| Battle of the East China Sea | |||||||
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| Part of theBattle of Okinawa and thePacific War | |||||||
.jpg) Yamato under attack | |||||||
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 United States |  Japan | ||||||
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 2nd Fleet | |||||||
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Operation Kikusui I (菊水作戦,Kikusui Sakusen 1), literallyOperation Chrysanthemum Water 1, best known asOperation Ten-Go (天号作戦,Ten-Gō Sakusen), literallyOperation Heaven, was the last majorJapanese naval operation in thePacific Theater ofWorld War II. In April 1945, theJapanese battleship Yamato, the largestbattleship in the world, and nine other Japanese warships, embarked from Japan for a suicide attack onAllied forces engaged in theBattle of Okinawa. The Japanese force was attacked by U.S.carrier-borne aircraft before it could reachOkinawa;Yamato and five other Japanese warships were sunk while 10 American aircraft were shot down. Several ships in the U.S. carrier task force suffered moderate damage from aerial kamikaze attacks while 100 Japanese planes were lost.Operation Kikusui I, best known asOperation Ten-Go, refers specifically toYamato's sortie, whileOperation Kikusui refers specifically to all Japanese kamikaze operations during the entire Okinawa campaign.
The sinking ofYamato demonstrated U.S.air supremacy in theAsiatic-Pacific Theater and the vulnerability ofsurface ships withoutair cover to aerial attack. The battle also exhibited Japan's willingness to make extreme sacrifices inkamikaze attacks aimed at delaying theAllied advance upon theJapanese home islands.
Furthermore, the engagement was also paramount by enabling U.S. forces to prevent Japan from holding a significant advantage over the Allies at Okinawa.[2][3] The designation ofYamato as a beached fortification against Alliedaerial andnaval bombardment of Okinawa would have become detrimental towards the invading armies,[4][5] in that, alike toOperation Downfall, the anticipated losses would have substantially increased for maritime combatants at large,[6] likewise with surrounding infantry support.[7][8] It is generally accepted amongst historians that the prior removal ofYamato from the scene was a preliminary objective of the Allies before any further assaults.[9][10]
By early 1945, following theSolomon Islands campaign, theBattle of the Philippine Sea and theBattle of Leyte Gulf, the once-formidableImperial Japanese Navy'sCombined Fleet was reduced to just a handful of operational warships and a few remaining aircraft and aircrew. Most of the remaining Japanese warships in the Combined Fleet were stationed at ports in Japan, with most of the large ships at the port ofKure in theHiroshima Prefecture on the main Japanese island ofHonshu.[11]
As a final step before theplanned invasion of the Japanese home islands, Allied forcesinvaded Okinawa on 1 April 1945. In March, when briefingEmperorHirohito on Japan's response to the expected invasion of Okinawa, Japanese military leaders explained that theImperial Japanese Army was planning extensive air attacks, including the use ofkamikaze tactics. The emperor then reportedly asked, "But what about the Navy? What are they doing to assist in defending Okinawa? Have we no more ships?" Feeling pressured by the emperor to mount some kind of attack, Japanese Navy commanders conceived akamikaze-type mission for their remaining operational large ships, which included thebattleshipYamato.[12]
The resulting plan, drafted under the direction of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, AdmiralSoemu Toyoda,[13] called forYamato and her escorts to attack the U.S. fleet supporting troops landing on the western coast of Okinawa.Yamato and her escorts were to fight their way to Okinawa and then beach themselves betweenHigashi andYomitan and fight asshore batteries until they were destroyed. Once the ships were destroyed, their surviving crew members were supposed to abandon ship and fight on land. Very little, if any, air cover could be provided for the ships, which would render them almost helpless to concentrated attacks from U.S. carrier-based aircraft.[12] In preparation for executing the plan, on 29 March the assigned ships left Kure forTokuyama, off the port ofMitajiri on the southern coast of Honshu.[14] Despite obeying orders to prepare for the mission, the commander of theTen-Go force, Vice-AdmiralSeiichi Itō, still refused to actually order his ships to carry it out, believing the plan to be futile and wasteful.[15]
Other officers of the Imperial Japanese Navy also had very negative views about the operation, believing that it was a waste of human life and fuel. Captain Atsushi Ōi, an operations officer at Grand Escort Command, was critical as fuel and resources were diverted from other operations. As he was told that the aim of this operation was "the tradition and the glory of the Navy," he shouted: "this war is of our nation and why should the honor of our 'surface fleet' be more respected? Who cares about their glory? Damn fools!".[16]
Vice AdmiralRyūnosuke Kusaka flew from Tokyo to Tokuyama on 5 April in a final attempt to convince Itō and the assembled commanders of the Combined Fleet to accept the plan.[16] Upon hearing of the proposed operation—which had been kept secret from most of them—the Combined Fleet commanders and captains unanimously joined Itō in rejecting it for the same reasons that he had expressed. Kusaka then explained that the Navy's attack would help divert U.S. aircraft away from the Army's planned kamikaze attacks on the U.S. fleet at Okinawa. He also explained that Japan's national leadership, including the emperor, were expecting the Navy to make their best effort to support the defense of Okinawa.[17]
Upon hearing this, the Combined Fleet commanders relented and accepted the proposed plan. The ships' crews were briefed on the nature of the mission and given the opportunity to stay behind if desired; none did. However, approximately 80 crew members who were new, sick, or infirm were ordered off the ships, including 67 naval cadets of Etajima Naval Academy Class No. 74 who had arrived on the battleship three days earlier.[18] The ships' crews engaged in some last-minute intense drills to prepare for the mission, mostly practicing damage control procedures.[19] At midnight, the ships were fueled. Reportedly, in secret defiance of orders to provide the ships with only just enough fuel to reach Okinawa, the Tokuyama personnel actually gaveYamato and the other ships almost all of the remaining fuel in the port, although this probably still was not enough to allow the force to return to Japan from Okinawa.[20]Yamato's executive officer organised a party for the crew for the evening of 5 April, during which many of the officers and sailors drank heavily.[21]
The United States Navy was able to monitor preparations for Operation Ten-Go by decoding Japanese radio signals. Through this source, the Americans received conclusive intelligence on 5 and 6 April that the attack was to be attempted. AdmiralRaymond Spruance, commander of theUnited States Fifth Fleet, ordered his forces to prepare to attack the Japanese at 00:30 on 6 April, beforeYamato and her escorts sailed.[22]
At 16:00 on 6 April,Yamato (with Admiral Itō on board), thelight cruiserYahagi, and eightdestroyers (Asashimo,Hamakaze,Isokaze,Suzutsuki,Hatsushimo,Yukikaze,Fuyutsuki, andKasumi)[23] departed Tokuyama to begin the mission.[24] Two Americansubmarines,Threadfin andHackleback, sighted the Japanese force as it proceeded south through theBungo Channel. Although they were unable to attack because of the ships' speed, they did spend several hoursshadowing the Japanesesortie and sending updates on its course to the U.S. fleet. The submarines' messages, which were reportedly sent uncoded, were also picked up by radio operators on the Japanese ships.
At dawn on 7 April, the Japanese force passed theŌsumi Peninsula into the open ocean heading south fromKyūshū toward Okinawa. They shifted into a defensiveformation, withYahagi leadingYamato and the eight destroyers deployed in a ring around the two larger ships, with each ship 1,500 m (1,600 yd) from each other and proceeding at 20 kn (23 mph; 37 km/h).[25] The destroyerAsashimo developed engine trouble and turned back. U.S.reconnaissance aircraft began to shadow the main force of ships. At 10:00, the force turned west to make it look like they werewithdrawing, but at 11:30, after being detected by two AmericanPBM Marinerflying boats, theYamato fired a salvo with her 460 mm (18.1 in) bow guns using special"beehive shells" (三式焼霰弾;san-shiki shōsan dan) but could not prevent the two planes from shadowing. The forces then turned back towards Okinawa.[18]
Upon receiving contact reports early on 7 April, Spruance ordered Task Force 54, which consisted mostly of modernizedStandard-type battleships under the command of Rear AdmiralMorton Deyo (which were engaged in shorebombardment), to intercept and destroy the Japanese sortie. Deyo moved to execute his orders, but Vice AdmiralMarc A. Mitscher, who commandedTask Force 58, preempted Spruance and Deyo by launching a massive air strike from his carriers, without informing Spruance until after the launches were completed.[26][27] Admiral Mitscher, a senior naval aviation officer, had long challenged the battleship-centric doctrines that had dominated U.S. naval strategy for much of the twentieth century. His career was defined by a fundamental dispute between advocates of traditional surface fleets and proponents of carrier-based air power—a rivalry embodied in his relationship with his immediate superior, Admiral Raymond Spruance. Although aircraft carriers had played central roles in the major Pacific battles, the ability of air power to independently overcome enemy surface forces had not been conclusively demonstrated. In this context, Operation Kikusui provided a pivotal opportunity to test and potentially confirm the supremacy of carrier-based operations over traditional battleship forces.[28]
Around 10:00 on 7 April, Task Groups 58.1 and 58.3 began launching 280 aircraft from their carriers. Task Group 58.4 launched a further 106 aircraft. The aircraft consisted ofF6F Hellcat andF4U Corsairfighters,SB2C Helldiverdive bombers, andTBF Avengertorpedo bombers.[29] Overall, 15 carriers launched aircraft. The air groups launched from five carriers became lost in bad weather and were not able to attack.[30] As a contingency, Spruance ordered Deyo to assemble a force of six fast battleships, seven cruisers and 21 destroyers to prepare for a surface engagement withYamato should the airstrikes prove unsuccessful.[31][32]
Around noon, the first American aircraft arrived overYamato; these were F6F Hellcat and F4U Corsair fighters conducting a fighter sweep of any Japanese aircraft defending the battle group; however, the severely depleted Imperial Japanese Army Air Force could muster no opposition,[34] which allowed U.S. dive-bomber and torpedo aircraft to set up for their attacks unmolested. These aircraft—after a two-hour flight from Okinawa—arrived over theYamato battle group and circled the ship formation just out ofanti-aircraft range; the lack of Japanese fighter resistance provided ample breathing room for American crews to methodically plan and coordinate their attack runs.[18]
The first wave of U.S. carrier planes was spotted by a Japanese lookout on the bridge at 12:32. Two minutes later, at 12:34,Yamato opened fire with her 460 mm main batteries. The ships stopped zigzagging and increased speed to 24 kn (28 mph; 44 km/h), began taking evasive maneuvers, and opened fire with their anti-aircraft guns.Yamato carried almost 150 anti-aircraft guns, including her massive 460 mm main guns that firedSan Shiki anti-aircraft shells.[35] The U.S. pilots deduced that the use of San Shiki and colored gunfire meant thatYamato's gunners relied on visual aiming and range, rather than being radar directed, and as a result "were missing with great consistency" despite the storm of fire that they put up.[28]
The Hellcat and Corsair fighters "were supposed to go first, to strafe, to rocket, to drop light ordnance, distracting the enemy gunners while the Helldivers plunged almost straight down with their heavy [armor piercing] bombs". This was because the Avenger torpedo bombers "needed all the distraction and diversion they could get when they made their dangerous low altitude runs straight at the enemy ships."[28] The Avengers mainly attacked from theport side so that if the torpedoes hit that side, it would increase the likelihood of the target ship capsizing.[36]
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At 12:46, a torpedo hitYahagi directly in her engine room, killing the entire engineering room crew and bringing her to a complete stop.Yahagi was hit by at least six more torpedoes and 12 bombs by succeeding waves of air attacks. The destroyerIsokaze attempted to come toYahagi's aid but was attacked and heavily damaged and sank sometime later.Yahagi capsized and sank at 14:05.[37]
During the first attack wave, despite evasive maneuvers that caused most of the bombs and torpedoes aimed at her to miss,Yamato was hit by twoarmor-piercing bombs and one torpedo.[38] Her speed was not affected, but one of the bombs started a fire aft of thesuperstructure that was not extinguished. Also, during the first attack wave, destroyersHamakaze andSuzutsuki were heavily damaged and taken out of the battle.Hamakaze sank later.[39]
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Between 13:20 and 14:15, the second and third waves of U.S. aircraft attacked, concentrating onYamato. During this time,Yamato was hit by at least eight torpedoes and up to 15 bombs. The bombs did extensive damage to the topside of the ship, including knocking out power to thegun directors and forcing the anti-aircraft guns to be individually and manually aimed and fired, greatly reducing their effectiveness.[40] The torpedo hits—almost all on the port side—causedYamato to list enough that capsizing was an imminent danger.[41]
At 13:33, in a desperate attempt to keep the ship from capsizing,Yamato's damage control team counter-flooded bothstarboard engine and boiler rooms. This narrowly mitigated the imminent danger of capsizing but also drowned the several hundred crew members crewing those stations, who were given no notice that their compartments were about to fill with water.[42][43] The loss of the starboard engines, plus the weight of the water, causedYamato to slow to about 10 kn (12 mph; 19 km/h).[44] At that same moment, another 110 aircraft were launched from Task Group 58. Twenty Avengers made a torpedo run from 60 degrees to port. Yamato started a sharp turn to port, but three torpedoes ripped into her port side amidships, jamming her auxiliaryrudder in position hard port.[39]
WithYamato proceeding more slowly and therefore being more accessible to target, U.S. torpedo aircraft concentrated on hitting her rudder and stern with torpedoes to affect her steering ability, which they succeeded in doing.[45] At 14:02, after being informed that the ship could no longer steer and was sinking, Itō ordered the mission canceled, the crew to abandon the ship and the remaining ships to begin rescuing survivors.[39]Yamato communicated this message to the other surviving ships bysignal flag because her radios had been destroyed.[46]
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Itō, along with CaptainKōsaku Aruga, who commandedYamato for the battle,refused to abandon ship, with Itō retiring to the flag cabin while Aruga tied himself to thebinnacle.[47] As the order to abandon the ship was issued after the ship began to capsize, many of her crew were trapped.[48] American aircraft continued to attackYamato during this period, and she suffered several more torpedo hits.[49] At 14:20,Yamato capsized completely and began to sink (30°22′N128°04′E / 30.367°N 128.067°E /30.367; 128.067). At 14:23, she suddenly blew up with an explosion so large that it was reportedly heard and seen 200 km (110 nmi; 120 mi) away inKagoshima and sent up amushroom-shaped cloud almost 20,000 ft (6,100 m) into the air.[50] Japanese survivorMitsuru Yoshida said that her large explosion downed several U.S. planes observing her end.[50] The explosion is believed to have occurred when the fires ignited by bomb hits reached the mainmagazines.[51]
Attempting to make it back to port, the destroyerAsashimo was bombed and sunk with no survivors. The destroyerKasumi was also crippled and had to be scuttled[39] by other, relatively undamaged destroyers.Suzutsuki was able to make it toSasebo, Japan, despite herbow being blown off, by steaming in reverse the entire way.[52]
The remaining three less-damaged destroyers (Fuyutsuki,Yukikaze, andHatsushimo) were able to rescue 280 survivors fromYamato (sources differ on the size ofYamato's crew, giving it as between 2,750 and 3,300 men), plus 555 survivors fromYahagi (out of a crew of 1,000) and just over 800 survivors fromIsokaze,Hamakaze, andKasumi. Between 3,700 and 4,250 Japanese naval personnel perished in the battle.[39][53] The ships took the survivors to Sasebo.[54]
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A total of 10 U.S. aircraft were shot down by anti-aircraft fire from the Japanese ships; some aircrews were rescued byseaplane or submarine. The U.S. lost 12 men. Some of the Japanese survivors reported that U.S. fighter aircraftstrafed Japanese survivors floating in the water.[55][56] Japanese survivors also reported that U.S. aircraft temporarily halted their attacks on the destroyers during the time that the destroyers were busy picking up survivors from the water.[57]
BesidesOperation Kikusui I,Operation Ten-Go also involved numerous suicide attacks on the U.S. invasion forces. The Japanese Army conducted an air attack on the U.S. naval fleet at Okinawa, but they failed to sink any ships. Around 115 aircraft—many of themkamikazes—attacked the U.S. ships throughout 7 April.Kamikaze aircraft hit the aircraft carrierHancock, battleshipMaryland, and destroyerBennett, causing moderate damage toHancock andMaryland and severe damage toBennett. About 100 Japanese aircraft were lost in the attack.[58]
Kikusui I was the last major Japanese naval operation of the war, and the remaining Japanese warships had little involvement in combat operations for the rest of the conflict.Suzutsuki was never repaired.Fuyutsuki was repaired but hit a U.S. air-dropped mine atMoji, Japan, on 20 August 1945, and was not subsequently repaired.Yukikaze survived the war almost undamaged.Hatsushimo hit a U.S. air-dropped mine on 30 July 1945, nearMaizuru, Japan, and was the 129th, and last, Japanese destroyer sunk in the war.[59]
Okinawa was declared secure by Allied forces on 21 June 1945,[60] after an intense and costly battle.Japan surrendered on 15 August 1945 after theatomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and theUSSR launching an invasion of northern China and Korea. The apparent willingness of Japan to sacrifice so many of its people using suicidal tactics such asOperation Ten-Go and in the Battle of Okinawa was reportedly a factor in the American decision to employ atomic weapons against Japan.[61]Maryland was repaired and upgraded following thekamikaze attacks fromOperation Ten-Go, although the war ended right after she returned to service.
Yamato remains fairly prominent in modernJapanese culture, where she is often portrayed as a symbol ofJapanese nationalism. The academic Robert Farley has written that popular depictions of the battleship portray her destruction as a "heroic, but also pointless and futile, sacrifice".[62] One of the reasons the event may have such significance in Japanese culture is that the wordYamato was often used as a poetic name for Japan. Thus, the end of the battleshipYamato could serve as a metaphor for the end of the Japanese empire, amidst her allegorical greatest might.[63][64]
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