One year after inheriting the throne, he married his Habsburg cousinMargaret of Austria, the sister ofFerdinand II, Holy Roman Emperor. Philip quickly delegated most of his power and duties to hischief minister, theDuke of Lerma, whose influence shaped much of his reign. In the outskirts of his territories, military power was upheld by successful but capricious proconsuls, such asAmbrogio Spinola and theDuke of Osuna. Philip is associated with a period of relative peace in Western Europe, called thePax Hispanica by some historians, but his lack of focus contributed to theSpanish Empire's gradual decline.
Although known in Spain as "Philip the Pious",[1] his international political reputation has been negative.[2] HistoriansC. V. Wedgwood,R. A. Stradling, andJ. H. Elliott have described him as an "undistinguished and insignificant man",[3] a "miserable monarch",[4] and a "pallid, anonymous creature, whose only virtue appeared to reside in a total absence of vice."[5] In particular, Philip's reliance on the Duke of Lerma drew much criticism. Many historians trace Spain's decline to the economic difficulties that began early in its reign. Nonetheless, as the ruler of the Spanish Empire at its height, the king who achieved atemporary peace with theDutch (1609–1621), and who brought Spain into theThirty Years' War (1618–1648) through an initially successful campaign, his reign remains a pivotal period inSpanish history.
Following the death of Philip III's older half-brotherDonCarlos, Prince of Asturias, their fatherPhilip II concluded that Carlos's problems had been exacerbated by exposure to political factions at the Spanish court.[6] He believed that Carlos's education and upbringing had been compromised, contributing to his mental instability anddisobedience. He began to make more serious arrangements for his other sons.[6] Philip II appointedJuan de Zúñiga, thenPrince Diego's governor, to continue this role for Philip, andGarcía de Loaysa as his tutor.[6] They were assisted byCristóvão de Moura, 1st Marquis of Castelo Rodrigo, a trusted advisor of Philip II. Philip believed that together they would provide a stable upbringing for Prince Philip and avoid the fate of his older brother Carlos.[7] Philip's education followed guidelines established by FatherJuan de Mariana, emphasizing moderation and personal discipline, with the goal of forming a king who was neither tyrannical nor overly influenced by courtiers.[7]
In his youth, "he imitates (as he does) KingSaint Ferdinand, displaying in his actions a miraculous combination of valor and holiness."[8] Prince Philip appears to have been liked by his contemporaries, described as 'dynamic, good-natured, and earnest,' suitably pious, and possessing a 'lively body and a peaceful disposition,' albeit with a relatively weak constitution.[9] Comparisons with the disobedient and ultimately insane Carlos were generally favorable to Prince Philip, although some observers noted that he appeared less intelligent and politically competent than his late brother.[9] Indeed, although Philip was educated inLatin, French,Portuguese andastronomy, and appears to have been a competent linguist,[7] recent historians suspect that much of his tutors' focus on Philip's undeniably pleasant, pious and respectful disposition was to avoid reporting that, languages aside, he was not in fact particularly intelligent or academically gifted.[10] Nonetheless, Philip does not appear to have been naïve – his correspondence with his daughters shows a distinctive cautious streak in his advice on dealing with court intrigue.[11]
Philip first met theMarquis of Denia – the future Duke of Lerma – then a gentleman of the King's chamber, in his early teens.[10] Lerma and Philip became close friends, but Lerma was considered unsuitable by the King and Philip's tutors. Lerma was dispatched toValencia asviceroy in 1595, with the aim of removing Philip from his influence;[10] but after Lerma pleaded poor health, he was allowed to return two years later.
By then in poor health himself, King Philip II grew deeply troubled over the prince's future, and he attempted to establish de Moura as a future, trusted advisor to his son, appointing his ally, García Loaysa y Girón, asarchbishop of Toledo.[12] The Prince received a new, conservativeDominican confessor.[12] The following year, Philip II died, and his son became King Philip III.
Philip married his cousin,Margaret of Austria, on 18 April 1599, a year after becoming king. Margaret, the sister of the futureEmperor Ferdinand II, would be one of three women at Philip's court who would apply considerable influence over the King.[13] Margaret was considered by contemporaries to be extremely pious—in some cases, excessively pious, and too influenced by the Church[14]—'astute and very skillful' in her political dealings,[15] although 'melancholic' and unhappy over the influence of the Duke of Lerma over her husband at court.[14] Margaret continued to fight an ongoing battle with Lerma for influence until her death in 1611. Philip had an 'affectionate, close relationship' with Margaret,[16] and paid her additional attention after they had a son in 1605.[16]
Alongside Philip's grandmother and aunt,Empress Maria—theAustrian representative to the Spanish court—andMargaret of the Cross, Maria's daughter, Margaret formed a powerful, uncompromisingCatholic and pro-Austrian voice within Philip's life.[13] They were successful, for example, in convincing Philip to provide financial support to Ferdinand from 1600 onward.[16]
Philip steadily acquired other religious advisors. Father Juan de Santa Maria—confessor to Philip's daughter,DoñaMaria—was felt by contemporaries to have an excessive influence over Philip at the end of his life,[17] and both he andLuis de Aliaga Martínez, Philip's ownconfessor, were credited with influencing the overthrow ofLerma in 1618. Similarly, Mariana de San Jose, a favored nun of Queen Margaret, was also criticized for her later influence over the King's actions.[17]
Tomás Fernández de Medrano, in hisRepública Mista (1602), praised Philip III's devotion to religion and the reverence he showed toward all its ministers, noting that he gave 'great examples' of piety and virtues, even suggesting that he would surpass such legendary Christian monarchs asGodfrey,Baldwin, andAmory.[8]
The Spanish crown at the time ruled through asystem of royal councils. The most significant of these were theCouncil of State and its subordinate Council for War, which were in turn supported by the seven professional councils for the different regions, and four specialized councils for theInquisition, theMilitary Orders, Finance and theCrusade tax.[18] These councils were then supplemented by small committees, orjuntas, as necessary, such as the 'junta of the night' through which Philip II exercised personal authority toward the end of his reign.[19] As a matter of policy, Philip II had tried to avoid appointinggrandees to major positions of power within his government. He relied heavily on the lesser nobles, the so-called 'service' nobility.[19] Philip II had taken the traditional system of councils and applied a high degree of personal scrutiny to them, especially in matters of paperwork, which he declined to delegate—the result was a 'ponderous' process.[20] To his contemporaries, the degree of personal oversight he exercised was considered excessive; his 'self-imposed role as the chief clerk to the Spanish Empire' was not thought entirely appropriate.[21]
Numerous memorials emerged in the late 16th and early 17th centuries, condemning his father's policies while commending the new course set by Philip III. Ecclesiastical scholars supported this transition, with Juan de Santa María emphasizing that the Catholic faith was the cornerstone of prosperity, vital for the monarchy, justice, and loyalty to the Pope. Similarly,Tomás Fernández de Medrano associated this religious foundation with the monarchy's "greatness" and prestige.[22]
Philip first started to become engaged in practical government at the age of 15, when he joined Philip II's private committee.[9] Philip III's reign marked a political shift, establishing thePax Hispanica and redefining the monarchy by aligningRoman Catholicism withHispanidad.[23] Diplomatically, he authorized theDuke of Sessa in 1599 to secure Papalinvestiture forNaples andJerusalem, reaffirming traditional ties of papal allegiance toClement VIII. In return, the 1603 Papal Brief granted taxation rights, boosting crown revenues to 18 millionducats. Philip III also supported the Papacy againstVenice, raising an army of 26,000.[24] Courtly memorials and various authors reinforcedMadrid-Rome ties.[25][26]
Philip III may have shared the Duke of Lerma's view that the late-period governmental system of Philip II had become impractical and overly exclusive of the high nobility. Signs of institutional stagnation were evident near the end ofPhilip II's reign.[27] In response, Philip III's approach to governance was rooted inkingship anddelegated rule, grounded in divine order and noble service, and embodied in theDoctrine of Medrano codified and etymologically traced tomedrar and theHouse of Medrano.[8][28][29][30]
While certain Italian authors reacting againstMachiavelli found audiences in Spain, they did not shape policy.[31] Rather, Philip's governance reflected the Doctrine of Medrano, Spain's established system of moral statecraft, noble service, and sacralized sovereignty, codified by the Medranos as a distinctly Spanish alternative to the pragmatic and power-centered maxims ofThe Prince.[8] Italian writers such asGirolamo Frachetta, a particular favorite of Philip, promoted a conservative vision of reason of state centered on princelyprudence and justobedience to the laws and customs of the realm.[32][27]
Philip's disposition, his friendship with Lerma, and the doctrinal treatiseRepública Mista (1602) byTomás Fernández de Medrano together shaped the intellectual context of his policy-making.[8] The result was a marked transformation in the role of the crown, from the direct, centralized governance ofPhilip II to a delegated, noble-mediated structure.[33]
In his 1602 political treatiseRepública Mista, Tomás Fernández de Medrano advised Philip III of Spain that withdrawing from hissubjects might be regarded as 'a form of religion', drawing a comparison between the king's limited interaction with his people and thereverence shown to theconsecratedEucharist.[34][35] Philip III elevated his father's precept of inaccessibility and invisibility to unprecedented levels. He drastically limited daily access to himself, granting it almost exclusively to his royal favorite, the Duke of Lerma, who managed most audiences to maintain the king's unseen presence.[36]
Medrano, who noted Philip III as "just, for traveling throughout his realm to personally hear and resolve the complaints of his people," advised the king that things rarely seen received greaterrespect andveneration;[8] it was according to reason of state that the king's isolation and retreat helped avoid chances that he might show his faults to those who would idealize him while unable to see him.[37] This model of symbolic kingship, grounded in controlled visibility and mediated power, helped define the role and necessity of thevalido in early 17th-century Spain.[8]
Within a few hours of Philip ascending to the throne,Lerma had been made a royal counsellor by the new king and set about establishing himself as a fully fledgedvalido, or royal favorite.[38] Philip III's withdrawal from his subjects made the role of thevalido more essential. In 1601,Juan Fernández de Medrano, a friar at the Monastery of San Prudencio de Monte Laturce, defended thevalido system. Directly addressing the Duke of Lerma, Juan Fernández de Medrano argued, "The ship governed by two captains is endangered even without a storm. An empire that depends on more than one cannot endure, as experience teaches."[8] Juan Fernández de Medrano presents thevalido as the legitimate and divinely sanctioned delegate of royal authority, emphasizing his central role in the governance of the realm. He declared, "The King, our Lord, made Your Excellency (God made him) the Father of this Ship, the soul of this body, and the Sun that illuminates us," employing a rich tapestry of metaphors to underscore thevalido's indispensability. Through these analogies, thevalido as captain, soul, and source of light, Medrano aligns political hierarchy with the divine order, portraying thevalido not merely as an advisor but as an extension of the monarch's will and a stabilizing force within the state. By invoking theological and cosmological imagery, he legitimizes thevalido's authority as essential for the maintenance of order, justice, and the common good, reinforcing the notion that effective governance depends on a divinely guided delegation of power.[8]
Lerma, in due course declared a duke, positioned himself as the gateway to the King. All the business of government, Philip instructed, was to arrive in writing and be channeled through Lerma before reaching him.[39] While Philip was not hugely active in government in other ways, once these memoranda, orconsulta, had reached him, he appears to have been assiduous in commenting on them.[40] Debates in royal councils would now only begin upon the written instruction of the king, again, through Lerma.[41] All members of royal councils were under orders to maintain complete transparency with Lerma as the King's personal representative;[41] indeed, in 1612 the councils were ordered by Philip to obey Lerma as if he were the king.[40]
The extent of the Duke of Lerma's direct involvement in the governance of Spain has long been a subject of historical debate. Contemporary observers frequently attributed nearly all decisions of state to his influence, perceiving him as the central figure behind the machinery of government during the reign of Philip III. This view cast Lerma as an omnipresent and powerfulvalido, orchestrating policy and court politics from behind the scenes. However, modern scholarship has offered a more nuanced interpretation, with some historians arguing that Lerma lacked both the temperament and the dynamism necessary to assert a dominant and sustained influence over the daily operations of government. According to this perspective, while Lerma undoubtedly held significant formal power and enjoyed the king's confidence, his effectiveness and initiative as a political actor may have been more limited than his reputation suggests, shaped as much by perception and courtly image as by actual administrative control,[42] still others consider Lerma to have carefully attended only those Councils of State that addressed matters of great importance to the King,[43] creating a space for the wider professionalization of government that had been lacking under Philip II.[44]
This new system of government became increasingly unpopular very quickly. The novel idea of avalido exercising power went against the long-standing popular conception that the king should exercise his powers personally, not through another.[45] Before long, the apparatus of the Spanish government was packed with Lerma's relatives, Lerma's servants and Lerma's political friends, to the exclusion of others.[46] Lerma responded by further limiting his public visibility in politics, avoiding signing and writing documents personally.[47]
Lerma consistently shaped the image of a loyal, self-effacing servant acting only for King Philip III, a cultivated posture supported by conduct and public narrative. Tomás Fernández de Medrano notes that Lerma's duty to the Crown was so complete that he accepted personal sacrifices, including separation from his family in order to manage their estates as part of his royal obligations.[8] Medrano presents these burdens as borne with dignity and religious devotion, casting Lerma's service as a spiritual vocation rather than a political calculation. This portrayal legitimized Lerma's authority by grounding it in humility, piety, and sacrificial loyalty, affirming that his power arose from commitment to the monarch and divine order rather than personal ambition.[8]
Writing inRepública Mista (1602), well before Lerma's eventual fall from favor, Medrano observed that, rather than succumbing tovanity, Lerma "arranged for his burial, endowing and rebuilding with great magnificence the sumptuous temple of San Pablo in Valladolid of the Order of Preachers, and performing many other magnificent works of great piety," a gesture that, in Medrano's view, reflected the rare virtue of remembering "that men are mortal."[8]
Lerma's role as royal favorite at court was further complicated by the rise of various "proconsuls" under Philip III's reign—significant Spanish representatives overseas, who came to exercise independent judgement and even independent policies in the absence of strong leadership from the center.[48] The challenges to government communication during the period encouraged aspects of this, but the phenomenon was much more marked under Philip III than under either the reign of his father or son.
In the Netherlands, his father Philip II had bequeathed his remaining territories in the Low Countries to his daughterIsabella of Spain and her husband,Archduke Albert, under the condition that if she died without heirs, the province would return to the Spanish Crown. Given that Isabella was notoriously childless, it was clear that this was only intended to be a temporary measure, and that Philip II had envisaged an early revision to Philip III.[3] As a result, Philip's foreign policy in the Netherlands would be exercised through the strong-willed archdukes, but in the knowledge that ultimately theSpanish Netherlands would return to him as king.[a] Meanwhile, the Italian-bornAmbrosio Spinola was to perform a crucial role as a Spanish general in theArmy of Flanders. Having demonstrated his military prowess at thesiege of Ostend in 1603, Spinola rapidly started to propose and implement policies almost independently of the central councils in Madrid,[49] somehow managing to achieve military victories even without central funding from Spain.[50] Lerma was uncertain of how to deal with Spinola; on the one hand, Lerma desperately needed a successful military commander in the Netherlands—on the other, Lerma was contemptuous of Spinola's relatively low origins and cautious of his potential to destabilize Lerma at court.[51] In the years leading to the outbreak of war in 1618, Spinola was working to produce a plan to finally defeat theDutch Republic, involving an intervention in the Rhineland followed by fresh hostilities aiming to cut the Low Countries in two: portrayed at the time as the 'spider in the web' of Catholic politics in the region, Spinola was operating without significant consultation with Philip in Madrid.[52]
In Italy, a parallel situation emerged.Pedro Henriquez de Acevedo, Count of Fuentes, as governor of theDuchy of Milan, exploited the lack of guidance from Madrid to pursue his own highly interventionist policy across Northern Italy, including making independent offers to support the Papacy by invading theVenetian Republic in 1607.[53] Fuentes remained in power and pursued his own policies until his death.Pedro de Toledo Osorio, 5th Marquess of Villafranca, as governor of Milan, similarly exercised his own considerable judgment on foreign policy.Pedro Téllez-Girón, 3rd Duke of Osuna, who had married into the Sandoval family as a close ally of Lerma, again showed significant independence as the Viceroy ofNaples towards the end of Philip's reign. In conjunction with the Spanish ambassador to Venice, the influentialAlfonso de la Cueva, 1st Marquis of Bedmar, Osuna pursued a policy of raising an extensive army, intercepting Venetian shipping, and imposing sufficiently high taxes that threats of a revolt began to emerge. To exacerbate matters, Osuna was found to have prevented the local Neapolitans from petitioning Philip III to complain.[54] Osuna fell from power only when Lerma had lost his royal favor, and Osuna's negative impact on Philip's plans for intervention in Germany had become intolerable.[54]
From 1612 onwards, and certainly by 1617, theLerma administration was crumbling. The monopoly of power in the hands of the Lerma's Sandoval family had generated numerous enemies; Lerma's personal enrichment in office had become a scandal; Lerma's extravagant spending and personal debts were beginning to alarm his own son,Cristóbal de Sandoval, Duke of Uceda; lastly, ten years of quiet diplomacy by Fathers Luis de Aliaga, Philip's confessor, and Juan de Santa Maria, Philip's daughter's confessor and a former client ofQueen Margaret,[17] had begun to apply personal and religious pressure on the King to alter his method of government.[55] Philip remained close to Lerma, however, and supported him in becoming a cardinal in March 1618 underPope Paul V, a position which would offer Lerma some protection as his government collapsed.
Lerma fell to an alliance of interests—Uceda, his son, led the attack, aiming to protect his future interests, allied withBaltasar de Zúñiga, a well-connected noble with a background in diplomacy across Europe, whose nephew,Olivares, was close to the heir to the throne,Prince Philip. Lerma departed for his ducal seat, and for six weeks Philip did nothing; then, in October, Philip signed a decree removing the powers of his formervalido, and announcing that he would rule in person.[55] Uceda initially took over as the primary voice at court, but without his father's extensive powers; de Zúñiga, meanwhile, became Philip's minister for foreign and military affairs. Philip, while unwilling to move further against Lerma, took politically symbolic action against Lerma's formersecretaryRodrigo Calderón, a figure emblematic of the former administration. Calderón, suspected of having killed Philip's wifeQueen Margaret by witchcraft in 1611, was ultimately tortured and then executed by Philip for the more plausible murder of the soldier Francisco de Juarez.[56]
The challenge for such a ruler was that these territories were, in legal terms, distinct entities bound together inpersonal union through the royal institutions of the Spanish crown, which relied heavily on the Castilian nobility as aruling class.[58] Even within the peninsula itself, Philip would rule through the kingdoms ofCastile,Aragon, andPortugal, the autonomous provinces ofCatalonia andAndalusia—all only loosely joined through the institution of the Castile monarchy and the person of Philip III.[59] Each part had different taxation, privileges and military arrangements; in practice, the level of taxation in many of the more peripheral provinces was less than in Castile, but the privileged position of the Castilian nobility at all senior levels of royal appointment was a contentious issue for the less favored provinces.
One of Philip's first domestic changes was the issuing of a decree in 1609 for the expulsion of theMoriscos from Spain, timed to coincide with the declaration of atruce in theEighty Years' War.[60] The Moriscos were the descendants of the Muslims that had converted to Christianity during theReconquista of the previous centuries; despite their conversion, they retained a distinctive culture, including many Islamic practices.[61] Philip II had made the elimination of the Morisco threat a key part of his domestic strategy in the south, attempting an assimilation campaign in the 1560s, which had resulted in theMorisco Revolt that concluded in 1570.[62] In the final years of his rule, Philip's father had reinvigorated efforts to convert and assimilate the Moriscos, but with almost 200,000 in the south of Spain alone, it was clear by the early years of the new century that this policy was failing.[61]
The idea of completely cleansing Spain of the Moriscos was proposed byJuan de Ribera, theArchbishop andViceroy of Valencia, whose views were influential with Philip III. Philip's eventual decree to expel a nationality that had lived in Spain for over 800 years and was assimilated within it was based less on doctrinal than financial considerations—confiscating the 'wealth' of the Moriscos, which caused jealousy and resentment by other Christians in Spain, especially in Valencia. Financially, the royal treasury stood to gain by seizing the assets of the removed peoples, while in due course, those close to the crown would benefit from cheap land or gifts of estates. Estimates vary slightly, but between approximately 275,000[61] to over 300,000[63] Moriscos were forced out of Spain between 1609 and 1614. To accomplish this, the Armada and 30,000 soldiers were mobilized with the mission of transporting the families toTunisia orMorocco. Philip intervened in the problematic decision of what to do with Morisco children. A central question was whether they should be allowed to take them to Islamic countries, where they would be brought up as Muslims, or, if they were to remain in Spain, what should be done with them. Philip paternalistically decreed that Morisco children under the age of seven could not be taken to Islamic countries, but that any children remaining in Valencia should be free from the threat of enslavement,[64] and rejected some of Ribera's more extreme suggestions.[65]
While popular at the time, and in keeping with earlier policies, this measure significantly damaged the economies of theKingdom of Valencia,Aragon, andMurcia. The supply of cheap labor and the number of rent-paying property owners in these areas decreased considerably, as did agricultural outputs.[66] In Valencia, fields were left abandoned and agricultural output decreased significantly.[67]
Mateo Alemán, anearly modern novelist who recorded the terrible 'plague that came down from Castile and the famine that rose from Andalusia' to cripple Philip III's domestic economy. Engraving byPedro Perete.
Philip III's reign was marked by significant economic problems across Spain.Famine struck during the 1590s through a sequence of bad harvests, while from 1599 to 1600 and for several years afterwards, there was a terrible outbreak ofbubonic plague across Spain, killing over 10% of the population.[68]Mateo Alemán, one of the first modern novelists in Europe, captured the despondent mood of the period, describing 'the plague that came down from Castile and the famine that rose from Andalusia' to grip the country.[69] While the failing harvests affected the rural areas most, the plagues reduced the urban population most significantly, in turn reducing the demand formanufactured goods and undermining the economy further.[70] The result was an economically weakened Spain with a rapidly falling population.
Financially, Philip's situation did not appear much better. He had inherited huge debts from his father, Philip II, and an unhelpful tradition that theCrown of Castile bore the brunt of royal taxation—Castile carried 65% of total imperial costs by 1616.[71] Philip III received no money from thecortes, or parliaments, ofAragon, the Basque provinces orPortugal;Valencia only provided one contribution, in 1604.[71] Philip did not openly challenge this situation but instead depended more and more heavily on the Castiliancortes; in turn, thecortes increasingly began to tie new grants of money to specific projects, subtly but steadily altering the relationship between the King andcortes.[72] By the financial crisis of 1607, thecortes had even insisted that it be recalled every three years, and that Philip take an oath—on pain ofexcommunication—to promise that he had spent the royal funds in line with the promises made previously to thecortes.[72]
Philip III of Spain
Philip andLerma's attempts to resolve this crisis largely failed, and were not helped by the increasing size of the royal household—an attempt to increase royal prestige and political authority[43]—Philip's own household costs rose enormously at a time of falling income.[73][better source needed] Philip's attempts to issue new currency—in particular the issues of the coppervéllon coinage in 1603–04, 1617, and 1621—simply created considerable instability.[71] The costs of the Dutch campaign resulted in Philip's bankruptcy in 1607, and the crown's attempt to resolve this by converting theasiento tax system—high-interest loans owed to tax farmers—into longer-termjuros bonds paying a much lower interest, produced a short-term benefit, but at the price of losing financial flexibility during future crises.[71] By 1618, almost all Philip's crown income was already assigned to its various creditors, and he had almost no spending discretion left.[71] Financially, the Spanish state had become dominated byGenoese bankers and lenders under Philip II, whose lines of credit had allowed the Spanish state to continue during its moments of financial crisis; under Philip III this process remained unchecked, building up considerable resentment against this foreign influence,[74] some going so far as to term the bankers 'white moors'.[75]
Throughout Philip's reign, a body of analysis of Spain's condition began to emerge through the work of the numerousarbitristas, or commentators, that dominated public discussions from around 1600 through to the 1630s.[76] These different voices focused heavily on thepolitical economy of Spain—the rural depopulation, the diverse and bureaucratic administrative methods, the social hierarchies and corruption, offering numerous, if often contradictory, solutions.[77] Nonetheless, through most of Philip's reign, there was no significant attempt at economic reform—Philip continued to rule in line with local laws and customs. Philip encouraged the consolidation of noble estates, selling off large quantities of crown lands to favored nobles and creditors.[78] There were no attempts to create an equivalent to the Frenchintendant position—the closest equivalent, thecorregidor, lacked the strong links to the crown required to overcome local opposition.[78] Only in Philip's final years did reform begin to gain momentum; a reform committee, orJunta de Reformación, was established in Lerma's final months in 1618.[79] Under the incoming administration, including the reformistBaltasar de Zúñiga, this committee ground on, but would only deliver substantial, if ill-fated, results when rejuvenated under Philip IV's reign.
Upon his accession, Philip inherited two major conflicts from his father. The first, the prolongedDutch revolt, posed a significant challenge to Spanish power from the ProtestantUnited Provinces, a crucial region of theSpanish Empire. The second, theAnglo–Spanish War, was a more recent and less critical conflict with the ProtestantEngland, characterized by the Spanish failure to effectively leverage its vast military resources against the smaller English forces.
Philip's own foreign policy can be divided into three phases. For the first nine years of his reign, he pursued a highly aggressive set of policies, aiming to deliver a 'great victory'.[80] His instructions toLerma to wage a war of 'blood and iron' on his rebellious subjects in the Netherlands reflects this.[47] After 1609, when it became evident that Spain was financially exhausted and Philip sought a truce with the Dutch, there followed a period of retrenchment; in the background, tensions continued to grow, however, and by 1618 the policies of Philip's 'proconsuls'—men likeSpinola,Fuentes,Villafranca,Osuna andBedmar—were increasingly at odds with Lerma's policy from Madrid.[48] The final period, in which Philip intervened in theHoly Roman Empire to secure theelection ofFerdinand II asHoly Roman Emperor and in which preparations were made for renewed conflict with the Dutch, largely occurred after the fall of Lerma and the rise of a new, more aggressive set of advisors in the Madrid court.
Eighty Years' War, Anglo-Spanish War, and the Pax Hispanica
Philip's initial aim was to achieve a decisive "great victory"[80] in thelong-running war against the rebelliousSpanish Netherlands while placing renewed pressure onElizabethan England, in an effort to terminate English support for the Dutch. TheSpanish Armada, rebuilt in the 1590s, remained effective against the English.[81] However, after the failure of theSpanish invasion of Ireland at theBattle of Kinsale, Philip reluctantly accepted that further attacks on England were unlikely to succeed.[80] In the Netherlands, a new war strategy resulted in the re-establishment of Spanish power on the north side of the major riversMeuse andRhine, strengthening the military pressure on the rebel provinces. The "great victory" strategy, however, began to descend into a financial war of attrition: theSouthern Netherlands, still under Spanish control, and theDutch Republic in the north—dominated byCalvinist Protestants—were both exhausted, and after the 1607 financial crisis, Spain was also unable to pursue the war. Philip thus turned to peace negotiations instead; with the accession to the throne ofJames I of England, it became possible to terminate both the war and English support to the Dutch via theTreaty of London.[82] This would start the Pax Hispanica, a period of peace which lasted until the Spanish entry into theThirty Years' War. Spain and the Netherlands, although now at peace, rearmed themselves in preparation for another war. Spain developed political hegemony and general stability to Spain and let theSpanish Golden Age happen. Spain also developed some cultural values, for example, making Castilian thelingua franca.
TheTwelve Years' Truce with the Dutch followed in 1609 and enabled the Southern Netherlands to recover, but was a de facto recognition of theDutch Republic’s independence, with whom many European powers established diplomatic relations. The truce did not halt Dutch commercial andcolonial expansion into the Caribbean and the East Indies, although Spain had demanded theDutch East India Company be liquidated as a treaty condition. Minor Dutch concessions included scrapping the plan for aDutch West India Company and stopping the harassment of the Portuguese in Asia. Both concessions were temporary as the Dutch soon recommenced preying upon Portuguese interests, which had already led to theDutch–Portuguese War in 1602 and would continue until 1654. The Twelve Years' Truce handed Philip's regime an opportunity to begin to recover its financial position.
The Council of Castile had a more pragmatic perspective about the changes in the balance of power since the consolidation of the Anglo-Dutch naval presence in theEast Indies, and felt the necessity to develop an alliance with one power against the other. This stemmed from the impossibility of an Iberian-Dutch alliance due to the lack of a formal treaty between the two parties and the threat of Dutch independence to Habsburg power within theHoly Roman Empire. Thus, the Council of Castile argued that allowing English trade in Asia would be better for the protection of theSpanish East Indies andPortuguese Colonies than a two-front war— owing to the currentDutch-Portuguese war. They also claimed that it was idealistic to fight for a monopoly over the Indian Ocean, as it had not been a reality since theEighty Years' War. However, the Portuguese argued that such concessions to the English would damage the trade between theLuso-Asians and the Portuguese. They also feared that the reputation of Portugal might suffer and that local powers in Asia, as well as those in Europe, would see Portugal as weak and unable to defend itself against its enemies, thus opening the door to competition in the area. In the end, the English rejected the proposal due to conflicts between the king andParliament, the refusal of English traders to compensate Iberians from previous attacks on their territories, and mutual hostility stemming from religious differences between Iberia and England.[83]
A period of instability commenced in theKingdom of France with the death ofHenry IV, who supported the war against Spain. In a sequence of aggressive policy moves, and largely without firm direction from Philip, his two regionalproconsuls (theDuke of Osuna, viceroy ofNaples and theMarquis of Villafranca, the Governor ofMilan) directed the Spanish policy in Italy, encountering resistance from theDuchy of Savoy and the Republic of Venice. To secure the connection between Milan and the Netherlands, a new route for theSpanish Road was opened throughValtellina, then part of the independent state of theThree Leagues (the present-day canton ofGraubünden, Switzerland). After the affair of the supposedBedmar Conspiracy in 1618, the Venetian authorities engaged in the persecution of pro-Spanish agents.
Philip largely respected the truce signed by his father with theOttoman Empire, but his proconsuls did not. Although Ottoman naval power was diminished since theBattle of Lepanto, activity from theirBarbary corsairs remained, leadingPedro Téllez-Girón, Duke of Osuna to use their tactics against them. Against the royal ban onprivateering, Osuna built a privateer fleet of galleons, previously thought to be impractical in the Mediterranean but increasingly used by the Barbary corsairs through western assistance. He landed a series of military successes, including thedestruction of a fleet intending to raid the Spanish Indies, and peaking with theBattle of Cape Gelidonya, where six of his ships defeated a traditional Ottoman armada almost ten times bigger. The battle was effectively an "epilogue to Lepanto", reflecting how the technological advantage of western countries had started taking over.[84] Philip celebrated the victory, but rejected Osuna's propositions to expand his fleet and reiterated that privateering was outlawed.[85] Osuna later followed onbombarding Constantinople, although again little came from it.
Philip III's global policy prioritized the East Indies over the West Indies, primarily because he inherited the colonial possessions of the Portuguese Empire. His rule was marked by ongoing conflicts such as theOttoman–Portuguese confrontations and theEighty Years' War with the Dutch in the East Indies. Under increasing pressure, Philip aimed to integrate Indo-Mediterranean trade routes by securing Spanish-Portuguese holdings along the African and Asian coasts. This strategy sought to prevent the expansion of Dutch and English forces, which threatened the monopoly established by theTreaty of Tordesillas. Philip also promoted the spread ofCatholicism through missionary efforts, particularly by theJesuits and othermendicant orders. To strengthen the Iberian Union against rival powers such as theDutch,British, andOttoman Empires, he prioritized the economic interests of thePortuguese Empire and encouraged collaboration in overseas trade. Under his reign, the Iberian Union forged alliances withSafavid Iran andMughal India.[86] A secondary objective of Philip's policy was to uphold the Portuguese commercial monopoly in the Indian Ocean. However, after theTwelve Years' Truce, the Spanish court deemed this monopoly unfeasible and instead focused on preserving Iberian dominance against rising competitors like the East India Company, the Dutch East India Company, and newer European challengers such as theDanish East India Company and theSwedish West India Company.[87]
The Spanish Crown paid close attention to the proposals of Sevillian elites, viewing them as opportunities to strengthen the Royal Treasury and improve Spain's position in Asia. As noted in the introduction, this approach required halting the deployment of extraordinary armadas from Lisbon in favor of four priorities: first, redirecting aid to Manila; second, fostering cooperation in Asia among the forces of the Iberian Union; third, reinforcing Iberian positions along the African coasts to deter the arrival of Dutch and English forces; and fourth, pursuing an alliance with the Safavid Empire to enhance Spain's position in the Mediterranean. However, this policy led to tensions with the Portuguese Crown, which opposed many of these initiatives.
Similarly, he developed an alternative trade route to theSpanish East Indies that connectedSeville directly toManila, bypassing the traditional path throughAcapulco andVeracruz used by theManila galleon. This initiative aimed to increase profits forPeninsular Spain and streamline the distribution of goods from China, India, andIndonesia throughout Europe.
Improvements to Asian fortifications were financed through trade with Japan. To strengthen economic and political control over overseas territories, the Crown removed powerful but uncooperative elites, including many Novohispanas who favored a triangular trade system between Mexico, the Philippines, and Japan or theMaluku Islands,Portuguese officials who resistedCastilian involvement in the Indian Ocean and sought to maintain a strict separation between thePortuguese andSpanish empires, andJesuits, who opposed the expansion of the SpanishPatronato real at the expense ofPapal primacy.
These changes led to the creation of the CastilianEstanco de Pimienta (Pepper Monopoly) in 1605 and the short-livedConselho da Índia (Council of the Indies) between 1604 and 1614. TheCrown of Castile also began negotiating with thePapal States to allow its own missionaries, primarily from mendicant orders, to travel from the Philippines to Japan and China, thereby ending the Portuguese Jesuits' monopoly on missionary work in East Asia.[86]
In 1601,Shah Abbas I of Persia and his ambassadorHossein Ali Beg Bayat proposed a complementary initiative: diverting the Persian raw silk trade through theCape of Good Hope rather than overland via theOttoman Empire. This route aimed to undermine the common enemy, the Turks, and pressure theVenetians into joining aHabsburg–Persian alliance. The proposal also promised to make the Spanish Asian trade project more profitable by granting the Iberian Union a commercial monopoly onPersian Gulf goods in Europe, which in turn could make the direct Seville–Manila route more attractive to merchants who had previously doubted its viability due to the absence of the Mexican crossing.[87]
"It is in the service of His Majesty that the said contract between New Spain and the Philippine Islands cease, and that it be done from Spain, since the Dutch and foreigners do it very easily, as is well known."
— Archivo de Indias
However, the project ultimately failed due to a combination oftechnological shortcomings, such as the lack of experiencedCastilianMarine Pilots and willing personnel for long, dangerous voyages; persistent Anglo-Dutchpiracy; resistance from the local elite in the Philippines who preferred theManila galleon route; and thePortuguese Kingdom's reluctance to cooperate. These obstacles, along with the eventual breakdown of relations with both Persia and Japan, and the broader conflict sparked by theThirty Years' War, brought Philip III's eastern geopolitical strategy to an end.[86]
Despite efforts to strengthenSpain-Safavid relations, thePortuguese–Safavid Conflicts escalated during the later years of Philip III's reign. This was partly due to the rising authority ofShah Abbas I, who increased military and strategic pressure in the Persian Gulf, ultimately ending any Iberian hopes of controlling the key arrival points of overland caravans in the region. The entry of theEnglish East India Company into thePersian Gulf further undermined Portuguese naval dominance. Portuguese authorities in theKingdom of Ormus viewed the Mocarrarias tributes paid by an ArabChieftain to thePersian shah as merely transactional payments ensuring the safe passage of caravans and ships throughSafavids territory. However, the Safavid court considered Ormus a vassal state and rejected the idea that Portugal had a legitimateright of conquest over territories under Persiansuzerainty. The handling of these tributes fluctuated depending on the balance of power when Persia appeared militarily dominant, the tributes were paid in full; when Portuguese control was stronger, they were reduced or ignored.
Initially, Portuguese authorities remained confident in theirnaval superiority, believing it sufficient to counter any pressure fromSafavid Persia. Maritime dominance was central to Portugal's strategy for controlling trade routes and maintaining influence in the Persian Gulf. However, the arrival of the English dramatically shifted the regional balance of power. Their presence forced the Portuguese to redirect their focus toward protecting sea lanes from corsair attacks and addressing the threat ofAnglo-Persian cooperation. This realignment strained Portuguese resources and introduced new strategic concerns, particularly the potential loss of maritime supremacy. AsShah Abbas I continued to consolidate military power and pursue increasingly assertive territorial and commercial ambitions, the longstanding Portuguese dominance in the Persian Gulf was increasingly challenged. The combination of rising Safavid strength and European intervention exposed the vulnerabilities ofPortugal's imperial presence in the region.
The fate of Hormuz during Philip III's reign was closely linked to a potentialHabsburg–Safavid military alliance proposed by Shah Abbas I against theOttoman Empire, which had been atwar with Persia since 1603. However, by that time, the Spanish–Ottoman Wars had already ended, and Philip III was reluctant to enter new military conflicts, preferring instead to take advantage of the existing peace. Despite this hesitation, the Spanish ambassador DonGarcía de Silva met with Abbas in 1618–1619 to discuss the proposed alliance. Negotiations were hindered by disputes over theCapture of Cambarão and by Abbas's perception that the Iberians were demanding too much such as severing ties with theEnglish East India Company in exchange for limited Spanish commitments, including no clear military action against the Ottomans (such as the proposed blockade of theRed Sea).
Internal disagreements further complicated matters. The Portuguese favored prioritizing the Indian Ocean and were wary of making concessions that could undermine their prestige inPortuguese India, while the Castilians focused on Mediterranean interests. They hoped to use Persia as a distraction against the Ottomans, buying time and extending Spanish influence in Europe, with the security of Ormus seen as a secondary benefit. After diplomatic talks failed,Philip III dispatched an armada led by Ruy Freire in 1619 to expel the English and reinforce the Portuguese position. The mission was unsuccessful and ultimately triggered an Anglo-Persian alliance, which later joined with the Dutch andOmanis. This coalition drove the Iberians out of the Persian Gulf, culminating in theAnglo-Persian capture of Qeshm andHormuz and the Spanish loss in theBattle off Hormuz in 1625.[87][89]
In the final years of Philip's reign, Spain entered the initial part of the conflict that would become known as theThirty Years' War (1618–48). The result was a decisive Spanish victory in theHoly Roman Empire that would lead to a recommencement of thewar with the Dutch shortly after Philip's death. Europe was anticipating a freshImperial election for the position ofHoly Roman Emperor upon the likely death ofMatthias, who was heir-less. Spain andAustria's commonHabsburg ancestry influenced Spain's involvement in the convoluted politics of the Empire: on the one hand, Philip had a vested interest in the success of his cousinFerdinand of Bohemia, who intended to follow Matthias to the throne; on the other, Philip had hopes of electing one of his own family, such asPrince Philip, to the Imperial throne[90] and worried that a failed bid by Ferdinand might reduce collective Habsburg prestige.[91]
Philip finally chose to intervene behind Ferdinand. Prince Philip had been rejected as unacceptable to the German nobility.[90] Philip had also been increasingly influenced over the years by firstQueen Margaret, and later the other, powerful Habsburg women at court, while the incoming set of advisors that replaced Lerma, especially de Zúñiga, also saw Spain's future as part of a strong alliance with a Habsburg Holy Roman Empire.[92] Finally, by theOñate treaty of 29 July 1617, Ferdinand made a successful appeal to Philip's self-interest by promising Spain the Habsburg lands inAlsace in return for Spanish support for his election.[93]
Crisis broke out in Ferdinand'sKingdom of Bohemia during 1618–19, with a confrontation between Catholic and Protestant factions. Ferdinand asked Spain for help to put down the rebellion; the Protestant rebels turned toFrederick V, Elector Palatine as their new king. The situation in the Empire was in many ways auspicious for Spanish strategy; in theSpanish NetherlandsAmbrosio Spinola had been conspiring to find an opportunity to intervene with theArmy of Flanders into theElectoral Palatinate. The Palatinate was a vital, Protestant set of territories along the Rhine threatening theSpanish Road, the main route for reinforcements from other Spanish territories to arrive into the rebellious Dutch provinces (through Genoa).[52] France, assumed bound to support Frederick against Ferdinand, was in fact inclined to remain neutral.[94] The Spanish troops headed by Spinola in the Palatinate and byJohann Tserclaes, Count of Tilly in Bohemia achieved a decisive victory against the Czechs in theBattle of White Mountain in 1620. With the Dutch now vulnerable to a strike through the Rhine valley, a renewed war against the Provinces, with the aim of forcing the Dutch to a more suitable permanent peace, appeared inevitable.
Philip died in 1621 shortly before the recommencement of war—his son,Philip IV, retained his chief foreign policy advisor,de Zúñiga, and an initially highly successful campaign against the Dutch began the same year.
In the Americas, Philip inherited a difficult situation inChile, where theArauco War raged and the localMapuche succeeded inrazing seven Spanish cities (1598–1604). An estimate byAlonso González de Nájera put the toll at 3,000 Spanish settlers killed and 500 Spanish women taken into captivity by Mapuche.[95] In retaliation, the proscription againstenslaving Indians captured in war was lifted by Philip in 1608.[96][97] This decree was abused when Spanish settlers inChiloé Archipelago used it to justify slave raids against groups such as theChono people of northwestern Patagonia, who had never been under Spanish rule and never rebelled.[98]
Jesuit missionaryLuis de Valdivia believed the Mapuche could be voluntarily converted to Christianity only if there was peace.[99][100] To diminish hostilities Valdivia proposed aDefensive War in a letter to Philip. The King supported the idea, issuing a decree that established the Defensive War as an official policy in 1612.[101] By the time Defensive War was established, war between the Spanish and the Mapuche had been going on for 70 years.[101]
These policies were not without criticism.Maestre de campo andcorregidor ofConcepción, Santiago de Tesillo claimed the Defensive War gave the Mapuche a much-needed respite to replenish their forces that should have been denied.[102] TheReal Audiencia of Santiago opined in the 1650s that theslavery of Mapuche was one of the reasons for constant state of war between the Spanish and the Mapuche.[103]
Philip III sought to strengthen the Spanish position in the Philippines in response to increasing threats from English and Dutch naval forces challenging the former Spanish-Portuguese monopoly over theEast Indies. The Spanish response became more urgent after a Spanish-Dutch naval battle nearManila in 1600. Philip III also aimed to conquer theSultanate of Ternate and its vassal kingdoms, fearing that Dutch expansion in the North Pacific could jeopardize Spanish trade with China and the security ofNew Spain.
To deter future attacks, he expanded the fleet of galleys and organized a military expedition to Ternate. As part of this effort,Pedro de Acuña prepared a series of reports on the political and military situation in theSpanish East Indies and Portuguese Indonesia, particularly focusing on relations between theDutch East India Company and theSultanate of Ternate. These reports were sent to theCouncil of the Indies in 1602.
As a result, both theCaptaincy General of the Philippines andPortuguese India decided to launch a joint expedition to the Philippines, carrying Spanish and Mexican troops, funds, and supplies to put an end to Dutch-Ternatean raids. However, theCouncil of Portugal hesitated to cooperate with theCouncil of Castile, preferring to uphold the territorial boundaries established by theTreaty of Zaragoza, rather than allow theSpice islands, then controlled by Ternate and the Dutch East India Company, to fall under Spanish influence.
Despite Portuguese reluctance, Spanish forces succeeded in capturing Ternate in 1606. However, they failed to eliminate Dutch influence entirely. The Dutch continued to support Ternatean resistance and eventually succeeded in expelling the Spanish from the islands.[104]
At the Spanish court, Acuña's plans were assessed and approved for implementation. However, there was a key issue: the Moluccas werePortuguese territory while the ministers who studied Acuña's proposals wereCastilian. Philip III did not want a confrontation between kingdoms over this issue and asked for a joint assessment of the Moluccas problem, but the ideas of both sides seemed irreconcilable. The Castilian advisors understood that if there was intervention from the Philippine Islands, as Acuña proposed, the Moluccas should come under Castilian control, since politically and militarily it made more sense. The Portuguese did not view this manoeuvre favourably and hoped that Ternate would return to Portuguese control, even if the Castilians had recovered it. In the end, there was no understanding, and the king opted for the Castilian position, and at the end of 1602, he approved Acuña's proposal (...) The governor's plan was first to regain control of Ternate, the most important kingdom with a great influence over the other local powers, and then to gain the loyalty of the other kingdoms. With their firm support, Acuña hoped to be able to cut off the clove trade to the Dutch, so that they would have no interest in returning to the islands. Finally, once the Spanish had settled in the Moluccas, he hoped to be able to make the leap to the islands of Ambon and Banda, where the Dutch maintained trade and had prominent forces. In a few years, the Spice Islands could be sealed off from the Batavian passage and thus deal a great blow to their economy and overseas prestige (...) After the initial success of the conquest of Ternate, a relief effort was organised from the Philippines, intended to make up for the losses of the day and the resources expended. This was not very extensive, but according to the original plan, this was not important, since the Spanish troops were going to rely on local troops in their fight against the Dutch. However, events did not go according to plan, and there was no clear alternative response to this relief (...) Essentially, the relief system devised by the Spanish for the Moluccas allowed them to supply the garrison with the money, men, and resources that the garrison might need to recover its losses and watch over the Moluccas, but it could not compete with the large forces that a VOC squadron could deploy on the ground.
In 1604, Philip III restricted Chinese trade exclusively to New Spain (Mexico), limiting it strictly to theManila galleon route, due to concerns that transpacific commerce was undermining the transatlantic trade system. This policy ended the flow of Asian goods and silver betweenMing China, thePhilippines, and the broader western fringe ofSpanish America including Mexico, Central America,Peru, and Chile which had previously been authorized byPhilip II in 1579.
The decision caused resentment in theViceroyalty of Peru, as it formally excluded the region from engaging in direct or indirect trade with the Far East, including stopovers atAcapulco. In response, smuggling among South American merchants increased as they sought to evade the restrictions.
Nonetheless, Montesclaros did not intend to disobey the king or promote corruption. Instead, he proposed legalizing the Manila–Acapulco–Callao trade route so that theSpanish crown could regulate and tax it officially.[104]
Phillip III's decision to depopulate the western part of the island ofHispaniola, or Santo Domingo, to eliminate the smuggling that took place in those areas, was considered controversial albeit little-known.[106]
This action, known inDominican history as theDevastations of Osorio, proved catastrophic forHispaniola. The island went from being a valuable resource for Spain in the Caribbean to the most impoverished territory of the Spanish empire.[107]
Furthermore, the depopulated territories in the west of the island were eventually occupied by the French (who were enemies of Spain at that time).
Between the end of Philip II's reign and during that of Philip III's, the Spanish Golden Age happened mostly in two cities: Seville and Madrid. Seville was the home ofDiego Velázquez, who started painting during Philip II's reign, and Madrid was the site of thePlaza Mayor, where a statue of Philip III was built.
To improve relations, Philip undertook a trip to Portugal in 1619, which was applauded by the new minister and valido, the Duke of Uzeda, son of the Duke of Lerma. He was received with enthusiasm, with councils and corporations spending enormous sums during his reception. He was suggested to makeLisbon the capital of the Spanish monarchy. Noblemen and jurisconsults complained that they neither received favors nor were employed in courts, embassies, or Spanish universities. The Duke of Uceda treatedTeodósio II, Duke of Braganza, a potential leader of opposition to Spanish rule, who had come to pay homage, harshly.
After months in Lisbon, Philip left in October, leaving the country dissatisfied, especially after the reappointment of the Marquess of Alenquer as Viceroy. His son, the futurePhilip III of Portugal, was sworn as the legitimate heir by the Portuguese. In the rest of Portugal's domains, the Dutch had tried to take theMoluccas,Malacca andMozambique, being defeated byAndré Furtado de Mendonça and Estêvão de Ataíde.
The reform of the kingdom's Ordinances was published in Portugal in 1603, which the King addressed at the beginning of his reign. These are the well-known ordinations called the Philippine Ordinances, which were preceded by the Alfonsine andManueline Ordinances.
This King became known in Portugal by the nicknameThe Pious. Upon leaving Portugal in 1619, he fell seriously ill inCovarrubias and never recovered, dying within a year. For 53 days, he was bedridden, covered in sores and abscesses. He died at the age of 42 due to pulmonary thromboembolism caused by prolonged immobilization.[110]
It is said that his last words were: "Oh! If at that time I had been in a desert to become a saint! Now I would appear with more confidence at the judgment seat of Jesus Christ!"[111]
Philip III's tomb, between those of his grandfather, father and son
Philip III died in Madrid on 31 March 1621, and was succeeded by his son,Philip IV, who swiftly removed the last remnants of the Sandoval family regime from court. According to the memoirs of the French ambassadorFrançois de Bassompierre, the claim that he was killed by the heat of abrasero (a pan of hot charcoal), due to the absence of the proper official is a humorous exaggeration of the court etiquette.[112]
Philip has generally left a poor legacy with historians. Three major historians of the period have described an 'undistinguished and insignificant man',[3] a 'miserable monarch',[4] whose 'only virtue appeared to reside in a total absence of vice'.[5] More generally, Philip has largely retained the reputation of 'a weak, dim-witted monarch who preferred hunting and traveling to governing'.[113]
Unlike Philip IV, whose reputation has improved significantly in the light of recent analysis, Philip III's reign has been relatively unstudied, possibly because of the negative interpretation given to the role of Philip and Lerma during the period.[113] Traditionally, the decline of Spain has been placed from the 1590s onward;revisionist historians from the 1960s, however, presented an alternative analysis, arguing that in many ways Philip III's Spain of 1621—reinforced with new territories in Alsace, at peace with France, dominant in the Holy Roman Empire, and about to begin a successful campaign against the Dutch—was in a much stronger position than in 1598, despite the poor personal performance of her king during the period.[114] Philip's use of Lerma as hisvalido has formed one of the key historical and contemporary criticisms against him; recent work[b] has perhaps begun to present a more nuanced picture of the relationship and the institution that survived for the next forty years in Spanish royal government.
Like manyHabsburgs, Philip III was the product of extensiveinbreeding. His father,Philip II, a product ofmarriage between first cousins, married his niece,Anna of Austria, herself the product of a cousin couple. Philip III, in turn, married his first cousin once removed,Margaret of Austria. This pattern would continue in the next generation, ultimately culminating in the end of the Spanish Habsburg line in the person of Philip's feeble grandson,Charles II.
Ancestors of Philip III and his relationship with his wife
^In reality, the Archdukes outlived Philip, resulting in the reunification occurring under his son, Philip IV.
^In particular, Feros (2006) and Williams' (2006) recent extensive studies of the period, and Sánchez's (1996) analysis of the role of powerful women, often under-reported in historical documents, at Philip's court.
^Cristina Borreguero Beltrán, Óscar R. Melgosa Oter, Ángela Pereda López, and Asunción Retortillo Atienza, eds.Piedra a piedra: La construcción de la historia moderna a la sombra de las catedrales. XVI Reunión Científica de la Fundación Española de Historia Moderna "A la sombra de las catedrales," Universidad de Burgos, 8–10 de junio de 2021. (2022). Page 137.https://digital.csic.es/bitstream/10261/272239/1/4-SanPedroBezares.pdf
^Guzmán, Carmen Luz (2013). "Las cautivas de las Siete Ciudades: El cautiverio de mujeres hispanocriollas durante la Guerra de Arauco, en la perspectiva de cuatro cronistas (s. XVII)" [The captives of the Seven Cities: The captivity of hispanic-creole women during the Arauco's War, from the insight of four chroniclers (17th century)].Intus-Legere Historia (in Spanish).7 (1):77–97.doi:10.15691/07176864.2014.0.94 (inactive 6 July 2025).{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: DOI inactive as of July 2025 (link)
^Reséndez, Andrés.The Other Slavery: The Uncovered Story of Indian Enslavement in America (Kindle ed.). Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. pp. 127–128.Philip III, had taken the drastic step of stripping indigenous "rebels" of the customary royal protection against enslavement in 1608, thus making Chile one of the few parts of the empire where slave taking was entirely legal.
^Valenzuela Márquez, Jaime (2009). "Esclavos mapuches. Para una historia del secuestro y deportación de indígenas en la colonia". In Gaune, Rafael; Lara, Martín (eds.).Historias de racismo y discriminación en Chile (in Spanish). pp. 231–233.
^Manuel Arturo Peña Batlle,Historia de la cuestión fronteriza dominico-haitiana, segunda edición, Editora Amigo del Hogar, 1988. Libro I: Época colonial, páginas 73–84. book saved on theInternet Archive. See bookhere.
^Royal and Supreme Council of the Indies,"Royal Decree to Antonio Osorio, president of the Court of Santo Domingo, ordering the transfer of the towns in Puerto de Plata, Monte Cristi, Bayajá and La Yaguana, located in the Northern Strip of the island of Hispaniola, inland, reducing them to two towns, and establishing the pardon of the guilty parties who are reduced to them.", Published on 6 August 1603, saved on theArchivo general de las Indias web page (See detailshere), see the complete documenthere
Sánchez, Magdalena S. (1996). "Pious and Political Images of a Habsburg Woman at the Court of Philip III (1598–1621)". In Sánchez; Saint-Saëns, Alain (eds.).Spanish women in the golden age: images and realities. Greenwood Publishing Group.
Stradling, R. A. (1988).Philip IV and the Government of Spain, 1621–1665. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Thompson, I. A. A. (2001). Hoffman; Norburg (eds.).Castile, Constitionalism and Liberty.
Wedgwood, C.V. (1981).The Thirty Years War. London: Methuen.
Williams, Patrick (2006).The Great Favourite: the Duke of Lerma and the court and government of Philip III of Spain, 1598–1621. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Zagorin, Perez (1992).Rebels and Rulers, 1500–1660. Vol. II Provincial rebellion: Revolutionary civil wars,1560–1660. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
See also Paul C. Allen,Philip III and the Pax Hispanica: The Failure of Grand Strategy (Yale UP: 2000) for an extensive discussion of the foreign policy of Philip III. Allen's is a revisionist work that also argues for a greater role played in international affairs by the Council of State and its leaders in this period rather than by Lerma.
The generations indicate descent fromCarlos I, under whom the crowns of Castile and Aragon were united, forming the Kingdom of Spain. Previously, the title Infante had been largely used in the different realms.
* also an infante of Castile and León, Aragon, Sicily and Naples,§also an infante of Spain and an archduke of Austria,#also an infante of Spain,‡also an imperial prince of Brazil,¶also a prince of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, Duke in Saxony,◙also a prince of Braganza,¤title removed in 1920 as their parents' marriage was deemed undynastic,ƒclaimant infante
Generations are numbered by male-line descent from the first archdukes. Later generations are included although Austrian titles of nobility were abolished in 1919.
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