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Pan-Turkism

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Political movement advocating the unity of Turkic peoples
Sun, crescent moon and star against a light-blue background
Flag of theOrganization of Turkic States
Flag misattributed to theTurkic Khaganate[a]

Pan-Turkism (Turkish:Pan-Türkizm) orTurkism (Turkish:Türkçülükor Türkizm) is apolitical movement that emerged during the 1880s among Turkic intellectuals who lived in the Russian region ofKazan (Tatarstan),South Caucasus (modern-dayAzerbaijan) and theOttoman Empire (modern-dayTurkey), with its aim being the cultural and political unification of allTurkic peoples.[5][6][7][8][9]Turanism is a closely related movement but it is a more general term, because Turkism only applies to Turkic peoples. However, researchers and politicians who are steeped in the pan-Turkic ideology have used these terms interchangeably in many sources and works of literature.[10]

Although many of the Turkic peoples share historical, cultural and linguistic roots, the rise of a pan-Turkic political movement is a phenomenon of the 19th and 20th centuries.[11] Ottoman poetZiya Gökalp defined pan-Turkism as a cultural, academic, and philosophical[12] and political[13] concept advocating the unity of Turkic peoples. Ideologically, it was premised onsocial Darwinism.[14][15][16] Pan-Turkism has been characterized by pseudoscientific theories known asPseudo-Turkology.

Name

[edit]

In research literature, "pan-Turkism" is used to describe the political, cultural and ethnic unity of allTurkic people. "Turkism" began to be used with the prefix "pan-" (from the Greek πᾶν, pan = all).[17]

Proponents use the latter as a point of comparison, since "Turkic" is a linguistic, ethnic and cultural distinction rather than a citizenship description. This differentiates it from "Turkish", which is the term which is officially used in reference to citizens of Turkey. Pan-Turkic ideas and reunification movements have become popular since thecollapse of the Soviet Union inCentral Asian and otherTurkic countries.

History

[edit]
Demonstration with flags
Pan-Turkic rally inIstanbul, March 2009

Development and spread

[edit]

In 1804, theTatar theologianGhabdennasir Qursawi wrote atreatise calling for the modernization of Islam. Qursawi was aJadid (from the Arabic wordjadid, "new"). The Jadids encouraged critical thinking, supported education and advocated the equality of the sexes, advocated tolerance of other faiths, advocated Turkic cultural unity, and advocated openness to Europe’s cultural legacy.[18] The Jadid movement was founded in 1843 inKazan. Its aim was the implementation of a semi-secular modernization program and the implementation of an educational reform program, both programs would emphasize the national (rather than the religious) identity of the Turks. Before they founded their movement in 1843, the Jadids considered themselvesMuslim subjects of theRussian Empire, a belief which they held until the Jadid movement disbanded.[19]

After they joined theWäisi movement, the Jadids advocated national liberation. After 1907, many supporters of Turkic unity immigrated to the Ottoman Empire.

The newspaperTürk in Cairo was published by exiles from the Ottoman Empire after the suspension of theOttoman constitution of 1876 and the persecution of liberal intellectuals. It was the first publication to use the ethnic designation as its title.[20]Yusuf Akçura published "Three Types of Policy" (Üç tarz-ı siyaset) anonymously in 1904, the earliest manifesto of a pan-Turkic nationalism.[20] Akçura argued that thesupra-ethnic union espoused by the Ottomans was unrealistic. ThePan-Islamic model had advantages, but Muslim populations were under colonial rule which would oppose unification. He concluded that an ethnic Turkish nation would require the cultivation of a national identity; a pan-Turkish empire would abandon theBalkans andEastern Europe in favor ofCentral Asia. The first publication of "Three Types of Policy" had a negative reaction, but it became more influential by its third publication in 1911 in Istanbul. The Ottoman Empire had lost its African territory to theKingdom of Italy and it would soon lose the Balkans. Pan-Turkish nationalism consequently became a more feasible (and popular) political strategy.[citation needed]

In 1908, theCommittee of Union and Progress came to power in Ottoman Turkey, and the empire adopted a nationalistic ideology. This contrasted with its largely Muslim ideology which dated back to the 16th century, when the sultan was thecaliph of his Muslim lands. Leaders who espoused Pan-Turkism fled from Russia and moved toIstanbul, where a strong pan-Turkic movement arose; the Turkish pan-Turkic movement grew and transformed itself into a nationalistic, ethnically oriented movement which sought to replace thecaliphate with a state. After thefall of the Ottoman Empire, some of them tried to replace the multi-cultural and multi-ethnic empire with a Turkish commonwealth, the advocates of this idea were influenced by the nationalism of theYoung Turks. Leaders likeMustafa Kemal Atatürk acknowledged that such a goal was impossible, replacing pan-Turkic idealism with a form of nationalism which aimed to preserve the existence of anAnatolian nucleus.[citation needed]

TheTürk Yurdu Dergisi (Journal of the Turkish Homeland) was founded in 1911 byAkçura. This was the most important Turkist publication of the time, "in which, along with other Turkic exiles from Russia, [Akçura] attempted to instill a consciousness about the cultural unity of all Turkic peoples of the world."[20]

In 1923,Ziya Gökalp, famous poet and theorician of Turkism ideology, wrote his bookThe Principles of Turkism and idealized the unity ofTurkic peoples by callingTuran as a goal of Turkism.[21]

A significant early exponent of pan-Turkism wasEnver Pasha (1881–1922), theOttoman Minister of War andactingcommander-in-chief duringWorld War I. He later became a leader of theBasmachi movement (1916–1934) against Russian and Soviet rule inCentral Asia. DuringWorld War II, theNazis founded aTurkestan Legion which was primarily composed of soldiers who hoped to establish an independentCentral Asian state after the war. The German intrigue bore no fruit.[10]

When the Turkish Republic was established under the leadership ofMustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1923, interest in Pan-Turkism declined, because Atatürk promoted Turkish nationalism within Turkey.[22][23] The Pan-Turkist movements gained some momentum in the 1940s, due to the support which it received fromNazi Germany, which sought to use Pan-Turkism as leverage in order to undermine Russian influence in an effort to acquire the resources of Central Asia during the course ofWorld War II.[24] The development of pan-Turkist and anti-Soviet ideology, in some circles, was influenced byNazi propaganda during this period.[25][26] Some sources claim thatNihal Atsız advocated Nazi doctrines and adopted aHitler-style haircut.[27]Alparslan Türkeş, a leading pan-Turkist, took a pro-Hitler position during the war[28] and developed close connections with Nazi leaders in Germany.[29] Several pan-Turkic groups in Europe apparently had ties to Nazi Germany (or its supporters) at the start of the war, if not earlier.[24] The Turco-Tatars in Romania cooperated with theIron Guard, a Romanian fascist organisation.[24] Although the Turkish government's archives which date back to the World War II years have not been declassified, the level of contact can be ascertained from German archives.[24] A ten-yearTurco-German treaty of friendship was signed in Ankara on 18 January 1941.[24] Official and semi-official meetings between German ambassadorFranz von Papen and other German officials and Turkish officials, including General H. E. Erkilet (of Tatar origin and a frequent contributor to pan-Turkic journals) took place in the second half of 1941 and the early months of 1942.[24] The Turkish officials included General Ali Fuad Erdem andNuri Pasha (Killigil), brother of Enver Pasha.[24]

Pan-Turkists were not supported by the Turkish government during this time and on 19 May 1944,İsmet İnönü made a speech in which he condemned Pan-Turkism as "a dangerous and sick demonstration of the latest times" going on to say that the Turkish Republic was "facing efforts hostile to the existence of the Republic" and those who advocate these ideas "will only bring trouble and disaster". Nihal Atsız and other prominent pan-Turkist leaders were tried and sentenced to imprisonment for conspiring against the government.Zeki Velidi Togan was sentenced to ten years imprisonment and four years in internal exile, Reha Oğuz Türkkan was sentenced to five years and ten months in prison and two years in exile, Nihal Atsız was sentenced to six years, six months and 15 days in prison and 3 years in exile. Others were sentenced to prison terms which only ranged from a few months to four years in length.[30][31] But the defendants appealed the convictions and in October 1945, the sentences of all the convicted were abolished by the Military Court of Cassation.[32]

While Erkilet discussed military contingencies, Nuri Pasha told the Germans about his plan to establish independent states which would be allies (notsatellites) of Turkey. These states would be formed by the Turkic-speaking populations which lived inCrimea,Azerbaijan,Central Asia, northwesternIran, and northernIraq. Nuri Pasha offered to assist Nazi Germany's propaganda efforts on behalf of this cause. However, Turkey's government also feared for the survival of the Turkic minorities in theUSSR and it told von Papen that it could not joinGermany until the USSR was crushed. The Turkish government may have been apprehensive about Soviet might, which kept the country out of the war. On a less-official level, Turkic emigrants from the Soviet Union played a crucial role in negotiations and contacts between Turkey and Germany; among them were prominent pan-Turkic activists likeZeki Velidi Togan,Mammed Amin Rasulzade, Mirza Bala, Ahmet Caferoĝlu, Sayid Shamil andAyaz İshaki. Several Tatar military units which consisted of Turkic speakers from the Turco-Tatar and Caucasian regions of the USSR who had previously been prisoners of war of the Germans joined them and fought against the Soviets, the members of these Tatar military units generally fought as guerrillas in the hope that they would be able to secure the independence of their homelands and establish a pan-Turkic union. The units, which were reinforced, numbered several hundred thousand. Turkey took a cautious approach at the government level, but pan-Turkists were angered by the Turkish government's inaction because they believed that it was wasting a golden opportunity to achieve the goals of pan-Turkism.[24]

Pseudoscientific theories

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See also:Turanism,Turkology, andHistorical negationism § Azerbaijan

There is no such thing as theKurdish people or nation. They are merely carriers of Turkish culture and habits. The imagined region proposed as the newKurdistan is the region that was settled by the proto-Turks. TheSumerians andScythians come immediately to mind.[33]

Orhan Türkdoğan - Professor of Sociology atGebze Technical University

Pan-Turkism has been characterized by pseudoscientific theories known asPseudo-Turkology.[34][35] Though dismissed in serious scholarship, scholars promoting such theories, often known as Pseudo-Turkologists,[34] have in recent times emerged among every Turkic nationality.[36][37] A leading light among them isMurad Adzhi, who insists that two hundred thousand years ago, "an advanced people of Turkic blood" were living in theAltai Mountains. These tall and blond Turks are supposed to have founded the world's first state,Idel-Ural, 35,000 years ago, and to have migrated as far as theAmericas.[36] According to theories like theTurkish History Thesis, promoted by pseudo-scholars, the Turkic peoples are supposed to have migrated fromCentral Asia to the Middle East in theNeolithic. TheHittites,Sumerians,Babylonians, andancient Egyptians are here classified as being of Turkic origin.[35][36][37][38] TheKurgan cultures of the early Bronze Age up to more recent times are also typically ascribed to Turkic peoples by pan-Turkic pseudoscholars, such asIsmail Miziev.[39] Non-Turkic peoples typically classified as Turkic, Turkish, Proto-Turkish orTuranian includeScythians,Sakas,Cimmerians,Medes,Parthians,Caucasian Albanians, and various ethnic minorities in Turkic countries, such asKurds.[39][40][41][37][38] Adzhi also considersAlans,Goths,Burgundians,Saxons,Alemanni,Angles,Lombards, and manyRussians as Turks.[36] Only a few prominent peoples in history, such asJews,Chinese people,Armenians,Greeks,Persians, andScandinavians are considered non-Turkic by Adzhi.[36] PhilologistMirfatyh Zakiev, former chairman of theSupreme Soviet of theTatar ASSR, has published hundreds of "scientific" works on the subject, suggesting Turkic origins of theSumerian,Greek,Icelandic,Etruscan andMinoan languages. Zakiev contends that "proto-Turkish is the starting point of theIndo-European languages".[36] Not only peoples and cultures, but also prominent individuals, such asSaint George,Peter the Great,Mikhail Kutuzov andFyodor Dostoevsky, are proclaimed to have been "of Turkic origin".[36] As such the Turkic peoples are supposed to have once been the "benevolent conquerors" of the peoples of most of Eurasia, who thus owe them "a huge cultural debt".[36][42] ThepseudoscientificSun Language Theory states that all human languages are descendants of aproto-Turkic language and was developed by the Turkish presidentMustafa Kemal Atatürk during the 1930s.[43] Kairat Zakiryanov considers theJapanese andKazakhgene pools to be identical.[44] Several Turkish academics (Şevket Koçsoy, Özkan İzgi, Emel Esin) claim thatZhou dynasty were of Turkic origins.[45]

Criticism of pan-Turkism

[edit]

Pan-Turkism is often perceived as being a new form of Turkish, and in a lesser extent, Azerbaijani imperial ambition, and has been recently accused ofOghuzification of history. Some view the Turkish and Azerbaijani leaders who believed that they could reclaim the prestige of the Ottoman Empire by espousing the pan-Turkist ideology asracist andchauvinistic.[46][47]

Pan-Turkist views on Armenian history

[edit]
See also:Anti-Armenian sentiment,Armenian genocide, andHistory of Armenia

Clive Foss, professor ofancient history at theUniversity of Massachusetts Boston, critically notes that in1982: The Armenian File in the Light of History, Cemal Anadol writes that theIranianScythians andParthians are Turks. According to Anadol, the Armenians welcomed the Turks into the region; their language is a mixture with no roots and their alphabet is mixed, with 11 characters which were borrowed from the ancient Turkic alphabet. Foss calls this viewhistorical revisionism: "Turkish writings have been tendentious: history has been viewed as performing a useful service, proving or supporting a point of view, and so it is treated as something flexible which can be manipulated at will".[48] He concludes, "The notion, which seems well established in Turkey, that the Armenians were a wandering tribe without a home, who never had a state of their own, is of course entirely without any foundation in fact. The logical consequence of the commonly expressed view of the Armenians is that they have no place in Turkey, and they never did. The result would be the same if the viewpoint were expressed first, and the history were written to order. In a sense, something like this seems to have happened, for most Turks who grew up under the Republic were educated to believe in the ultimate priority of Turks in all parts of history, and ignore the Armenians all together; they had been clearly consigned to oblivion."[49]

Zangezur corridor

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Main article:Zangezur corridor
Azerbaijan and Turkey promote their vision of an land corridor through Armenian territory as a means of "uniting the Turkic world"[50][51]

The Zangezur corridor[b] is a concept for atransport corridor[60][61][62] that emerged after the2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, promoted primarily by Azerbaijan and Turkey as a direct land link between mainland Azerbaijan and itsNakhchivan exclave through Armenia’s southernSyunik province.[63][64] This proposed route, is envisioned without Armeniancheckpoints[65][66] and is framed by its supporters as a way to connect the broader Turkic world.[50][51][c] Armenia has steadily objected to it, asserting that "corridor logic" deviates from the ceasefire terms, and that it is a form of propaganda thatthreatens Armenian sovereignty.[67]

Certain critics regard the concept as a pan-Turkicexpansionist project. Azerbaijan has threatened to force the corridor’s creation using if Armenia does not agree.[68] Turkey haslong sought to establish a direct land corridor to mainland Azerbaijan.[69][70][71] Multiple sources state that this ambition was a driving factor behind theArmenian Genocide, as the Armenian population represented ageographical obstacle between Turkic entities.[72][73][74]Genocide Watch characterizes the corridor as a pan-Turkic project which "will cost thousands of Armenian lives."[75] TheLemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention has stated that the seizure of Armenia's Syunik region would "realize the pan-Turkic dream that fueled the Armenian Genocide of 1915-1923,"[76][77][78] adding that Azerbaijan's "actions extend far beyond mere territorial disputes, touching upon the very existence of Armenia and Armenians in what is left of theirancestral homeland."[79]

Ahmad Kazemi, academic and researcher on Eurasian issues, wrote that "Azerbaijan is seeking to establish the so-called pan-Turkic illusionary Zangezur corridor in south of Armenia under the pretext of creating connectivity in the region," arguing that "this corridor is not compatible with any of the present geopolitical and historical realities of the region."[80]

Since the end of theSecond Nagorno-Karabakh War, Azerbaijan has increasingly promotedexpansionist claims to Armenian territory which it describes as "Western Azerbaijan."[81][82] In September 2022, pro-government media and certain Azerbaijani officials briefly promoted the irredentist concept of the "Goycha-Zangazur Republic" which claims all of southern Armenia.[82] Azerbaijani parliamentarian Hikmat Babaoghlu criticized the idea, stating that it weakens Azerbaijan's public case to create the Zangezur corridor.[82]

Pan-Turkist views in Azerbaijan

[edit]
Demonstration with flags
Pan-Turkic rally inQuba, 2011

Kâzım Karabekir said

The aim of all Turks is to unite with the Turkic borders. History is affording us today the last opportunity. In order for theIslamic world not to be forever fragmented it is necessary that the campaign againstKarabagh be not allowed to abate. As a matter of fact drive the point home inAzeri circles that the campaign should be pursued with greater determination and severity.[83]

Western Azerbaijan is a term used in the Republic ofAzerbaijan to refer toArmenia. According to theWhole Azerbaijan theory, modern Armenia andNagorno-Karabakh were once inhabited by theAzerbaijanis.[84] Its claims are based on the belief that current Armenia was ruled by Turkic tribes and states from theLate Middle Ages to theTreaty of Turkmenchay which was signed after the 1826–1828Russo-Persian War. The concept has been sanctioned by the government ofAzerbaijan and its current president,Ilham Aliyev, who has said that Armenia is part of ancient Turkic, Azerbaijani land. Turkish and Azerbaijani historians have said that Armenians are alien, not indigenous, in theCaucasus and Anatolia.[85]

During the existence of theAzerbaijan SSR of theSoviet Union, pan-Turkist political elites ofBaku who were loyal to the Communist cause, in tandem with Soviet-era historical revisionism and myth-building, invented a national history based on the existence of an Azerbaijani nation-state that dominated the areas to the north and south of theAras river, which was supposedly torn apart by anIranian-Russian conspiracy in the Treaty of Turkmenchay of 1828.[86] This "imagined community" was cherished, promoted and institutionalized in formal history books of the educational system of the Azerbaijan SSR and the post-SovietAzerbaijan Republic.[86] As the Soviet Union was a closed society, and its people were unaware of the actual realities regarding Iran and its citizens of Azerbaijani descent, the elites in Soviet Azerbaijan kept cherishing and promoting the idea of a "united Azerbaijan" in their activities.[87] This romantic thought led to the founding of nostalgic literary works, known as the "literature of longing"; examples amongst this genre are, for instance,Foggy Tabriz byMammed Said Ordubadi, andThe Coming Day byMirza Ibrahimov.[87] As a rule, works belonging to the "literature of longing" genre were characterized by depicting the life ofIranian Azerbaijanis as a misery due to suppression by the "Fars" (Persians), and by narrating stories about Iranian Azerbaijanis waiting for the day when their "brothers" from the "north" would come and liberate them.[87] Works that belonged to this genre, as the historian and political scientist Zaur Gasimov explains, "were examples of blatantAzerbaijani nationalism stigmatizing the “division” of the nation along the river Araxes, as well as denunciations of economic and cultural exploitation of Iranian Azerbaijanis, etc."[88] Gasimov adds: "an important by-product of this literary genre was strongly articulatedanti-Iranian rhetoric. Tolerance and even support of this anti-Iranian rhetoric by the communist authorities were obvious."[88]

Nationalist political elites in post-Soviet Azerbaijan, being the inheritors of this mentality created during the Soviet rule, forwarded this "mission" for achieving a "united Azerbaijan" as a political goal of utmost importance.[87] Azerbaijani presidentAbulfaz Elchibey (1992–93) devoted his life to carrying out this mission, and he, in tandem with other pan-Turkist elites, went on a campaign for the ethnic awakening of Iranian Azerbaijanis.[87] It may be due to these ideas that Elchibey was elected president in the new country's first presidential election in 1992.[87] He and his government has been widely described as pursuing Pan-Turkic and anti-Iranian policies.[89] Other than the pan-Turkist leadership, nationalist intellectuals and Azerbaijani media also stipulated the question of "Southern Azerbaijan" in their main political agenda's.[87] In 1995-1996, according to one survey of the Azerbaijani press, the question of Iranian Azerbaijanis was covered more than any other topic by state-controlled and independent outlets in the young republic of Azerbaijan.[87] Since 1918, political elites with Pan-Turkist-oriented sentiments in the area that comprises the present-day Azerbaijan Republic have depended on the concept ofethnic nationalism in order to create an anti-Iranian sense of ethnicity amongst Iranian Azerbaijanis.[90] Iranian Azerbaijani intellectuals who have promoted Iranian cultural and national identity and put forth a reaction to early pan-Turkist claims over Iran's Azerbaijan region have been dubbed traitors to the "Azerbaijani nation" within the pan-Turkist media of the Republic of Azerbaijan.[91]

Ahmad Kazemi, the author of the bookSecurity in South Caucasus, told Iran's Strategic Council on Foreign Relations in a 2021 interview that "Azerbaijan is seeking to establish the so-called pan-Turkish illusionaryZangezur corridor in south of Armenia under the pretext of creating connectivity in the region", arguing that "this corridor is not compatible with any of the present geopolitical and historical realities of the region".[92]

Turkification of Genghis Khan

[edit]

Genghis Khan, founder of theMongol Empire, was and is largely recognised as Mongolian. However, due to the fluidity of his Mongol force and the incorporation of many Turkic tribes into his imperial realm at the time, this has led to an attempt to claim the history of the Mongol conqueror as a Turk, especially within the Turkish and Azerbaijani sphere, which has also led to genocidal and denial ideas to emerge as they seek to make Genghis Khan their national icon. The result is an extensive Turkification, especially within the Oghuz sphere, about Genghis Khan's history to grant him the position in Turkic history.[93][94][95][96]

Interestingly, however, the same pan-Turkist force that draws campaign to Oghuzify and Turkify Genghis Khan, has also been deeply xenophobic against theMongols due to theMongol invasion of the Khwarazmian Empire that destroyed the Persianate OghuzKhwarazmian Empire, pushing Oghuz Turks westward to Anatolia; as for the result, films likeDiriliş: Ertuğrul andMendirman Jaloliddin extensively carry anti-Mongolian messages as savages and murderers that forced Turks to leave westward.[97][98] At the same time, due to this Oghuzification campaign of Genghis Khan, they have totally failed to notice the huge different gaps betweenOghuz,Karluk andKipchak tribes; ironically, unlike the Oghuz, the Karluks and Kipchaks underwent Mongolisation culturally, contributing to the confused perception of Genghis Khan and an inability to separate fictions from nuanced studies.[99]

Russian views on pan-Turkism

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InTsarist Russian circles, pan-Turkism was considered a political,irredentist and aggressive idea.[100] Turkic peoples in Russia were threatened by Turkish expansion, and I. Gasprinsky and his followers were accused of being Turkish spies. After theOctober Revolution, theBolsheviks’ attitude to Turkism differed significantly from the Russian Empire’s. At the 10th Congress of Bolshevik Communist Party in 1921, the party "condemned pan-Turkism as a slope to bourgeois-democratic nationalism", however unofficially pan-Turkism was supported and promoted. The emergence of a pan-Turkism scare[citation needed] in Soviet propaganda made it one of the “most frightening” political labels in the USSR. The most widespread accusation used in the repression[citation needed] of educated Tatars and other Turkic peoples during the 1930s was that of pan-Turkism.[101]

In France and other Francophone countries

[edit]

The idea has also been discussed in theFrancophone world, noting that as victors in the First World War, England and France "dismembered the Arab portion" of the Ottoman Empire and shared it amongst themselves, further alienating Turkey. The loss of the Arabian oil fields limited Turkey becoming a petroleum power on the world stage; called "le panturquisme" in French, authors argue that it arose as a way of reclaiming some of the lost glory after the Ottoman defeat in the war and the loss of prestige in the region.[102]

In the United States and the rest of the New World

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Pan-Turkists likeReha Oğuz Türkkan have openly claimed thatpre-Columbian civilizations were Turkic civilizations and they have also claimed that modern-dayNative Americans are Turkic peoples, and activities which Turkish lobbying groups have conducted in order to draw Native Americans into the service of the wider Turkic world agenda have drawn criticism and triggered accusations that the Turkish government is falsifying the history of Native Americans in the service of Turkish imperialist ambitions.[103][104] According to an article by Polat Kaya which was published by theTurkish Cultural Foundation, the exact origins of Native Americans remain unclear and while they are widely believed to have migrated from Asia, the exact connection between Native Americans and other Turkic peoples remains disputed.[citation needed]

In scientific term

[edit]

Philip L. Kohl notes that the above-mentioned theories are nothing more than "incredible myths".[39] Nevertheless, the promotion of these theories have "taken on large-scale proportions" in countries such asTurkey andAzerbaijan.[40] Often associated withGreek,Assyrian andArmenian genocide denial, pan-Turkic pseudoscience has received extensive state and state-backed non-governmental support, and is taught all the way from elementary school to the highest level of universities in such countries.[41] Turkish and Azerbaijani students are imbued with textbooks which make "absurdly inflated" claims which state that allEurasian nomads, including theScythians, and allcivilizations on the territory of theOttoman Empire, such asSumer,ancient Egypt,ancient Greece, and theByzantine Empire, were of Turkic origin.[105] Konstantin Sheiko and Stephen Brown explain the reemergence of such pseudo-history as a form of national therapy, helping its proponents cope with the failures of the past.[36]

Criticism among Central Asian Turks

[edit]

There have been an increasing criticism among Central Asian Turks about pan-Turkism being more, or less, just a simply clouded version ofTurkish imperialism promoted by Turkey and Azerbaijan, in a form of an Islamised "Oghuzification" of Turkic identity, while ignoring the complex history of Turkic peoples as a dispersed and divided groups with multiple ethnicities and religious affiliations like howTuvans are Turkic Buddhists, orGagauz being Turkic Christians; some have compared it topan-Slavism,pan-Arabism,pan-Asianism,pan-Germanism andpan-Africanism — both failed because of unrealistic claims.[106][107][108] Additionally, constant warfare between Turkic tribes and different civilisational paths, something that also occurred with the Arab, Slavic, Asian, Germanic and African groups, such as the war between Oghuz-ledOttoman Empire and Karluk-ledTimurid Empire, or even the violent oppression of the supposedly "Altaic"Koreans by fellow "Altaic"Japanese during the 20th century, are also another focal point to question the motive of Turkic/Turan/Altaic unity with little recognition of the deep differences underneath; such criticism is also shared by numerous non-Central Asian scholars abroad.[106][109][110][111][112][113][114]

Notable pan-Turkists

[edit]

Pan-Turkist organizations

[edit]

Azerbaijan

Kazakhstan

Turkey

Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)

Uzbekistan

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]
  1. ^According toBook of Zhou andBook of Sui (later repeated byHistory of the Northern Dynasties), Göktürks erected atuğ banner decorated with a wolf's head made of gold to show that they had not forgotten their origin from a she-wolf ancestress.[1][2][3] Atuğ is a banner made of horse-hairs and based on Chinese banners made ofyak-hairs (纛standard Chinese <Middle Chinese *dok)[4]
  2. ^Zangezur refers to the historical and geographical region in the Caucasus. In Azerbaijan, the variation "Zangazur corridor" is used as well.[52][53]
    The concept has also been referred to by press and media as the "Nakhchivan corridor"[54][55] (Armenian:Նախիջևանի միջանցք;Azerbaijani:Naxçıvan dəhlizi), the "Meghri corridor",[56][57] (Armenian:Մեղրիի միջանցք;Azerbaijani:Meğri dəhlizi) and the "Syunik corridor"[58][59] (Armenian:Սյունիքի միջանցք;Azerbaijani:Sünik dəhlizi).
  3. ^Zangezur refers to the historical and geographical region in the Caucasus. In Azerbaijan, the variation "Zangazur corridor" is used as well.[52][53]
    The concept has also been referred to by press and media as the "Nakhchivan corridor"[54][55] (Armenian:Նախիջևանի միջանցք;Azerbaijani:Naxçıvan dəhlizi), the "Meghri corridor",[56][57] (Armenian:Մեղրիի միջանցք;Azerbaijani:Meğri dəhlizi) and the "Syunik corridor"[58][59] (Armenian:Սյունիքի միջանցք;Azerbaijani:Sünik dəhlizi).

References

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  1. ^Zhoushuvol. 50. quote: "旗纛之上,施金狼頭。…… 蓋本狼生,志不忘舊。"
  2. ^SuishuVol. 84 text: "故牙門建狼頭纛,示不忘本也。"
  3. ^Beishivol. 99: section Tujue text: "故牙門建狼頭纛,示不忘本也。"
  4. ^Clauson, Gerard (1972). An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-13th Century Turkish. Oxford University Press. p. 464
  5. ^Fishman, Joshua; Garcia, Ofelia (2011).Handbook of Language and Ethnic Identity: The Success-Failure Continuum in Language and Ethnic Identity Efforts. Vol. 2. Oxford University Press. p. 269.ISBN 978-0-19-539245-6.It is commonly acknowledged that pan-Turkism, the movement which aimed to politically and/or culturally unify all Turkic peoples, emerged among Turkic intellectuals who lived in Russia as a liberal-cultural movement in the 1880s.
  6. ^"Pan-Turkism".Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Encyclopædia Britannica. 2009. Retrieved19 Jul 2009.Political movement of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, which had as its goal the political union of all Turkish-speaking peoples in theOttoman Empire,Russia,China,Iran, andAfghanistan.
  7. ^Landau, Jacob (1995).Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism To Cooperation. Indiana University Press.ISBN 978-0-253-20960-3.
  8. ^Jacob M. Landau, "Radical Politics in Modern Turkey", BRILL, 1974.
  9. ^Robert F. Melson, "The Armenian Genocide" in Kevin Reilly (Editor), Stephen Kaufman (Editor), Angela Bodino (Editor) "Racism: A Global Reader (Sources and Studies in World History)", M.E. Sharpe (January 2003). pg 278:"Concluding that their liberal experiment had been a failure, CUP leaders turned to Pan-Turkism, axenophobic andchauvinistic brand ofnationalism that sought to create a new empire which would have been based onIslam and Turkish ethnicity."
  10. ^abIskander Gilyazov, "Пантюрκизм, Пантуранизм и ГерманияArchived 2006-10-04 at theWayback Machine", magazine "Татарстан" No 5-6, 1995.(in Russian)
  11. ^"Pan-Turkism".Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved2 April 2016.
  12. ^Gökalp, Ziya; Devereaux, Robert (1968).The Principles of Turkism. E. J. Brill. p. 125.ISBN 9789004007314.Turkism is not a political party but a scientific, philosophic and aesthetic school of thought.
  13. ^Kieser, Hans-Lukas (2006).Turkey beyond nationalism: towards post-nationalist identities. I. B. Tauris. p. 19.ISBN 978-1-84511-141-0.
  14. ^Doğan, Attila (2006).Osmanlı Aydınları ve Sosyal Darwinizm. Istanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.ISBN 978-9756176504.
  15. ^Hovannisian, Richard G. (2011).The Armenian Genocide: Cultural and Ethical Legacies. New Brunswick, New Jersey:Transaction Publishers. p. 298.ISBN 978-0-7658-0367-2.
  16. ^Oranlı, Imge (2020). "Epistemic Injustice from Afar : Rethinking the Denial of Armenian Genocide".Social Epistemology.35 (2):120–132.doi:10.1080/02691728.2020.1839593.S2CID 229463301.
  17. ^Mansur Hasanov, Academician of Academy of Sciences of Tatarstan Republic, "Великий реформатор", in magazine "Республика Татарстан" № 96–97 (24393-24394), 17 May 2001.(in Russian)
  18. ^Rafael Khakimov, "Taklid and IjtihadArchived 2007-02-10 at theWayback Machine",Russia in Global Affairs, Dec. 2003.
  19. ^N.N., "Полтора Века Пантюрκизма в Турции", magazine "Панорама".(in Russian)
  20. ^abcErsoy, Ahmet; g¢Rny, Maciej; Kechriotis, Vangelis (January 2010).Modernism: The Creation of Nation States. Central European University Press. p. 218.ISBN 9789637326615. Retrieved13 August 2014.
  21. ^Türkçülüğün Esasları pg.25 (Gökalp, Ziya)
  22. ^Pan Turkism, Encyclopedia Britannica.
  23. ^Eligur, Banu (2010).The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey. Cambridge University Press. p. 41.ISBN 9781139486583.
  24. ^abcdefghJacob M. Landau. Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation. India University Press, 1995. 2nd Edition. pp 112–114.
  25. ^Jacob M. Landau, "Radical Politics in Modern Turkey", BRILL, 1974. pg 194: "In the course of theSecond World War, various circles in Turkey absorbedNazi propaganda; these were pro-German and admiredNazism, which they grasped as a doctrine of warlike dynamism and a source of national inspiration, on which they could base their pan-Turkic and anti-Soviet ideology."
  26. ^John M. VanderLippe, "The politics of Turkish democracy", SUNY Press, 2005. "A third group was led by Nihal Atsiz, who favored a Hitler style haircut and mustache, and advocatedracist Nazi doctrines"
  27. ^John M. VanderLippe,The Politics of Turkish Democracy: Ismet Inonu and the Formation of the Multi-Party System, 1938-1950, (State University of New York Press, 2005), 108;"A third group was led by Nihal Atsiz, who favored a Hitler style haircut and moustache, and advocated Nazi racist doctrines."
  28. ^Peter Davies, Derek Lynch, "The Routledge Companion to Fascism and the Far Right", Routledge, 2002. pg 244: "Alparslan Türkeş: Leader of a Turkish neo-fascist movement, Nationalist Action Party(MHP). During the war, he adopted a pro-Hitler position and was imprisoned after a 1960 coup attempt against his country's ruler.
  29. ^Berch Berberoglu, " Turkey in crisis: from state capitalism to neocolonialism", Zed, 1982. 2nd edition. pg 125: "Turkes established close ties with Nazi leaders in Germany in 1945 "
  30. ^VanderLippe, John M. (2012-02-01).Politics of Turkish Democracy, The: Ismet Inonu and the Formation of the Multi-Party System, 1938-1950. SUNY Press. p. 109.ISBN 9780791483374.
  31. ^Ercilasun, Ahmet Bican (2018).Atsız, Türkçülüğün Mistik Önderi (in Turkish). Panama Yayincilik. p. 94.ISBN 9786052221068.
  32. ^Landau, Jacob M.; Landau, Gersten Professor of Political Science Jacob M.; Landau, Yaʻaqov M. (1995).Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation. Indiana University Press. pp. 117–118.ISBN 978-0-253-32869-4.
  33. ^Gunes, Cengiz; Zeydanlioglu, Welat (2013).The Kurdish Question in Turkey: New Perspectives on Violence, Representation and Reconciliation.Routledge. p. 11.ISBN 978-1135140632.
  34. ^abFrankle, Elanor (1948).Word formation in the Turkic languages.Columbia University Press. p. 2.
  35. ^abAktar, A.; Kizilyürek, N; Ozkirimli, U.; K?z?lyürek, Niyazi (2010).Nationalism in the Troubled Triangle: Cyprus, Greece and Turkey.Springer. p. 50.ISBN 978-0230297326.
  36. ^abcdefghiSheiko, Konstantin; Brown, Stephen (2014).History as Therapy: Alternative History and Nationalist Imaginings in Russia. ibidem Press. pp. 61–62.ISBN 978-3838265650.According to Adzhi, Alans, Goths, Burgundians, Saxons, Alemans, Angles, Langobards and many of the Russians were ethnic Turks.161 The list of non-Turks is relatively short and seems to comprise only Jews, Chinese, Armenians, Greeks, Persians, and Scandinavians... Mirfatykh Zakiev, a chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar ASSR and a professor ofphilology who has published hundreds of scientific works, argues that proto-Turkish is the starting point of theIndo-European languages. Zakiev and his colleagues claim to have discovered the Tatar roots of the Sumerian, ancient Greek and Icelandic languages and deciphered Etruscan and Minoan writings.
  37. ^abcKhazanov, Anatoly M. (1996).Post-Soviet Eurasia: Anthropological Perspectives on a World in Transition. Department of Anthropology,University of Michigan. p. 84.ISBN 1889480002.Discredited hypotheses – widespread in the 1920s and 1930s – about the Turkic origin of Sumerians, Scythians, Sakhas, and many other ancient peoples are nowadays popular
  38. ^abHunter, Shireen; Thomas, Jeffrey L.; Melikishvili, Alexander (2004).Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity and Security.M.E. Sharpe. p. 159.ISBN 0765612828.M. Zakiev claims that the Scythians and Sarmatians were all Turkic. He even considers the Sumerians as Turkic
  39. ^abcKohl, Philip L.; Fawcett, Clare (1995).Nationalism, Politics and the Practice of Archaeology.Cambridge University Press. pp. 143, 154.ISBN 0521558395.Apparently innocuous were other contradictory and/or incredible myths related by professional archaeologists that claimed that the Scythians were Turkic-speaking
  40. ^abSimonian, Hovann (2007).The Hemshin: History, Society and Identity in the Highlands of Northeast Turkey.Routledge. p. 354.ISBN 978-0230297326.Thus, ethnic groups or populations of the past (Huns, Scythians, Sakas, Cimmerians, Parthians, Hittites, Avars and others) who have disappeared long ago, as well as non-Turkic ethnic groups living in present-day Turkey, have come to be labeled Turkish, Proto-Turkish or Turanian
  41. ^abLornjad, Siavash; Doostzadeh, Ali (2012).On The Modern Politization of the Persian Poet Nezami Ganjavi. CCIS. p. 85.ISBN 978-9993069744.Claims that many Iranian figures and societies starting from the Medes, Scythians and Parthians were Turks), are still prevalent in countries that adhere to Pan—Turkist nationalism such as Turkey and the republic of Azerbaijan. These falsifications, which are backed by state and state backed non—governmental organizational bodies, range from elementary school all the way to the highest level of universities in these countries.
  42. ^Lynn Meskell,Archaeology Under Fire: Nationalism, Politics and Heritage in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, Routledge, 1998.
  43. ^"Мустафа (Кемаль) Ататюрк Мустафа Ататюрк". Retrieved2 April 2016.
  44. ^К.Закирьянов. Я вполне допускаю мысль, что в жилах Обамы течет тюркская кровь (Russian)
  45. ^
    • Esin, Emel (1986)."The Culture of the Turks: The Initial Inner Asian Phase" Publisher, Atatürk Culture Centre. p. 435, 439.
    • Koçsoy, Şevket (2002). "Türk Tarihi Kronojojisi",Türkler, C. I., Yeni Türkiye, Ankara, p. 73.
    • İzgi, Özkan (2002). "Orta Asya'nın En Eski Kültürleri ve Çin Medeniyeti ile İlişkileri",Türkler, C. I., Yeni Türkiye, Ankara, pp. 685-687.
    • Esin, Emel (2002). "İç Asya'da Milattan Önceki Bin Yılda Türklerin Atalarına Atfedilen Kültürler",Türkler, C. I., Yeni Türkiye, Ankara, p. 733-734.
  46. ^Jacob M. Landau. Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation. India University Press, 1995. 2nd Edition.pg 45: "Pan-Turkism's historic chance arrived both shortly before and during the First World War, when it was adopted as a guiding principle of state policy by an influential group among the Young Turks"
  47. ^Robert F. Melson, "The Armenian Genocide" in Kevin Reilly (Editor), Stephen Kaufman (Editor), Angela Bodino (Editor) "Racism: A Global Reader (Sources and Studies in World History)", M.E. Sharpe (January 2003). pg 278: "Concluding that their liberal experiment had been a failure, CUP leaders turned to Pan-Turkism, a xenophobic and chauvinistic brand of nationalism that sought to create a new empire based on Islam and Turkish ethnicity ... It was in this context of revolutionary and ideological transformation and war that the fateful decision to destroy the Armenians was taken."
  48. ^Clive Foss, “The Turkish View of Armenian History: A Vanishing Nation,” inThe Armenian Genocide: History, Politics, Ethics, ed. by Richard G. Hovannisian (New York: St. Martins Press, 1992), pp. 261–268.
  49. ^Clive Foss, “The Turkish View of Armenian History: A Vanishing Nation,” inThe Armenian Genocide: History, Politics, Ethics, ed. by Richard G. Hovannisian (New York: St. Martins Press, 1992), p. 276.
  50. ^abՍարգսյան, Տաթևիկ (27 October 2021).""Օր կգա, երբ մենք Զանգեզուրից կկարողանանք հասնել մինչև Ստամբուլ". Էրդողան" ["A day will come when we will be able to reach Istanbul from Zangezur." – Erdogan].«Ազատ Եվրոպա/Ազատություն» Ռադիոկայան.Archived from the original on 28 October 2021. Retrieved28 October 2021.
  51. ^ab"Ilham Aliyev: Zangezur Corridor will unite the entire Turkic world".morningexpress.in. 12 November 2021.Archived from the original on 13 November 2021. Retrieved13 November 2021.
  52. ^abIsmayilova, Vafa (31 May 2021)."President Aliyev: Zangazur corridor to boost connectivity with Turkey".AzerNews.Archived from the original on 10 June 2021. Retrieved10 June 2021.
  53. ^ab"Azerbaijani President: when Zangazur corridor opens, it will open new opportunities for all the countries of the region".Azeri Press Agency. 20 May 2021.Archived from the original on 10 June 2021. Retrieved10 June 2021.
  54. ^abCite error: The named reference:0 was invoked but never defined (see thehelp page).
  55. ^abBayramova, Aynur (3 February 2021)."Azerbaijani, Turkish officials to discuss Nakhchivan corridor".Report Information Agency.Archived from the original on 10 June 2021. Retrieved10 June 2021.
  56. ^ab"Armenia 2nd President Kocharyan on "Meghri corridor" plan: Not beneficial to us now to discuss it as "corridor"".News.am. 28 May 2021.Archived from the original on 10 June 2021. Retrieved10 June 2021.
  57. ^abYakish, Yashar (24 January 2021)."Moscow summit on Karabakh".Azerbaijan In Focus.Archived from the original on 10 June 2021. Retrieved10 June 2021.
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  59. ^abHovsepyan, Gayane (20 May 2021)."Pashinyan says Baku seeking to influence June parliamentary election".Hetq Online.Archived from the original on 10 June 2021. Retrieved10 June 2021.
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  61. ^"The 'Zangezur Corridor' is a geo-economic revolution".Emerging Europe. 17 May 2021.Archived from the original on 17 October 2021. Retrieved17 October 2021.
  62. ^"The Meghri Corridor: A Viable Transport Link or Geopolitical Noose?". 22 March 2021.Archived from the original on 5 November 2021. Retrieved17 October 2021.
  63. ^"Южные ворота Карабаха. Что происходит в Гадруте после войны". РИА Новости. 23 May 2021.Archived from the original on 23 May 2021. Retrieved24 May 2021.
  64. ^"In Karabakh, Turkish and Azerbaijani leaders cement alliance".Eurasianet. 16 June 2021.Archived from the original on 16 June 2021. Retrieved16 June 2021.
  65. ^"Fikir ayrılığı: 'Dəhliz' ilə 'nəqliyyat əlaqəsi'nin fərqi" [Disagreement: Difference between 'corridor' and 'transport link'].Azadlıq Radiosu (in Azerbaijani). 19 November 2021.Archived from the original on 19 November 2021. Retrieved2021-11-19.
  66. ^de Waal, Thomas."In the South Caucasus, Can New Trade Routes Help Overcome a History of Conflict?".Carnegie Europe.Archived from the original on 3 January 2022. Retrieved30 December 2021.
  67. ^"Armenian-Azerbaijani border crisis: latest developments".Caucasus Watch. 2021-05-17.Archived from the original on 27 November 2021. Retrieved2021-10-16.
  68. ^"What will become of the Zangezur corridor? Comments from Azerbaijan and Armenia - JAMnews". 21 April 2021.Archived from the original on 15 June 2021. Retrieved14 November 2021.
  69. ^Marsoobian, Armen T. (2023-08-01)."Genocide by Other Means: Heritage Destruction, National Narratives, and the Azeri Assault on the Indigenous Armenians of Karabakh".Genocide Studies International.15 (1):21–33.doi:10.3138/GSI-2023-0009.ISSN 2291-1847.
  70. ^"Iran-Azerbaijan: What is behind the recent tensions?".middleeasteye.net. 9 October 2021.Archived from the original on 7 November 2021. Retrieved8 November 2021.
  71. ^Seleck, Jude E. (9 March 2024).1001 Masks of Turkish Ittihadism in a Century: From Armenian Genocide to Neo-Ittihadism. Unknown.ISBN 9788350940870.Turks have nurtured a century-old aspiration dating back to the CUP era for an unbroken linkage to Central Asia. However, Christian majority Armenia, particularly a democratic one, poses an obstacle. Thus, until the Zangezur corridor is established, Erdogan and his close ally Devlet Bahceli, the leader of the MHP, will continue to encourage Aliyev to wage war against Armenia.
  72. ^Zenkovsky, Serge A. 1907–1990 (1960).Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia. Russian Research Center studies. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Pr.The massacre in 1914–1916 of one and a half million Armenians was largely conditioned by the desire of the Young Turks to eliminate the Armenian obstacle which separated Ottoman Turks from the Turks of Azerbaijan, and to prepare the way for the territorial unification of the 'Oguz,' or southeastern group.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
  73. ^Astourian, Stephan H.; Kévorkian, Raymond H. (2021).Collective and state violence in Turkey: the construction of a national identity from empire to nation-state. New York (N.Y.): Berghahn. p. 147.ISBN 978-1-78920-450-6.Another cabled order, dated 25 September 1920 and intercepted by Ottoman and British intelligence, is equally revealing of the Kemalist regime's intentions. Signed by Kemal in person, it instructed army commanders about planned operations against Armenia—described as an 'obstacle to communications with the Muslim peoples' to whom Turkey had 'promised' its help—and tasked the 'Army of the Arax' with 'opening and maintaining communications with Allied forces to the east and northeast.' These orders were complemented by an encrypted telegram dated 8 November that recommended 'achieving our goal in stages,' 'by acting as if we wanted peace.'...It was only by offering itself to the Bolsheviks that Caucasian Armenia managed to escape a third phase of genocide, this time planned by the Kemalist government…Kemalist involvement in genocidal action against Caucasian Armenians marks the transition from the original Unionist movement to the new Unionist wave embodied by Mustafa Kemal. While nuances may be observed between the practices of these two frequently intermingled groups, their ethnonationalist ideology was basically identical…The famous 'war of national liberation' prepared by the Unionists and waged by Kemal was a vast operation, intended to complete the genocide by finally eradicating Armenian, Greek, and Syriac survivors…If one were to summarize this phase of Turkish Ottoman history in a few words, one could say that it illustrates the clear continuity between the genocidal policy implemented by the Committee of Union and Progress and that pursued by its Kemalist heirs.
  74. ^Dadrian, Vahakn N. (1989)."Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law: The World War I Armenian Case and Its Contemporary Legal Ramifications".Yale Journal of International Law.14: 221.Under 'the pretext' of protecting the rights of the Azerbaijanis, who are related to the Turks by ethnic and religious ties, the General [Karabekir] was advised to militarily occupy the entire territory of Armenia, temporarily arrange the frontiers of Armenia in such a way that 'under the pretext of protecting the rights of Muslim minorities there is ground for constant intervention', and disarm the Armenians, at the same time 'arming the Turks of the area little by little, toward the goal of linking up east and west in the area, and molding Azerbaijan into an independent Turkish government through the creation of a national force structure.'
  75. ^"Genocide Warning: Azerbaijan is invading Armenia".Genocide Watch. 2024-04-24. Retrieved2025-07-24.Syunik is home to the Zangezur corridor in Armenia, through which Azerbaijan seeks to build an oil pipeline to Turkey. Azerbaijan and Turkey will reap the economic benefits from controlling Syunik. But their true intention is to "connect the Turkic world," according to the Azerbaijani ambassador to Turkey, Rashad Mammadov. Mammadov's words reek of Pan-Turkism, the ideology behind the Armenian Genocide. As seen in Artsakh, attempts to create a New Ottoman Empire will cost thousands of Armenian lives.
  76. ^"Red Flag Alert for Genocide - Azerbaijan in Armenia".Lemkin Institute. Retrieved2024-07-19.
  77. ^"Statement on Self-Determination of Armenians in Artsakh (South Caucasus): There is No Peace or Prosperity through Genocide".Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention. November 24, 2022.
  78. ^"A Peace to End All Peace? Statement on the International Actors Sponsoring So-Called Peace Negotiations Between Armenia and Azerbaijan." Lemkin Institute, 3 May. 2024, "It is imperative that the great powers negotiating this peace view their work within the context of an on-going genocidal threat to Armenian life that has existed in the region since the 19th century and particularly since the Armenian Genocide of 1915-1923.”
  79. ^"Red Flag Alert - Azerbaijan in the Republic of Armenia - Update 2".Lemkin Institute. Retrieved2024-07-19.
  80. ^"Strategic dimensions of the recent tension in relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan". 23 May 2005.Archived from the original on 19 July 2022. Retrieved17 October 2021.
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  82. ^abc"The rise and fall of Azerbaijan's "Goycha-Zangazur Republic" | Eurasianet".eurasianet.org.Archived from the original on 25 January 2023. Retrieved2023-01-21.
  83. ^Karabekir, Istiklâl Harbimiz/n.2/, p. 631
  84. ^"Present-day Armenia located in ancient Azerbaijani lands – Ilham Aliyev". News.Az. October 16, 2010. Archived fromthe original on July 21, 2015.
  85. ^
  86. ^abAhmadi, Hamid (2017). "The Clash of Nationalisms: Iranian response to Baku's irredentism". In Kamrava, Mehran (ed.).The Great Game in West Asia: Iran, Turkey and the South Caucasus.Oxford University Press. pp. 109–110.ISBN 978-0190869663.
  87. ^abcdefghAhmadi, Hamid (2017). "The Clash of Nationalisms: Iranian response to Baku's irredentism". In Kamrava, Mehran (ed.).The Great Game in West Asia: Iran, Turkey and the South Caucasus.Oxford University Press. p. 110.ISBN 978-0190869663.
  88. ^abGasimov, Zaur (2022). "Observing Iran from Baku: Iranian Studies in Soviet and Post-Soviet Azerbaijan".Iranian Studies.55 (1): 49.doi:10.1080/00210862.2020.1865136.S2CID 233889871.
  89. ^
    • Cornell, Svante (2005).Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus.Routledge. p. 87.ISBN 9781135796693.Elchibey's anti-Iranian rhetoric and the subsequent deterioration of Azerbaijani-Iranian relations to below freezing point...
    • Peimani, Hooman (1999).Iran and the United States: The Rise of the West Asian Regional Grouping. Praeger. p. 35.ISBN 9780275964542.Characterized by its anti-Iranian, anti-Russian, pro-Turkish outlook, the Elchibey government's pursuit of pan-Turkism...
    • Grogan, Michael S. (2000).National security imperatives and the neorealist state: Iran and realpolitik. Naval Postgraduate School. pp. 68–69.Elchibey was anti-Iranian, pan-Azeri
    • Eichensehr, Kristen E.; Reisman, William Michael, eds. (2009).Stopping Wars and Making Peace: Studies in International Intervention.Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. p. 57.ISBN 9789004178557.radically pro-Turkish and anti-Iranian President Elchibey in June made Iran unacceptable to Azerbaijan as a mediator.
  90. ^Ahmadi, Hamid (2017). "The Clash of Nationalisms: Iranian response to Baku's irredentism". In Kamrava, Mehran (ed.).The Great Game in West Asia: Iran, Turkey and the South Caucasus. Oxford University Press. p. 106.ISBN 978-0190869663.
  91. ^Ahmadi, Hamid (2017). "The Clash of Nationalisms: Iranian response to Baku's irredentism". In Kamrava, Mehran (ed.).The Great Game in West Asia: Iran, Turkey and the South Caucasus.Oxford University Press. p. 121.ISBN 978-0190869663.
  92. ^"Strategic dimensions of the recent tension in relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan". 27 August 2021.
  93. ^https://www.inlibra.com/document/download/pdf/uuid/d69fc2e8-3882-3004-9a22-bfc67736623c
  94. ^https://www.meforum.org/pan-turkism-and-islamism-drive-azerbaijani
  95. ^https://www.tuba.gov.tr/en/publications/non-periodical-publications/science-and-thought-series-1/ghengis-khan-and-his-legacy/perception-of-genghis-khan-and-his-successors-in-the-historiography-of-turkiye-and-the-turkic-world
  96. ^https://turkishstudies.net/turkishstudies?mod=makale_ing_ozet&makale_id=15904
  97. ^https://5pillarsuk.com/2017/11/12/ten-historical-facts-for-dirilis-ertugrul-fans/
  98. ^https://www.dailysabah.com/arts/uzbek-turkish-tv-series-mendirman-jaloliddin-to-go-on-air-sunday/news
  99. ^https://kipchaks.com/oguzes-karluks-kipchaks-how-do-the-main-branches-of-the-turks-differ/
  100. ^Geraci, Robert P. (2001).Window on the East: National and Imperial Identities in Late Tsarist Russia. Cornell University Press. p. 278.ISBN 978-0-8014-3422-8.
  101. ^Mansur Hasanov, Academician of Academy of Sciences of Tatarstan republic, in "People's Political Newspaper" № 96–97 (24393-24394) 17 May 2001http://www.rt-online.ru/numbers/public/?ID=25970
  102. ^Thual, François (2007)."International: Le Corridor Des Turcs L'aire Des Turcs Ou l'ère Des Turcs".La Revue Administrative (in French).60 (357):281–83.JSTOR 41941814. RetrievedJuly 21, 2022.
  103. ^
  104. ^Boldt, Andreas (2017).Historical Mechanisms: An Experimental Approach to Applying Scientific Theories to the Study of History.Taylor & Francis. pp. 107–108.ISBN 978-1351816489.Violent flirtation with PanTuranism had a lasting effect on kemalist Turkey and its historical ideology: Turkish pupils are imbued by history textbooks even today with a dogma of absurdly inflated PanTurkish history—Turkish history comprises all Eurasian nomads, Indo-European (Scythian) and Turk-Mongol, plus their conquests in Persia, India China, all civilizations on the soil of the Ottoman Empire, from Sumer and Ancient Egypt via Greeks, Alexander the Great to Byzantium.
  105. ^abhttps://journals.rudn.ru/political-science/article/view/38678
  106. ^https://toppress.kz/article/velikii-turan-i-mifi-o-pantyurkizme-zachem-kazahstanu-pripisivayut-chuzhie-ambicii
  107. ^https://www.caravan.kz/news/pantjurkizm-ne-stoit-na-povestke-vneshnej-politiki-kazahstana/
  108. ^https://camonitor.kz/28392-mify-i-realnost-tyurkskogo-edinstva.html
  109. ^https://medium.com/@managing2024/introduction-setting-the-stage-for-the-battle-of-ankara-73a5ff96440a
  110. ^https://www.youngpioneertours.com/japanese-rule-over-korea/
  111. ^https://www.annualreviews.org/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-linguistics-030521-042356
  112. ^https://agmipublications.am/index.php/ijags/issue/view/11
  113. ^https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00263206.2019.1706167
  114. ^Balci, Bayram (2014). "Between ambition and realism: Turkey's engagement in the South Caucasus". In Agadjanian, Alexander; Jödicke, Ansgar; van der Zweerde, Evert (eds.).Religion, Nation and Democracy in the South Caucasus. Routledge. p. 258....the second president of independent Azerbaijan, Abulfaz Elchibey, was a prominent pan-Turkist nationalist...
  115. ^Murinson, Alexander (2009).Turkey's Entente with Israel and Azerbaijan: State Identity and Security in the Middle East and Caucasus. Routledge. p. 35.ISBN 9781135182441.Naturally, they were associated with Elchibey's pan-Turkist aspirations...
  116. ^Hale, William M. (2000).Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000. Psychology Press. p. 292.ISBN 9780714650715.Within Turkey, the pan- Turkist movement led by Alparslan Türkeş...
  117. ^Larrabee, F. Stephen; Lesser, Ian O. (2003).Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty. Rand Corporation. p. 123.ISBN 9780833034045.The late Alparslan Turkes, the former head of the MHP, actively promoted a Pan-Turkic agenda.

Further reading

[edit]
  • Jacob M. Landau.Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation. Hurst, 1995.ISBN 1-85065-269-4

External links

[edit]
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1These are traditional areas of settlement; the Turkic group has been living in the listed country/region for centuries and should not be confused with modern diasporas.
2State with limited international recognition.
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  • Note: Forms of nationalism based primarily onethnic groups are listed above. This does not imply that all nationalists with a given ethnicity subscribe to that form ofethnic nationalism.
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