Philosophical realism—usually not treated as a position of its own but as a stance towards other subject matters—is the view that a certain kind of thing (ranging widely fromabstract objects likenumbers tomoral statements to the physical world itself) hasmind-independent existence, i.e. that it exists even in the absence of anymind perceiving it or that itsexistence is not just a mereappearance in the eye of the beholder.[1][2][3][4] This includes a number of positions withinepistemology andmetaphysics which express that a given thing instead exists independently ofknowledge,thought, orunderstanding.[5][6] This can apply to items such as thephysical world, thepast andfuture,other minds, and theself, though may also apply less directly to things such asuniversals,mathematical truths,moral truths, andthought itself. However, realism may also include various positions which instead rejectmetaphysical treatments of reality altogether.[7][8]
Realism can also be a view about the properties of reality in general, holding that reality exists independent of themind, as opposed to non-realist views (like some forms ofskepticism andsolipsism) which question thecertainty of anything beyond one's own mind. Philosophers who profess realism often claim thattruth consists in acorrespondence between cognitive representations and reality.[9]
Realists tend to believe that whatever we believe now is only an approximation of reality but that the accuracy and fullness of understanding can be improved.[10] In some contexts, realism is contrasted withidealism. Today it is more often contrasted withanti-realism, for example in thephilosophy of science.[11][12]
Metaphysical realism maintains that "whatever exists does so, and has the properties and relations it does, independently of deriving its existence or nature from being thought of or experienced."[15] In other words, anobjective reality exists (not merely one or more subjective realities).
Perceptual realism is the common sense view that tables, chairs and cups of coffee exist independently of perceivers. Direct realists also claim that it is with such objects that we directly engage. The objects of perception include such familiar items as paper clips, suns and olive oil tins. It is these things themselves that we see, smell, touch, taste and listen to. There are, however, two versions of direct realism: naïve direct realism and scientific direct realism. They differ in the properties they claim the objects of perception possess when they are not being perceived. Naïve realism claims that such objects continue to have all the properties that we usually perceive them to have, properties such as yellowness, warmth, and mass. Scientific realism, however, claims that some of the properties an object is perceived as having are dependent on the perceiver, and that unperceived objects should not be conceived as retaining them. Such a stance has a long history:
By convention sweet and by convention bitter, by convention hot, by convention cold, by convention colour; in reality atoms and void. [Democritus, c. 460-370 BCE, quoted by Sextus Empiricus in Barnes, 1987, pp. 252-253.][16]
In contrast, some forms ofidealism assert that no world exists apart from mind-dependent ideas and some forms ofskepticism say we cannot trust our senses. The naive realist view is thatobjects have properties, such as texture, smell, taste and colour, that are usuallyperceived absolutely correctly. We perceive them as theyreally are.
Immanent realism is the ontological understanding which holds that universals areimmanently real within particulars themselves, not in a separate realm, and not mere names. Most often associated withAristotle and theAristotelian tradition.
Scientific realism is, at the most general level, the view that the world described by science is the real world, as it is, independent of what we might take it to be. Withinphilosophy of science, it is often framed as an answer to the question "how is the success of science to be explained?" The debate over what the success of science involves centers primarily on the status ofunobservable entities apparently talked about by scientifictheories. Generally, those who are scientific realists assert that one can make reliable claims about unobservables (viz., that they have the sameontological status) as observables.Analytic philosophers generally have a commitment to scientific realism, in the sense of regarding the scientific method as a reliable guide to the nature of reality. The main alternative to scientific realism isinstrumentalism.[17]
Realism in physics (especiallyquantum mechanics) is the claim that the world is in some sense mind-independent: that even if the results of a possible measurement do not pre-exist the act of measurement, that does not require that they are the creation of the observer (contrary to the "consciousness causes collapse"interpretation of quantum mechanics). That interpretation of quantum mechanics, on the other hand, states that thewave function is already the full description of reality. The different possible realities described by the wave function are equally true. The observer collapses the wave function into their own reality. One's reality can be mind-dependent under this interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Aesthetic realism (not to be confused with Aesthetic Realism, the philosophy developed byEli Siegel, or"realism" in the arts) is the view that there are mind-independent aesthetic facts.[18][19]
Plato (left) and Aristotle (right), a detail ofThe School of Athens, a fresco byRaphael. In Plato's metaphysics, ever-unchangingForms, or Ideas, exist apart from particular physical things, and are related to them as theirprototype orexemplar. Aristotle's philosophy of reality also aims at theuniversal. Aristotle finds the universal, which he callsessence, in the commonalities ofparticular things.
Platonic realism is a radical form of realism regarding the existence ofabstract objects, includinguniversals, which are often translated from Plato's works as "Forms". Since Plato frames Forms as ideas that are literally real (existing even outside of human minds), this stance is also calledPlatonic idealism. This should not be confused with "idealistic" in the ordinary sense of "optimistic" or with other types ofphilosophical idealism, as presented by philosophers such asGeorge Berkeley. As Platonicabstractions are not spatial, temporal, or subjectively mental, they are arguably not compatible with the emphasis of Berkeley's idealism grounded in mental existence. Plato's Forms include numbers and geometrical figures, making his theory also includemathematical realism; they also include theForm of the Good, making it additionally includeethical realism.
In Aristotle's more modest view, the existence of universals (like "blueness") is dependent on the particulars that exemplify them (like a particular "blue bird", "blue piece of paper", "blue robe", etc.), and those particulars exist independent of any minds: classicmetaphysical realism.
There were many ancient Indian realist schools, such as the Mimamsa, Vishishtadvaita, Dvaita, Nyaya, Yoga, Samkhya, Sauntrantika, Jain, Vaisesika, and others. They argued for their realist positions, and heavily criticized idealism, like that of theYogachara, and composed refutations of the Yogacara position.[21]
Medieval realism developed out of debates over theproblem of universals.[22] Universals are terms or properties that can be applied to many things, such as "red", "beauty", "five", or "dog". Realism (also known asexaggerated realism) in this context, contrasted withconceptualism andnominalism, holds that such universals really exist, independently and somehow prior to the world.Moderate realism holds that they exist, but only insofar as they are instantiated in specific things; they do not existseparately from the specific thing. Conceptualism holds that they exist, but only in the mind, while nominalism holds that universals do not "exist" at all but are no more than words (flatus vocis) that describe specific objects.
Inearly modern philosophy,Scottish Common Sense Realism was a school ofphilosophy which sought to defend naive realism against philosophical paradox andscepticism, arguing that matters ofcommon sense are within the reach of common understanding and that common-sense beliefs even govern the lives and thoughts of those who hold non-commonsensical beliefs. It originated in the ideas of the most prominent members of the Scottish School of Common Sense,Thomas Reid,Adam Ferguson andDugald Stewart, during the 18th centuryScottish Enlightenment and flourished in the late 18th and early 19th centuries in Scotland and America.
The roots of Scottish Common Sense Realism can be found in responses to such philosophers asJohn Locke,George Berkeley, andDavid Hume. The approach was a response to the "ideal system" that began with Descartes' concept of the limitations ofsense experience and led Locke and Hume to a skepticism that called religion and the evidence of the senses equally into question. The common sense realists found skepticism to be absurd and so contrary to common experience that it had to be rejected. They taught that ordinary experiences provide intuitively certain assurance of the existence of the self, of real objects that could be seen and felt and of certain "first principles" upon which sound morality and religious beliefs could be established. Its basic principle was enunciated by its founder and greatest figure, Thomas Reid:[24]
If there are certain principles, as I think there are, which the constitution of our nature leads us to believe, and which we are under a necessity to take for granted in the common concerns of life, without being able to give a reason for them—these are what we call the principles of common sense; and what is manifestly contrary to them, is what we call absurd.
^Conway, Daniel (1999). "Beyond Truth and Appearance: Nietzsche's Emergent Realism". In Babich, Babette E. (ed.).Nietzsche, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 204. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 109–122.doi:10.1007/978-94-017-2428-9_9.ISBN978-90-481-5234-6.
^Laird Addis, Greg Jesson, Erwin Tegtmeier (eds.),Ontology and Analysis: Essays and Recollections about Gustav Bergmann, Walter de Gruyter, 2007, p. 107.
^Cuneo and Woudenberg, eds.The Cambridge companion to Thomas Reid (2004) p 85
^abcdGestalt Theory: Official Journal of the Society for Gestalt Theory and Its Applications (GTA),22, Steinkopff, 2000, p. 94: "Attention has varied between Continental Phenomenology (late Husserl, Merleau-Ponty) and Austrian Realism (Brentano, Meinong, Benussi, early Husserl)".
^Liliana Albertazzi, Dale Jacquette,The School of Alexius Meinong, Routledge, 2017, p. 191.
^Mark Textor,The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy, Routledge, 2006, pp. 170–1: "[Husserl argues in theLogical Investigations that the rightness of a judgement or proposition] shows itself in our experience of self-evidence (Evidenz), which term Husserl takes from Brentano, but makes criterial not of truth per se but of our most secure awareness that things are as we take them to be, when the object of judgement, thestate of affairs, is given most fully or adequately. ... In his struggle to overcome relativism, especially psychologism, Husserl stressed the objectivity of truth and its independence of the nature of those who judge it ... A proposition is true not because of some fact about a thinker but because of an objectively existing abstract proposition's relation to something that is not a proposition, namely a state of affairs."
^Sean Creaven,Marxism and Realism: A Materialistic Application of Realism in the Social Sciences, Routledge, 2012, p. 33.
^Michael Resnik, "II. Frege as Idealist and then Realist,"Inquiry 22 (1–4):350–357 (1979).
^Bertrand Russell,Philosophy of Logical Atomism, Open Court, 1998 [1918].
^Austin, J. L., 1950, "Truth", reprinted inPhilosophical Papers, 3rd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press 1979, 117–33.
^Karl Popper,Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge, 1963.
^Thornton, Stephen (2015-01-01). Zalta, Edward N. (ed.).Karl Popper (Winter 2015 ed.). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. ("Popper professes to be anti-conventionalist, and his commitment to the correspondence theory of truth places him firmly within the realist's camp.")
^Gustav Bergmann,Logic and Reality, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964; Gustav Bergmann,Realism: A Critique of Brentano and Meinong, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967.
^Putnam, H.,Realism and Reason. Philosophical Papers, vol. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
^Putnam, H.Realism with a Human Face. Edited by James Conant. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990, p. vii.
^A. M. Ferner,Organisms and Personal Identity: Individuation and the Work of David Wiggins, Routledge, 2016, p. 28.
^Paul John Ennis,Post-continental Voices: Selected Interviews, John Hunt Publishing, 2010, p. 18.