The so-calledPacts of Madrid of 1953 were three "executive agreements" signed inMadrid on September 23, 1953, between theUnited States andSpain, then under thedictatorship of General Franco. Under these agreements, five U.S. military bases were to be established on Spanish soil in exchange for economic and military aid. For the Francoist regime, these pacts, alongside theconcordat with the Catholic Church signed a month earlier, marked its definitive integration into the Western bloc after years of isolation followingWorld War II due to its ties with theAxis powers. The Spanish government also received additional assistance known as "American aid [es]."
The agreements were a significant effort to break Spain'sinternational isolation post-World War II, a period when the victoriousAllies of World War II and much of the world remained hostile to afascist regime sympathetic to the Axis cause and established withGerman andItalian assistance.[2]
By late 1947, signs emerged that the Western powers' stance toward Franco's regime was softening, as the formerWorld War II allies split into the "free world" versus the "communist dictatorship," in the words of PresidentHarry Truman. The outbreak of the "Cold War" ultimately benefited the Francoist regime, giving Spain newfound strategic value to the Western bloc against a potential Soviet attack on Europe not controlled by theRed Army.[3]
In November 1947, the United States successfully opposed a new condemnation of Franco's regime at theUN and prevented further sanctions. Four months later,France reopened its border with Spain, closed in 1946 after the execution ofCristino García Granda. Between May and June 1948, trade and financial agreements were signed withFrance and theUnited Kingdom. Early in 1949, the Francoist regime received its first U.S. bank loan, approved by the American government, worth $25 million.[4] Shortly before, the chairman of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee had visited Spain.[5]
The "rehabilitation" of theFrancoist regime was formally completed in 1950, following the outbreak of theKorean War in June, the first major Cold War confrontation. Upon learning ofNorth Korea's invasion ofSouth Korea, the Spanish government quickly sent a note to the U.S. offering "to assist the United States in halting communism by sending forces to Korea." The U.S. merely thanked Spain, but the following month, the Senate, at the urging of DemocratPat McCarran—a member of theSpanish Lobby created byJosé Félix de Lequerica, Franco's unofficial representative in Washington—authorized the Export-Import Bank to grant Spain a $62.5 million loan.[6] On November 4, 1950, theUN General Assembly, with strong U.S. support and French and British abstentions, revoked theDecember 1946 resolution condemning Franco's regime by a wide margin—38 in favor, 10 against, 12 abstentions.[7][8] In the following months, Western ambassadors returned to Madrid, and Spain's entry into UN specialized agencies was approved.[9]
The U.S. interest in Spain centered on its geostrategic value: besides controlling theStrait of Gibraltar, the Spanish mainland could serve as a rear base for U.S. military operations in Europe, while theCanary Islands offered a prime position for controlling a vast Atlantic and northwestern African area.[10]
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Negotiations with the U.S. began in April 1952—after the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations had met Franco in Madrid in July 1951, reaching a preliminary military cooperation agreement. The U.S. delegation was led by General August Kissner for military matters and George Train for economic issues, while Spain's delegation was headed by GeneralJuan Vigón. Initial U.S. reluctance to politically endorse Franco was overcome afterDwight Eisenhower's election, with the appointment ofJames Dunn as ambassador to Madrid, who was more flexible than his predecessor in accepting Spain's terms. The agreements were signed on September 23, 1953, but they were not treaties—as Spain had requested—but "executive agreements" between governments, as a treaty would have required U.S. Senate approval, which was unattainable due to widespread opposition to Franco's regime.[11]
At the signing ceremony in thePalacio de Santa Cruz, the unequal nature of the agreements was evident: Spain was represented by Foreign MinisterAlberto Martín-Artajo and Commerce Minister Manuel Arburúa, while the U.S. delegation consisted only of its ambassador and the president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Spain.[12]
The Pacts of Madrid comprised three agreements: the first dealt with U.S. provision of war materiel to Spain; the second covered economic aid, including loans; the third, the most significant, addressed mutual defense aid, establishing U.S. military bases on Spanish soil. Spain committed "to contribute fully to the development and maintenance of its own defensive power and that of the free world... to the extent permitted by its human potential, resources, facilities, and general economic condition," and "consistent with its political and economic stability," effectively securing U.S. support for theFrancoist regime.[13] The base agreement stated:[12]
The Government of Spain authorizes the Government of the United States... to develop, maintain, and use for military purposes, jointly with the Government of Spain, those areas and facilities in Spanish territory under Spanish jurisdiction deemed necessary by the competent authorities of both governments for the purposes of this Agreement. [...] The areas prepared for joint use under this Agreement shall always remain under the Spanish flag and command, and Spain shall undertake to adopt the necessary measures for their external security. However, the United States may, in all cases, exercise the necessary oversight over U.S. personnel, facilities, and equipment.
The bases were theoretically under joint Spanish-U.S. sovereignty, but a secret protocol, revealed years later, allowed the U.S. to unilaterally decide their use "in the event of clear communist aggression threatening Western security" without notifying Spain. Nuclear weapons, including those on nuclear submarines, were stored at these bases—even atTorrejón Air Base, near Madrid.[12][14]
Over the first ten years of the agreements, which were later extended, five major U.S. military bases were established in Spain: four air bases (Morón Air Base,Zaragoza Air Base,Torrejón Air Base, andSan Pablo Air Base) and one naval base (Naval Station Rota), along with smaller facilities likeAir Surveillance Squadrons [es]. Around 7,000 U.S. military personnel and their families were stationed there.[12] U.S. presence extended to sites inConstantina,[15]El Frasno,[16]Villatobas,[17]Sonseca,[18]Roses,[19]L'Estartit,[20]Alcoy,[21]Elizondo,[22]Sóller,[23] andMañón.[24]
Between 1953 and 1963, Spain received over $1.5 billion in U.S. economic aid, primarily loans managed by the Export-Import Bank to purchase U.S. goods like food, cotton, and coal. Military aid totaled $456 million in second-hand equipment, modernizing theSpanish Armed Forces, which still relied on Italian and German weapons from theSpanish Civil War. However, the U.S. restricted their use to defensive purposes.
From 1954 to 1961, military aid amounted to $500 million in grants.[2] Between 1962 and 1982, an additional $1.238 billion was provided—$727 million in loans and $511 million in grants.[2] From 1983 to 1986, aid averaged $400 million annually in concessional credit sales, dropping to just over $100 million annually in 1987 and 1988, with plans to phase it out by 1989 as Spain grew more self-sufficient.[2] Over 200 Spanish officers and NCOs received annual training in the U.S. under a parallel program.[2]
Geostrategically, Spain joined the Western defense system but was excluded from decision-making, barred fromNATO—founded in 1949—due to European members' opposition to Franco's dictatorship and its Axis ties. Spain thus became "a strategic satellite rather than a formal ally of the United States."[25][13] The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff saw these bases as vital for an orderly retreat from Central Europe in case of a Soviet attack.[26]
The pacts' primary benefit was political, ending the international isolation Franco's regime had faced since 1945. However,Julio Gil Pecharromán notes that Spanish politicians and military soon felt treated as junior partners, receiving "little more than crumbs" of aid, yet theNational Movement had no choice but to rely on this powerful protector to maintain power.[27]Stanley G. Payne agrees: "This relationship undoubtedly bolstered the regime's image at home and abroad. Martín Artajo claimed it validated Franco's stance from the start. Yet, there was significant domestic opposition—though stifled—viewing it as asymmetrical and risking Spain's involvement in U.S.-led conflicts."[28]
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Below is a summary of equipment provided by the U.S. under the 1953 agreements and subsequent deals:
Delivery ofM47 Patton,M48 Patton,M24 Chaffee, andM41 Walker Bulldog tanks;M-1A3 cannons;M101,M114, andM37 howitzers;M3 half-tracks; andM4 vehicles.
Modernization ofAudaz-class andLiniers-class [es] destroyers,Pizarro-class frigates,D-class [es] submarines, and smaller vessels (torpedo boats, minelayers, gunboats, minesweepers). Later deliveries included the aircraft carrierDédalo,Lepanto-class andChurruca-class destroyers,Balao-class submarines, and additional smaller craft.[29] Collaboration in developingBaleares-class frigates.
Delivery ofF-86 Sabre fighters,Lockheed T-33 trainers,T-6 Texan propeller trainers,DC-3 andDC-4 transport aircraft, andGrumman Albatross patrol and rescue planes. Later additions includedLockheed F-104 Starfighter andF-4 Phantom II fighters,Caribou andC-97 Stratofreighter transports,Boeing KC-97 Stratotanker tankers, andBell 47 andUH-1 Iroquois helicopters.
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