Convoy PQ 2
Part ofArctic Convoys of theSecond World War
The Norwegian and the Barents seas, site of the Arctic convoys
Date 17–30 October 1941 Location Arctic Ocean Scapa Flow:58°54′N3°03′W / 58.900°N 3.050°W /58.900; -3.050 to Arkhangelsk: 64°32'N 40°32'E Result British victory
Belligerents
Royal Navy Merchant Navy	Luftwaffe Kriegsmarine
Commanders and leaders
Escorts:Alfred Phillips Convoy:	Hans-Jürgen Stumpff Hermann Böhm
Strength
11 escorts in relays 7 freighters
Casualties and losses
No loss	No loss

Convoy PQ 2 (17–30 October 1941) was the third of theArctic Convoys of theSecond World War by which the Western Allies supplied theSoviet Union afterOperation Barbarossa, the German invasion, which began on 22 June 1941. The convoy sailed fromScapa Flow and arrived safely atArkhangelsk.

From Operation Dervish, at the end of August 1941 to 20 December, six more convoys (Convoy PQ 1 to Convoy PQ 6) sent 45 ships, all of which reached Arkhangelsk or Murmansk. German awareness of these and the reciprocal westbound convoys (Convoy QP 1 to Convoy QP 4) was too vague to plan attacks by theKriegsmarine or theLuftwaffe.

On 13 November 1941, the commander-in-chief of theKriegsmarine,Großadmiral (Grand Admiral)Erich Raeder, told Hitler that, owing to the extreme weather and the lack of air reconnaissance, the prospects of the small number of U-boats in the Arctic Ocean were poor.

AfterOperation Barbarossa, the German invasion of theUSSR, began on 22 June 1941, the UK and USSR signed an agreement in July that they would "render each other assistance and support of all kinds in the present war against Hitlerite Germany".^[1] Before September 1941 the British had dispatched 450 aircraft, 22,000 long tons (22,000 t) of rubber, 3,000,000 pairs of boots and stocks of tin, aluminium, jute, lead and wool. In September British and US representatives travelled to Moscow to study Soviet requirements and their ability to meet them. The representatives of the three countries drew up a protocol in October 1941 to last until June 1942.^[2]

The BritishGovernment Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) based atBletchley Park housed a small industry of code-breakers andtraffic analysts. By June 1941, the GermanEnigma machine Home Waters (Heimish) settings used by surface ships and U-boats could quickly be read. On 1 February 1942, the Enigma machines used in U-boats in the Atlantic and Mediterranean were changed but German ships and the U-boats in Arctic waters continued with the olderHeimishHomeHydra from 1942,Dolphin to the British). By mid-1941, BritishY-stations were able to receive and readLuftwaffeW/T transmissions and give advance warning ofLuftwaffe operations. In 1941, navalHeadache personnel with receivers to eavesdrop onLuftwaffe wireless transmissions were embarked on warships.^[3]

The rival GermanBeobachtungsdienst (B-Dienst, Observation Service) of theKriegsmarineMarinenachrichtendienst (MND, Naval Intelligence Service) had broken several Admiralty codes and cyphers by 1939, which were used to helpKriegsmarine ships elude British forces and provide opportunities for surprise attacks. From June to August 1940, six British submarines were sunk in the Skaggerak using information gleaned from British wireless signals. In 1941,B-Dienst read signals from the Commander in Chief Western Approaches informing convoys of areas patrolled by U-boats, enabling the submarines to move into "safe" zones.^[4]

Between Greenland and Norway are some of the most stormy waters of the world's oceans, 890 mi (1,440 km) of water under gales full of snow, sleet and hail.^[5] The cold Arctic water was met by theGulf Stream, warm water from theGulf of Mexico, which became theNorth Atlantic Drift. Arriving at the south-west of England the drift moves between Scotland and Iceland; north of Norway the drift splits. One stream bears north ofBear Island toSvalbard and a southern stream follows the coast of Murmansk into the Barents Sea. The mingling of cold Arctic water and warmer water of higher salinity generates thick banks of fog for convoys to hide in but the waters drastically reduced the effectiveness ofASDIC as U-boats moved in waters of differing temperatures and density.^[5]

In winter, polar ice can form as far south as 50 mi (80 km) off the North Cape and in summer it can recede to Svalbard. The area is in perpetual darkness in winter and permanent daylight in the summer and can make air reconnaissance almost impossible.^[5] Around theNorth Cape and in theBarents Sea the sea temperature rarely rises about 4°Celsius and a man in the water will die unless rescued immediately.^[5] The cold water and air makes spray freeze on the superstructure of ships, which has to be removed quickly to avoid the ship becoming top-heavy. Conditions in U-boats were, if anything, worse the boats having to submerge in warmer water to rid the superstructure of ice. Crewmen on watch were exposed to the elements, oil lost its viscosity, nuts froze and sheared off. Heaters in the hull wee too demanding of current and could not be run continuously.^[6]

German naval forces in Norway were commanded byHermann Böhm, theKommandierender Admiral Norwegen. Two U-boats were based in Norway in July 1941, four in September, five in December and four in January 1942.^[7] By mid-February twenty U-boats were anticipated in the region, with six based in Norway, two inNarvik orTromsø, two atTrondheim and two at Bergen. Hitler contemplated establishing a unified command but decided against it. The German battleshipTirpitz arrived at Trondheim on 16 January, the first ship of a general move of surface ships to Norway. British convoys to Russia had received little attention since they averaged only eight ships each and the long Arctic winter nights negated even the limitedLuftwaffe effort that was available.^[8]

In mid-1941,Luftflotte 5 (Air Fleet 5) had been re-organised for Operation Barbarossa withLuftgau Norwegen (Air Region Norway) headquartered inOslo.Fliegerführer Stavanger (Air CommanderStavanger) the centre and north of Norway,Jagdfliegerführer Norwegen (Fighter Leader Norway) commanded the fighter force andFliegerführer Kerkenes (Oberst [colonel] Andreas Nielsen) in the far north had airfields atKirkenes andBanak. The Air Fleet had 180 aircraft, sixty of which were reserved for operations on theKarelian Front against theRed Army.^[9]

The distance from Banak toArkhangelsk was 560 mi (900 km) andFliegerführer Kerkenes had only tenJunkers Ju 88 bombers ofKampfgeschwader 30, thirtyJunkers Ju 87Stuka dive-bombers tenMesserschmitt Bf 109 fighters ofJagdgeschwader 77, fiveMesserschmitt Bf 110 heavy fighters ofZerstörergeschwader 76, ten reconnaissance aircraft and an anti-aircraft battalion. Sixty aircraft were far from adequate in such a climate and terrain where

...there is no favourable season for operations. (Earl Ziemke [1959] in Claasen [2001])^[10]

The emphasis of air operations changed from army support to anti-shipping operations only after March 1942, when Allied Arctic convoys becoming larger and more frequent coincided with the reinforcement of Norway with ships and aircraft and the less extreme climatic conditions of the Arctic summer.^[9]

A convoy was defined as at least one merchant ship sailing under the protection of at least one warship.^[11] At first the British had intended to run convoys to Russia on a forty-day cycle (the number of days between convoy departures) during the winter of 1941–1942 but this was shortened to a ten-day cycle. The round trip to Murmansk for warships was three weeks and each convoy needed a cruiser and two destroyers, which severely depleted theHome Fleet. Convoys left port and rendezvoused with the escorts at sea. A cruiser provided distant cover from a position to the west of Bear Island. Air support was limited to330 Squadron and269 Squadron,RAF Coastal Command fromIceland, with some help from anti-submarine patrols from Sullom Voe, inShetland, along the coast of Norway.Anti-submarine trawlers escorted the convoys on the first part of the outbound journey. Built for Arctic conditions, the trawlers were coal-burning ships with sufficient endurance. The trawlers were commanded by their peacetime crews and captains with the rank ofSkipper,Royal Naval Reserve (RNR), who were used to Arctic conditions, supplemented by anti-submarine specialists of theRoyal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR).^[12] British minesweepers based at Arkhangelsk met the convoys to join the escort for the remainder of the voyage.^[13]

The ships of Convoy PQ 2,Harpalion,Hartlebury,Queen City,Orient City,Temple Arch andEmpire Baffin departed from Liverpool on 10 October 1941 and assembled atScapa Flow in theOrkneys. The convoy sailed for Arkhangelsk on 17 October.^[16] From 18 to 30 October the convoy was escorted by theCounty-class cruiserHMS Norfolk, the destroyersHMS Icarus andEclipse with theHalcyon-class minesweepersHMS Bramble,Seagull andSpeedy. The convoy was met by the minesweepersGossamerHussar andLeda from Achangelsk on the night of 29/30 October, arriving on 30 October.^[17]

Convoy PQ 2 arrived without loss on 30 October 1941.^[12] The Germans paid little attention to the first eleven British convoys before March 1942, which averaged only eight ships each.^[18][b] In the winter darkness theLuftwaffe had great difficulty in finding Allied convoys, which made attacks on Murmansk and the railway south more practical. As the Allied supply effort increased in 1942, the Arctic route carrying 1.2 million tons of supplies of the total of 2.3 million tons, the reinforcement of theLuftwaffe andKriegsmarine led to German countermeasures growing in extent and effect.^[18]

To protect return convoys and sweep for mines, the commander of the Home Fleet,John Tovey, established a force of ocean-going, Halcyon-class minesweepers at the Kola naval base, which had the speed, armament and anti-submarine capacity similar to that ofFlower-class corvettes. As specialist vessels the minesweepers usually had experienced career officers. Thefleet oilerRFA Aldersdale arrived withOperation Dervish (21–31 August 1941), to stay at Kola to fuel ships for the return journey. Soviet destroyers atPolyarnoe were available to reinforce convoy escorts for the last part of the journey.^[19]

From Operation Dervish, at the end of August 1941, the first convoy which comprised seven ships, to 20 December, six more convoys (Convoy PQ 1 to Convoy PQ 6) sent 45 ships, all of which reached Arkhangelsk or Murmansk. German awareness of these and the reciprocal westbound convoys (Convoy QP 1 to Convoy QP 4) was too vague to plan attacks on the convoys by theKriegsmarine or theLuftwaffe. On 13 November 1941, the commander-in-chief of theKriegsmarine,Großadmiral (Grand Admiral)Erich Raeder, told Hitler that, owing to the extreme weather and the lack of air reconnaissance, the prospects of the small number of U-boats in the Arctic Ocean were poor.^[20]

Convoyed ships^[14]

Name	Year	Flag	GRT	pos'n	Notes
SS Empire Baffin	1941	United Kingdom	6,978	22
SS Harpalion	1932	United Kingdom	5,486	21	Vice-Convoy Commodore
SS Hartlebury	1934	United Kingdom	5,082	32
SS Kheti	1927	United Kingdom	2,734	—	Ammunition carrier, stayed at Scapa Flow
SS Orient City	1940	United Kingdom	5,095	11	Convoy Commodore
SS Queen City	1924	United Kingdom	4,814	31
SS Temple Arch	1940	United Kingdom	5,138	12

Convoy escorts^[12]

Name	Flag	Type	Notes
HMS Norfolk	Royal Navy	County-classcruiser	18–30 October
HMS Eclipse	Royal Navy	E-class destroyer	17–30 October
HMS Icarus	Royal Navy	I-classdestroyer	17–30 October
Uritski	Soviet Navy	Orfey-classdestroyer	29–30 October
Valerian Kuybyshev	Soviet Navy	Novik-class destroyer	29–30 October
HMS Bramble	Royal Navy	Halcyon-classminesweeper	17–30 October
HMS Gossamer	Royal Navy	Halcyon-classminesweeper	29–30 October
HMS Hussar	Royal Navy	Halcyon-classminesweeper	29–30 October
HMS Leda	Royal Navy	Halcyon-classminesweeper	29–30 October
HMS Seagull	Royal Navy	Halcyon-classminesweeper	14–30 October
HMS Speedy	Royal Navy	Halcyon-classminesweeper	14–30 October

• Blair, Clay (1996).Hitler's U-Boat War: The Hunters 1939–42. Vol. I. London: Cassell.ISBN 0-304-35260-8.
• Kemp, Paul (1993).Convoy! Drama in Arctic Waters. London: Arms and Armour Press.ISBN 1-85409-130-1 – via Archive Foundation.
• Rohwer, Jürgen; Hümmelchen, Gerhard (2005) [1972].Chronology of the War at Sea, 1939–1945: The Naval History of World War Two (3rd rev. ed.). London: Chatham Publishing.ISBN 1-86176-257-7.
• Roskill, S. W. (1962) [1956].The Period of Balance.History of the Second World War: The War at Sea 1939–1945. Vol. II (3rd impression ed.). London:HMSO.OCLC 174453986.Archived from the original on 6 March 2014.
• Schofield, Bernard (1964).The Russian Convoys. London: BT Batsford.OCLC 906102591 – via Archive Foundation.

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