| People's Liberation Army Rocket Force | |
|---|---|
| 中国人民解放军火箭军 | |
 Emblem of the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force | |
| Active | 1 July 1966; 59 years ago (1966-07-01) |
| Country |  People's Republic of China |
| Allegiance |  Chinese Communist Party[1] |
| Type | Tactical and strategic missile force |
| Role | Strategic deterrence Second strike |
| Size | 120,000+ personnel |
| Part of |  People's Liberation Army |
| Headquarters | Qinghe,Haidian,Beijing,China |
| March | 火箭军进行曲 ("March of the Rocket Force") |
| Anniversaries | 1 July annually |
| Equipment | |
| Engagements | |
| Commanders | |
| Commander | Vacant |
| Political Commissar | GeneralXu Xisheng |
| Insignia | |
| Flag |  |
| Badge |  |
| Sleeve badge |  |
| People's Liberation Army |
|---|
 |
| Executive departments |
| Staff |
| Services |
| Arms |
| Domestic troops |
| Special operations forces |
| Military districts |
| History of the Chinese military |
| Military ranks of China |
ThePeople's Liberation Army Rocket Force,[a] formerly theSecond Artillery Corps,[b] is thestrategic and tacticalmissile force of thePeople's Republic of China. The PLARF is the 4thbranch of thePeople's Liberation Army (PLA) and controls China's arsenal of land-based ballistic, hypersonic, cruise missiles—bothnuclear and conventional.
The armed service branch was established on 1 July 1966 and made its first public appearance on 1 October 1984. The headquarters for operations is located atQinghe,Beijing. The PLARF is under the direct command of theChinese Communist Party'sCentral Military Commission (CMC). The name was changed from the PLA Second Artillery Corps to the PLA Rocket Force on 1 January 2016.
The PLARF comprises more than 120,000 personnel and six ballistic missile "Bases" (units at roughlycorps orarmy group grade), plus 3 support Bases in charge of storage, engineering, and training respectively. The six operational Bases are independently deployed in the fiveTheaters throughout China. and each controls a number of brigades.[needs update]
China has the largest land-based missile arsenal in the world. According toUnited States Department of Defense estimates, this includes 400 ground-launchedcruise missiles, 900 conventionally armedshort-range ballistic missiles, 1,300 conventionalmedium-range ballistic missiles, 500 conventionalintermediate-range ballistic missiles, as well as 400intercontinental ballistic missiles. Many of these are extremely accurate, which would allow them to destroy targets even without nuclear warheads.[2] TheBulletin of the Atomic Scientists andFederation of American Scientists estimated in 2023 that China has a stockpile of approximately 500 nuclear warheads,[3][4] while a 2024 United States Department of Defense estimate put the number of nuclear warheads at 600.[2] In 2025, FAS estimated the Chinese nuclear stockpile at around 600 warheads (the majority stored and not directly operationally), while the Pentagon estimates that the PRC will have around 1,000 warheads by 2030.[5]
China established the Second Artillery as a branch of the PLA designed to operate its nuclear missiles.[6]: 75 Top political leadership retained centralized control over the nuclear arsenal.[6]: 75–76 In 1967, the CMC issued theTemporary Regulations on the Second Artillery's Basic Tasks and Command Relationships, which established a direct line of command to the nuclear missile units and specified that "force development, deployments, maneuvers, and especially its combat [operations] must all be under the collective leadership of the CMC; extremely strictly [and] extremely precisely, obeying and carrying out the orders of the CMC."[6]: 76–77
In the 1970s, the nuclear weapons program saw the development ofMRBM,IRBM andICBMs and marked the beginning of a deterrent force. China continued MRBM deployment, began deploying the Dongfeng-3 IRBM and successfully tested and commenced deployment of theDongfeng-4 (CSS-4) limited-range ICBM.
In 1980, the CMC stated that the Second Artillery should operate under the principles of "close defense" to ensure survivability of the nuclear force and "key point counterstrikes" to carry out retaliation.[6]: 75–76 In 1984, the Second Artillery added a third principle, reflectingDeng Xiaoping's preferences, that the nuclear force be "lean and effective".[6]: 76 The Second Artillery made its first public appearance on 1 October 1984.[7]
In the late 1980s, China was the world's third-largest nuclear power, possessing a small but crediblenuclear deterrent force of approximately 100 to 400 nuclear weapons. Beginning in the late 1970s, China deployed a full range of nuclear weapons and acquired a nuclearsecond-strike capability. The nuclear forces were operated by the 100,000-person Strategic Missile Force, which was controlled directly by theGeneral Staff.
China began developingnuclear weapons in the late 1950s with substantialSoviet assistance. With theSino-Soviet split in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Soviet Union withheld plans and data for anatomic bomb, abrogated the agreement on transferringdefense andnuclear technology, and began the withdrawal of Soviet advisers in 1960. Despite the termination of Soviet assistance, China committed itself to continue nuclear weapons development to break "thesuperpowers' monopoly on nuclear weapons," to ensure Chinesesecurity against the Soviet and American threats, and to increase Chinese prestige and power internationally.
China made rapid progress in the 1960s in developing nuclear weapons. In a 32-month period, China successfully tested its firstatomic bomb on October 16, 1964, atLop Nor, launched its firstnuclear missile on October 27, 1966, and detonated its firsthydrogen bomb on June 17, 1967. Deployment of theDongfeng-1 conventionally armedshort-range ballistic missile and theDongfeng-2 (CSS-1)medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) occurred in the 1960s. TheDongfeng-3 (CCS-2)intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) was successfully tested in 1969. Although theCultural Revolution disrupted thestrategic weapons program less than other scientific and educational sectors in China, there was a slowdown in succeeding years.
Gansu hosted a missile launching area.[8] China destroyed 9U-2 surveillance craft while two went missing when they attempted to spy on it.[9]
By 1980, China had overcome the slowdown in nuclear development caused by theCultural Revolution and had successes in its strategic weapons program. In May 1980, China successfully test launched its full-range ICBM, theDongfeng-5 (CCS-4); the missile flew from central China to theWestern Pacific, where it was recovered by a naval task force. The Dongfeng-5 possessed the capability to hit targets in theSoviet Union and the westernUnited States.
In 1981, China launched threesatellites intospace orbit from a singlelaunch vehicle, indicating that China might possess the technology to developmultiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). China also launched theType 092 submarineSSBN (Xia-class) in 1981, and the next year it conducted its first successful test launch of theJulang-2submarine-launched ballistic missile (CSS-NX-4).
In addition to the development of a sea-based nuclear force, China began considering the development oftactical nuclear weapons. PLA exercises featured the simulated use of tactical nuclear weapons in offensive and defensive situations beginning in 1982. Reports of Chinese possession of tactical nuclear weapons had remained unconfirmed in 1987.
In 1986, China possessed a credible deterrent force with land, sea and air elements. Land-based forces included ICBMs, IRBMs, and MRBMs. The sea-based strategic force consisted of SSBNs. TheAir Force'sbombers were capable of deliveringnuclear bombs but would be unlikely to penetrate the sophisticatedair defenses of modern military powers.
During the 1999NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, theUnited States bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.[6]: 17 Believing that the bombing was intentional, Chinese leadership worried that China was significantly lacking in leverage against the United States.[6]: 17 Among the measures China took to close its lack in leverage were efforts to develop precision missiles and accelerating plans to expand conventional missile forces.[6]: 17, 132
China's nuclear forces, in combination with the PLA's conventional forces, served to deter both nuclear and conventional attacks on the Chinese lands. Chinese leaders pledged to not use nuclear weapons first (no first use), but pledged to absolutely counter-attack with nuclear weapons if nuclear weapons are used against China. China envisioned retaliation against strategic and tactical attacks and would probably strikecountervalue rather thancounterforce targets.
The combination of China's few nuclear weapons and technological factors such as range, accuracy, and response time limited the effectiveness of nuclear strikes against counterforce targets. China has been seeking to increase the credibility of its nuclear retaliatory capability by dispersing and concealing its nuclear forces in difficult terrain, improving their mobility, and hardening itsmissile silos.
TheCJ-10 long-range cruise missile made its first public appearance during the military parade on the60th Anniversary of the People's Republic of China; the CJ-10 represents the next generation in rocket weapons technology in the PLA.
In late 2009, it was reported that the Corps was constructing a 3,000–5,000-kilometre (1,900–3,100 mi) long underground launch and storage facility for nuclear missiles in theHebei province.[10]47 News reported that the facility was likely located in theTaihang Mountains.[11]
TheDF-ZFhypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) made its first flight test on 9 January 2014;[12] it likely entered service by October 2019.[13] It is believed to have atop speed of Mach 10, or 12,360 km/h (7,680 mph).[14]
Two Chinese technical papers from December 2012 and April 2013 show that China has concluded that hypersonic weapons pose "a new aerospace threat" and that they are developing satellite directed precision guidance systems. China is the third country to enter the "hypersonic arms race" after Russia and the United States. The U.S. Air Force has flown theX-51A Waverider technology demonstrator and the U.S. Army has flight tested theAdvanced Hypersonic Weapon.[citation needed] China later confirmed the successful test flight of a "hypersonic missile delivery vehicle," but claimed it was part of a scientific experiment and not aimed at a target.[15]
The name was changed from the PLA Second Artillery Corps to the PLA Rocket Force on 1 January 2016.[16][17] Despite claims by some, there appears to be no evidence to suggest that the new generation of Chinese ballistic-missile submarines came under PLARF control.[18][19]
US Air ForceNational Air and Space Intelligence Center estimated that as of 2023 the number of Chinese nuclear warheads capable of reaching the United States has expanded well over 200.[20]
In June 2021, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies has found out that China is constructing new missile silo field inGansu in western China. According to the satellite picture, 119 missile silos forintercontinental ballistic missiles are under construction nearYumen City.[21] In July,Federation Of American Scientists found out there are another 110 silos being built inHami,Xinjiang. The two significant expansion projects include silos more than ten times the number of ICBM silos in operation of PLARF today.[22]
In July 2021, China tested globe-circling hypersonic missile including the unprecedented launch of a separate 2nd missile from the ultra-high-speed vehicle according to the Financial Times and Wall Street Journal. The test showed China's development of its strategic, nuclear-capable weapons as more advanced than any had thought, surprising Pentagon officials, the two newspapers said. Neither the United States nor Russia has demonstrated the same ability, which requires launching a missile from a parent vehicle traveling five times the speed of sound. According to reporting by the Financial Times, this weapons system consists of two parts: a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) and a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV).[23][24]
In July 2023,South China Morning Post reported that PLARF commanderLi Yuchao and deputy commander Liu Guangbin were under the investigation by theCMC Commission for Discipline Inspection. Later that month, both Li Yuchao and Liu Guangbin were officially removed from their posts, whileWang Houbin was appointed as the commander of the PLARF.[25] Additionally,Xu Xisheng was appointed as the political commissar.[26] Li Yuchao and Liu Guangbin's expulsion has not been formally explained. There are rumors that they are being investigated for corruption or disclosing military secrets.[27][28] Furthermore, it was thought to be an odd decision to replace the Rocket Force commander with military personnel from outside the branch, and this led to concerns about the security, credibility, and integrity of the PLA as well as its participation in China's military tactics during the Taiwan Strait conflict.[29]
On 25 September 2024 at 00:44UTC, the PLARF performed its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test over the Pacific Ocean since the early 1980s. The specific ICBM that was launched was not stated.[30][31]
| Title | 上将 Shang jiang | 中将 Zhong jiang | 少将 Shao jiang | 大校 Da xiao | 上校 Shang xiao | 中校 Zhong xiao | 少校 Shao xiao | 上尉 Shang wei | 中尉 Zhong wei | 少尉 Shao wei | 学员 Xue yuan |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Equivalent translation | General | Lieutenant general | Major general | Senior colonel | Colonel | Lieutenant colonel | Major | Captain | First lieutenant | Second lieutenant | Officer cadet |
| Shoulder insignia |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Collar insignia |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Rank group | 高级军士 Gāo jí jūn shì | 中级军士 Zhōng jí jūn shì | 初级军士 Chū jí jūn shì | 义务兵 Yì wù bīng | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Title | 一级军士长 Yī jí jūn shì zhǎng | 二级军士长 Er jí jūn shì zhǎng | 三级军士长 Sān jí jūn shì zhǎng | 一级上士 Yī jí shàng shì | 二级上士 Er jí shàng shì | 中士 Zhōng shì | 下士 Xià shì | 上等兵 Shàng děng bīng | 列兵 Liè bīng |
| Equivalent translation | Master Sergeant First Class | Master Sergeant Second Class | Master Sergeant Third Class | Staff Sergeant First Class | Staff Sergeant Second Class | Sergeant | Corporal | Private First Class | Private |
| Shoulder insignia |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Collar insignia |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
Commander:
Political Commissars:
The Special Operations Regiment has been seen usingbow and arrows along withQBZ-95 rifles andQBU-88 sniper rifles.[32][33]
TheQBZ-03 has also been used by the PLARF.[34]
As of at least 2024, China has the largest land-based missile arsenal in the world.[35]
| Missile | NATO designation | Type | Number | Warhead | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CJ-10[36] | CH-SSC-9 Mod 1[36] | Cruise missile[36] | ~72[36] | Conventional[36] | |
| CJ-10A[36] | CH-SSC-9 Mod 2[36] | Cruise missile[36] | Conventional[36] | ||
| CJ-100[36] | CH-SSC-13[36] | Cruise missile[36] | Conventional[36] | ||
| CJ-1000 | Hypersonic Cruise missile | Nuclear/Conventional | |||
| DF-5A[36] | CSS-4 Mod 2[37] | ICBM[36] | 18+[36] | Nuclear[36] | |
| DF-5B[36] | CSS-4 Mod 3[37] | ICBM[36] | Nuclear[36] | ||
| DF-5C[36] | CSS-4 Mod 4 (uncertain)[37] | ICBM[36] | Nuclear[36] | ||
| DF-11A[36] | CSS-7[38] | SRBM[36] | ~108[36] | Conventional[36] | |
| DF-15B[36] | CSS-6[38] | SRBM[36] | ~81[36] | Conventional[36] | |
| DF-16[36] | CSS-11[38] | SRBM[36] | ~36[36] | Conventional[36] | |
| DF-17[36] | CSS-22[38] | MRBM[36] | ~48[36] | Conventional[36] | CarriesDF-ZFhypersonic glide vehicle (HGV)[39] |
| DF-21C[36] | CSS-5[38] | MRBM[36] | ~30[36] | Conventional[36] | |
| DF-21D[36] | CSS-5[38] | MRBM[36] | Conventional[36] | ||
| DF-26[36] | CSS-18[38] | IRBM[36] | 140+[36] | Conventional/nuclear[36] | |
| DF-27[36] | IRBM[36] | Conventional/nuclear[36] | Carries HGV[36] | ||
| DF-31[36] | CSS-10 Mod 1[37] | ICBM[36] | ~6 | Nuclear[36] | Silo-based[36] |
| DF-31A[36] | CSS-10 Mod 2 (uncertain)[37] | ICBM[36] | ~24[36] | Nuclear[36] | |
| DF-31AG[36] | CSS-10 Mod 2 (uncertain)[37] | ICBM[36] | ~56[36] | Nuclear[36] | |
| DF-41[36] | CSS-20[37] | ICBM[36] | ~36[36] | Nuclear[36] |
The PLARF is directly subordinated to the CMC.[40] and headquartered inBeijing.[41] The PLARF comprises more than 120,000 personnel,[36] and is organized into six operational bases and three support bases;[42] these are corps leader or corps deputygrade units.[40] The operational bases cover geographical areas, and their ordnance mix reflects their location and mission.[40] They are similarly structured with six to eight missile brigrades, support regiments, and at least one hospital. Base equipment inspection regiments are responsible for storing nuclear warheads.[43] Bases have peacetime administrative control of nuclear forces. In wartime, the CMC has direct control over nuclear forces. Control over conventional forces is unclear; in 2022, there was evidence of continuing integration withtheater commands.[40]
The PLARF has operated a separate command and control structure from the rest of the PLA since 1967.[44] The goal of the system is to ensure tight control of nuclear warheads at the highest levels of government. This is done by the Central Military Commission having direct control of the PLARF, outside of the structure of military regions.[citation needed] The six operational Bases are independently deployed in the fiveTheaters throughout China.[45][46] and each controls a number of brigades.[needs update]
TheMilitary Unit Cover Designators (MUCD) from the April 2017 system for PLARF units are 5-digit numbers starting with "96" with the remaining digits organization details. MCUD's starting with "961" or "965" are from the pre-2017 MUCD system.[47]
PLARF headquarters has four administrative departments: Staff Department, Political Work Department, Equipment Department, and Logistics Department.[48]
Wang Houbin became PLARF commander in July 2023,[25]Xu Xisheng was the political commissar in 2022.[49]
Base 61 [zh] (第六十一基地), MUCD Unit 96601[50] is an operational base covering eastern and some of southeastern China with headquarters inHuangshan,Anhui. It was created in 1965.[51]
Base 61 includes a brigade for testing its large short-ranged conventional missile inventory and anunmanned aerial vehicle regiment forintelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.[51]
| Name | Chinese name | MUCD | Location | Weapons | Nuclear capable | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 611[41] | Unit 96711[50] | Qingyang,Anhui[41] | DF-26[41] | Yes[41] | Major upgrade underway[41] | |
| 612[41] | Unit 96712[50] | Leping,Jingdezhen,Jiangxi[41] | DF-21A[41] | Yes[41] | Possibly upgrading toDF-31AG[41] | |
| 613[41] | Unit 96713[50] | Shangrao,Anhui[41] | DF-15B[41] | No[41] | Possibly upgrading toDF-17[41] | |
| 614[41] | Unit 96714[50] | Yong'an,Fujian[41] | DF-17[41] | Unknown[41] | ||
| 615[41] | Unit 96715[50] | Meizhou,Guangdong[41] | DF-11A[41] | No[41] | ||
| 616[41] | Unit 96716[50] | Ganzhou,Jiangxi[41] | DF-17[41] | No[41] | New base added since 2020.[41] | |
| 617[41] | Unit 96717[50] | Jinhua,Zhejiang[41] | DF-16[41] | No[41] | ||
| Nanchang,Jiangxi[41] | No[41] | Status uncertain |
Base 62 [zh] (第六十二基地), MUCD Unit 96602[50] is an operational base covering most of southeastern China with headquarters inKunming,Yunnan. It was created in 1966.[52]
| Name | Chinese name | MUCD | Location | Weapons | Nuclear capable | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 621[41] | Unit 96721[50] | Yibin,Sichuan[41] | DF-31AG (uncertain)[41] | Yes[41] | ||
| 622[41] | Unit 96722[50] | Yuxi,Yunnan[41] | DF-31A[41] | Yes[41] | ||
| 623[41] | Unit 96723[50] | Liuzhou,Guangxi[41] | DF-10A[41] | No[41] | ||
| 624[41] | Unit 96724[50] | Danzhou,Hainan[41] | DF-21D[41] | No[41] | Possibly upgrading to new missile[41] | |
| 625[41] | Unit 96725[50] | Jianshui,Yunnan[41] | DF-26[41] | Yes[41] | ||
| 626[41] | Unit 96726[50] | Qingyuan,Guangdong[41] | DF-26[41] | Yes[41] | ||
| 627[41] | Unit 96727[50] | Puning.Jieyang,Guangdong[41] | DF-17[41] | No[41] | Base expansion underway as of 2025[41] |
Base 63 [zh] (第六十三基地), MUCD Unit 96603 is an operational base covering southern inland China with headquarters inHuaihua,Hunan.[53]
Base 63 includes a regiment responsible for fueling liquid-fuelled missiles.[53]
| Name | Chinese name | MUCD | Location | Weapons | Nuclear capable | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 631[41] | Unit 96731[50] | Jingzhou,Hubei[41] | DF-5B (possibly DF-5C)[41] | Yes[41] | 6 silos, adding 6 more[41] | |
| 632[41] | Unit 96732[50] | Shaoyang,Hunan[41] | DF-31AG[41] | Yes[41] | ||
| 633[41] | Unit 96733[50] | Huitong,Hunan[41] | DF-5A[41] | Yes[41] | 6 silos[41] | |
| 634[41] | Unit 96734[50] | Yueyang,Hunan[41] | DF-5C (uncertain)[41] | Unknown[41] | 12 silos under construction as of 2025[41] | |
| 635[41] | Unit 96735[50] | Yichun,Jiangxi[41] | DF-17 (uncertain)[41] | No[41] | ||
| 636[41] | Unit 96736[50] | Shaoguan,Guangdong[41] | DF-16A[41] | No |
Base 64 [zh] (第六十四基地), MUCD Unit 96604[50] is an operational base covering northwest and north-central China with headquarters inLanzhou,Gansu.[54]
Base 64 has an equipment inspection brigade instead of a regiment.[43]
| Name | Chinese name | MUCD | Location | Weapons | Nuclear capable | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 641[41] | Unit 96741[50] | Hancheng,Shaanxi[41] | DF-31 (uncertain)[41] | Unknown[41] | ||
| Hancheng,Shaanxi[41] | DF-31AG[41] | Yes[41] | New based completed 2024[41] | |||
| 642[41] | Unit 96742[50] | Datong,Shanxi[41] | DF-31AG[41] | Yes[41] | At least 3 dispersed launch units[41] | |
| 643[41] | Unit 96743[50] | Tianshui,Gansu[41] | DF-31AG[41] | Yes[41] | ||
| 644[41] | Unit 96744[50] | Hanzhong,Shaanxi[41] | DF-41[41] | Yes[41] | ||
| 645[41] | Unit 96745[50] | Yinchuan,Ningxia[41] | DF-41 (uncertain)[41] | Unknown[41] | ||
| 646[41] | Unit 96746[50] | Korla,Xinjiang[41] | DF-21C | Yes[41] | ||
| 647[41] | Unit 96747[50] | Zhangye,Qinghai[41] | DF-26 (uncertain)[41] | Unknown[41] | New brigade base under construction as of 2025[41] | |
| Hami,Xinjiang[41] | DF-31A (uncertain)[41] | Unknown[41] | 120 silos[41] | |||
| Yumen,Gansu[41] | DF-31A (uncertain)[41] | Unknown[41] | 110 silos[41] |
Base 65 [zh] (第六十五基地), MUCD Unit 96605[50] is an operational base covering eastern and northeastern China with headquarters inShenyang,Liaoning.[55] It was formerly Base 51.[56]
| Name | Chinese name | MUCD | Location | Weapons | Nuclear capable | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 651[41] | Unit 96751[50] | Chifeng,Inner Mongolia[41] | DF-41[41] | Yes[41] | ||
| 652[41] | Unit 96752[50] | Tonghua,Jilin[41] | DF-31AG[41] | Yes[41] | ||
| Tonghua area[41] | DF-31A (uncertain)[41] | Yes[41] | ||||
| 653[41] | Unit 96753[50] | Laiwu,Shandong[41] | DF-21D[41] | No[41] | Possibly upgrading to new missile[41] | |
| 654[41] | Unit 96754[50] | Dengshahe,Liaoning[41] | DF-26 (uncertain)[41] | Unknown[41] | Former DF-21A used for DF-26 support[41] | |
| Dengshahe,Liaoning[41] | DF-26 (uncertain)[41] | Unknown[41] | New base construction paused[41] | |||
| Huangling[41] | DF-26[41] | Yes[41] | ||||
| 655[41] | Unit 96755[50] | Tonghua,Jilin[41] | DF-17 (uncertain)[41] | No[41] | Base upgrade underway as of 2025[41] | |
| 656[41] | Unit 96756[50] | Linyi,Shandong[41] | CJ-100 (uncertain)[41] | No[41] | ||
| 657[41] | Unit 96757[50] | Rumored new base[41] | ||||
| Yulin,Shaanxi[41] | DF-31A (uncertain)[41] | Unknown[41] | 90 silos[41] |
Base 66 [zh] (第六十六基地), MUCD Unit 96606 is an operational base covering central China with headquarters inLuoyang,Henan. It was established in 1966.[57]
| Name | Chinese name | MUCD | Location | Weapons | Nuclear capable | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 661[41] | Unit 96761[50] | Lushi,Henan[41] | DF-5B[41] | Yes[41] | 6 silos[41] | |
| Sanmenxia[41] | DF-5[41] | Yes[41] | New base[41] | |||
| 662[41] | Unit 96762[50] | Luanchuan,Henan[41] | DF-5C (uncertain)[41] | Yes[41] | 12 silos under construction 2025[41] | |
| 663[41] | Unit 96763[50] | Nanyang,Henan[41] | DF-31A[41] | Yes[41] | ||
| 664[41] | Unit 96764[50] | Xiangyang,Hubei[41] | DF-31AG[41] | Yes[41] | ||
| 665[41] | Unit 96765[50] | Changzhi,Shanxi[41] | DF-26 (uncertain)[41] | Unknown[41] | ||
| 666[41] | Unit 96766[50] | Xinyang,Henan[41] | DF-26[41] | Yes[41] |
Base 67 [zh] (第六十七基地) is a support base headquartered inBaoji,Shaanxi,[58] responsible for the storage, maintenance and distribution of China's nuclear weapons.[59] Base 67 was created in 1958 as Unit 0674 in Haiyan County, Qinghai. It was transferred to theCommission for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense in 1969 and moved toShaanxi, and then to the Second Artillery Corps in 1980. It was known asBase 22 until 2017.[58]
Base 67 includes the subterranean[60] nuclear weapons storage complex inTaibai County in theQin Mountains.[59][58] Preparations to move the nuclear weapons storage facility to Taibai began in 1969.[60] In 2010, relatively few warheads were maintained at operational base-level for extended durations. The distribution of warheads is reliant on the country's transportation network.[61] The construction of theBaoji–Chengdu railway by the PLA in the 1960s may have been to support warhead distribution.[60] A derailment inside a tunnel during the2008 Sichuan earthquake shutdown the Baoji–Chengdu railway for 12 days. In another incident, a Second Artillery Corps crane was used to clear amultiple-vehicle collision caused by icy roads in the Qin Mountains.[61]
The Missile Technical Service Brigade is the main unit overseeing the Taibai facility.[62] Its main focus seems to be warhead storage and maintenance.[63] It is complemented by the brigade-sized Unit 96038 which seems focused on inspection and testing of certain warhead components.[63] Unit 96038 includes a security battalion with the 38-member "Sharp Blade" Special Operations Team forsite defense and the "Guardian Spirits of the Restricted Zone" Security Company.[64] The "Sharp Blade" unit also performs nuclear missile escort, warhead security and offensive tasks.[65]
Base 68 [zh] (第六十八基地) is an engineering support base responsible for constructing physical infrastructure headquartered inLuoyang,Henan.[66]
Base 68 was created as the PLARF Engineering Base in 2012 from the Engineering Technical Zongdui (ETZ);[66] ETZ was created in 1962 to handle installation of test platforms for nuclearweapon and satellite tests.[67] It was combined with 308th Engineering Command in 2017 to create Base 68.[66]
Base 68 contains six engineering brigades plus support regiments.[67]
Base 69 [zh] (第六十九基地) is a training support base created in 2017 headquartered inYinchuan. It has four Test and Training Districts and various independent test and training regiments.[68]
The 1st Test and Training District provides training in desert environments, and provides measurement and control support for missile tests.[69] The 2nd Test and Training District hosts aopposing force (OPFOR) regiment for PLARF training.[70] The 3rd Test and Training District provides training in plateau operations, hosts the PLARF'selectronic warfare OPFOR unit, and supports theGobi Desert test range.[71] The 4th Test and Training District provides cruise missile and rail transport training.[72]
The PLARF Golden Wheel Project (Chinese Wikipedia:金轮工程) co-operates theDF-3 andDF-21medium-range ballistic missiles inSaudi Arabia since the establishment ofRoyal Saudi Strategic Missile Force in 1984.[73][74]
I am a member of the People's Liberation Army. I promise that I will follow the leadership of the Communist Party of China...
This report also quotes Chinese expert Song Zhongping saying that the Rocket Force could incorporate 'PLA sea-based missile unit[s] and air-based missile unit[s]'.
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This article incorporates text from this source, which is in thepublic domain. China: A Country Study.Federal Research Division.
