| Operation Vigorous | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of theBattle of the Mediterranean of theSecond World War | |||||||
 Relief map of the Mediterranean Sea | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
 United Kingdom Australia |  Italy Germany | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Philip Vian | Angelo Iachino | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 8 light cruisers 26 destroyers 9 submarines 2 minesweepers 4 corvettes 2 rescue ships 4 motor torpedo boats 11 merchant ships 1 auxiliary ship | 2 battleships 2 heavy cruisers 2 light cruisers 12 destroyers 6E-boats 2U-boats c. 220 aircraft | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 1 light cruiser sunk 3 destroyers sunk 2 merchant ships sunk 1 MTB sunk 3 cruisers damaged 2 merchant ships damaged c. 200 killed[a] | 1 heavy cruiser sunk 1 battleship damaged 21 aircraft shot down c. 600 killed[b] | ||||||
 | |||||||
Operation Vigorous (known in Italy asBattaglia di mezzo giugno 1942, "the Battle of mid-June 1942") was a British operation during theSecond World War, to escort supply Convoy MW 11 from the eastern Mediterranean toMalta, which took place from 11 to 16 June 1942. Vigorous was part of Operation Julius, a simultaneous operation withOperation Harpoon fromGibraltar and supporting operations. Sub-convoy MW 11c sailed fromPort Said (Egypt) on 11 June, to tempt the Italian battlefleet to sail early, use up fuel and be exposed tosubmarine and air attack. Convoy MW 11a and Convoy MW 11b sailed next day fromHaifa, Port Said andAlexandria; one ship was sent back because of defects. Italian and German (Axis) aircraft attacked Convoy MW 11c on 12 June and a damaged ship was diverted toTobruk, just east of Gazala. The merchant ships and escorts rendezvoused on 13 June. The British plans were revealed unwittingly to the Axis by the US Military Attaché in Egypt, ColonelBonner Fellers, who reported toWashington, D.C. in"Black"-coded wireless messages; it was later discovered that the Black Code had been broken by theServizio Informazioni Militare (Italian military intelligence).
The convoy and escorts sailed through "Bomb Alley" betweenCrete andCyrenaica under attack from Axisbombers,dive-bombers,torpedo-bombers,E-boats and submarines and were then threatened by the sailing of an Italian battlefleet fromTaranto. The British relied on aircraft and submarines to repel the Italian fleet in the absence ofbattleships andaircraft carriers but only oneheavy cruiser was sunk. When the Italian battleships were within 150 nmi (170 mi; 280 km) the British convoy and escorts were ordered to turn back and wait for the Italians to suffer losses from torpedo-bombers, bombers and submarines but little more damage was inflicted and after several more turns towards and away from Malta, the convoy and escorts returned to Alexandria on 16 June. TheBattle of Gazala (26 May – 21 June) was being fought in Libya during Operation Julius and beginning on 14 June, the British defeat forced theEighth Army to withdraw eastwards, losing landing grounds from which aircraft could provide air cover for Convoy MW 11.
Operation Julius and the subsidiary Operation Vigorous were failures; only two merchant ships from Operation Harpoon, the simultaneous convoy from Gibraltar, reached Malta to deliver supplies. In the absence of air cover and the suppression of Axis air power lining the routes to Malta, the central Mediterranean had been closed to British ships. Malta could not be revived as an offensive base and to provide some aviation fuel for the defending fighters, the British resorted to the expedient of running supplies through the blockade by submarine. No more convoys were attempted from the eastern Mediterranean until the Eighth Army conquered Libya. MoreSpitfires were delivered to Malta during July and increasing losses forced theLuftwaffe andRegia Aeronautica to reduce the tempo of operations. A limited return to offensive operations was made against Axis convoys to Libya andOperation Pedestal in August delivered four merchant ships and anoil tanker from Gibraltar, which further revived Malta as an offensive base, despite the loss of most of the convoy and many naval ships.
Axis bombing smashed the docks, ships, aircraft and airfields by the end of April 1942 and then the bombing was switched to targets preliminary to invasion: camps, barracks, warehouses and road junctions. After 18 April, German bombing suddenly stopped and Italian bombers took over, regularly bombing with small formations of aircraft. During the month, Axis aircraft flew more than9,500 sorties against388 British, all but30 being fighter sorties. The British had lost50 aircraft,20 shot down in combat against37 Axis losses during the dropping of 6,700 long tons (6,800 t) of bombs, three times the March figure, 3,000 long tons (3,000 t) on the docks, 2,600 long tons (2,600 t) on airfields. The bombing demolished or damaged11,450 buildings,300 civilians were killed and350 seriously wounded; good shelters existed but some casualties were caused by delayed-action bombs. Rations of meat, fats and sugar were cut further and on 5 May, the bread ration was cut to 10.5 oz (300 g) per day, enough to last until late July; pasta rations had already been stopped and there had been a poor winter potato harvest.[3]
Threedestroyers, three submarines, threeminesweepers, fivetugs, a water carrier and afloating crane were sunk in port and more ships damaged. The island continued to function as a staging post but the Axis bombing campaign neutralised Malta as an offensive base. Two boats of the 10th Submarine Flotilla had been sunk, two were damaged in harbour and on 26 April the flotilla was ordered out because of mining by small fast craft, which were undetectable by radar and inaudible during the bombing; the surviving minesweepers were too reduced in numbers to clear the approaches. Three reconnaissance aircraft remained and only22 bomber sorties were flown, eleven more by FAA aircraft during the month and by the start of June, only twoFairey Albacores and twoFairey Swordfish were left.[4]
From December 1941,Luftwaffe bombing neutralised Malta, British decrypts of ItalianC 38m cipher messages showed more sailings and fewer losses and on 23 February 1942, an Italian "battleship convoy" reached Tripoli. By the end of February,11 ships had crossed without escort and an intelligence blackout caused by a change to theC 38m machine in early March made little difference to the British for lack of means. After the British brokeC 38m again,26 Axis supply journeys had been made by May, only nine being spotted by air reconnaissance. On 14 April, five Malta aircraft were shot down and the submarineHMS Upholder was lost. On 10 March, the cruiserHMS Naiad was sunk by a U-boat and on 10 May, three of four destroyers were sunk by theLuftwaffe. In February and March, Axis losses were9 per cent of supplies, those sent in April less than one per cent and May losses were7 per cent.[5]
The Axis was able to reinforce North Africa sufficient for Rommel to try to attack before the British. In late April, the British Chiefs of Staff ruled that there would be no convoy to Malta in May, because the Italian fleet could be expected to sail and the convoy would need battleship and aircraft carrier cover, which was not available. An operation to fly Spitfires to Malta succeeded and anti-aircraft ammunition was to be supplied by fast minelayer, with which Malta would have to hold on until mid-June, when the situation in theWestern Desert might be clearer. ShouldMartuba orBenghazi inCyrenaica be captured by the Eighth Army, a westbound convoy from Alexandria might survive without cover from battleships and aircraft carriers. It would also be known ifLuftwaffe aircraft had been diverted to theRussian Front and if the crisis in theIndian Ocean had abated, sufficient for ships to escort a fast convoy from Alexandria.[6]
Operation Hercules (Operazione C3) was an Axis plan to invade Malta and during 1942, reinforcement of theLuftwaffe in Sicily and the bombing campaign against the island led to speculation that it was the prelude to invasion. Gleanings fromprisoners of war and diplomatic sources led to a certain apprehension about the meaning of troop movements in southern Italy. The absence of evidence from signals intelligence and air reconnaissance led to a conclusion that an invasion was not imminent but the need to protect the source of information meant that this was not disclosed by the British. That preparations were being made was revealed on 7 February through the decryption ofLuftwaffe Enigma messages but by 23 March the scare died down and more bombing was expected. By 31 March the progress of the Axis bombing campaign led to a prediction that the attempt would be made in April but this was soon discounted because although the bombing offensive increased from 750 long tons (760 t) in February, to 2,000 long tons (2,000 t) in March, 5,500 long tons (5,600 t) in April, Enigma decodes showed that there were still425Luftwaffe aircraft in Sicily, not the650 aircraft originally intended, because aircraft were detained in Russia by the Soviet winter offensive and on 26 April, Enigma revealed thatFliegerkorps II was being withdrawn. By 2 May, aLuftwaffe bomber group and a fighter group had been withdrawn with more to follow, which explained the lull.[7][8] Hitler was lukewarm about the operation, in case the Italian navy left down German airborne forces but the capture of Tobruk in mid-June made it appear that the invasion was unnecessary. Hitler and Mussolini agreed toPanzerarmee Afrika pursuing the British into Egypt for the rest of June and into July, which meant cancelling Hercules.[9][10]
After the success ofOperation Crusader (18 November – 30 December 1941), theEighth Army advanced 500 mi (800 km) west to El Agheila in Libya, capturing airfields and landing grounds useful for air cover for Malta convoys. The British misjudged the speed of Axis reinforcement and expected to attack well before the Axis butPanzerarmee Afrika forestalled the Eighth Army by beginning an offensive on 21 January 1942. By 6 February, the British had been defeated, forced to retreat east of theJebel Akhdar back to the Gazala line just west of Tobruk, wherePanzerarmee had begun its retirement seven weeks earlier.[11] At theBattle of Gazala (26 May – 21 June),Panzerarmee Afrika attacked first again but appeared close to defeat until 11 June. Operation Julius began on the same day as theAfrika Korps broke out and by 14 June, forced the British to retreat towards Tobruk. The Axis then forces pursued the British into Egypt and theDesert Air Force lost the Libyan landing grounds from which to cover Malta convoys.[12]
Two weeks before the convoys, the carrierHMS Eagle began operations to deliver 63 Spitfires to Malta, which increased the number to95 serviceable fighters. Air operations for the two convoys began on 24 May, whenVickers Wellington bombers of104 Squadron from Malta, began bombing airfields and ports in Sicily and southern Italy. On 11 June, the Wellingtons were withdrawn to accommodate six Wellington torpedo bombers of38 Squadron,Bristol Beaufort torpedo-bombers of217 Squadron andMartin Baltimore reconnaissance aircraft of69 Squadron. Aircraft from Gibraltar, Malta and Egypt also began reconnaissance flights on 11 June, searching for the Italian fleet.[13]
Twelve Beauforts of39 Squadron were based at Bir Amud in Egypt near the Libyan border, fiveB-24 Liberator bombers of160 Squadron and about24 aircraft of the Halverson DetachmentUnited States Army Air Forces (USAAF) atRAF Fayid, were also made available.[14] Short-range fighters based in Palestine, Egypt, Cyrenaica and Malta, were to provide air cover at first and as the convoy moved out of range, protection would be taken over byCurtiss Kittyhawks of250 Squadron equipped with long-range fuel tanks,Bristol Beaufighters from252 Squadron and272 Squadron and Beaufighter night fighters from227 Squadron. Air cover from Cyrenaica could not overlap with coverage from Malta leaving a gap but Wellingtons of 205 Group and the light bombers of the Desert Air Force would attack Axis airfields in North Africa. The coastal 201 Group would provide reconnaissance and anti-submarine sorties and a small sabotage party was to land on Crete to attack Axis aircraft on the ground.[15][14]
Vigorous was planned as a joint Royal Navy–RAF operation, to be conducted from the headquarters of201 Naval Co-operation Group by AdmiralHenry Harwood and Air MarshalArthur Tedder, with Rear AdmiralPhilip Vian in command of the convoy and escorts (Force A). On 22 March 1942, in OperationMG 1 protectingConway MW 10 to Malta, theSecond Battle of Sirte between the Italian fleet and the British escorts had been fought. The British escorts had held off the Italian fleet for2+1⁄2 hours but in the longer days of June, it was doubted that the feat could be repeated. If a larger Italian force attacked the convoy, Vian was to protect the convoy with smoke and the escorts were to repulse the attackers with torpedoes and try to inflict early casualties using gunfire against two of the Italian ships. The success of the convoy would depend on the Italian fleet being damaged by air and submarine attack before it could close on the ships, rather than on surface action because the battleshipsHMS Queen Elizabeth andValiant were still out of action.[16]
Bringing the battleshipHMS Warspite and several aircraft carriers from theEastern Fleet to reinforce theMediterranean Fleet was considered but the danger of air attack was so great that it was rejected. The convoy and escort force was larger than the effort in March, with Force A, theDido-class cruiserHMS Cleopatra asflagship and the cruisersHMS Dido,HMS Euryalus of the 15th Cruiser Squadron andHMS Hermione from the Eastern Fleet, provided the convoy escort with four5.25-inch light cruisers and theC-class anti-aircraft cruiserHMS Coventry. The Eastern Fleet sent the 6-inchTown-classcruiser cruisersHMS Newcastle,HMS Birmingham andHMS Arethusa of the 4th Cruiser Squadron. The operation was to have26 destroyers, ten from the Eastern Fleet, four corvettes, two minesweepers to clear the Malta approaches, fourMotor Torpedo Boats (MTB) and two rescue ships. The former battleshipHMS Centurion, which had been disarmed between the wars and used for training, was fitted with anti-aircraft guns and pressed into service to masquerade as an operational battleship. The1st Submarine and 10th Submarine Flotilla were to send nine boats as a moving screen parallel to the convoy as it passed between Crete and Cyrenaica (Bomb Alley). On the days before and after, the submarines were to patrol areas that the Italian fleet was likely to be found.[16]
Operation Harpoon, the Operation Julius convoy eastbound from Gibraltar began on 4 June, with the departure from Scotland of five merchant ships as convoy WS19z. It had been being given out that the ships were bound for Malta via the Cape but the deception was exposed whenTroilus was ordered to assume a short voyage; the naval liaison officer, five signals staff and Navy gunners on board each merchant ship also left little to the imagination. With the cruisersHMS Kenya,HMS Liverpool and ten destroyers, the convoy passed through theStraits of Gibraltar on the night of11/12 June and became convoy GM4, to be joined by an oil tanker and its escorts.[17] Force H consisted of a battleship, two aircraft carriers, three cruisers and eight destroyers. The close escort was provided by an anti-aircraft cruiser, nine destroyers, sixMotor Gun Boats (MGB) and small craft.HMS Welshman was to accompany the ships and then dash for Malta at 28 kn (52 km/h; 32 mph), with ammunition for the aircraft on Malta. Off the Italian coast,13 submarines were to patrol, ready to ambush Italian ships.[18]
A shortage of oil limited Italian naval operations but the accumulation of ships at Alexandria and decrypted wireless messages from ColonelBonner Fellers, the US Military attaché in Cairo (die gute Quelle, the good source), alerted theRegia Marina that convoys were about to be run from Alexandria and Gibraltar to Malta.Supermarina the navy high command, planned a counter-operation against both convoys and nine submarines were sent to patrol off the Algerian coast, five between Lampedusa and Malta and five east of Malta in the Ionian Sea. Two ItalianMAS-boats and sixE-boats lay in ambush between Crete and Cyrenaica and the 7th Cruiser Division (it:Ammiraglio di divisione [Vice-Admiral]Alberto Da Zara) withRaimondo Montecuccoli andEugenio di Savoia in Palermo and the destroyersAscari,Alfredo Oriani,Lanzerotto Malocello,Premuda andVivaldi in Cagliari waited for Harpoon, along with MAS-boats and a large number of aircraft to operate in the western basin of the Mediterranean.[19] The main Italian battlefleet was reserved for the eastbound convoy from Alexandria.[20]
To camouflage preparations, the eleven merchantmen were loaded at Alexandria, Port Said, Suez, Haifa and Beirut, rendezvousing at Port Said and Haifa. Secrecy led to a lack of practice for the military passengers who made up damage control and fire-fighting parties and some defects in the ships' guns went unnoticed. The Port Said shipsAagtekirk,Bhutan,City of Calcutta andRembrandt of Convoy MW 11c, sailed36 hours early in the afternoon of 11 June, in Operation Rembrandt, each towing an MTB. Escorted byCoventry and eightHunt-class destroyers, Convoy MW 11c was to simulate the Malta convoy and steam about as far as the Tobrukmeridian and turn back to rendezvous with the remainder.[21] It was hoped that the decoy operation would lure out the Italian fleet, which would be exposed to attack and run short of fuel before the main convoy sailed.[22] During the night five of the freighters for Operation Harpoon rendezvoused with the tankerKentucky off Gibraltar; by morning GM4 was making 12–13 kn (22–24 km/h; 14–15 mph) to the east.[23]
Convoy MW-11a ofAjax,City of Edinburgh,City of Pretoria,City of Lincoln andElizabeth Bakke sailed from Haifa and Port Said on 12 June, escorted by the 7th Destroyer Flotilla ofNapier,Norman,Nizam,Inconstant andHotspur, with fleet minesweepersBoston andSeaham.Elizabeth Bakke was ordered into port from Convoy MW 11a, escorted byZulu due to overloading and a fouled hull, which stopped the ship keeping direction or reaching the convoy speed of 13 kn (24 km/h; 15 mph). Convoy MW 11b sailed from Alexandria withPotaro, the tankerBulkoil, the decommissioned battleshipCenturion, carrying supplies and operating as a decoy, the rescue shipsMalines andAntwerp, escorted by five destroyers and four corvettes. During the evening, Convoy MW 11c was attacked from Crete by15 Ju 88 bombers of IKampfgeschwader 54 andCity of Calcutta was damaged by a near-miss. The ship stopped and took on a list but got under way at 11 kn (20 km/h; 13 mph) to be ordered at11:00 p.m. to divert to Tobruk with its towed MTB, escorted byExmoor andCroome. During the short night, Convoy MW 11c turned back to rendezvous off Alexandria with the rest of Convoy MW 11 the next day and the Hunts put in to refuel.[24] Operation Harpoon was undisturbed becauseSupermarina suspected that it was a decoy.[25]
The three convoy elements met offMersa Matruh during the afternoon and made for Malta as the 7th Destroyer Flotilla put into Alexandria to refuel, the rest of the destroyers sailing on and the rest leaving Alexandria with the main force, seven cruisers and their destroyer screen. During the afternoon, the weather deteriorated and the MTBs on tow were cast off to return to Alexandria but MTB 259 was damaged and sunk, the rest made port the next day. During the night a five-man raiding party was landed by submarine on Crete and damaged or destroyed about20 aircraft ofLehrgeschwader 1 atMaleme airfield. The activity of raiding parties was reported to Washington by Bonner Fellers; three SBS parties had landed the week previous, one to attack the aircraft but had not been able to penetrate the airfield security.[26]
After dark, Axis aircraft continuously illuminated the convoy with flares and dropped occasional bombs, then at4:30 a.m. theLuftwaffe attacked the main escort force catching up from the east, dropping more bombs and flares until British fighters arrived after dawn.[27]Douglas Bostons and Wellington bombers attacked Axis airfields nearDerna and other places during the night, to interfere with Axis air operations against the convoy. At the Gazala position in Libya, the British tanks had been defeated in the fighting from11 to 13 June and the Eighth Army was ordered to retreat the next day.[28] Operation Harpoon continued and more aircraft of theRegia Aeronautica were transferred to Sardinia but lost contact with the convoy.[25] Two Italian cruisers and three destroyers departed Cagliari during the evening for Palermo, ready to stop a fast ship from dashing to Malta.[29]
Dust storms in Libya grounded day bombers until the evening and most of the aircraft based in Libya that operated over Vigorous.[30] The convoy escorts reorganised, the four corvettes, two minesweepers and the 5th Destroyer Flotilla with nine destroyers being joined by17 fleet destroyers of the 2nd, 7th, 12th, 14th and 22nd flotillas.Aagtekirk,Erica andPrimula developed engine-trouble,Erica was sent to Mersa Matruh and the other two to Tobruk, escorted byTetcott. At12:20 p.m., about 12 nmi (22 km; 14 mi) off Tobruk, the ships were attacked andPrimula was shaken by near misses. About fortyJunkers Ju 87Stuka dive-bombers andJunkers Ju 88 medium bombers bombedTetcott and the rest attackedAagtekirk, which was hit and caught fire as three bombers were shot down.[22] Ships and boats were sent from Tobruk but could only pick up survivors by2:30 p.m. and the ship ran aground and burned out. The rest of the convoy was covered byHurricanes and Kittyhawks diverted from the Battle of Gazala, which protected the convoy from a big force of bombers.[31]
During the afternoonLehrgeschwader 1 was more circumspect until the convoy was beyond the cover of the short-range British fighters, then from4:30 a.m.,60–70 bombers made seven attacks in five hours, opposed by a few long-range Kittyhawks and Beaufighters. The eight merchantmen were in four columns around the rescue ships, with the cruisers about 1,200 yd (1,100 m) out, the Hunt class destroyers 1 nmi (1.9 km; 1.2 mi) beyond and the fleet destroyers on anti-submarine patrol 2,500 yd (2,300 m) outside the Hunts. The formation was effective against torpedo-bombers but risked attack by dive-bombers in the absence of British fighters. The Germans attacked from 10,000 ft (3,000 m) from the rear or sides in groups of10–12 aircraft, dividing into twos and threes to bomb. At5:30 p.m. about20 aircraft attackedBulkoil andBhutan from the flank and near-missedBulkoil andPotaro which took on water.Bhutan was hit three times and sank at6:05 p.m.;153 crew and passengers were picked up by the rescue ships and a destroyer but16 men were lost.[32][c] After the rescue,Antwerp andMalines were directed to Tobruk where the serious cases were transferred to a hospital ship and then they sailed for Alexandria, Tobruk being under artillery bombardment by Axis guns, arriving at9:15 p.m. next day.[34]
Two hours afterBhutan sank, the periscope ofU-77 was seen as the German submarine attackedPakenham in the outer screen. The torpedo missed but the attack on the submarine was cancelled, when torpedo boats were seen to the north-west. British fighters were ordered to engage but were bounced byBf 109s escorting the E-boats. The worst of the bombing stopped once dark fell and desultory bombing and flare dropping resumed. The escort force moved into night formation, the fleet destroyers in line ahead of the convoy, two cruisers and four destroyers on the port and starboard quarters and a destroyer at each corner of the formation 5 nmi (9.3 km; 5.8 mi) out. The flare-dropping deterred the E-boats from coming too close but the convoy and escort crews were very tired and much of the anti-aircraft ammunition of the convoy and escorts had been expended.[35]
At6:45 p.m. a Baltimore crew flying from Malta had caught sight of the Italian fleet and gave a strength report of four cruisers with four destroyers, preceding two battleships and four destroyers, which reached Harwood at10:30 p.m. APhotographic Reconnaissance (PR) flight over Taranto had verified the departure of the ships at8:00 p.m. and another sighting reached Harwood that at2:24 a.m. the fleet was making 20 kn (37 km/h; 23 mph) southwards.[36] At11:15 p.m. Harwood signalled Vian that the Italian fleet (AdmiralAngelo Iachino) with two battleships, two heavy and two light cruisers and12 destroyers had sailed fromTaranto and would reach the convoy by7:00 a.m.[37][d] Vian requested permission to turn back as it would be impossible for the escorts to protect the merchantmen for another long summer day. Harwood ordered Vigorous to continue towards Malta until2:00 a.m. on 15 June, then turn onto a reciprocal course.[38] At Gazala, the Eighth Army began to withdraw after it had been defeated in the fighting from11 to 13 June, leaving a garrison inside Tobruk; both sides sent aircraft to Vigorous, which gave a respite to the armies.[39] Harpoon came into range of the20 Italian bombers and50 torpedo-bombers based in Sardinia. Fighter-bombers attacked first, then bombers and torpedo-bombers at the same time which sank a merchant ship and damaged a cruiser. As the convoy came within range of Sicily, tenLuftwaffe Ju 88s joined in but the early attacks were defeated, seven British and17 Axis aircraft being lost.[25]
The turn order was given at1:45 a.m., a hazardous manoeuvre for a large group of ships out of position, full of tired crews and menaced by Axis torpedo-boats and U-boats. As the turn was made the cruisers fell back and were attacked by the 3rdSchnellbootflottille (Leutnant-zur-SeeSiegfried Wuppermann);S 56 fired first at3:50 a.m. and hitNewcastle with one torpedo head on, which was screened by destroyers as damage-control parties worked on the damage andNewcastle soon worked back up to 24 kn (44 km/h; 28 mph) The destroyerHMS Hasty was hitbyS 55 at5:25 a.m.,12 men were killed and the ship was so badly damaged that it was sunk byHotspur. As the sun rose, Convoy MW 11 was heading east and at3:40 a.m. four Wellington torpedo-bombers from Malta found the Italian fleet, dropped flares and attacked but the ships made smoke and only one Wellington dropped torpedoes. At the same time, nine 217 Squadron Beauforts took off from Malta, reached the Italians as dawn broke and the first three Beauforts attackedTrento at6:10 a.m., achieving one torpedo hit, as two bombers pressed on through the destroyer and cruiser screen.Trento came to a standstill after it was struck amidships at5:15 a.m.[40] Force W, covering Operation Harpoon, turned back during the night and the convoy proceeded with the close escorts of Force X.[25] The Italian cruisers and seven destroyers at Palermo sailed at dusk.[29]
The British torpedo attack came when the Italian battlefleet was passing through the area of the 10th Submarine Flotilla, after the plan to form a line north of the track of the convoy had been overtaken by events after the Italian battleships sailed and the convoy turned back.HMS Umbra (Lieutenant S. L. C. Maydon) picked up the Italian ships on hydrophone and steered towards the fleet as the torpedo-bombers dropped illumination flares. Maydon found thatUmbra was
...in the unenviable position of being in the centre of a fantastic circus of wildly careering capital ships, cruisers and destroyers...of tracer-shell streaks and anti-aircraft bursts...there was not a quadrant of the compass unoccupied by enemy vessels weaving to and fro....[yet] It was essential to remain at periscope depth, for an opportunity to fire might come at any moment.
— Maydon[41]
Italian cruiser Trento was circled by the battleships, which then resumed their southward course, leaving it behind with the destroyerAntonio Pigafetta; at6:46 a.m. Maydon fired torpedoes atItalian battleship Vittorio Veneto, with no hits. The Italian ships had also been seen at6:15 a.m. byHMS Ultimatum (Lieutenant P. R. H. Harrison), the heavy cruisers to the west of the battleships and at6:22 a.m.Ultimatum attacked through the destroyer screen, only to be frustrated by the cruisers zig-zagging and passing overhead.HMS Uproar (Lieutenant J. B. de B. Kershaw) briefly sighted the battlefleet but was too far away to attack.HMS Thrasher,HMS Taku andHMS Thorn (Lieutenant-Commander R. G. Norfolk) received the sighting report and surfaced to overhaul the ships but onlyThorn at7:00 a.m. caught sight of them out of range.Umbra,Uproar andUltimatum turned towards the immobilisedTrento and at10:06 a.m.Umbra hitTrento with two torpedoes, the ship sinking an hour later.[42]
The battlefleet continued south in two groups and eight US and one British B-24 bomber attacked at9:00 a.m. from 14,000 ft (4,300 m) and accurately bombed, hittingLittorio with a 500 lb (230 kg)-bomb with little effect. As the B-24s turned away, five 39 Squadron Beauforts from Bir Amud arrived at low level, having set off at6:25 a.m. to synchronise their attack with the B-24s, minus their Beaufighter escort, which had been diverted to the ground battle. Bf 109s andMC 202s based near Gazala intercepted the12 Beauforts, shot down two and damaged five, which turned back (one failing to return). Near the Italian battlefleet, two more Beauforts were damaged by long-range anti-aircraft fire at about9:40 a.m. but by turning broadside to bring more guns to bear, the Italian ships presented bigger targets, the Beaufort crews claiming a hit on a battleship and the US crews above reporting hits on a cruiser and a destroyer, although all torpedoes missed; the Beauforts turned for Malta and landed at Luqa, the damaged leader crash-landing.[43]
The combined HQ at Alexandria received reports only after long delays and during the night, Harwood became more apprehensive that the convoy would soon sail back into Bomb Alley and ordered another turn at7:00 a.m. Vian was then ordered to avoid the Italians until aircraft had attacked around10:30 a.m. If the attack failed, Vian was to get the convoy to Malta and if the Italian ships intercepted, the merchant ships were to be abandoned to their fate, the escorts escaping in any direction. At8:30 a.m., reconnaissance reports showed that the battlefleet was still making south, 150 nmi (170 mi; 280 km) from the convoy and at9:40 a.m., Harwood ordered the ships to reverse course again. It was only at11:15 a.m. that Harwood and Tedder discovered that aircraft from Malta had engaged the Italian battlefleet and received the exaggerated claims of torpedo hits, including those on the battleships. Harwood signalled that Convoy MW 11 should turn for Malta again, the escorts to abandon the freighters if challenged and then at12:45 p.m. delegated freedom of action to Vian.[44] At dawn, the ships of Operation Harpoon were intercepted by an Italian cruiser force and the five British fleet destroyers boldly attacked as the smaller destroyers remained with the convoy and eventually the Italian ships broke off the attack at10:00 a.m. Air attacks on the convoy had continued, two ships were damaged and one sunk. The Italian cruisers reappeared, fired on a previously disabled destroyer, which had been taken in tow by an escort destroyer; the crippled ship was left adrift, and eventually torpedoed and sunk by an aircraft. The damaged merchant ships were scuttled or abandoned by their escorts. The rest of the convoy sailed into a minefield, a destroyer hit a mine and sank, the two surviving merchantmen and the remaining escorts reaching Malta that night.[45]
The11:51 a.m. order from Harwood to turn for Malta reached Vian at1:45 p.m. but Axis bombers had attacked from11:50 a.m. when20 Ju 87s attacked. Most of the Ju 87s(Stuka) dive-bombers attacked the escorts butCity of Edinburgh andCity of Pretoria was near-missed and slightly damaged,City of Edinburgh claiming a bomber and a probable.Ajax was attacked by five aircraft at1:00 p.m. and six Ju 87s bombedBirmingham, one near miss putting a front turret out of action for oneStuka shot down. The convoy escorts received a reconnaissance report that the battleships were closer and the convoy continued east, the signal granting discretion arriving at2:20 p.m. At3:20 p.m., 36 Axis aircraft returned and again concentrated on warships.HMS Airedale on the starboard quarter was attacked by twelveStukas (fromStG 3) was disabled andHMS Aldenham was ordered to sink the ship rather than linger in Bomb Alley. The other 24Stukas attacked the merchant ships with no result andCenturion, which survived and shot down a bomber.[46]
The Italian ships were close to contact butSupermarina ordered Iachino to turn away when only 110 nmi (130 mi; 200 km) from the convoy if the British had not been engaged by4:00 p.m. At3:15 a.m. the battlefleet turned north-west, towardsNavarino (Pylos) ready to advance should the British try again. British aircraft shadowing the battlefleet reported the turn at4:05 p.m. and at16:25 p.m. Harwood ordered Vian to turn the convoy again, asking if the Hunts and other ships had fuel enough to make Malta, the cruisers and fleet destroyers to turn for Malta after dark. Convoy MW 11 was under attack when the signal arrived and after waiting for two hours for a reply, Harwood ordered that only the four fastest merchantmen,Arethusa and two destroyers should make a dash for Malta. The convoy and escorts had been attacked again from5:20–7:20 p.m. by Ju 87s dive-bombing and Ju 88s bombing from 16,000 ft (4,900 m) as tenSM 79s attacked with torpedoes. Three ships received near misses but radar directed anti-aircraft fire in the growing darkness made the attackers cautious. At6:00 p.m., Ju 88s attacked in a shallow dive, near-missedArethusa andCenturion and badly damagedNestor. The SM 79s attacked after one had been shot down by two Beaufighters and three more were shot down by ships' gunners, along with two bombers.[47] German bombers in Libya flew193 sorties against Vigorous from14 to 15 June which gave some respite to the Eighth Army as it retreated towards the Egyptian frontier but left RAF landing grounds aroundGambut vulnerable to attack.[48]
As the SM 79s departed, Vian signalled to Harwood that Force A and Convoy MW 11 had less than1⁄3 of their ammunition left and at8:53 p.m., Harwood ordered Operation Vigorous to be abandoned and the ships to return to Alexandria. The Italian battlefleet continued away from the convoy, lost the British shadowing aircraft at4:40 p.m. and the relief aircraft was intercepted by German fighters. The 1st and 10th Submarine flotillas tried to reach a position to intercept but British signals were taking about four hours to arrive; some boats surfaced to listen to signals traffic and use the information.HMS Porpoise sailed north at3:35 p.m. was bombed at7:35 p.m., losing the chance to attack andHMS P222 to the west was also forced to dive at8:00 p.m. Another reconnaissance aircraft from Malta found the fleet at10:55 p.m. and the five 38 Squadron Wellington torpedo-bombers attacked at0:30 a.m. The attack was thwarted by smoke screens and the evasive manoeuvres of the fleet, except for a torpedo hit onLittorio which caused superficial damage.[49][50]
Another Axis air attack had no effect and during the night the convoy zig-zagged eastwards at 13 kn (24 km/h; 15 mph), withNestor falling behind, down at the bow, towed byJavelin and escorted byEridge andBeaufort. At1:27 a.m.U-205 (Korvettenkapitän Franz-Georg Reschke) got through the anti-submarine cordon around Convoy MW 11 and torpedoedHermione, which heeled over and sank,88 men being killed and with about400 survivors.[51] Two air attacks were made onNestor and its escorts and at4:30 a.m. the tow parted for the second time; with dawn due and the long summer day to follow, the captain of the Australian destroyerNestor decided that the risk to the other destroyers was too great and hadNestor sunk at7:00 a.m. The other destroyers caught up with the convoy during the afternoon.City of Calcutta sailed from Tobruk withTetcott andPrimula and more attempts by U-boats to attack Convoy MW 11 failed, the convoy reaching Alexandria that evening.Centurion was too deep in the water and waited at the Great Pass as the five remaining merchantmen entered port.Bulkoil andAjax were escorted to Port Said by four destroyers.[52][53]
In 1960,Ian Playfair, the British official historian, wrote that the relationship of the "battle for supplies" with the land war reached a climax in the second half of 1942. Far from the Eighth Army capturing airfields to the west in the Cyrenaican bulge, it had been defeated at Gazala while Operation Julius was on and lost the landing grounds to the east. The disaster at Gazala had led to the military forces on Malta trying to save Egypt rather than vice versa. Convoy MW 11 had been a "disappointing operation" and turned back because the British and US air attacks on the Italian battlefleet had failed to inflict the damage hoped. Force A could not hope to defeat it in a surface action, a view echoed by Greene and Massignani in 2003.[53] By the time that the Italian battleships had been ordered back, the convoy and escorts lacked the ammunition to continue and seven long-range Beaufighters had been lost, depriving Vigorous of air cover while beyond the reach of short-range fighters. Communications had been inadequate, with some signals taking too long to arrive but Playfair wrote that without airfields in the west of Cyrenaica, even quick and accurate reports would not have compensated. Six freighters in Vigorous and Harpoon had been sunk and nine forced to return to port. Two ships of Operation Harpoon reached Malta and delivered 15,000 long tons (15,000 t) of supplies, which with a decent harvest might keep the population of Malta fed until September but the depletion of aviation fuel led to fighters being give priority over the offensive force. Transit flights through Malta except for Beaufort torpedo bombers was suspended, only close range air attacks on easy targets were to be permitted and fuel for the fighters was to be carried to Malta by submarine.[54]
In 1962, the British naval official historianStephen Roskill called the Axis success undeniable. Malta had not been supplied and the British had lost a cruiser, three destroyers and two merchantmen against the sinking ofTrento and minor damage toLittorio. No attempt was made to run another convoy from Alexandria until the Eighth Army had conquered Libya. Roskill wrote that with hindsight, the course of events on land made naval operations in the central Mediterranean inherently dangerous and during the operation, the withdrawal of the Eighth Army lost one of the airfields being used for air cover. Harwood was right that the bomber and torpedo-bomber force was too small and had not compensated for the lack of battleships and with Axis aircraft based along the length of the route to Malta, air power had decided the course of events. On land, the diversion of Axis bombers against the convoys had been of some benefit to the British as they conducted the "scuttle" to El Alamein. In 194130 of 31 merchant ships sailing for Malta arrived but in the first seven months of 1942, of the30 ships that sailed, ten were sunk, ten were turned back damaged, three were sunk on arrival and seven delivered their supplies.[55]
In 2003, Richard Woodman wrote that the 14 June order from Harwood, for the convoy to continue west before turning back, showed indecision and a lack of strategic sense, risking valuable merchant ships in the hope that British submarine and air attacks might enable the convoy to proceed.Vigorous had been an "imperial balls-up" and the retreat to Alexandria an Axis victory, showing that Britain had lost control of the central Mediterranean. On 16 June, Harwood reported that
We are outnumbered both in surface ships and Air Force and very gallant endeavour of all concerned cannot make up for...the deficiency.
— Harwood[56]
In a later report, Harwood blamed the RAF for its inability to provide a sufficient number of aircraft capable of defeating the Italian battle fleet. The only success in Operation Julius was the arrival of two of the Harpoon ships at Malta; on land, Tobruk surrendered a few days after Convoy MW 11 returned to port and by late June, the Eighth Army had retreated to El Alamein.[57]
The cruiserHermione, destroyersAiredale,Hasty andNestor and two merchant ships were sunk during Operation Vigorous; three cruisers, a destroyer and a corvette were damaged. British aircraft and submarines sank the cruiserTrento and damagedLittorio; anti-aircraft gunners on the escorts and merchant ships shot down21 of about220 attacking aircraft.[58] Two destroyers were sunk during Operation Harpoon, a cruiser, three destroyers and a minesweeper were damaged, an Italian destroyer was slightly damaged, the RAF lost five aircraft, the FAA seven and claimed22 Axis aircraft.[59]
During July, the submarinesHMS Parthian andClyde delivered aviation fuel, ammunition and other stores; another59 Spitfires were flown offEagle during sorties on 15 and 21 July.Welshman made its third trip and arrived on 16 July; at the end of the month the 10th Submarine Flotilla returned and the minesweepers with Harpoon had reduced the mine danger in the Malta approaches. Early in July Axis bombers had dropped another 700 long tons (710 t) of bombs, mainly on airfields, destroyed17 aircraft on the ground and damaged many others. The fighters flew about1,000 sorties and lost36 Spitfires outof 135, the Axis forces losing65 aircraft. Losses forced theLuftwaffe andRegia Aeronautica to increase the number of fighter sorties per bomber and then to resort to hit and run attacks by fighter-bombers. Later in July, the greater number of British fighters at Malta justified a return to intercepting raids further out to sea, which had great success.[60]
Operation Pedestal(13–15 August) was another British operation to carry supplies toMalta. Despite many losses, enough supplies were delivered by the British for the population and military forces on Malta to resist, although it had ceased to be an offensive base. Pedestal was a costly tactical defeat for the Allies, the last Axis Mediterranean victory and one of the greatest Britishstrategic victories of the war. Only five of the14 merchant ships in the convoy reachedGrand Harbour but the arrival ofSS Ohio, justified the decision to hazard so many warships. The cargo of aviation fuel inOhio revitalised the Malta-based air offensive against Axis shipping. After Pedestal, submarines returned to Malta andSupermarine Spitfires flown from the aircraft-carrierHMS Furious enabled a maximum effort to be made against Axis ships. Italian convoys had to be routed further away from the island, lengthening the journey and increasing the time during which air and naval attacks could be mounted. The Siege of Malta was broken by theSecond Battle of El Alamein (23 October – 11 November) andOperation Torch (8–16 November) in the western Mediterranean, which enabled land-based aircraft to escort merchant ships to the island.[61]
| Name | Year | Flag | GRT | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MV Ajax | 1931 |  Merchant Navy | 7,540 | MW 11A |
| SS City of Edinburgh | 1938 | Merchant Navy | 8,036 | MW 11A |
| SS City of Lincoln | 1938 | Merchant Navy | 8,039 | MW 11A |
| SS City of Pretoria | 1937 | Merchant Navy | 8,049 | MW 11A |
| MV Elizabeth Bakke | 1937 |  Norway | 5,450 | MW 11A |
| SS Bulkoil | 1942 |  United States | 8,071 | MW 11B, tanker |
| SS Potaro | 1940 | Merchant Navy | 5,410 | MW 11B tanker, damaged |
| MV Aagtekirk | 1934 |  Netherlands | 6,811 | MW 11C, sunk |
| SS Bhutan | 1929 | Merchant Navy | 6,104 | MW 11C, sunk |
| SS City of Calcutta | 1940 | Merchant Navy | 8,063 | MW 11C |
| Rembrandt | Merchant Navy | 5,559 | MW 11C | |
| MTB-259 | — |  Royal Navy | — | Motor torpedo boat, towed by merchant ship, sunk |
| MTB-261 | — | Royal Navy | — | Motor torpedo boat, towed by merchant ship |
| MTB-262 | — | Royal Navy | — | Motor torpedo boat, towed by merchant ship |
| MTB-264 | — | Royal Navy | — | Motor torpedo boat, towed by merchant ship |
| HMSAntwerp | 1919 | Royal Navy | 2,957 | Rescue ship |
| HMSMalines | 1921 | Royal Navy | 2,969 | Rescue ship |
| HMS Centurion | 1911 | Royal Navy | — | King George V-classbattleship decommissioned, decoy |
| Name | Flag | Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| HMS Porpoise | Royal Navy | Grampus-classsubmarine | Patrolled off Taranto and south of Strait of Messina |
| HMS Proteus | Royal Navy | Parthian-classsubmarine | Patrolled off Taranto and south of Strait of Messina |
| HMS Taku | Royal Navy | Triton-classsubmarine | Patrolled off Taranto and south of Strait of Messina |
| HMS Thorn | Royal Navy | Triton-classsubmarine | Patrolled off Taranto and south of Strait of Messina |
| HMS Thrasher | Royal Navy | Triton-classsubmarine | Patrolled off Taranto and south of Strait of Messina |
| HMS Ultimatum | Royal Navy | U-class submarine | Patrolled off Taranto and south of Strait of Messina |
| HMS Umbra | Royal Navy | U-class submarine | Patrolled off Taranto and south of Strait of Messina |
| HMS Una | Royal Navy | U-class submarine | Patrolled off Taranto and south of Strait of Messina |
| HMS Uproar | Royal Navy | U-class submarine | Patrolled off Taranto and south of Strait of Messina |
| HMS Safari | Royal Navy | S-class submarine | Patrolled Sicily – Sardinia |
| HMS Unbroken | Royal Navy | U-class submarine | Patrolled Sicily – Sardinia |
| HMS Unison | Royal Navy | U-class submarine | Patrolled Sicily – Sardinia |
| HMS Unruffled | Royal Navy | U-class submarine | Patrolled Sicily – Sardinia |
| Name | Flag | Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 815 Naval Air Squadron | Royal Navy | Swordfish | Air-to-surface-vessel radar (ASV) |
| 821 Naval Air Squadron | Royal Navy | Albacore | Bomber/torpedo-bomber |
| 825 Naval Air Squadron | Royal Navy | Albacore | Bomber/torpedo-bomber |
| 830 Naval Air Squadron | Royal Navy | Albacore | Bomber/torpedo-bomber |
| 69 Squadron |  Royal Air Force | Baltimore | Reconnaissance bomber |
| 217 Squadron | Royal Air Force | Beaufort | Torpedo-bomber |
| 39 Squadron | Royal Air Force | Beaufort | Torpedo-bomber |
| 203 Squadron | Royal Air Force | Blenheim | Bomber |
| 13th Light Bomber Squadron |  Greece | Blenheim | Bomber |
| 203 Squadron | Royal Air Force | Maryland | Bomber |
| 459 Squadron RAAF | Royal Air Force | Hudson | Maritime reconnaissance |
| 2 PRU | Royal Air Force | Spitfire | Photographic reconnaissance |
| 230 Squadron | Royal Air Force | Sunderland | Maritime patrol (flying boat) |
| 47 Squadron | Royal Air Force | Wellesley | Bomber |
| 38 Squadron | Royal Air Force | Wellington | Torpedo-bomber |
| 221 Squadron (det.) | Royal Air Force | Wellington | Air-to-surface-vessel radar (ASV) |
| Name | Flag | Class | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| S 54 |  Kriegsmarine | S-boot | From Derna |
| S 55 | Kriegsmarine | S-boot | From Derna, sankHMS Hasty 14 June |
| S 56 | Kriegsmarine | S-boot | From Derna, damagedHMS Newcastle 14 June |
| S 58 | Kriegsmarine | S-boot | From Derna |
| S 59 | Kriegsmarine | S-boot | From Derna |
| S 60 | Kriegsmarine | S-boot | From Derna |
| U-205 | Kriegsmarine | Type VIIC | SankHMS Hermione |
| Name | Flag | Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| I./Kampfgeschwader 54 | Luftwaffe | Junkers Ju 88 | From Crete, damagedCity of Calcutta 12 June |
| Lehrgeschwader 1 | Luftwaffe | Junkers Ju 88 | From Crete, sankBhutan, damagedPotaro 14 June |
