TheOrange Revolution (Ukrainian:Помаранчева революція,romanized: Pomarancheva revoliutsiia) was a series ofprotests that led to political upheaval inUkraine from late November 2004 to January 2005. It gained momentum primarily due to the initiative of the general population,[7] sparked by the aftermath of the2004 Ukrainian presidential election run-off which was claimed to be marred by massivecorruption,voter intimidation andelectoral fraud.[8]Kyiv, the Ukrainian capital, was the focal point of the movement's campaign ofcivil resistance, with thousands of protesters demonstrating daily.[9] Nationwide,[10] this was highlighted by a series of acts ofcivil disobedience,sit-ins, andgeneral strikes organized by the opposition movement.
The protests were prompted by reports from several domestic and foreign election monitors as well as the widespread public perception that the results of the run-off vote of 21 November 2004 between leading candidatesViktor Yushchenko andViktor Yanukovych were rigged by the authorities in favour of the latter.[11] The nationwide protests succeeded when the results of the original run-off were annulled, and a revote was ordered byUkraine's Supreme Court for 26 December 2004. Under intense scrutiny by domestic and international observers, the second run-off was declared to be "free and fair". The final results showed a clear victory for Yushchenko, who received about 52% of the vote, compared to Yanukovych's 44%. Yushchenko was declared the official winner and with his inauguration on 23 January 2005 in Kyiv, the Orange Revolution ended. In the following years, the Orange Revolution had a negative connotation among pro-government circles inBelarus andRussia.[12][13][14][15]
Georgiy Gongadze, a Ukrainian journalist and the founder ofUkrayinska Pravda (a newspaper well known for publicising the corruption or unethical conduct of Ukrainian politicians), was kidnapped and murdered in 2000. Persistent rumours suggested that Ukrainian presidentLeonid Kuchma had ordered the killing.[17][18] Gen. Oleksiy Pukach, a former police officer, was accused of the murder under the orders of a former minister who committed suicide in 2005. Pukach was arrested in 2010[19] and was sentenced to life in prison in 2013.[20][21] The murder sparked a movement against Kuchma in 2000 that may be seen as the origin of the Orange Revolution in 2004.[18] After two terms of presidency (1994–1999)[22] and theCassette Scandal of 2000 that significantly damaged his image,[23][24] Kuchma decided not to run for a third term in the 2004 elections[25] and instead supportedPrime MinisterViktor Yanukovych in the presidential race againstViktor Yushchenko of theOur Ukraine–People's Self-Defense Bloc.[26][27]
The state of Ukraine during the2004 presidential election was considered to be in "ideal condition" for an outburst from the public. During this time, Ukrainians were impatient while waiting for the economic and political transformation.[28] The results of the election were thought to be fraudulent.[29]
The Revolution empowered many Ukrainians to take to the streets and participate in the protests, some lasting as long as seventeen days. The protests did not have national participation, but mostly was joined by western and central Ukrainians.Ukraine gained independence in 1991 and it was the quest for that independence that supported the Orange Revolution. Ukrainians for the most part did not want to be too closely associated with the past history of the Soviet Union. The Austro-Hungarian roots in the eastern European geo-cultural area of Ukraine (formerly known asPoland-Lithuania) helped shape the modern-day Ukrainian national identity.[30]
The Ukrainian regime prior to the Orange Revolution sought to create a path fordemocratization.[8] Ukraine was considered a "competitive authoritarian regime" that is transitioninghybrid regime, allowing for room to fully transition into a liberal democracy, with a market based economy.[31] The Ukrainian electorate sought to elect a candidate to bring economic and political reforms. Yushchenko quickly established himself as the leading candidate in calling for these reforms.[citation needed]
After a clear lack of faith in the government had been instilled in the Ukrainian population, Yushchenko's role had never been more important[peacock prose] to the revolution. Yushchenko was a charismatic candidate[peacock prose] who showed no signs of being corrupt. Yushchenko was on the same level as his constituents[according to whom?] and presented his ideas in a "non-Soviet" way. Young Ukrainian voters were extremely important to the outcome of the 2004 presidential election. This new wave of younger people born in a post-Soviet Ukraine had different views of the main figures in Ukraine. They were exposed to a lot of negativity from Kuchmagate and therefore had very skewed visions about Kuchma and his ability to lead their country.[citation needed]
The abundance of younger people who participated showed an increasing sense ofnationalism that was developing in the country. The Orange Revolution had enough popular impact that it interested people of all ages.[32]
On 2 July 2004, Our Ukraine and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc established theForce of the People, a coalition which aimed to stop "the destructive process that has, as a result of theincumbent authorities, become a characteristic for Ukraine" – at the time President Kuchma and Prime Minister Yanukovych were the "incumbent authorities" in Ukraine. The pact included a promise by Viktor Yushchenko to nominate Tymoshenko as Prime Minister if Yushchenko won the October 2004 presidential election.[37]
Anorange ribbon, a symbol of the Ukrainian Orange Revolution.[38] Ribbons are common symbols of non-violent protest.
The 2004 presidential election in Ukraine eventually featured two main candidates:
sitting prime minister Viktor Yanukovych, largely supported by Leonid Kuchma (the outgoing president who had already served two terms in office from 1994 and was precluded from running himself due to theterm limits under theconstitution)
the opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko, leader of the Our Ukraine faction in theUkrainian parliament and a former prime minister (in office 1999–2001)
The election took place in a highly charged atmosphere, with the Yanukovych team and the outgoing president's administration using their control of the government and state apparatus for intimidation of Yushchenko and his supporters. In September 2004 Yushchenko suffereddioxin poisoning under mysterious circumstances. While he survived and returned to the campaign trail, the poisoning undermined his health and altered his appearance dramatically (his face remains disfigured by the consequences to this day[update]).[citation needed]
The two main candidates were neck and neck in the first-round vote held on 31 October 2004, winning 39.32% (Yanukovych) and 39.87% (Yushchenko) of the votes cast. The candidates who came third and fourth collected much less:Oleksandr Moroz of theSocialist Party of Ukraine andPetro Symonenko of theCommunist Party of Ukraine received 5.82% and 4.97%, respectively. Since no candidate had won more than 50% of the cast ballots, Ukrainian law mandated arun-off vote between two leading candidates. After the announcement of the run-off,Oleksandr Moroz threw his support behindViktor Yushchenko. The Progressive Socialist Party'sNataliya Vitrenko, who won 1.53% of the vote, endorsed Yanukovych, who hoped for Petro Symonenko's endorsement but did not receive it.[39]
In the wake of the first round of the election, many complaints emerged regarding voting irregularities in favour of the government-supported Yanukovych. However, as it was clear that neither nominee was close enough to collect an outright majority in the first round, challenging the initial result would not have affected the outcome of the round. So the complaints were not actively pursued and both candidates concentrated on the upcoming run-off, scheduled for 21 November.
Pora! activists were arrested in October 2004, but the release of many (reportedly on President Kuchma's personal order) gave growing confidence to the opposition.[40]
Yushchenko's supporters originally adoptedorange as the signifying colour of his election campaign. Later, the colour gave its name to an entire series of political labels, such asthe Oranges (Pomaranchevi in Ukrainian) for his political camp and its supporters. At the time when the mass protests grew, and especially when they brought about political change in the country, the termOrange Revolution came to represent the entire series of events.
In view of the success of using colour as a symbol to mobilise supporters, the Yanukovych camp choseblue for themselves.
Viktor Yushchenko (first round) – percentage of total national vote
Viktor Yanukovych (first round) – percentage of total national vote
Viktor Yushchenko (second round) – percentage of total national vote
Viktor Yanukovych (second round) – percentage of total national vote
Protests began on the eve of the second round of voting, as the official count differed markedly fromexit poll results which gave Yushchenko up to an 11% lead, while official results gave the election win to Yanukovych by 3%. While Yanukovych supporters have claimed that Yushchenko's connections to the Ukrainianmedia explain this disparity, the Yushchenko team publicised evidence of many incidents ofelectoral fraud in favour of the government-backed Yanukovych, witnessed by many local and foreign observers. These accusations were reinforced by similar allegations, though at a lesser scale, during the first presidential run of 31 October.[citation needed]
The Yushchenko campaign publicly called for protest on the dawn of election day, 21 November 2004, when allegations of fraud began to spread in the form of leaflets printed and distributed by the 'Democratic Initiatives' foundation, announcing that Yushchenko had won – on the basis of its exit poll.[1] Beginning on 22 November 2004, massive protests[nb 1] started in cities across Ukraine.[42] The largest, in Kyiv'sMaidan Nezalezhnosti(Independence Square), attracted an estimated 500,000 participants,[4] who on 23 November 2004 peacefully marched in front of the headquarters of theVerkhovna Rada, the Ukrainian parliament, many wearing orange or carrying orange flags, the colour of Yushchenko's campaign coalition. One of the most prominent activists of that time wasParaska Korolyuk, subsequently bestowed with theOrder of Princess Olga. From 22 NovemberPora! undertook the management of the protests in Kyiv until the end of the demonstration.[41]
Protests in Lviv, late November 2004
The local councils inKyiv,Lviv,[43] and several other cities passed, with the wide popular support of their constituency, a largely symbolic refusal to accept the legitimacy of the official election results, and Yushchenko took a symbolicpresidential oath.[44] This "oath" taken by Yushchenko in half-empty parliament chambers, lacking thequorum as only the Yushchenko-leaningfactions were present, could not have any legal effect. But it was an important symbolic gesture meant to demonstrate the resolve of the Yushchenko campaign not to accept the compromised election results. In response, Yushchenko's opponents denounced him for taking an illegitimate oath, and even some of his moderate supporters were ambivalent about this act, while a more radical side of the Yushchenko camp demanded him to act even more decisively. Some observers argued that this symbolic presidential oath might have been useful to the Yushchenko camp if events have taken a more confrontational route.[citation needed] In such a scenario, this "presidential oath" which Yushchenko took could be used to lend legitimacy to the claim that he, rather than his rival who tried to gain the presidency through alleged fraud, was a truecommander-in-chief authorised to give orders to the military and security agencies.
Pro-Yanukovych demonstration inSiverskodonetsk, where deputies allied to theParty of Regions threatened to separate from Ukraine in case of Yushchenko's victory
At the same time, local officials in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, the stronghold ofViktor Yanukovych, started a series of actions alluding to the possibility of the breakup of Ukraine or an extra-constitutionalfederalisation of the country, if their candidate's claimed victory were not recognised. Demonstrations of public support for Yanukovych were held throughout Eastern Ukraine, and some of his supporters arrived in Kyiv. In Kyiv the pro-Yanukovych demonstrators were far outnumbered by Yushchenko supporters, whose ranks were continuously swelled by new arrivals from many regions of Ukraine. The scale of the demonstrations in Kyiv was unprecedented. By many estimates, on some days they drew up to one million people to the streets, in freezing weather.[45]
In total, 18.4% of Ukrainians have claimed to have taken part in the Orange Revolution (across Ukraine).[1]
Although Yushchenko entered into negotiations with outgoing president Kuchma in an effort to peacefully resolve the situation, the negotiations broke up on 24 November 2004. Yanukovych was officially certified as the victor by theCentral Election Commission, which itself was allegedly involved in falsification of electoral results by withholding the information it was receiving from local districts and running a parallel illegal computer server to manipulate the results. The next morning after the certification took place, Yushchenko spoke to supporters in Kyiv, urging them to begin a series of mass protests, general strikes and sit-ins with the intent of crippling the government and forcing it to concede defeat.
In view of the threat of illegitimate government acceding to power, Yushchenko's camp announced the creation of theCommittee of National Salvation which declared a nationwide political strike.
On 1 December 2004, theVerkhovna Rada passed a resolution that strongly condemned pro-separatist andfederalisation actions, and passed anon-confidence vote in theCabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, a decision Prime Minister Yanukovych refused to recognise. By theConstitution of Ukraine, the non-confidence vote mandated the government's resignation, but the parliament had no means to enforce a resignation without the co-operation of Prime Minister Yanukovych and outgoing president Kuchma.
On 3 December 2004,Ukraine's Supreme Court finally broke the political deadlock. The court decided that due to the scale of the electoral fraud it became impossible to establish the election results. Therefore, it invalidated the official results that would have given Yanukovych the presidency. As a resolution, the court ordered a revote of the run-off to be held on 26 December 2004.[46] This decision was seen as a victory for the Yushchenko camp while Yanukovych and his supporters favoured a rerun of the entire election rather than just the run-off, as a second-best option if Yanukovych was not awarded the presidency. On 8 December 2004 the parliament amended laws to provide a legal framework for the new round of elections. The parliament also approved the changes to theConstitution, implementing a political reform backed by outgoing president Kuchma as a part of a political compromise between the acting authorities and opposition.
In November 2009 Yanukovych stated that although his victory in the election was "taken away", he gave up this victory in order to avoid bloodshed. "I didn't want mothers to lose their children and wives their husbands. I didn't want dead bodies fromKyiv to flow down theDnipro. I didn't want to assume power through bloodshed."[47]
Viktor Yushchenko (Final round) – percentage of total national vote
Viktor Yanukovych (Final round) – percentage of total national vote
The 26 December revote was held under intense scrutiny by local and international observers. The preliminary results, announced by theCentral Election Commission on 18 December, gave Yushchenko and Yanukovych 51.99% and 44.20% of the total vote, which represented a change in the vote by +5.39% to Yushchenko and −5.27% from Yanukovych respectively when compared to the November poll.[48] The Yanukovych team attempted to mount a fierce legal challenge to the election results using both the Ukrainian courts and the Election Commission complaint procedures. However, all their complaints were dismissed as without merit by both theSupreme Court of Ukraine and the Central Election Commission.[42] On 10 January 2005 the Election Commission officially declared Yushchenko as the winner of the presidential election[42] with the final results falling within 0.01% of the preliminary ones. This Election Commission announcement[49] cleared the way for Yushchenko's inauguration as thepresident of Ukraine. The official ceremony took place in theVerkhovna Rada building on 23 January 2005 and was followed by the "public inauguration" of the newly sworn President atMaidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in front of hundreds of thousands of his supporters.[50] This event brought the Ukrainian Orange Revolution to its peaceful conclusion.[51]
Role of Ukrainian intelligence and security agencies
According to one version of events recounted byThe New York Times,[52] Ukrainian security agencies played an unusual role in the Orange Revolution, with aKGB successor agency in the former Soviet state providing qualified support to the political opposition. As per the paper report, on 28 November 2004 over 10,000MVS (Internal Ministry) troops were mobilised to put down the protests in Independence Square in Kyiv by the order of their commander, Lt. Gen. Sergei Popkov.[53] The SBU (Security Service of Ukraine, a successor to the KGB in Ukraine) warned opposition leaders of the crackdown. Oleksander Galaka, head of GUR (military intelligence) made calls to "prevent bloodshed". Col. Gen.Ihor Smeshko (SBU chief) and Maj. Gen. Vitaly Romanchenko (military counter-intelligence chief) both claimed to have warned Popkov to pull back his troops, which he did, preventing bloodshed.
In addition to the desire to avoid bloodshed, theNew York Times article suggests thatsiloviki, as the security officers are often called in the countries of theformer Soviet Union, were motivated by personal aversion to the possibility of having to serve President Yanukovych, who was in his youth convicted of robbery and assault and had alleged connection withcorrupt businessmen, especially if he were to ascend to the presidency by fraud. The personal feelings of Gen. Smeshko towards Yanukovych may also have played a role. Additional evidence of Yushchenko's popularity and at least partial support among the SBU officers is shown by the fact that several embarrassing proofs of electoral fraud, including incriminatingwiretap recordings of conversations among the Yanukovych campaign and government officials discussing how to rig the election, were provided to the Yushchenko camp.[54] These conversations were likely recorded and provided to the opposition by sympathisers in the Ukrainian Security Services.
According to Abel Polese, Kuchma was concerned about its reputation in theWest; because of a lack ofnatural resources to finance his regime he had to show a commitment to democracy in order to be targeted for Western financial assistance.[55]
In February 2004, an editorial "A Chestnut Revolution" appeared inThe Wall Street Journal, the author of which wrote that "Ukraine offers the best chance to build on the Georgian success in popular democracy — as long as the West and the democratic opposition play their cards right".[56] The note also says that the United States has already spent $2 billion to support a "free and independent" Ukraine and it would be better if this money went to support Kuchma's democratic rivals, whose actions are inspired byGeorgia andSerbia.[56]
Adrian Karatnycky, a senior researcher atFreedom House, who was born in New York into a family of Ukrainian immigrants, has repeatedly traveled to Ukraine to meet with representatives of public groups, figures of the country's political elite, as well as people from Viktor Yushchenko's team.[57] When opposition candidate Yushchenko visited New York, Karatnycky acted as a connector, organizing meetings with American associations, such as theConference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations.[57] A year before the elections, Karatnycky, together with NDI and Freedom House, gathered 1,023 observers from Central and Eastern Europe, who organized theEuropean Network of Election Monitoring Organizations.[57] Karatnycky himself took a direct part as an observer during the second round of the presidential elections and witnessed violations.[57]
In August 2004, he took part in a training camp for Ukrainian activists; according to him, "Croatians, Romanians, Slovakians, and Serbians – leaders of the group that led civic opposition to Milošević – taught Ukrainian kids how to ‘control the temperature’ of protesting crowds".[57] Democratic activists were trained on how to resist government pressure, as well as establish communication with the public and the police.[57] Karatnycky also served as president of Freedom House from 1996 to 2003 and executive director from 1993 to 1996, and in this position helped create a network of centers and public organizations in Ukraine engaged in monitoring the media and elections.[57] On November 30, 2004, at the very beginning of the protests, Karatnycky stated in his speech at theKnickerbocker Club: "I think the ‘orange revolution’ will win this time, and I can’t conceive of a set of circumstances under which Yushchenko won’t be president of the country".[57]
In the two years before the2004 Ukrainian presidential election, the United States spent $65 million "to aid political organizations in Ukraine, paying to bring opposition leaderViktor Yushchenko to meet U.S. leaders and helping to underwrite exit polls indicating he won a disputed runoff election."[58] State Department spokesmanRichard A. Boucher said that the U.S. money was not going to help a particular candidate, but to institutions that are necessary for free elections.[58]Freedom House and theNational Democratic Institute also funded civic groups that counted votes and announced exit poll results.[59] In late November 2004, SenatorRichard Lugar arrived in Kyiv as a representative of PresidentGeorge W. Bush and delivered a message to PresidentLeonid Kuchma: "you play a central role in ensuring that Ukraine’s election is democratic and free of fraud and manipulation. A tarnished election, however, will lead us to review our relations with Ukraine."[60]
Throughout the demonstrations,Ukraine's emerging Internet usage (facilitated by news sites that began to disseminate theKuchma tapes) was an integral part of the orange revolutionary process. It has even been suggested that the Orange Revolution was the first example of an Internet-organised mass protest.[61] Analysts believe that the Internet and mobile phones allowed an alternative media to flourish that was not subject to self-censorship or overt control by President Kuchma and his allies and pro-democracy activists (such asPora!) were able to use mobile phones and the Internet to coordinate election monitoring and mass protests.[62][63]
This section needs to beupdated. Please help update this article to reflect recent events or newly available information.(December 2015)
As part of the Orange Revolution, the Ukrainian constitution was changed to shift powers from the presidency to the parliament. This wasOleksandr Moroz's price for his decisive role in winning Yushchenko the presidency. The Communists also supported these measures. These came into effect in 2006 during which Yanukovych's Party of Regions won the parliamentary election, creating a coalition government with the Socialists and the Communists under his leadership. As a result, President Viktor Yushchenko had to deal with a powerful Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych who had control of many important portfolios. His premiership ended in late 2007 after Yushchenko had succeeded in his months-long attempt to dissolve parliament. After the election, Yanukovych's party again was the largest, but Tymoshenko's finished far ahead of Yushchenko's for second place. The Orange parties won a very narrow majority, permitting a new government under Tymoshenko, but Yushchenko's political decline continued to his poor showing in the 2010 presidential election.
A Circuit administrative court in Kyiv forbade mass actions atMaidan Nezalezhnosti from 9 January 2010 to 5 February 2010. TheMayor's office had requested this in order to avoid "nonstandard situations" during the aftermath of the2010 presidential election. Apparently (in particular) theParty of Regions,All-Ukrainian Union "Fatherland" andSvoboda had applied for a permit to demonstrate there.[65] Incumbent PresidentViktor Yushchenko got a dismal 5.45% of votes during the election.[66]"Ukraine is a European democratic country", said Yushchenko in a sort of political will at the polling station. "It is a free nation and free people."[67] According to him, this is one of the great achievements of the Orange Revolution.
In the 2010 presidential electionViktor Yanukovych was declared the winner which was labeled by some Yanukovych supporters as "an end to this Orange nightmare".[68] Immediately after his election Yanukovych promised to "clear the debris of misunderstanding and old problems that emerged during the years of the Orange power".[69] According to influentialParty of Regions memberRinat Akhmetov the ideals of the Orange Revolution won at the 2010 election "We had a fair and democratic independent election. The entire world recognised it, and international observers confirmed its results. That's why the ideals of the Orange Revolution won".[70] According toYulia Tymoshenko the 2010 elections were a missed "chance to become a worthy member of the European family and to put an end to the rule of theoligarchy".[71]
A stamp of Ukraine issued in 2005 in honour of the Orange Revolution
President Viktor Yushchenko decreed in 2005 that 22 November (the starting day of the Orange Revolution) will be a non-public holiday "Day of Freedom".[72] This date was moved to 22 January (and merged withUnification Day) by President Viktor Yanukovych late December 2011.[73][74][75] President Yanukovych stated he moved "Day of Freedom" because of "numerous appeals from the public".[74][nb 2]
A 2007 study revealed that opinion about the nature of the Orange Revolution had barely shifted since 2004 and that the attitudes about it in the country remained divided along the same largely geographical lines that it had been at the time of the revolution (West andCentral Ukraine being more positive about the events andSouth andEastern Ukraine more cynical (seniors also).[1] This research also showed that Ukrainians in total had a less positive view on the Orange Revolution in 2007 than they had in 2005.[1] It has been suggested that since the Orange Revolution was impactful enough to interest people of all ages it increased the overall unity of Ukraine.[original research?]
^Andrew Wilson, "Ukraine's 'Orange Revolution' of 2004: The Paradoxes of Negotiation", inAdam Roberts andTimothy Garton Ash (eds.),Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present,Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 295–316.[1]Archived 20 March 2017 at theWayback Machine
^For question on ultimate source of orders and mobilisation details see Lehrke, Jesse Paul.The Transition to National Armies in the Former Soviet Republics, 1988–2005. Oxfordshire, UK: Routledge (2013), 188–89.
Paul D'Anieri, ed.Orange Revolution and Aftermath: Mobilisation, Apathy, and the State in Ukraine (Johns Hopkins University Press; 2011) 328 pagesISBN978-0-8018-9803-7
Tetyana Tiryshkina.The Orange Revolution in Ukraine – a Step to Freedom (2nd ed. 2007)ISBN978-1-84753-857-4
Pavol Demes and Joerg Forbrig (eds.).Reclaiming Democracy: Civil Society and Electoral Change in Central and Eastern Europe. German Marshall Fund, 2007.
Andrey Kolesnikov (2005). Первый Украинский: записки с передовой(First Ukrainian [Front]: Notes from the Front Line). Moscow: Vagrius.ISBN5969700622.(in Russian)
The Orange Ribbon: A Calendar of the Political Crisis in Ukraine, compiled by Wojciech Stanistawski. Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies (www.osw.waw.pl), 2005. by the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), Warsaw, 2005.
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