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Palestinian nationalism is thenational movement of thePalestinian people that espousesself-determination andsovereignty over theregion of Palestine.[1] Originally formed in the early 20th centuryin opposition toZionism, Palestinian nationalism later internationalized and attached itself to other ideologies;[2] it has thus rejected theoccupation of thePalestinian territories by the government ofIsrael since the1967 Six-Day War.[3] Palestinian nationalists often draw upon broader political traditions in theirideology, such asArab socialism andethnic nationalism in the context of Muslimreligious nationalism. Related beliefs have shaped thegovernment of Palestine and continue to do so.
In the broader context of theArab–Israeli conflict in the 21st century, Palestinian nationalist aims have included an end to therefugee status of individuals separated from their native lands during the1948 Palestinian expulsion and flight, advocates stating that a "right of return" exists either to the occupied territories or to both those areas plus places within Israel itself. Nationalists have additionally worked to advance specific causes in terms of current residents' lives such asfreedom of assembly,labor rights, theright to health care, and theright to travel. Divisions exist between nationalists over particular ideological goals, an example being the gulf betweenIslamist Palestinians favoring a moreauthoritarian state compared tocentrist andsecular Palestinians supportingdemocraticself-determination. Palestinian nationalists are also divided by preferred tactics; some favornonviolent resistance while others advocate for and engage inpolitical violence both inside and outside Israel.[4]
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Israeli historian Haim Gerber, a professor of Islamic History atHebrew University of Jerusalem, traces Arab nationalism back to a 17th-century religious leader,MuftiKhayr al-Din al-Ramli (1585–1671) who lived inRamla. Khayr al-Din al-Ramli's religious edicts (fatwa, pluralfatawa), collected into final form in 1670 under the nameal-Fatawa al-Khayriyah, mentions the conceptsFilastin,biladuna (our country),al-Sham (Syria),Misr (Egypt), anddiyar (country), in senses that appear to go beyond objective geography. Gerber describes this as "embryonic territorial awareness, though the reference is to social awareness rather than to a political one".[5]Baruch Kimmerling andJoel Migdal suggest a singular Palestinian identity was first prefigured in the inter-community coalitions which emerged in the region after the1834 Palestinian Arab revolt against Egyptian conquest and conscription.[6]
Zachary J. Foster suggests the first recorded use of the term "Filastini" (lit. 'Palestinian') to describe the region's Arab inhabitants dates to 1898, whenKhalil Beidas used it in thepreface to a book he translated from Russian to Arabic.[a] Foster said that the term "Palestinian" had already been used decades earlier in Western languages by the 1846–1863 British Consul in Jerusalem,James Finn; the GermanLutheran missionary Johann Ludwig Schneller (1820–1896), founder of theSyrian Orphanage; and the American James Wells.[7] Foster also records early usage of the term by Farid Georges Kassab, "aBeirut-basedOrthodox Christian" in 1909. Kassab refers to the Arabic-speaking locals as Palestinians throughout his book,Palestine, Hellenism, and Clericalism, but also says that "the Orthodox Palestinian Ottomans call themselves Arabs".[8] From 1911, the Palestinian Arab Christian newspaperFalastin also addressed its readers as Palestinians.[9][10]
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In his 1997 book,Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness, historianRashid Khalidi says that Palestinian identity has never been an exclusive one, with "Arabism, religion, and local loyalties" playing an important role.[11] Khalidi describes the Arab population of BritishMandatory Palestine as having "overlapping identities", with some or many expressing loyalties to villages, regions, a projected nation of Palestine, an alternative of inclusion in aGreater Syria, an Arab national project, as well as toIslam;[12] and that this had not yet evolved into "nation-statenationalism".[13] He says that modern-day Palestinian identity is informed by the history of Palestine—encompassing the Biblical, Roman, Byzantine, Umayyad, Fatimid, Crusader, Ayyubid, Mamluk and Ottoman periods—as Palestinians have come to understand it over the last century,[14] but says that Palestinian nationalist consciousness is in fact "relatively modern".[15] Khalidi suggests the modern national identity of Palestinians has its roots in nationalist discourses that emerged among the peoples of theOttoman Empire in the late 19th century, which sharpened following the demarcation of modern nation-state boundaries in theMiddle East afterWorld War I.[11]James L. Gelvin suggests the emergence of Palestinian nationalism during theinterwar period was a "response to Zionist immigration and settlement".[16] He says this does not make Palestinian identity any less legitimate "or make it less valid than Zionism", since "all nationalisms are defined by what they oppose".[16] Khalidi also says thatZionism played a role in shaping the Palestinian identity, but says "it is a serious mistake to suggest that Palestinian identity emerged mainly as a response to Zionism".[11]
Bernard Lewis says Arab nationalism in the Ottoman Empire "had not reached significant proportions before the outbreak of World War I", and therefore Palestinians could not oppose Zionism based on Palestinian nationalism, since it did not yet exist.[17]Benny Morris suggests that the Arabs in Palestine remained part of a larger Pan-Islamist orPan-Arab national movement until 1920.[18] Morris says the emergence of the Palestinian national identity can be traced through the successive postwarPalestine Arab Congresses: in January 1919, theFirst Congress saw "Palestine as part of Arab Syria"; in December 1920, theThird Congress called upon the British to establish a "native government", making no further mention of "Southern Syria".[19]Daniel Pipes suggests that, as a result of the carving of theBritish Mandate of Palestine out ofGreater Syria, the Arabs of the new Mandate were forced to make the best they could of their situation, with a distinctly "Palestinian Arab" identity emerging by the end of 1920.[20]
The collapse of theOttoman Empire was accompanied by an increasing sense ofArab identity in the Empire's Arab provinces, most notablySyria, considered to include both northernPalestine andLebanon. This development is often seen as connected to the wider reformist trend known asal-Nahda ("awakening", sometimes called "the Arabrenaissance"), which in the late 19th century brought about a redefinition of Arab cultural and political identities with the unifying feature ofArabic.[21]
Under the Ottomans, Palestine's Arab population mostly saw themselves as Ottoman subjects. In the 1830s however, Palestine was occupied by the Egyptian vassal of the Ottomans,Muhammad Ali and his sonIbrahim Pasha. ThePalestinian Arab revolt was precipitated by popular resistance against heavy demands for conscripts, as peasants were well aware that conscription was little more than a death sentence. Starting in May 1834 the rebels took many cities, among themJerusalem,Hebron andNablus. In response, Ibrahim Pasha sent in an army, finally defeating the last rebels on 4 August in Hebron.[6]
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WhileArab nationalism, at least in an early form, andSyrian nationalism were the dominant tendencies along with continuing loyalty to the Ottoman state, Palestinian politics were marked by a reaction to foreign predominance and the growth of foreign immigration, particularlyZionist.[22]
The Egyptian occupation of Palestine in the 1830s resulted in the destruction ofAcre and thus, the political importance of Nablus increased. The Ottomans wrested back control of Palestine from the Egyptians in 1840–41. As a result, the Abd al-Hadi clan, who originated inArrabah in theSahl Arraba region in northernSamaria, rose to prominence. Loyal allies of Jezzar Pasha and the Tuqans, they gained the governorship of Jabal Nablus and othersanjaqs.[23]
In 1887 theMutassariflik (Mutasarrifate) of Jerusalem was constituted as part of an Ottoman government policy dividing thevilayet ofGreater Syria into smaller administrative units. The administration of the mutasarrifate took on a distinctly local appearance.[24]
Michelle Compos records that "Later, after the founding ofTel Aviv in 1909, conflicts over land grew in the direction of explicit national rivalry."[25] Zionist ambitions were increasingly identified as a threat by Palestinian leaders, while cases of purchase of lands by Zionist settlers and the subsequent eviction of Palestinian peasants aggravated the issue.
The programmes of four Palestinian nationalist societiesjamyyat al-Ikha’ wal-‘Afaf (Brotherhood and Purity),al-jam’iyya al-Khayriyya al-Islamiyya (Islamic Charitable Society),Shirkat al-Iqtissad al-Falastini al-Arabi (lit. 'Arab Palestinian Economic Association') andShirkat al-Tijara al-Wataniyya al-Iqtisadiyya (lit. 'National Economic Trade Association') were reported in the newspaperFilastin in June 1914 by letter from R. Abu al-Sal’ud. The four societies has similarities in function and ideals; the promotion of patriotism, educational aspirations and support for national industries.[26]
Palestinian ArabA’ayan ("Notables") were a group of urban elites at the apex of the Palestinian socio-economic pyramid where the combination of economic and political power dominated Palestinian Arab politics throughout the British Mandate period. The dominance of the A’ayan had been encouraged and utilised during the Ottoman period and later, by the British during the Mandate period, to act as intermediaries between the authority and the people to administer the local affairs of Palestine.
Theal-Husayni family were a major force in rebelling againstMuhammad Ali who governedEgypt and Palestine in defiance of theOttoman Empire. This solidified a cooperative relationship with the returning Ottoman authority. The family took part in fighting theQaisi family in an alliance with a rural lord of theJerusalem areaMustafa Abu Ghosh, who clashed with the tribe frequently. The feuds gradually occurred in the city between the clan and the Khalidis that led the Qaisis however these conflicts dealt with city positions and not Qaisi-Yamani rivalry.[27]
The Husaynis later led resistance and propaganda movements against theYoung Turks who controlled the Ottoman Empire and more so against the British Mandate government and early Zionist immigration.[27]Jamal al-Husayni was the founder and chairman of thePalestine Arab Party (PAP) in 1935.Emil Ghoury was elected as General Secretary, a post he held until the end of the British Mandate in 1948. In 1948, afterJordan had occupied Jerusalem,King Abdullah of Jordan removedHajj Amīn al-Husayni from the post ofGrand Mufti of Jerusalem and banned him from entering Jerusalem.
TheNashashibi family had particularly strong influence in Palestine during the British Mandate Period from 1920 until 1948.[28] Throughout this period, they competed with the Husaynis, for dominance of the Palestinian Arab political scene.[29] As with other A’ayan their lack of identification with the Palestinian Arab population allowed them to rise as leaders but not as representatives of the Palestinian Arab community.[30] The Nashashibi family was led byRaghib Nashashibi, who was appointed as Mayor of Jerusalem in 1920.[31] Raghib was an influential political figure throughout the British Mandate period, and helped form theNational Defence Party in 1934.[32] He also served as a minister in the Jordanian government, governor of the West Bank, member of the Jordanian Senate, and the first military governor in Palestine.
TheTuqan family, originally from northern Syria, was led byHajj Salih Pasha Tuqan in the early eighteenth century and were the competitors of the Nimr family in theJabal Nablus (the sub-district of Nablus and Jenin). Members of the Tuqan family held the post ofmutasallim (sub-district governor) longer than did any other family in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.The rivalry between the Tuqans and Nimr family continued until the 1820s.[33]
Awni Abd al-Hadi of the ‘Abd al Hadi family. The Abd al-Hadis were a leading landowning family in the Palestinian districts ofAfula,Baysan, Jenin, and Nablus. Awni established theHizb al-Istiqlal (Independence Party) as a branch of the pan-Arab party.Rushdi Abd al-Hadi joined the British administrative service in 1921.Amin Abd al-Hadi joined the SMC in 1929, and Tahsin Abd al-Hadi was mayor of Jenin. Some family members secretly sold their shares of Zirʿin village to the Jewish National Fund in July 1930 despite nationalist opposition to such land sales.Tarab ‘Abd al Hadi feminist and activist was the wife of Awni ‘Abd al Hadi,Abd al-Hadi Palace built by Mahmud ‘Abd al Hadi in Nablus stands testament to the power and prestige of the family.
Other A’ayan were the Khalidi family, al-Dajjani family, and the al-Shanti family. The views of the A’ayan and their allies largely shaped the divergent political stances of Palestinian Arabs at the time.In 1918, as the Palestinian Arab national movements gained strength in Jerusalem,Jaffa,Haifa,Acre andNablus, Aref al-Aref joined Hajj Amīn, his brother Fakhri Al Husseini, Ishaaq Darweesh, Ibrahim Darweesh,Jamal al-Husayni,Kamel Al Budeiri, and Sheikh Hassan Abu Al-So’oud in establishing the Arab Club.
Following the arrival of the British a number ofMuslim-Christian Associations were established in all the major towns. In 1919 they joined together to hold the firstPalestine Arab Congress in Jerusalem. Its main platforms were a call for representative government and opposition to theBalfour Declaration.
TheFaisal-Weizmann Agreement led the Palestinian Arab population to reject the Syrian-Arab-Nationalist movement led by Faisal (in which many previously placed their hopes) and instead to agitate for Palestine to become a separate state, with an Arab majority. To further that objective, they demanded an elected assembly.[34] In 1919, in response to Palestinian Arab fears of the inclusion of the Balfour declaration to process the secret societyal-Kaff al-Sawada’ (the Black-hand, its name soon changed toal-Fida’iyya, The Self-Sacrificers) was founded, it later played an important role in clandestine anti-British and anti-Zionist activities. The society was run by theal-Dajjani andal-Shanti families, with Ibrahim Hammani in charge of training; ‘Isa al-Sifri developed a secret code for correspondence. The society was initially based in Jaffa but moved its headquarters toNablus, the Jerusalem branch was run byMahmud Aziz al-Khalidi.[35]
After the April riots an event took place that turned the traditional rivalry between the Husayni and Nashashibi clans into a serious rift,[36] with long-term consequences for al-Husayni and Palestinian nationalism. According toSir Louis Bols, great pressure was brought to bear on the military administration from Zionist leaders and officials such as David Yellin, to have the Mayor of Jerusalem,Mousa Kazzim al-Husayni, dismissed, given his presence in theNabi Musa riots of the previous March. ColonelStorrs, the Military Governor of Jerusalem, removed him without further inquiry, replacing him with Raghib. This, according to the Palin report, 'had a profound effect on his co-religionists, definitely confirming the conviction they had already formed from other evidence that the Civil Administration was the mere puppet of the Zionist Organization.'[37]
TheHigh Commissioner of Palestine,Herbert Samuel, as a counterbalance the Nashashibis gaining the position of Mayor of Jerusalem, pardoned Hajj Amīn and Aref al-Aref and established aSupreme Muslim Council (SMC), or Supreme Muslim Sharia Council, on 20 December 1921.[38] The SMC was to have authority over all the MuslimWaqfs (religious endowments) andSharia (religious law) Courts in Palestine. The members of the council were to be elected by an electoral college and appointed Hajj Amīn as president of the council with the powers of employment over all Muslim officials throughout Palestine.[39] The Anglo American committee termed it a powerful political machine.[40]
The Hajj Amin rarely delegated authority, consequently most of the council's executive work was carried out by Hajj Amīn.[40] Nepotism and favoritism played a central part to Hajj Amīn's tenure as president of the SMC, Amīn al-Tamīmī was appointed as acting president when the Hajj Amīn was abroad, The secretaries appointed were ‘Abdallah Shafĩq and Muhammad al’Afĩfĩ and from 1928 to 1930 the secretary was Hajj Amīn's relativeJamāl al-Husaynī, Sa’d al Dīn al-Khaţīb and later another of the Hajj Amīn's relatives ‘Alī al-Husaynī and‘Ajaj Nuwayhid, aDruze was an adviser.[40]
It was during theBritish mandate period that politicisation of theWailing Wall occurred.[41][further explanation needed] The disturbances at the Wailing wall in 1928[which?] were repeated in 1929, however the violence in theriots that followed, that left 116 Palestinian Arabs, 133 Jews dead and 339 wounded, were surprising in their intensity.[42]
Izz ad-Din al-Qassam established theBlack Hand gang in 1935. Izz ad-Din died in a shootout against the British forces.[43][44] He has been popularised in Palestinian nationalist folklore for his fight againstZionism.[45]
The Great revolt of 1936–1939 was an uprising by Palestinian Arabs in the British Mandate of Palestine in protest against mass Jewish immigration.
Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, a leader of the revolt, was a member of thePalestine Arab Party who had served as its Secretary-General and had become editor-in-chief of the party's paperAl-Liwa’[46] as well as of other newspapers, includingAl-Jami’a Al-Islamiyya.[47] In 1938, Abd al-Qadir was exiled and in 1939 fled toIraq where he took part in theRashid Ali al-Gaylani coup.
Muhammad Nimr al-Hawari, who had started his career as a devoted follower of Hajj Amin, broke with the influential Husayni family in the early 1940s.[48] The British estimated the strength of theal-Najjada paramilitary scout movement, led by Al-Hawari, at 8,000 prior to 1947.[49]
TheNashashibi clan broke with theArab High Committee andHajj Amīn shortly after the contents of thePalestine Royal Commission report compiled by the Peel Commission were released on 7 July 1937, announcing a territorial partition plan.[50] The Nashashibis, the ArabPalestinian Communist Party, and many other Palestinians accepted the plan, but the split in the ranks between rejectionists and pro-partitionists led to Hajj Amin taking control of the Arab High Committee. He, with the support of theArab League, rejected the plan.[51]
The revolt of 1936–1939 led to an imbalance of power between the Jewish community and the Palestinian Arab community, as the latter had been substantially disarmed.[50] The British also greatly reduced Zionist immigration to appease the Arab Middle East with a confrontation withNazi Germany looming.[52][53]A further offer was made to the Palestinians in the British "White Paper of 1939", which proposed a ceiling of 75,000 on Jewish migration into Palestine over the next five years, after which Arab agreement would be required. It additionally proposed severely limiting Jewish land purchases, and offered an Arab-majority Palestinian state within ten years. This offer was rejected by theArab Higher Committee.[52][54]
Al-Qadir moved toEgypt in 1946, but secretly returned to Palestine to lead theArmy of the Holy War (AHW) in January 1948, and was killed during hand-to-hand fighting againstHaganah; where AHW capturedQastal Hill on theTel Aviv–Jerusalem road, on 8 April 1948.[55] al-Qadir's death was a factor in the loss of morale among his forces, Ghuri, who had no experience of military command was appointed as commander of the AHW.Fawzi al-Qawuqji, at the head of theArab Liberation Army remained as the only prominent military commander.[56]
In September 1948, theAll-Palestine Government was proclaimed in Egyptian-controlled Gaza Strip, and immediately won the support of Arab League members except Jordan. Though jurisdiction of the Government was declared to cover the whole of the formerMandatory Palestine, its effective jurisdiction was limited to theGaza Strip.[57] The Prime Minister of the Gaza-seated administration was namedAhmed Hilmi Pasha, and the President was namedHajj Amin al-Husseini, former chairman of theArab Higher Committee.[58]
The All-Palestine Government however lacked any significant authority and was in fact seated in Cairo. In 1959 it was officially merged into theUnited Arab Republic by the decree of Nasser, crippling any Palestinian hope for self governance. With the establishment in 1948 of theState of Israel, along with the1948 Palestinian exodus, the common experience of thePalestinian refugee Arabs was mirrored in a fading of Palestinian identity.[59] The institutions of a Palestinian nationality emerged slowly amongPalestinian refugees in the diaspora. In 1950Yasser Arafat foundedIttihad Talabat Filastin.[60] After the1948 Arab–Israeli War, most of the Husseini clan relocated toJordan and theGulf States. Many family heads that remained in the Old City and the northern neighborhoods ofEast Jerusalem fled due to hostility with the Jordanian government, which controlled that part of the city.[61]
TheFatah movement, which espoused a Palestinian nationalistideology in which Palestinians would be liberated by the actions of Palestinian Arabs, was founded in 1954 by members of the Palestinian diaspora—principally professionals working in the Gulf States who had been refugees inGaza and had gone on to study inCairo orBeirut—includingYasser Arafat who was head of theGeneral Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS) (1952–1956) inCairo University,Salah Khalaf,Khalil al-Wazir,Khaled Yashruti was head of the GUPS in Beirut (1958–1962).[62]
ThePalestine Liberation Organisation was founded by a meeting of 422 Palestinian national figures in Jerusalem in May 1964, following an earlier decision of theArab League. Issued on 28 May, the PLO's founding charter sought aone-state solution within the boundaries ofMandatory Palestine, with aright of return andself-determination for Palestinians.[63][64] The charter also called for the dissolution of Israel and the expulsion of all Jews that had arrived after theBalfour Declaration, with any remaining Jews considered part of a single democratic state.[65] The charter also sought to "prohibit... the existence and activity" of Zionism.[66]
Following the defeat of the Arab states in the June 1967Six-Day War, theWest Bank,East Jerusalem and theGaza Strip came under Israeli military control and occupation.[67] Following theBattle of Karameh in May 1968, which Yasser Arafat claimed as a victory (inArabic, "karameh" means "dignity"), Arafat quickly became a Palestinian national hero. Masses of young Arabs joined the ranks of his group Fatah. Under pressure,Ahmad Shukeiri resigned from the PLO leadership and in July 1969, Fatah joined and soon controlled the PLO. The fierce Palestinian guerrilla fighting and the Jordanian Artillery bombardment forced the IDF withdrawal and gave the Palestinian Arabs an important morale boost. Israel was calling their army the indomitable army but this was the first chance for Arabs to claim victory after defeat in 1948, 1953, and 1967. After the battle, Fatah began to engage in communal projects to achieve popular affiliation.[68] After the Battle of Karameh there was a subsequent increase in the PLO's strength.[69][70]
In 1974 the PLO called for an independent state in the territory ofMandate Palestine.[71] The group usedguerilla tactics to attack Israel from their bases inJordan,Lebanon, andSyria, as well as from within the Gaza Strip and West Bank.[72]
In 1988, the PLO officially endorsed atwo-state solution, with Israel and Palestine living side-by-side contingent on specific terms such as makingEast Jerusalem capital of the Palestinian state and giving Palestinians theright of return to land occupied by Palestinians prior to the 1948 and 1967 wars with Israel.[73] Some scholars, journalists and politicians doubted the honesty in these declarations, and viewed the ambiguity in them as prevarications directed to a Western audience.[74][75]
TheFirst Intifada (1987–1993) would prove another watershed in Palestinian nationalism, as it brought the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza to the forefront of the struggle. TheUnified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU; Arabical-Qiyada al Muwhhada) mobilised grassroots support for the uprising.[76]
In 1987, the Intifada caught the PLO by surprise; the leadership abroad could only indirectly influence the events.[76] A new local leadership, the UNLU, emerged, consisting of many leading Palestinian factions. The initially spontaneous disturbances soon came under local leadership from groups and organizations loyal to the PLO that operated within the Occupied Territories: Fatah, thePopular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, theDemocratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and thePalestine Communist Party.[77] The UNLU was the focus of the social cohesion that sustained the persistent disturbances.[78]
After KingHussein of Jordan proclaimed the administrative and legal separation of the West Bank from Jordan in 1988, the UNLU organised to fill the political vacuum.[79][80]
In 1987, Palestinian Islamic scholarAhmed Yassin founded the Islamic Resistance Movement, also known asHamas,[81][82] after the outbreak of theFirst Intifada against theIsraeli occupation. It emerged as a distinctSunniIslamist organisation[83] from his 1973Mujama al-Islamiya Islamic charity affiliated with theMuslim Brotherhood.[84] According to their founding documents, including their first communique in 1987, and their 1988 charter, Hamas was borth with the goals of waging holy war against Zionism, opposing the peace process, and increase religiosity amongst the youth.[85][86] The organization advocated for "martyrdom" as the ideal objective in their struggle against Israel.[87] During the intifada, Hamas ended the PLO's monopoly as sole political representative of the Palestinian people.[88]
Some Israelis had become tired of the constant violence of the First Intifada, and many were willing to take risks for peace.[89] Some wanted to realize the economic benefits in the new global economy. TheGulf War (1990–1991) did much to persuade Israelis that the defensive value of territory had been overstated, and that theIraqi invasion of Kuwait psychologically reduced their sense of security.[90]
A renewal of the Israeli–Palestinian quest for peace began at the end of theCold War as the United States took the lead in international affairs. After the collapse of theSoviet Union, Western observers were optimistic, asFrancis Fukuyama wrote in an article, titled "The End of History". The hope was that the end of the Cold War heralded the beginning of a new international order. PresidentGeorge H. W. Bush, in a speech on 11 September 1990, spoke of a "rare opportunity" to move toward a "New world order" in which "the nations of the world, east and west, north and south, can prosper and live in harmony," adding that "today the new world is struggling to be born".[91]
The demands of the local Palestinian and Israeli populations somewhat differed from those of the Palestinian diaspora, which had constituted the main base of the PLO until then, in that they were primarily interested inindependence, rather than theright of return for refugees. The resulting 1993Oslo Agreement cemented the belief in atwo-state solution in the mainstream Palestinian movement, as opposed to the PLO's original goal, aone-state solution which entailed the destruction of Israel and its replacement with a secular, democratic Palestinian state.[92][93][94]
The two-state solution had first been seriously discussed in the 1970s, whenSaid Hammami said the PLO would be willing to accept a two-state solution, on at least an interim basis.[95][96] By 1982, the PLO had officially committed to recognising a two-state solution based on a Palestinian state in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. By the mid-1980s, the two-state solution became the negotiating position of the PLO leadership, with leaderYasser Arafat and King Hussein of Jordan attempting to persuade the United States of the Palestinians' right to self-determination in return for acceptance ofUnited Nations Security Council Resolution 242, and therefore implicit acceptance of Israel's existence.[97] In 1988, thePalestine National Council (PNC) published the first official Palestinian statement recognising a two-state solution, which called only for withdrawal fromEast Jerusalem and theoccupied Palestinian territories.[98] Together with Arafat's later statements in Geneva, this was accepted by the United States as a basis for dialogue.[99]
In 1993 with the transfer of increased control of Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem from Israel to the Palestinians, PLOchairman Yasser Arafat appointedSulaiman Ja'abari as Grand Mufti. When he died in 1994, Arafat appointedEkrima Sa'id Sabri. Sabri was removed in 2006 byPalestinian National AuthoritypresidentMahmoud Abbas, who was concerned that Sabri was involved too heavily in political matters. Abbas appointedMuhammad Ahmad Hussein, who was perceived as a political moderate.[citation needed]
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Contemporary proposals for a Palestinian state include establishment of anindependent state for the Palestinian people inPalestine on land that wasoccupied by Israel since theSix-Day War of 1967 and prior to that year byEgypt (Gaza) and byJordan (West Bank andEast Jerusalem). The proposals include theGaza Strip, which is controlled by theHamas faction of thePalestinian National Authority; the West Bank, which is administered by theFatah faction of thePalestinian National Authority; andEast Jerusalem, which was unilaterally annexed by Israel in 1980 and remains under Israeli control.[100] A minority of Palestinians and Israelis support aone-state solution instead throughout the region of British Mandatory Palestine, which would include all of Gaza, the West Bank, and Israel.[b]
"From the river to the sea" is, and forms part of, a popular Palestinian political slogan. It references the land which lies between theJordan River and theMediterranean Sea and has been frequently used in statements by Arab leaders.[103][104] It is also chanted at pro-Palestinian protests and demonstrations,[105] where it is often followed or preceded by the phrase "Palestine will be free".[106][107]
From its establishment in 1964 until the 1980s, the PLO claimed "Palestine from the river to the sea" as its territory.[97][71][108] In a slightly different fashion, "Palestine from the river to the sea" is still claimed byHamas, referring to all areas of formerMandatory Palestine.[109][110][111]
Some groups within the PLO hold a morepan-Arabist view than Fatah, and Fatah itself has never renouncedArab nationalism in favour of a strictly Palestinian nationalist ideology. Some of the pan-Arabist members justifying their views by claiming that the Palestinian struggle must be the spearhead of a wider, pan-Arab movement. For example, the MarxistPFLP viewed the "Palestinianrevolution" as the first step to Arab unity as well as inseparable from a globalanti-imperialist struggle. This said, however, there seems to be a general consensus among the main Palestinian factions that national liberation takes precedence over other loyalties, including Pan-Arabism, Islamism andproletarian internationalism.[citation needed]
In a later repetition of these developments, thepan-Islamic sentiments embodied by theMuslim Brotherhood and otherreligious movements, would similarly provoke conflict with Palestinian nationalism. About 90% of Palestinians areSunni Muslims,[where?][citation needed] and while never absent from therhetoric and thinking of thesecularist PLO factions, Islamic political doctrines, orIslamism, did not become a large part of the Palestinian movement until the 1980s rise ofHamas.[citation needed]
By early Islamic thinkers, nationalism had been viewed as an ungodly ideology, substituting "thenation" forGod as an object of worship and reverence. The struggle for Palestine was viewed exclusively through a religious prism, as a struggle to retrieveMuslim land and the holy places ofJerusalem. However, later developments, not least as a result of Muslim sympathy with the Palestinian struggle led to many Islamic movements accepting nationalism as a legitimate ideology. In the case of Hamas, the Palestinian offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood.[citation needed]
That year, Al-Karmil was founded in Haifa 'with the purpose of opposing Zionist colonization...' and in 1911, Falastin began publication, referring to its readers, for the first time, as 'Palestinians'.
As befitted its name, Falastin regularly discussed questions to do with Palestine as if it were a distinct entity and, in writing against the Zionists, addressed its readers as "Palestinians".
The most successful radical Sunni Islamist group has been Hamas, which began as a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine in the early 1980s.
When Israel first encountered Islamists in Gaza in the 1970s and '80s, they seemed focused on studying the Quran, not on confrontation with Israel. The Israeli government officially recognized a precursor to Hamas called Mujama Al-Islamiya, registering the group as a charity. It allowed Mujama members to set up an Islamic university and build mosques, clubs and schools. Crucially, Israel often stood aside when the Islamists and their secular left-wing Palestinian rivals battled, sometimes violently, for influence in both Gaza and the West Bank.
Inhabitants of the occupied territories and other Palestinians had shown serious interest in a two-state solution since the mid-1970s, and the mainstream of the PLO had since the 1982 Arab summit in Fez been officially committed to mutual recognition between Israel and a Palestinian state located in the West Bank and Gaza, with East Jerusalem as its capital. Support for a two-state solution had also informed PLO diplomacy in the mid-1980s, when Yasir Arafat worked with King Hussein in an effort to persuade the United States to recognize the Palestinian people's right to self-determination in return for PLO acceptance of UN [Resolution] 242.PLO Negotiations Affairs Department (13 November 2008)."The Historic Compromise: The Palestinian Declaration of Independence and the Twenty-Year Struggle for a Two-State Solution"(PDF). Archived fromthe original(PDF) on 26 April 2012. Retrieved6 February 2010.Quigley, John (2005).The Case for Palestine: An International Law Perspective. Duke University Press. p. 212.doi:10.1215/9780822386766.ISBN 978-0-8223-3527-6.
Only two years ago he [Saddam Hussein] declared on Iraqi television: 'Palestine is Arab and must be liberated from the river to the sea and all the Zionists who emigrated to the land of Palestine must leave.'
One exception was Faysal al- Husayni, who stated in his 2001 Beirut speech: 'We may lose or win [tactically] but our eyes will continue to aspire to the strategic goal, namely, to Palestine from the river to the sea.'
Thus, the MAB slogan 'Palestine must be free, from the river to the sea' is now ubiquitous in anti-Israeli demonstrations in the UK ...
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