ThePanic of 1930 was afinancial crisis that occurred in the United States which led to a severe decline in themoney supply during a period of declining economic activity. A series ofbank failures from agricultural areas during this time period sparked panic among depositors which led to widespreadbank runs across the country.[1]
The increase in the amount of hard cash held in lieu of deposits lowered themoney multiplier effect which lowered the money supply and spending, draggingeconomic growth for the years to come. The lack of expansionary monetary policy by theFederal Reserve Board coupled with such deteriorating financial and economic situation exacerbated the recession into what became known as theGreat Contraction and later theGreat Depression.[2]
Failures occurred predominantly among state-chartered banks. National banks accounted for less than 1/6 of the total bank failures and less than 1/4 were members of the Federal Reserve System.[2]
Caldwell and Company, a leadinginvestment bank known as the "Morgan of the South," stands as a notable bank failure. Its half billion dollars worth of financial interests included a number of insurance companies, industrial enterprises, and the region's largest bank chain.[2] When Caldwell collapsed, its correspondent network of financial interests failed as well. Its collapse sparked further demand for currency from banks in affected regions.
The Federal Reserve, created in 1913 in response to thePanic of 1907, did not expand national money supply during this time period. The regional Federal Reserve Banks took different approaches to the panic.
The Federal Reserve Bank ofSt. Louis followed thereal bills doctrine and did not open thediscount window to its member banks in trouble following the collapse of Caldwell and Company. The Federal Reserve Bank ofAtlanta opened the discount window to solvent member banks which had illiquid securities and neededliquidity. Banks under the Atlanta Fed had a lowerfailure rate than those under the St. Louis Fed, lending credence to the theory that the panic was largely an issue of liquidity rather than solvency.[3]
Illiquidity coupled with a contagion of fear is seen as the major factor in precipitating the financial crisis. Acontagion of fear led to higher short-term demand for currency and further strained the liquidity of banks and as a result made them cash flowinsolvent. The contagion also led banks to dump their earning assets to build up their reserves which led to the failure of some banks otherwise solvent.[3]
Balance sheetinsolvency is seen as another possible explanation for the banking panic. However, data shows that most bank failures due to balance sheet insolvency happened between the panics between 1930 and 1933 while most bank failures due to illiquidity happened during the actual bank panics.[3] Illiquidty shocks were observed by measuring increased hoarding.
After the ensuingGreat Contraction, the Fed began to learn to deal with regional banking panics and started to embrace its role as lender of last resort. The importance of conducting expansionary monetary policy became evident as a result of the consequentGreat Depression.