Palestinian suicide attacks involve the use ofsuicide bombings byPalestinian groups in theIsraeli–Palestinian conflict, predominantly targeting Israeli civilians.[2] This tactic is also referred to asPalestinian suicide terrorism.[3] It emerged in the 1990s and reached its peak during theSecond Intifada (2000–2005). Attacks occurred at various locations, including shopping centers, public buses, transit stations, cafes, nightclubs, and restaurants,[4] According to a 2006 study from theUniversity of Haifa, only a few of the bombings targeted military objectives.[5] Between 1994 and 2005, suicide bombings killed 735 Israelis and wounded 4,554.[5]
The majority of Palestinian suicide bombings targeting Israelis have been carried out by radical Palestinian groups,[6] who often recruit potential bombers from outside their ranks, rather than relying on internal members.[7][6] In the early 1990s,Islamist organizations such asHamas and thePalestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) adopted this strategy in response to theOslo Accords, which had elevated thePLO's more secular position and sidelined these Islamist groups.[8] During the Second Intifada, suicide attacks against Israel intensified and gained widespread Palestinian support, leading to thedevelopment of a martyrdom cult.[9] This led to its adoption by other groups such as theAl-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades and Fatah'sTanzim, which sought to leverage the tactic to enhance their own standing.[10][9]
In Palestinian society, suicide bombings are commonly referred to as "martyrdom operations".[11] For many Palestinian suicide bombers, martyrdom represents a fulfillment of religious duty, driven by an Islamist interpretation ofJihad that equates martyrdom with a sacred obligation.[12] This perspective, combined with ananimosity toward Jews and a response to perceived national humiliation and injustice associated with the1948 displacement and theIsraeli occupation, renders martyrdom a compelling choice.[13] Bombers are also motivated by a desire for revenge, personal pride and honor, and the promise of spiritual and material rewards in the afterlife.[13] Public support for suicide bombers is reflected in cultural practices such as mass funerals, the naming of public spaces after bombers,[14] and promotion through social media, written media, education, and children's programs.[15]
Suicide bombings in the 1990s and 2000s had an unexpected and severe impact on Israel'shome front,[16] profoundly affecting Israeli society and hardening attitudes towards Palestinians as potential peace partners in atwo-state solution.[17] The bombings contributed to Israeli prime ministerAriel Sharon's decision to construct theWest Bank barrier inside and around the West Bank.[17]
In the 1980s there were high-profile incidents of suicideterrorism inLebanon, and since then the tactic has become widespread globally.[18][19] The first suicide attack by an Islamist group occurred in the1981 Iraqi Embassy in Beirut by theIslamic Dawa Party, followed byHezbollah's1983 Beirut barracks bombings.[19][7] This tactic has since been employed in countries such asIndia,Indonesia,Iran, Iraq,Israel,Kenya, Lebanon,Pakistan, Palestine, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka,Turkey, the UK, the US, and Yemen.[19] Hezbollah's attacks specifically influenced Palestinian groups such asHamas and thePalestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), leading them to adopt similar procedures for selecting and training suicide bombers.[20]
Between 1994 and 2005, suicide bombings killed 735 Israelis and wounded 4,554.[5]
Palestinian militants refer to suicide bombings as "martyrdom operations" (Arabic:عمليات استشهادية,romanized: 'amaliyyāt istišhādiyya).[11] This term is used by both the more recently formed Islamic nationalist groups (such as Hamas andPalestinian Islamic Jihad), as well as the militant wings of somePalestine Liberation Organization factions (such as theAl-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades and thePFLP).[21]
The majority of suicide bombings targeting Israelis have been organized byPalestinian nationalist groups,[6] initially led by Islamist organizations and then adopted by more secular groups.[10] These organizations typically recruit bombers from outside their own ranks, rather than relying on internal members.[6] Suicide bombs were later used by a smaller number of Palestinians in anti-nationalist groups.[22][23][24][25]
Hamas, through its military wingAl-Qassam Brigades,[27] has been responsible for numerous suicide attacks since 1993. The group has conducted more suicide attacks and caused more Israeli casualties than any other Palestinian group.[27]
Hamas presents both practical and doctrinal justifications for suicide bombings. Practically, they emphasize the harm and deterrence these attacks inflict on Israeli society. Doctrinally, they glorify martyrdom as the pinnacle of jihad andIslamic belief.[28] Theold 1988 Hamas Covenant (revised in 2017) articulated the group's goal, stating, "Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it". Additionally, Article 7 of the 1988 Covenant declares, "The time [of Redemption] will not come until the Muslims fight the Jews and kill them, and until the Jews hide behind rocks and trees when the call is raised: 'Oh Muslim, here is a Jew hiding! Come and kill him.'"[29] The group contends that suicide bombings establish a "balance of fear" (tawazun ra'b) against Israel by inflicting significant casualties and psychological distress on Israelis, despite the group's own military limitations. Additionally, Hamas[who?] frames these attacks as a testament to "Palestinian innovative genius" (abqariyyat al-ibda' al-filastini), showcasing their perceived creativity and strategic ingenuity in the ongoing conflict.[28]
The first major attack by Hamas occurred on April 13, 1994, at theHadera bus station suicide bombing, killing five people,[27] as retribution for theCave of the Patriarchs massacre byBaruch Goldstein in February.[30] A significant escalation in Hamas' suicide bombing campaign followed the assassination of bombmakerYahya Ayyash in January 1996. This led to a surge in attacks until late 1997.[27] During the initial 21 months of the Second Intifada (September 2000 to June 2002), Hamas was responsible for approximately 43% of all suicide attacks against Israelis, killing 161 and injuring over 1,100.[27] Ganor writes that from 2000 to 2005, Hamas orchestrated 92 out of 155 total terrorist attacks.[31] Moghadam notes that Hamas has demonstrated a high level of lethality and effectiveness in its attacks, often causing more casualties than other Palestinian groups.[27]
ThePalestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) was behind the1989 Tel Aviv–Jerusalem bus attack, which killed 16 civilians, and is considered by some[who?] as the first Palestinian suicide attack in Israel.[33]
The PIJ began conducting suicide bombings between 1994 and 1997.[34] The group's attacks primarily targeted civilians withinIsrael proper, including Jerusalem.[35]The PIJ's first notablesuicide bombing was on November 11, 1994, when a PIJ member used a bicycle bomb to kill three Israelis. On January 22, 1995, PIJ carried out one of the deadliest attacks in Israeli history withdual bombings at Beit Lid junction, resulting in the deaths 20 Israeli soldiers and 1 civilian.[32] During the initial 21 months of the Second Intifada (September 2000 to June 2002), PIJ was responsible for approximately 20% of all successful suicide attacks, killing at least 28 Israelis and injuring 213. The number of attacks by PIJ increased over time, peaking with theMegiddo Junction bus bombing in June 2002, which killed 17 Israelis.[34]
TheIdeology of the PIJ was influenced by Islamist thinkerSayyid Qutb.[33]Fathi Shiqaqi, a co-founder of PIJ, has advocated the idea that jihad is a personal duty.[36] Former PIJ leaderRamadan Shalah expressed the group's reliance onmartyrdom as a tactic, stating, "We have nothing with which to repel the killing and thuggery against us except the weapon of martyrdom. It is easy and costs us only our lives [...] human bombs cannot be defeated, not even bynuclear bombs".[37]
During theSecond Intifada,Fatah, the primary faction of thePalestine Liberation Organization (PLO) led then byYasser Arafat, was a major player in the use of suicide terrorism. During the initial 21 months of the Second Intifada (September 2000 to June 2002), Fatah has been responsible for nearly a third of all suicide attacks and became the most active organization in terms of the number of attacks on Israelis. The group's strategy involved leveraging the Tanzim and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades to provide a secular alternative to Islamist groups like Hamas and PIJ.[38]
TheTanzim, the armed wing of Fatah, was involved in significant violence, particularly followingAriel Sharon's visit to theTemple Mount. The Tanzim's first major suicide attack occurred on January 17, 2002, inHadera, killed six people and wounded 33 at abat mitzvah children celebration.[38]
TheAl-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, a faction within Fatah formed after September 2000, emerged during the Second Intifada as a leading group in carrying out suicide attacks. In the early months of 2002, this group was responsible for over half of all suicide attacks, prompting the U.S. State Department to designate it as aForeign Terrorist Organization in March 2002. The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades are closely linked to Fatah, with many of its members also being part of thePalestinian Authority's security forces.[38]
ThePopular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a secular Marxist–Leninist faction originating from the PLO, carried out a limited number of suicide attacks during the Second Intifada.[38] Under George Habash's leadership, the PFLP's rejection of suicide attacks led to a decline in support. However, after shifting to suicide terrorism and adopting jihadist rhetoric in 2001, the group's support levels quickly recovered.[39] Under the leadership ofSecretary GeneralAhmad Sa'adat (2001 to present),[40] the PFLP were responsible for several notable incidents, including theassassination ofIsraeli Minister of TourismRehavam Ze'evi.[41][42] On February 16, 2002, the PFLP executeda suicide bombing at a mall inKarnei Shomron, resulting in 2 Israeli deaths and 29 injuries. Approximately three weeks later, the PFLP conducted another suicide attack in the settlement of Ariel, injuring 15 people.[38]
Another group in Palestine who have allegedly used suicide bombs wereJund Ansar Allah, ananti-nationalist Islamist group in theHamas-dominated Gaza Strip. Jund Ansar Allah attacked Israel and weredestroyed by forces in 2009, in unconnected incidents. Both Israel and Hamas claim that militants from the group used suicide vests/belts, or horses loaded with explosives.[43][44][45]
The IDF claimed that members ofJund Ansar Allah who attempted to attackKarni crossing had been wearing explosive belts, but they were shot dead before detonating them.[44] On 8 June 2009 the group carried out a raid on theKarni border crossing between the Gaza Strip and Israel. Ten people from the group rode into battle on horses laden with large quantities of explosives. Five Jund Ansar Allah were killed during the attack, but at least those were shot dead by Israeli troops.[45] Israeli officials said several of the men had been wearing explosive belts, and suspected they had been attempting to kidnap a soldier.[44]
On 14 August 2009, the leader of Jund Ansar Allah,Abdel Latif Moussa, unexpectedly declared the creation of the Islamicemirate in the Gaza Strip to his armed followers at theIbn Taymiyya mosque inRafah after theFriday prayer.[46][47] During his sermon, Moussa condemned thePalestinian nationalistIslamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) for failing to implement properSharia law and "not being any different from asecular government".[43][44][48][49] On the same day, Hamas'Qassam Brigades attacked theIbn Taymiyya mosque inRafah and otherJund Ansar Allah bases in Rafah, including the leader's house. The BBC andThe Jerusalem Post reported that according to Hamas, when they reached the positions of Moussa and Abu Abdullah al Suri, the two men detonated explosive vests.[50][43] Jund Ansar Allah was virtually destroyed after the fighting, having both of its leaders killed, and its bases captured.[51][52][53][54]
In 2017 and 2019, during theSinai insurgency, there were suicide bombings in theGaza Strip by local ISIS sympathizers.[23][24] ISIS are a global extremist group, with an ideology that fundamentally opposes thePalestiniannationalism of Hamas and the other groups above.[25] In 2017 twoHamas government border guards were killed while attempting to intercept an ISIS suicide bomber atRafah Crossing.[23][55][56] The Hamas government responded to that bombing with a crackdown on followers of "deviant ideologies" (meaning ISIS andsimilar groups).[57][58]
In 2018, members ofISIS in the Sinai "declared war" on Hamas, demanding Hamas release ISIS militants held inGaza's prisons.[59] Then in 2019, another suicide attack – also attributed to ISIS – directly targetedGaza Strip police.[60][24] Three police officers were killed,[61][62][63] all three victims were allegedly members of Hamas.[64] Gaza's Security forces responded by arresting ten people whom they suspected were members of the cell who arranged the attack.[22][24]
Martyrdom among Palestinian suicide bombers is often driven by a combination of religious beliefs, nationalistic sentiment, and personal incentives.[6][65][66] Individual motivations for becoming a suicide bomber may stem from various factors, including the desire to attain expected rewards in theafterlife, economic or social benefits for family members, the influence of a widespreadculture of martyrdom, the struggle for national liberation, a drive to seek revenge for the death or injury of a loved one, or a response to the real or perceived humiliation associated withIsraeli occupation.[6][67] The involvement of secular groups likeFatah in organizing suicide attacks indicates that religious fervor is not the sole determinant.[12]
Some scholars argue that religious motives play a significant role among Palestinian suicide bombers, particularly in the recruitment practices of groups likeHamas andPIJ, which seek deeply religious individuals. According to Israeli academicAssaf Moghadam, the Islamist interpretation ofJihad is central to this motivation, which encompassesJihad al-nafs (the internal struggle for self-control) andJihad bi al-saif (armed struggle or "holy war"). Islamist groups dismiss the former as heretical and emphasize the latter as the true "Greater Jihad," supporting their view withQuranic verses that equate warfare with religious duty.[12] Moghadam says they use the termshaheed (martyr) for suicide attackers to distinguish these acts from ordinary suicide, which isforbidden in Islam,[12] and that the term derives fromshaheda, meaning "to witness," and refers to those who die bearing witness to their faith.[68] He adds that Hamas in particular sees martyrdom as a crucial part ofPalestinian identity and mobilization, portraying it as the ultimate act of jihad and devotion to Islam.[69] Israeli academic Ami Pedahzur argues that Hamas and PIJ maintain that jihad in Palestine is a personal duty (fard ayn), rather than a communal obligation (fard kifaya).[70] Other scholars have noted that the termshaheed is not limited to individuals involved in suicide operations, but is instead widely applied to any Palestinian whose life is cut short by theIsraeli occupation, regardless of whether they engaged in violent resistance.[71]
According to Moghadam, Islamist groups often frame violence, including suicide bombings, as a defensive Jihad against perceived threats from Israel and the West. He argues that this rhetoric has escalated to calls for violence against Jews more broadly. He notes that during theSecond Intifada, Sheikh Ibrahim Madhi, in a sermon at theSheikh Ijlin Mosque inGaza, declared that the Jews are "the greatest enemies of theIslamic nation" and that "nothing will deter them except for us voluntarily detonating ourselves in their midst".[12] Moghadam has also said that "a deep-seated animosity toward Jews seems likely to serve as an additional incentive to commit acts of suicide terrorism".[13] He further states that since the early 1990s, and particularly with the onset of the Second Intifada,martyrdom has becomeincreasingly glorified among Palestinians, driven by a tradition in Islam and amplified by Islamist leaders.[12] This glorification has, he says, encouraged Palestinians to undertake "martyrdom operations" against Israelis, depicted as acts of bravery in contrast to the perceived cowardice of Westerners, including Israelis, who are seen as reluctant to sacrifice their lives.[12] According to Moghadam this belief is echoed in statements by figures like the mufti of Jerusalem,Ekrima Sa'id Sabri, and Hamas leaderIsmail Haniyeh, who have contrasted the Muslim willingness to die with the Jewish preference for life.[12][69] He says that martyrdom brings elevated status in Palestinian society, where honor and dignity are highly valued, reinforced by a cult of martyrdom, with martyrs celebrated through posters, leaflets, and large rallies, and for many young Palestinians this glorification offers a path to significant social status and recognition.[72]
Other scholars have challenged the notion that religion is a primary motivator for Palestinian suicide bombings, instead emphasizing political, nationalistic, and socio-cultural factors. Bassam Yousef Ibrahim Banat, Professor of Applied Sociology and an active researcher on Palestinian issues, argues that Palestinian suicide bombers (istishhadiyin) were not religious extremists but ordinary individuals with stable psychological profiles, motivated primarily by nationalistic goals and a response to the daily repression of Israeli occupation. His research concludes that their actions stem from a desire to defend their homeland and people, not religious fervor.[73] Similarly, sociologists Robert Brym and Bader Araj contend that suicide bombings during the Second Intifada were largely strategic reactions to heightened Israeli state repression. They argue that increased violence and limitations on nonviolent protest led secular nationalist groups likeFatah to adopt suicide tactics, not out of religious competition, but as a tactical shift within a broader conflict over territorial control.[74]
Political scientistRobert Pape has found that the vast majority of suicide attacks since the 1980s have been motivated by strategic and political objectives, primarily to end foreign military occupation, rather than by religious or ideological factors. Pape conducted a study of over 2,200 suicide attacks over a 30-year period and found that 95% were not driven by religious rewards but were instead responses to foreign occupation. According to the study, 90% of the attacks were anti-American and occurred in regions under U.S. military occupation. The study also noted a significant decline in suicide bombings in Israel following itswithdrawal from Gaza and parts of the West Bank. Pape concluded that suicide bombing is often a strategic response to occupation and the perceived failure of other forms of resistance.[75] Cultural anthropologistScott Atran has similarly found that suicide attacks are not primarily motivated by religious beliefs. In his field research and interviews with militant leaders, Atran reported that the promise of religious rewards was not cited as a motivating factor, stating that he had never encountered a case where such beliefs were a central motivator for martyrdom. Atran also highlights that some of the most active suicide bombing groups in recent history have been secular or only nominally religious, such as those affiliated with nationalist movements rather than religious institutions. Interviews with families of Palestinian and Muslim suicide bombers often did not show consistent expressions of pride or religious justification. Atran concluded that suicide attacks are more closely linked to political, social, and cultural factors than to religious doctrine.[76]
According to Ami Pedahzur andAssaf Moghadam another motivator is the promise of rewards in the afterlife, as described in Islamic teachings and varioushadiths.[77][78][70][a] These rewards include forgiveness of sins, protection from hell, a crown of glory, marriage to seventy-two virgins (houris), and the ability to extend these privileges to seventy relatives.[77][70] These promises create a strong incentive for individuals to undertake martyrdom, viewing it as a way to trade their limited earthly possessions for the luxurious rewards promised in paradise.[77] Reports indicate that many are convinced of these rewards, which significantly influences their willingness to undertake martyrdom.[77] Reportedly, there has been at least one case of a suicide bomber taking steps, like wrapping toilet paper around their genitals, to preserve their ability to enjoy these rewards.[77] Palestinian media has framed martyrdom in terms of marriage to virgins, further solidifying this expectation.[77]
However, the story of the 72 virgins promised to suicide bombers in paradise is a myth with no basis in Islam, and it is an Islamophobictrope. The majority of Palestinian suicide bombers are educated and not driven by economic despair. Furthermore, Jihadi leaders themselves reject candidates who seek self-sacrifice for rewards like virgins, as these individuals are considered unfit for such missions. Instead, suicide bombers are typically selected for their ideological commitment, patience, and planning abilities.[79][80] The 72 virgins trope is not relevant to Palestinian religious life, and instead has often been perpetuated by western media. Muslim scholars emphasize that it is not part of Islamic teachings.[81]
Scott Atran, acultural anthropologist researching terrorism, argued against the narrative that suicide bombers are primarily motivated by the belief in rewards such as 72 virgins. In his research and interviews with jihadi leaders, Atran asserts that he has never encountered a case where suicide bombers were driven by such beliefs, emphasizing that if anyone were to approach jihadi leaders seeking martyrdom for the promise of virgins, the door would immediately be "slammed in their face."[76]
Political scientistRobert Pape stated in a study of over 2,200 suicide attacks carried out over a 30-year period that 95% of these attacks had nothing to do with promises of 72 virgins or heavenly rewards. Instead, they were a response to foreign occupation; 90% of the attacks were anti-American and occurred in regions under U.S. occupation. The study also noted a dramatic decline in suicide bombings in Israel after the country withdrew from Gaza and parts of the West Bank. Pape argued that suicide bombing is primarily driven by cultural divides, and the failure of other forms of resistance, with suicide bombing emerging as a last resort.[75][82][83]
Some Islamic theologians and jurists, includingYusuf al-Qaradawi, who hosted the weekly TV showSharia and Life onAl-Jazeera, have condemned terrorist attacks byAl-Qaeda and similar groups, butnot Palestinian suicide bombings against Israeli civilians.Yusuf al-Qaradawi argues that Israel is a militarized state that has, since its founding, seized Palestinian land and displaced its people through persecution, torture, and humiliation. He uses the "doctrine of necessity" to justify Palestinian guerrilla warfare and martyrdom operations as a last resort, claiming that peaceful means to regain their homeland have been exhausted.[84] Others argue thatuniversal conscription in Israel blurs the line between civilians and soldiers: since every Israeli citizen has served, is serving, or will serve in the military, they are seen by terrorists as part of the military effort and therefore complicit in the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.[85][86]
Another significant motivator for suicide bombers is the financial and social support provided to their families following the attack. Suicide bombers' families often receive substantial cash payments, ranging from $1,000 to several thousand dollars, from organizations such as Hamas or the PIJ, and occasionally from external supporters.[77] In 2002, Iraqi presidentSaddam Hussein reportedly offered up to $25,000 to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers.[87] This financial support, combined with the elevated social status bestowed upon the family due to the martyrdom of their member, leads to significant improvements in their living conditions and public standing.[77] However, while economic hardship can drive some Palestinians to seek martyrdom, it alone does not fully explain the phenomenon. Economic deprivation has been a long-standing issue, and some suicide bombers come from relatively affluent families.[88]Claude Berrebi of theRAND Corporation found that nearly 60% of suicide bombers recruited by Hamas and Islamic Jihad had education beyond high school, whereas less than 15% of the general adult male Palestinian population did. Additionally, these bombers were significantly less likely to come from impoverished backgrounds compared to their peers.[89]
Many Palestinian suicide bombers are motivated by nationalist sentiments, joining groups like Hamas, PIJ, and Fatah to fight perceived injustices and defend their land against what they see as encroachment by the "Zionist entity".[90] This sense of injustice associated with the1948 displacement and theIsraeli occupation, drives their willingness to die for their cause. The significance of land and home inPalestinian culture, combined with the feeling of humiliation and frustration, fuels their resolve.[90] Nationalist fervor is also linked to the concept of "national Jihad," which aims to bolster Palestinian identity and pride through "resistance". Suicide bombings are viewed as a potent tactic inasymmetric warfare, designed to instill fear in Israeli society and demonstrate Palestinian resolve.[90] Lacking the ability to directly confront Israel's superior military might, and convinced that negotiations will never lead to the creation of a Palestinian state, a significant part of the Palestinian population sees martyrdom operations as the only means of forcing Israel to meet their demands.[91]
Hamas spokesmen claimed that suicide bombings instilled significant fear among the "Zionist occupiers".[28] They celebrated the notion that life in Israel had become akin to "hell" and argued that these attacks undermined theZionist goal of a secure haven for Jews, and led to doubts about Israel's future as well as substantial emigration.[28] Influential Islamic scholarYusuf al-Qaradawi stated that "The Palestinian who blows himself up is a person who is defending his homeland. When he attacks an occupier enemy, he is attacking a legitimate target."[92] Former Hamas leaderAbdel Aziz al-Rantisi, reacting to the2001 Dolphinarium discotheque massacre, stated that Palestinians "will never approve of the occupation of [their] homeland."[90]
Another key motivator for suicide bombers is the desire for revenge, driven by "perceptions of personal harm, unfairness, and injustice, as well as the anger, indignation, and hatred associated with such perceptions".[93] Students from middle-class backgrounds atAn-Najah National University, a group with a high representation among suicide bombers in the Palestinian territories, reportedly said that "Martyrs give us dignity to free ourselves". This reflects the widespread sentiment among Palestinians that daily life in the occupied territories is marked by fear, despair, and constant humiliation, which provoke strong sense of justice and a desire for revenge.[93]
Cognitive psychology studies on Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza report that "members of different militant groups often attribute their own violent acts to personal or collective humiliation experienced at the hands of their oppressors".[94][95] Political scientistHilal Khashan argues that collective Palestinian frustration, exacerbated by failed peace initiatives and Israel's military dominance, has fostered a suicidal mentality among impoverished Palestinians, particularly inrefugee camps, and led to increased support for radicalpolitical Islam.[96]
In a region heavily affected by conflict, many Palestinians are driven by personal losses and seek to avenge the deaths or injuries of close friends or family members. Revenge is a powerful motivator, often expressed during funeral processions and reflected in the personal testimonies of bombers who admit that avenging fallen loved ones was a primary reason for their actions.[77] Interviews conducted by Brym and Araj with the families and friends of Palestinian suicide bombers suggest that these individuals do not exhibit higher levels of depression than what is typically observed in the general population.[97][7]
Research by Kimhi and Even identifies four profiles of Palestinian suicide bombers. One type is the "exploited suicide bomber," driven by personal crises or a desire to atone for perceived sins such as extramarital relationships, homosexuality, or cooperation with Israel. Another profile is the "seeking retribution for suffering" bomber, which they identified as a major prototype of Palestinian suicide bombers.[78]
Palestinian suicide bombings have been interpreted as a political and military strategy rather than acts driven solely by individual motivations. From this perspective, they are viewed as deliberate actions by organised groups undermilitary occupation, aimed at forcing occupiers to withdraw by causing heavy casualties and drawing media attention, or at strengthening the group's position against rival organisations.[98][99][100]
Political scientistRobert Pape argues that suicide attacks are not driven byreligious fundamentalism, but are a rational strategy used by weaker groups against democratic states to force the withdrawal of troops from occupied territories these groups see as their homeland.[101][102][103] While religion can be used as a recruitment tool, the main motivation is the strategic military objectives of terrorist organisations: "There is strong evidence that Islamic fundamentalism has not been the driving force behind Palestinian suicide terrorism".[104] According to Pape, suicide bombing is effective: "The main reason that suicide terrorism is growing is that terrorists have learned that it works".[105][106] He argues that the suicide campaigns byHamas andIslamic Jihad against Israel in 1994-1995 provide a key test of these theories. He believes these groups thought the bombings would speed up Israel's withdrawal fromGaza and the West Bank, an assessment shared by other observers and Israeli leaders, which ultimately proved correct.[101][107]
Critics argue that Pape overstates the success of suicide terrorism,[108][109] and that the link between suicide bombing and foreign occupation is weak, as is the link with the democratic nature of the occupying countries.[110][111] They propose alternative explanations, such as the inter-group competition (or "outbidding") theory.[citation needed]
The outbidding theory suggests that competing political organisations use suicide bombings to show their commitment to the cause and gain popular support.[112][113][114] Unlike Pape's view of suicide bombings as a direct tool of coercion against the state, the outbidding theory interprets suicide bombings as a form of "domestic political signaling":[115] a way of sending a powerful political message within one's own political community. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict illustrates this outbidding process, with groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad using suicide bombings to capture the Palestinian imagination and compete for leadership not only with each other but also with thePalestinian Authority.[116][117]
Terrorism scholarMia Bloom argues that in Israel/Palestine, "the bombings became a method of recruitment for militant Islamic organizations within the Palestinian community. They serve at one and the same time to attack the hated enemy (Israel) and give legitimacy to outlier militant groups who compete with the Palestinian Authority (PA) for leadership of the community".[118] She observes that support for suicide bombings was lower during periods of optimism for peace, such as during theOslo process and the earlyPA elections, but as the peace process stalled and the PA's credibility waned, backing for militant groups increased. Bloom concludes that Israeli efforts to weaken the PA unintentionally strengthened more militant groups.[117] She also argues thatIsrael's targeted killings of terrorist leaders may benefit these groups by creating "nationalist myths, martyrs, and cults of personality".[119]
Recruitment for suicide missions by Palestinians groups generally involves a selective process where potential candidates are chosen based on their religious commitment, loyalty, and ability to maintain secrecy. Palestinian groups prefer to identify and approach individuals who have already demonstrated strong ideological alignment. Recruiters often target students and young people in mosques, universities, social activities, and in Israeli prisons. Candidates are scrutinized for their ability to handle psychological pressure, their personal and family backgrounds, and their criminal records.[120]
The training for suicide bombers typically lasts from several weeks to months and is designed to prepare candidates practically, mentally and spiritually. It begins with rigorous indoctrination, involving classes on specificQuranic andHadith teachings aboutmartyrdom and theafterlife, as well as exposure toanti-Israeli propaganda. Candidates also undergo spiritual purification through fasting, extensive prayer, and seeking forgiveness for past sins. The process also includespsychological conditioning, with evaluations to ensure candidates are not clinically depressed or suicidal but are genuinely committed. Practical training includes handling and assembling explosive devices, performing detonations, and practicing escape routes, often through simulated missions to ensure familiarity with procedures and equipment.[120]
The planning of suicide attacks is executed with utmost secrecy and strict compartmentalization. This detailed process involves gathering intelligence, procuring weapons—often smuggled from Egypt or Iran—and organizing logistics. The planning is divided into specific roles: organizational leadership sets strategic goals, operators manage the selection and preparation of bombers, and aides handle material acquisition and logistical support.[120] In some cases, foreign countries have been involved in training and planning Palestinian suicide bombings. For instance, after his arrest in 1996, Hasan Salama, a senior Hamas member, admitted that he had been trained in Iran to prepare for attacks against Israeli targets.[122]
According to Assaf Moghadam, as the mission approaches, candidates typically disappear from their homes and families to avoid detection. They undergo final intensive training and briefings about their specific attack. In the days before the mission, candidates often record a final message, which may include a declaration of their intent and a call for others to follow their example. These recordings are usually made against the backdrop of the organizational symbols and often include religious elements.[120]
Bombers are typically given disguises, such asJewish religious clothing, Israeli military uniforms, or tourist clothing, and are instructed to target crowded public places while avoiding security checkpoints.[120] Targets have included shopping centers, public buses, nightclubs, eateries, and places popular with teenagers and children.[123] Final preparations include writing a will, performing religious rites, and finalizing operational details.[120]
Bruce Hoffman notes that Palestinian suicide bombings have been strategically employed to provoke a response from Israel that can be used for propaganda.[124] Hamas used suicide attacks to provoke an aggressive response from Israel, aiming to present its violence as defensive and superior to that of rival Palestinian groups.[125] This approach seeks to garner international sympathy for the terrorists and critique the Israeli reaction, thereby shaping both public opinion and international support.[124]
Islamic groups initially excluded women from active participation in suicide bombings. However, this changed during the Second Intifada as groups like the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades began to utilizefemale suicide bombers. By 2003, Palestinian Islamic Jihad took responsibility for two female bombers.[126]
Eventually, Hamas also recognized female martyrs,[126] in what has been described by the group as a "significant evolution".[127] The first among them wasReem Riyashi, a young mother of two, who carried out theErez Crossing bombing in January 2004.[126][128]
Several scholars observed that the recruitment of female suicide bombers by Palestinian groups was driven by the need to bypass Israeli security measures and checkpoint barriers.[127] There have also been reports of Palestinian women who, under psychological or physical coercion, were driven to carry out suicide attacks due to the perceived dishonor they brought upon their families.[129]
The influence ofHezbollah, a LebaneseShia organization, is evident in the suicide attacks conducted by both Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Both groups adopted Hezbollah's procedures for selecting and training suicide bombers, including psychological preparation, writing farewell letters, and making videotapes.[20]Khaled Meshal, Hamas's political leader, stated in July 2000, "We always have the Lebanese experiment before our eyes... It was a great model of which we are proud."[125]Fathi Shiqaqi, founder of the PIJ, said he developed a plan for "exceptional" martyrdom operations based on Hezbollah's theological justifications.[125] PIJ leaderRamadan Shalah acknowledged that the group's suicide bombings were influenced by Hezbollah's 1983 bombings.[37]
Comparing Palestinian bombings to those carried out by other groups highlights several differences in tactics and target selection. Palestinian suicide attacks predominantly aimed at civilians and were often conducted by newly recruited members. In contrast, in Sri Lanka, theTamil Tigers primarily targeted military objectives or high-profile civilian figures and employed a specialized unit known as theBlack Tigers specifically for these operations.[7]
Among Palestinians, suicide attacks are typically followed by demonstrations of support, the distribution of pamphlets, and large funerals attended by hundreds or thousands of supporters.[14] Instead of grieving, families are encouraged to celebrate the deaths of their loved ones.[68]Additionally, streets, schools, and public squares are often named in honor of the deceased martyrs.[14]The culture of martyrdom is deeply embedded, evident in various forms including naming sports tournaments after suicide bombers or featuring dramas about figures like the bomb makerYahya Ayyash.[130]
Palestinian organizations have used various methods to promote their activities, including displaying posters of suicide bombers in communities, sharing videos and photos of martyrs on social media, employing imams to incite violence in mosques, integrating such messages into the education system, and organizing summer camps where children receive training in weapon use and survival skills.[15] Victor notes that Palestinian children as young as six often express a wish to become martyrs, although they may not fully comprehend its significance. By twelve, they usually have a clearer understanding and are more committed to the idea.[132]
ThePalestinian Authority (PA) has also supported the commemoration of suicide bombers, reflecting a growing unity among Palestinians around this practice.[133] In 2002, the Palestinian Authority named a soccer tournament after Abdel Baset Odeh, the Hamas suicide bomber responsible for thePassover massacre that killed 30 people during thePassover Seder in Netanya. While other tournaments had been named after Palestinian suicide bombers, this was the first instance of such an honor being given by the PA to a Hamas affiliate.[133]
Before 1996, public support for suicide bombings among Palestinians was below 30 percent.[134] By 1999, support for 'martyrdom operations' was 26.1%, but it rose to 66.2% three months into theSecond Intifada.[135] In the summer of 2001, support for suicide bombings peaked at over 70%, according to a Palestinian Center for Public Opinion poll. By the summer of 2002, this support had decreased slightly but remained strong, with more than two-thirds of Palestinians endorsing such attacks.[136]
The emergence of Palestinian suicide bombings in the 1990s represented a significant escalation in violence compared to the earlierFirst Intifada (1987–1993).[7] Almost all Palestinian suicide bombings targeted civilians,[123][7] and were carried out by newly recruited members.[7] Between 1993 and early August 2002, over 135 Palestinian suicide bombers carried out attacks targeting Israeli civilians and soldiers.[18]
Overall, during theSecond Intifada, from September 2000 to February 2005, there were approximately 116 suicide attacks carried out by 127 bombers.[139] Notable among these was theDolphinarium discotheque massacre in June 2001, when a PIJ suicide bomber detonated at aTel Aviv nightclub, killing 21 people, most of whom were teenagers.[16] The bloodiest attack[140] was thePassover massacre in March 2002, when Hamas-affiliated Abd al-Bassat Ouda, disguised as a woman, detonated a ten-kilogram bomb in the dining room of the Park Hotel inNetanya duringPassover seder, killing 30 guests and injuring 140 others.[141] In March 2002 alone there were 23 attacks, resulting in 135 Israeli deaths.[142] Palestinian suicide terrorism reached its zenith during this year, and then saw a gradual decline, with attacks ceasing by 2005.[143]
During the Second Intifada, the typical expense of a suicide bombing was around $150. Despite this low cost, such attacks resulted in six times more deaths and approximately twenty-six times more casualties than other forms of terrorism.[144]
On August 18, 2024, anattempted suicide bombing inTel Aviv, claimed by Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, resulted in the bomber's death and wounded a passerby. The bombing, which detonated prematurely near a local synagogue, is one of the rare instances of such attacks in Israel since the Second Intifada and may be the first suicide attack since 2016.[145][17] On 27 August 2024,Khaled Mashal, former chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau, called for the resumption of Palestinian suicide bombings in Israel and the West Bank.[146]
According to a 2006 study from theUniversity of Haifa, common targets for Palestinian suicide bombings have included everyday public spaces such as markets, shops, buses, restaurants, bars, coffee shops, and shopping malls. These locations have been frequently chosen due to their accessibility, the large number of civilians present, and the ease with which attackers can blend in.[147] TheUniversity of Haifa study included 120 suicide bombings documented between 1994 and 2005 in Israel (which the authors defined as includingIsraeli-occupied territories), the paper categorized targets as follows:
A project from theUniversity of Chicago included 176 "confirmed suicide attacks" in Israel andPalestine, including the same time period and later. They defined a much larger number of locations and individuals as military or other security forces targets. They classified 69 targets at "security" (police or military), including 66 Israeli security targets and 3 Hamas government targets in the Gaza Strip.[148] They described the individuals targeted in 44 "confirmed suicide attacks" as either "IDF", "army", "navy", "soldiers", or "troops", plus an additional four "unconfirmed" suicides with similarly described targets.[148] Three additional attacks targeted Hamas government police or "Hamas Interior Border Security Forces" in the Gaza Strip.[148]
According to aUniversity of Haifa study, buses and transportation hubs have been particularly attractive to perpetrators due to their frequent use and the anonymity they offer.[147] Although increased security at some locations has reduced accessibility, such as central bus stations and shopping malls, attacks have continued to target areas where large crowds gather and security is less stringent. The selection of targets has been influenced by factors such as distance, ease of access, and the presence of large groups, although these variables have also been affected by time and the effort required to reach the target.[147]
Palestinian suicide terrorism largely stemmed from urban centers and adjacentrefugee camps in the Gaza Strip and West Bank.Jenin has been described as the 'capital' of Palestinian suicide terrorism, with attacks originating from the city responsible for the deaths of 124 people.[149] According to Israeli intelligence, Hamas primarily operated from the northern West Bank, notably aroundNablus, while the Islamic Jihad focused its activities in Jenin. Although both groups maintained a presence in Gaza, their operations were limited by the Gaza Strip's surrounding fence, confining their attacks to local targets such as soldiers, security personnel, and settlers.[149]
Kliot and Charney's study of 120 Palestinian suicide attacks from 1994 to September 2005 shows that most attacks targeted major Israeli cities, withJerusalem experiencing the highest number (30), followed byTel Aviv (11), andHaifa (7). Smaller cities and towns also suffered attacks, includingNetanya (6) and cities in theTel Aviv metropolitan area (10).[149] Around 65% of the attacks occurred in cities, reflecting their accessibility and potential to cause mass casualties. The remainder of the attacks took place in theGaza Strip (14), theWest Bank (7) and smaller, less logical targets, often due to planning limitations or proximity to Palestinian centers in the West Bank. Attacks in Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza were minimal, likely due to strong security measures.[149]
Israel has preferredtargeted assassinations to address suicide terrorism, believing that capturing their targets alive would result in higher Israeli casualties.[151] In 1995, Israel carried out assassinations of key militant leaders, such as PIJ'sFathi Shaqaqi in Malta in October 1995 and Hamas'Yahya Ayyash three months later. Ayyash, known as "the Engineer," was a master bomb maker responsible for numerous attacks and had first proposed using suicide bombings. His death, however, led to another wave of attacks.[125] Following a surge of suicide bombings in early 1996, the Israeli government established an extensive and costly security system to protect borders, roads, and key installations. This included new security units focused on public transport and school security.[152]
In early 2002, a wave of terror attacks culminating in the deadlyPassover massacre challenged Israeli PMAriel Sharon's deterrence-based strategy, as the violence intensified despite Israeli military efforts. Sharon's response evolved from targeted assassinations to a more comprehensive approach aimed at dismantling terrorist infrastructure.[153] This led toOperation Defensive Shield, which involved reoccupying areas underPalestinian Authority control to counteract terrorism.[153] The operation targeted the infrastructure of Palestinian terrorism across six major cities, includingBethlehem,Nablus,Ramallah,Tulkarm,Qalqilya, andJenin, with the latter—being a major source of terrorism—experiencing intense fighting.[16] Yasser Arafat was isolated in hisRamallah headquarters, which remained under siege until 2004, and his authority declined.[16]
Despite Operation Defensive Shield's success in degrading terrorist capabilities, attacks continued, leading to increased public pressure for the construction of theWest Bank barrier, which began in 2002.[154] By August 2003, the main section of the barrier was completed, significantly impacting attack patterns.[155] Initially, the number of suicide bombings declined sharply, from 19 in 2003 to 6 in 2004 and 5 in 2005. Between the barrier's completion and June 2004, only three terror attacks originated from the northern West Bank and breached Israel, exploiting incomplete sections of the barrier. In contrast, from September 2000 to June 2003, 73 attacks from the same area had successfully penetrated this section.[155]
The barrier has shifted the focus of attacks to less protected regions, including Gaza, southern Israel, and parts of Jerusalem, as well as areas where the barrier was not yet constructed such as the area ofRosh HaAyin and theBeth Shean valley.[155] Attackers have been forced to adopt longer and more challenging routes, leading to a decrease in successful attacks.[155] Overall, by 2008, it was observed that while the barrier has not entirely halted suicide bombings, it has effectively redirected and complicated the attackers' efforts.[155]
The attacks hardened Israeli public attitudes toward Palestinians as potential partners in atwo-state peace agreement.[17]
The 1990s saw Hamas using suicide bombings to disrupt theOslo Accords and the peace process, aiming to weaken thePalestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and polarize Israeli politics.[156] Within a month of the Oslo Accords signing, Hamas launched a new series of bombings that killed twenty-six Israelis and injured many more. This violent response conveyed Hamas's position that peace and security could not be achieved "unless and until Hamas [was] recognized and its demands [were] met."[157]
In 1996, a series of devastating Hamas suicide bombings, which resulted in significant casualties and nearly half the death toll from the previous two years, is often credited with shaping the results of the1996 Israeli general election. The bombings intensified public fear and shifted voter sentiment, contributing toBenjamin Netanyahu's victory overShimon Peres. Netanyahu's hard-line stance on security became more appealing to voters.[20] When Netanyahu began his term, he focused his political agenda on "combating terrorism". Unlike the previous government's approach of "addressing terrorism and peace separately", Netanyahu's policy emphasized pursuing peace only in the absence of "terror" for Israelis.[158]
In September 2000, Hamas led theSecond Intifada, which was marked by hundreds of suicide bombings that left hundreds of Israelis dead and thousands injured. In August 2005, Israel's unilateraldisengagement from the Gaza Strip was seen as a direct consequence of Hamas's terror campaign. Hamas won elections to thePalestinian Legislative Council, leading to clashes withFatah that eventually resulted in Hamas taking control of Gaza while the PLO retained authority over the West Bank.[159]
The use of suicide bombing by Palestinian Islamist groups is believed to have influenced organizations such asHezbollah andAl-Qaeda.[160] Al-Qaeda, a transnationalist Islamist group, employed this tactic in high-profile attacks, including the1998 US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the2000 USS Cole bombing in Yemen, and ultimately theSeptember 11 attacks on the United States in 2001. The latter marked a significant escalation in global terrorism, prompting widespread security reforms and further legitimizing the jihadi movement, attracting more foreign fighters to Al-Qaeda.[160]
Following the Second Intifada, Hamas shifted from using suicide bombings to focusing on rocket attacks against Israel. By 2005, Hamas began adopting a strategy similar toHezbollah's, leveragingIranian support and smuggling routes to build a significant rocket arsenal.[161] In 2006–2007, Hamas took control of theGaza Strip from Fatah and began ruling the territory. Operational challenges, such as theGaza–Israel barrier and enhanced Israeli intelligence, limited the effectiveness of traditional suicide attacks. Consequently, Hamas adoptedrocket fire against Israeli urban centers as a primary strategy, leading to substantial disruption and casualties in southern Israel and posing an ongoing threat to a larger civilian population.[161] Alongside rocket attacks, the group has also engaged inshootings,stabbings, andvehicle-ramming attacks.[162] Between Hamas' takeover in 2007 and 2023, the group engaged inseveral wars with Israel.[159][163]
On 27 August 2024,Khaled Mashal, a high-ranking Hamas official and former leader, called for the resumption of Palestinian suicide bombings during a speech in Turkey. His call came a few weeks after a failed suicide bombing attempt in Tel Aviv on 18 August.[146]
Paradise Now (2005), directed byHany Abu-Assad, tells the story of two Palestinian friends recruited for a suicide bombing mission in Tel Aviv, exploring their motivations, doubts and the moral complexities of their actions. The film rejects the romantic notion of heroism and sacrifice: both main characters are disillusioned young men, trapped and suffocated by the occupation, far from the heroic figure of the martyr.[164] While the film sparked controversy and accusations of sympathy for terrorists, Abu-Assad stated that his aim was to encourage dialogue rather than justify violence. The film received worldwide praise and was nominated for anAcademy Award for Best Foreign Language Film.[165][166]
The Attack (2012), based on the novel byYasmina Khadra, centers on an Israeli-Palestinian surgeon, well integrated into Israeli society, whose wife is accused of being a suicide bomber.[167] The film explores themes of identity, loyalty, and the personal toll of political conflict, and has been described as an "intelligent, involving movie that’s by turns a murder mystery and a politically charged argument about contemporary Palestinian identity".[168]
InThe Attack (2005),Yasmina Khadra tells the story of Dr. Amin Jaafari, a successful Palestinian surgeon with Israeli citizenship, who is forced to confront the realities of his environment when his wife is revealed to be a suicide bomber. The novel, on which the2012 film is based, delves into the psychological and emotional aftermath of a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv. The book is translated from the original French.[169]
Fauda is an Israeli television series that depicts the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from both sides. While it primarily focuses on Israeli undercover operations, it also portrays Palestinian militants involved in planning attacks, including Abu Ahmad ("The Panther"), a prominent Hamas operative in Season 1, and Al-Makdasi in Season 2. The series has been praised for its nuanced characters but also criticized for potentially reinforcing stereotypes. According toSayed Kashua, "By introducing the terrorist group,Fauda allows viewers in the United States and Europe to see Al-Makdasi as their own enemy — and revel in the heroism of the brave Israelis who protect them from the barbarians".[170]
Various documentaries and news specials have covered the phenomenon of Palestinian suicide bombings, includingThe Cult of the Suicide Bomber (2005)[171] andSuicide Killers (2006).[172]
Moussa, a doctor and local cleric, was killed alongside 21 others in the ensuing battle. Hamas officials said he and an aide named Khaled Banat, a Syrian national of Palestinian origin also known as Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir, had blown themselves up using explosive vests.
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