^abcdJacek Jędruch (1998).Constitutions, elections, and legislatures of Poland, 1493–1977: a guide to their history. EJJ Books. pp. 186–187.ISBN 978-0-7818-0637-4. Retrieved13 August 2011.
  69. ^Norman Davies (30 March 2005).God's Playground: The origins to 1795. Columbia University Press. p. 254.ISBN 978-0-231-12817-9. Retrieved13 August 2011.
  70. ^David Pickus (2001).Dying With an Enlightening Fall: Poland in the Eyes of German Intellectuals, 1764–1800. Lexington Books. p. 118.ISBN 978-0-7391-0153-7. Retrieved18 June 2012.
  71. ^Daniel Stone (2001).The Polish-Lithuanian State: 1386–1795. University of Washington Press. pp. 282–285.ISBN 978-0-295-98093-5. Retrieved8 January 2013.
  72. ^Jacek Jędruch (1998).Constitutions, elections, and legislatures of Poland, 1493–1977: a guide to their history. EJJ Books. pp. 188–189.ISBN 978-0-7818-0637-4. Retrieved13 August 2011.

Further reading

[edit]
  • Adam Wolański,Wojna polsko-rosyjska 1792 r, Wydawnictwo Volumen, Warszawa 1996,ISBN 83-85218-48-3
  • Andrzej Grabski et al.,Zarys dziejów wojskowości polskiej do roku 1864. Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej. Warszawa 1966.
  • Antoni Juszczyński, Marian Krwawicz,Wypisy źródłowe do historii polskiej sztuki wojennej. Polska sztuka wojenna w latach 1764–1793. Zeszyt dziewiąty. Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej. Warszawa 1957.
Grand
Duchy of
Lithuania

(to 1795)
13th
century
14th c.
Lithuanian Civil Wars
15th c.
Lithuanian Crusade
16th c.
Muscovite–Lithuanian Wars
Uprisings
17th c.
Wars with Sweden
Rebellions
Muscovy
Ottomans &
Tatars
18th c.
Early
Late
Lithuania
partitioned
(1795–1918)
Uprisings
Interwar
Lithuania

(1918–1940)
World War II
Soviet
occupation

(1944–1990)
Restored
Lithuania

(since 1990)
General and related
Piast Poland
Mongol invasions
Jagiellon Poland
Polish–Teutonic wars
Commonwealth
Polish–Swedish wars
Polish–Ottoman wars
Poland partitioned
Second Republic
World War II in Poland
Ghetto uprisings
People's Republic
Third Republic
Armed conflicts involvingRussia (includingTsarist,Imperial andSoviet times)
Related
Lists by opponent
Internal
Tsardom of
Russia
18th–19th
century
20th
century
21st
century
Bibliographies
Navigation
National
Other
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Polish–Russian_War_of_1792&oldid=1304373659"
Categories:
Hidden categories:

[8]ページ先頭

©2009-2025 Movatter.jp