| Operation Ox Head/Unternehmen Ochsenkopf | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of theTunisian campaign of theSecond World War | |||||||
.jpg) Panzer VI (Tiger I) in Tunisia, 1943 | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
 United Kingdom Free France |  Germany Italy | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Kenneth AndersonCharles Allfrey | Jürgen von ArnimRudolf Lang | ||||||
| Units involved | |||||||
| V Corps | Korpsgruppe Weber | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| ≥ 25 tanks[1] | 13,000 men[2] 77 tanks[3] | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 4,200 casualties (2,300 prisoners) 16 tanks 31 guns 40 vehicles | 4,500 casualties (2,200 prisoners) 71 tanks 60 vehicles | ||||||
 | |||||||
Unternehmen Ochsenkopf (Operation Ox Head) also known as theBattle of Sidi Nsir and theBattle of Hunts Gap was anAxis offensive operation inTunisia from26 February to 4 March 1943, during theTunisia Campaign of theSecond World War. The offensive and a subsidiary operationUnternehmen Ausladung was intended to gain control ofMedjez el Bab,Béja,El Aroussa,Djebel Abiod and a position known as Hunt's Gap, between the BritishFirst Army and the AxisArmy Group Africa (Heeresgruppe Afrika/Gruppo d'Armate Africa). The offensive gained some ground, but none of the more ambitious objectives were achieved before the operation was called off due to increasing losses of infantry and tanks, particularly the heavyTigers.Unternehmen Ochsenkopf was the last big Axis offensive by the5th Panzer Army before the surrender of the Afrika Korps in May 1943.[4]
After theBattle of Kasserine Pass(19–24 February), the Axis created Army Group Africa (Heeresgruppe Afrika/Gruppo d'Armate Africa) as a command headquarters for the5th Panzer Army and the Italian1st Army in Tunisia.Adolf Hitler and the German General StaffOberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) believed thatGeneraloberstHans-Jürgen von Arnim should assume command butGeneralfeldmarschallAlbert Kesselring the GermanOberbefehlshaber Süd (OB Süd, Commander-in-Chief South) argued forGeneralfeldmarschallErwin Rommel, who was appointed to command the newArmy Group Africa on 23 February.[3]Comando Supremo, the Italian General Staff, ordered Rommel to end the attack at Kasserine, in view of the Allied reinforcement of the Tebessa area, to conduct a spoiling offensive against theEighth Army (GeneralBernard Montgomery) as it approached the defences of theMareth Line from the east.[5]
The villages of Gafsa, Metlaoui and Tozeur were to be held by mobile troops and most of the attack group was to return to the 1st Italian Army. The10th Panzer Division had retired from Thala by early on 23 February and the21st Panzer Division ended its attack on Sbiba on 24 February. The divisions were to refit and also rejoin the 1st Italian Army, ready for an attack in early March, the moves to be covered by minor operations on the 5th Panzer Army front. On 24 February, Arnim flew to Rome without consulting Rommel and advocated an offensive towards Béja, being convinced that the BritishFirst Army (GeneralKenneth Anderson), had sent reinforcements south from the northern front to saveSbiba andThala. Arnim gained the approval of Kesselring for an attack on a wide front against theV Corps (Charles Allfrey) sector on 26 February.[6][5]
Unternehmen Ochsenkopf was a plan to penetrate the British defences on 26 February, withKorpsgruppe Weber (GeneralFriedrich Weber) of the334th Infantry Division, elements of theLuftwaffeHermann Göring Division which had recently arrived and the parts of the 10th Panzer Division not involved inUnternehmen Frühlingswind (Operation Spring Storm), in three groups or horns, in the shape of a bull's head. The northern horn, with most of the tanks, was to advance on the route fromMateur from the north-east, to capture Béja 40 km (25 mi) west of Medjez.[7]
The second group was to attack fromGoubellat towards Sloughia and Oued Zarga to envelop the British at Mejez El Bab and the third group was to carry out a pincer attack in theBou Arouda valley, then advance through El Aroussa to Gafour, with the objective of the road junction atEl Aroussa. In the north, the improvisedDivision von Manteuffel (formerly Division von Broich), in the subsidiaryUnternehmen Ausladung (Operation Disembarkation), was to defeat the British in the Sedjenane valley, cut the communications fromJefna to Djebel Aboid and cover the northern flank ofKorpsgruppe Weber. The operations would force the allies to withdraw and delay a further advance, while Rommel prepared the attack of the 1st Italian Army (the former German–Italian Panzer Army) from the Mareth Line defences against the Eighth Army.[3][8]
The subsidiaryUnternehmung Ausladung began on the morning of 26 February, to outflank the British in Sedjenane and the high ground opposite Green Hill, with an attack on the hilly coastal strip to the north between the town and Cap Serrat. The area was lightly held by poorly equipped French troops of theCorps Francs d'Afrique.[9]Division von Manteuffel led the attack with elite troops of theLuftwaffeFallschirmjäger Regiment (motorized) "Barenthin" (MajorRudolf Witzig) and the Italian10th Bersaglieri Regiment.[10] The Axis forces, with air support from theLuftwaffe made good progress across the hills held by theFree French betweenCap Serrat, the railway andSedjenane. The French managed to repulse an Italian attack but were then overrun and many were taken prisoner.[11]
On 27 February, elements of the139th Infantry Brigade of the46th Infantry Division and attachedNo. 1 Commando, supported by the70th Field Regiment RA and 5th Medium Regiment RA, moved up to counter the German advance but lacked air support and were short of artillery, after taking part in the Battle of Kasserine.[9][11] Until 1 March, the British conducted costly but successful counter-attacks, which delayed the Axis advance on the hamlet. On 2 March, aDurham Light Infantry (DLI) counter-attack was a costly failure and the battalion was withdrawn to a wooded area outside Sedjenane; more German attacks on Sedjenane that day and the next were defeated.[10] A counter-attack by a battalion of theLincolnshire Regiment, the DLI andChurchill tanks of theNorth Irish Horse drove the Germans back in determined fighting.[11]
The British position became untenable due to withdrawals by the French further west in the Medjez area, when Axis troops occupied high ground dominating the town. The French commander had thought his position was being outflanked and ordered a withdrawal. The German penetration towards Béja and Medjez along with the French withdrawal had caught the 139th Infantry Brigade in a salient and two companies ofSherwood Foresters were overrun.[11] On 4 March, the British retreated 24 km (15 mi) from Sedjenane toward Djebel Abiod to stabilise the front.[9] The Axis attack on Djebel Abiod was delayed for five days by the defence of Sedjenane and it was not captured.[10][12]
The southern horn of the operation was to be conducted byKampfgruppe Audorff with the Hermann Göring Parachute Division, the 334th Infantry Division and supporting panzer battalions.[13] Protecting this area was Y Division, anad hoc British force, which had been formed from the 38th (Irish) Brigade, a mixture of commandos,Grenadier andColdstream Guards, elements of the1st Parachute Brigade, with the Churchill tanks of C Squadron142 (Suffolk) Regiment RAC under command.[7] Thekampfgruppe attacked on the evening of 25 February, their first objectives being Tally Ho corner, an important road junction and aknoll nicknamed Fort MacGregor.[14] The southernmost of the horn was to be carried out byKampfgruppe Schmid underLuftwaffe generalJoseph Schmid, commanding the leading elements of the Hermann Goering Division. As part of this attack, a grouping underWalter Koch, consisting of the two battalions of the 5th German "Fallschirmjäger" regiment, and a company of tanks from the 7th Panzer Regiment. Its task was to seize the pass at Bir el Krima and then advancing through the Mahmoud Gap, to capture the road-junction between Sidi Mahmoud and Djebel Rihane, to El Aroussa.[15] Further South, 'Kampfgruppe Holzinger' would attack from the heights of Djebel Mansour with El Aroussa as their objective.[16]
TheLuftwaffe had attacked the British positions and shot up transport behind the front. At Fort MacGregor, D Company of theEast Surreys were attacked by the paratroops of the Hermann Göring Division.[17] After two German attacks were repulsed, paratroops blew holes in thebarbed wire and the defenders were soon overwhelmed and destroyed.[14] Djebel Djaffa, further west, held by a battalion of French colonial troops was attacked simultaneously by the paratroops; the French were surprised and swiftly overrun, most being captured.[17]
A hasty counter-attack by the Surreys on Fort MacGregor was attempted but was stopped just forward of the start line and the Surreys withdrew with many casualties. British artillery bombarded the hill for several hours with all the medium and heavy guns and when the Surreys attacked again, it was empty save for sixshell-shocked Germans.[17] The paratroopers had been devastated by the shelling and had no choice but to withdraw.[14] The summit was no bigger than a football pitch and was strewn with human remains, mostly German but also the British dead of D Company.[17] Allfrey sent forward theLancashire Fusiliers,600 men ofNo. 6 Commando, the 56thReconnaissance Regiment,Valentine tanks of the17th/21st Lancers, elements of the51st Royal Tank Regiment (51st RTR) and the North Irish Horse.[9][14][18] The next day almost as soon as they arrived, the Surreys and the Valentines of the 17/21st Lancers counter-attacked Djebel Djaffa, which was recaptured after some resistance.[17]
The next dayKampfgruppe Schmid struck South - a company ofFallschirmjäger riding on tanks and the rest following in lorries, over ran the pass at Bir El Krima.[19] By dawn a lorry-mounted troop 6 Commando under Lieutenant-ColonelDerek Mills-Roberts, had encountered the leading elements of the German attack and engaged them near a farm, which because it had asteamroller in its yard, became known as "Steamroller Farm".[20] The Commandos thinking this was a reconnaissance in force launched a series of counter-attacks designed to drive them back east, but realising the full scale of the attack had to make a fighting withdrawal instead losing some 40% of their original strength. The Commandos however reformed, and reinforced by divisional reconnaissance troops, managed to halt the German attack, backed by heavy mortar fire.[15]
Next in line was the 1st Parachute Brigade who were being ferried in support of the line south of Djebel Mansour by lorry andBren carriers at night. The 2nd Battalion faced 'Kampfgruppe Holzinger', a force of Austrian and ItalianAlpini and elements of the 334th Division, notably the 756th Mountain regiment (Gebirgsjäger-Regiment 756). The Italian assault attempted to penetrate the wild country through to Bou Arada, but the 2nd battalion repelled the attack, even at the expense of all their ammunition. Heavy machine gun fire forced the Italians into the many ravines for cover and at night a sweep by the Paras brought in some 90 prisoners. The 1st and 3rd battalions meanwhile holding a position known as the Argoub south of DjebelBou Arada faced a large assault by 756th Mountain regiment. The 1st battalion became hard pressed and were forced to withdraw from the Arboub, but reinforced by the 3rd battalion they retook the position in a determined counter attack with mortar fire, fixed bayonets andBren guns firing from the hip. The paras then drove the Axis forces back into a horseshoe shaped Wadi at the foot of Djebel Mansour. Trapped, the Axis then had to endure 3,000 mortar shells in 90 minutes ranged by the 3rd battalion, as well as machine gun fire. In all the paras took 150 prisoners and killed around 250.[21] Holzinger's attack had been defeated, and Von Arnim shifted the Mountain regiment towards Lang's sector northwest of Medjez El Bab.[22]
The rest of 334th Division meanwhile struck at Tally Ho corner just before midnight, surprised and overran the commando garrison, whose survivors were rescued by Churchill tanks.[18] The Germans pressed on to a small ridge 6 mi (9.7 km) to the east of El Aroussa, where two battalions of the Hermann Göring Division and a supporting panzer company assaulted a position defended by the Churchill tanks of Suffolk Squadron, 142nd Regiment RAC. Firing fromhull down positions, the Churchill tanks knocked out fourPanzer IVs, disabled threePanzer IIIs and destroyed an88 mm gun for the loss of a Churchill. The German infantry suffered many casualties and the survivors withdrew after determined resistance by the British infantry supported by massed artillery.[7] The British received reinforcements and counter-attacked after another bombardment, pushing the Germans back from Tally Ho corner into the hills east of the Medjez-El-Bab to El-Aroussa road during the night.[23][18]
After dark, the British advanced and mopped up halfway along the road to Steamroller Farm, held by about2,000 men from two battalions of the Hermann Göring Division, elements of apanzergrenadier regiment,5 cm Pak 38 and88 mm anti-tank guns.[23] A squadron of the 51st RTR in Churchill Mk III tanks and a company of Coldstream Guards set off just before noon on 28 February and by4:00 p.m. they were in sight of the farm.[24] German artillery-fire was directed at them and shortly afterwards they were attacked byJunkers Ju 87 (Stuka) dive bombers, losing five Churchills.[25] The 1st Troop pressed forward into the farm area with the Coldstream Guards but were pinned down.[26] Another Churchill tank, commanded by Second Lieutenant J. C. Renton, arrived and two tanks made a 1,500 yd (1,400 m) dash across an exposed causeway covered by an88 mm gun. At 20 yd (18 m) the gun fired and grazed the turret, before the crew fled and the Churchill flattened the gun; the Churchills then reached the summit of the pass and surprised the Germans there.[25]
The tanks came across German transport and shot them up as they went by, then knocked out two Panzer IIIs and two anti-tank guns as they tried to deploy.[24] The Germans fled and as dusk fell the column was destroyed.[7] Hollands and Renton were ordered to rejoin their squadron but the leading tank stalled and had to be given atow start. The tank sortie destroyedtwo 88 mm,two 75 mm, andtwo 50 mm anti-tank guns, four smaller anti-tank guns,25 wheeled vehicles,two 3-inchmortars, the two Panzer IIIs and inflicted nearly200 casualties.[25] The next day the French owner of the farm arrived at El Aroussa to say that the Germans had gone and the British occupied the area.[24] The depleted Hermann Göring Regiment had suffered many more casualties; its commander had assumed that the tanksortie was from a much bigger formation and sent a message toFliegerführer Afrika that he had been attacked by a "mad tank battalion which had scaled impossible heights" and "compelled his ultimate withdrawal".[25]
Kampfgruppe Lang had77 tanks, including twenty Tigers of the501st Heavy Panzer Battalion andmotorised infantry from the 10th Panzer Division. The rest of the 10th Panzer Division was to attack once the objectives were achieved and advance westwards, about 25 mi (40 km) south of Medjez.[3] The area was held by the128th (Hampshire) Infantry Brigade and several artillery batteries.[27] On 26 February, the northern attack ofOchsenkopf commenced with an attack on theSidi Nsirhamlet and railway station, where the road and railway connecting Béja and Mateur diverged (the road ran east into the hills, whereas the railway followed the easier north-east route).[28][29] The172nd Field Regiment RA, with three batteries of25-pounder guns and the155th Battery, with eight 25-pounders and 130 officers and men. They were dug in around a farm near Sidi Nsir, along with the 5th Battalion,Hampshire Regiment. They were to monitor German movements but most were poorly trained, with no battle experience.[3] At Hampshire Farm, the defenders were to absorb the first shock of an Axis attack on Béja, to give the defenders between Medjez and Beja at Hunt's Gap time to prepare. It was estimated the Germans attacked with thirteen infantry battalions (c. 13,000 men) with the supporting troops of two divisions (c. 30,000 men) on the northern front.[30]
During the night of 25/26 February,Very light signals began to go up in the hills around Sidi Nsir, and at6:30 a.m., German mortars began firing on the British guns. After45 minutes, German tanks drove down the road from Mateur and four of the 25-pounders opened fire. No. 1 gun had been specially placed at the top of a slope to cover the approach from Mateur and fired over open sights. The leading German tanks ran onto mines, were damaged and withdrew with the infantry.[3] At11:00 a.m. the Germans made another attempt on the left flank but F Troop opened fire and hit four German tanks, setting them ablaze.[31] German infantry engaged B Company with small-arms fire but were repulsed. Around midday, the Germans prepared to attack again but massed British artillery fire broke up the attack before it began.[32]
By1:00 p.m., thirty German tanks,self-propelled guns and infantry had worked round both flanks and were within 600 yd (550 m). The highest observation post was attacked, itswireless transmitter destroyed and telephone lines cut. EightBf 109 fightersstrafed each gun in turn all day, inflicting casualties and also attacked rear areas.[32] Several of the British vehicles on the road to Hunt's Gap were hit and ammunition had to be salvaged at risk by the gunners.Bivouacs andammunition dumps were also hit and left burning. Just after2:30 p.m., German lorried infantry turned the southern flank by infiltrating forward under cover of a hill. At3:00 p.m., German infantry commenced small-arms fire at close range and a Tiger, at the head of a column of tanks, moved along the road into the battery position, as thirteen more tanks gave covering fire fromhull-down positions. The British gunners switched toarmour piercing shot and knocked out three tanks, blocking the road.[33]
At5:30 p.m., another German attack on the remaining guns began; seven tanks were hit but one by one, the remaining guns were hit by tank-gun and machine-gun fire.[3] By nightfall, only one 25-pounder and severalBren guns remained, engaging the German tanks at ranges of from 10–20 yd (9.1–18.3 m).[32] "Tanks are on us" was the last wireless message and Newham ordered the evacuation of battalion headquarters and the Germans captured Sidi Nsir.[34] Of the 130 men of 155th Battery (9 officers and 121 other ranks), only 9 reached British lines and at least 2 of those were wounded.[3][35]
The Germans had lost a day in capturing the hamlet of Sidi Nsir and they were unable to press on through Hunt's Gap until 27 February. The defence of Sidi Nsir had gained time to prepare defences at the gap, adefile about 24 km (15 mi) north-east of Béja. The 128th Infantry Brigade had support from seventy-two 25-pounders, fifteenBL 5.5-inch medium guns and two squadrons of Churchill MK IIIs of the North Irish Horse.[36] A tank-killing zone had been prepared with minefields, anti-tank guns, hull-down Churchill tanks anddirect fire areas for medium and heavy artillery. Acab rank ofHurricane Mk IID tank-busters, equipped with40 mmVickers S guns, circled overhead in communication with the ground, waiting for targets.[15]
On 27 February 1943,Kampfgruppe Lang (Oberst Rudolf Lang) drove south from Sidi Nsir toward Beja. They came under fire from artillery and aircraft while travelling through Hunt's Gap and made slow progress. The British were still hurriedly preparing the defences at Hunt's Gap, north of Kzar Mezouar.[37]
On 28 February, Rommel ordered Lang to hurry up; he ordered an attack just before dawn by about ten Panzer IVs and lorried infantry, after an artillery bombardment on the positions of B Company, 2/4th Hampshires.[38] Churchill tanks knocked out four Panzer IVs, which halted the attack.[39] The Germans attacked again and penetrated C Company but the tanks of the North Irish Horse stopped the Germans until dusk. B Company was ordered to withdraw after aplatoon was overrun and a second was in danger of collapse.[15] C Company was overrun by German infantry and armour later in the day but the attackers were unable to advance further.[12]
The next day Lang found he was only 10 mi (16 km) from Hunt's Gap and was down to six operational tanks.[40] The 2/5th Leicester arrived and a thick fog fell across the valley, which hampered the RAF. The Germans attacked in the fog, surprised D Company and a platoon was overrun but the rest of the attack was repulsed by artillery-fire and infantry of the 1/4th Hampshires. The fog lifted and immediately the RAF made eight sorties into the valley and caught German supply columns as artillery concentrations were directed by theforward observation officers andair observation post observers.[12] The German tanks and infantry suffered many casualties; the serpentine road which the Axis transport was using was turned into a wilderness of bomb craters and burning vehicles, forcing a withdrawal.[41][42] The 2/4th Hampshire held on to their last positions as the Germans tried to advance along a wadi to the south. The British surprised them with a counter-attack in which forty Germans were killed and sixty captured.[15] Further along the road towards Sidi Nsir, artillery broke up another German attack. Eight Tiger Is had been immobilised by mines and had to be blown up by their crews to avoid capture.[43] A British tank officer went forward to investigate, saw no sign of Germans, reached the tanks and found the turrets open and the crews gone.[44]
On 2 March, the Germans withdrew, having lost over forty tanks and nearly sixty other armoured vehicles; two out of the four German infantry battalions were taken prisoner, in addition to the killed and wounded.[15][41] Many of the prisoners had been on theEastern Front and claimed that they had never experienced such a weight of bombardment.[44] The offensive had failed to achieve the main objectives and Arnim called off further attacks.[36] Anderson had considered abandoning Medjez, until the success of the defence of Hunt's Gap, the no retreat order issued byGeneralHarold Alexander (commander of the18th Army Group) and the end of the German attack, which saved the village. By 5 March, the 2/4th Hampshire had lost243 men killed or missing and were relieved by the 8th Battalion,Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, of the 36th Infantry Brigade, 78th Division.[15]
Weber ordered Lang to fall back to defensive positions; Rommel was dismayed when he heard that19 Tigers had been destroyed.[45][46] Major Hans-Georg Lueder, commander ofSchwere Panzer Abteilung 501 (Heavy Tank Battalion 501) was severely wounded and the detachment lost so many tanks that it ceased to be an effective fighting force.[47][43][48] None of the Axis operational objectives were met, despite gaining some ground in the west. The battle cost the Germans the initiative; at best they had only slightly delayed an Allied offensive.[49] The divisions needed for the attack of the 1st Italian Army on the Eighth Army were delayed for a week by the failure ofUnternehmen Ochsenkopf and theBattle of Medenine was a costly failure.[50][51] Allfrey was promoted to major-general on 9 March.[52] An Axis success would have meant the loss of Béja and the retirement of the Allied line along the northern sector, including a withdrawal from Medjez el Bab, which would have prolonged the campaign and interfered with Allied plans for theAllied invasion of Sicily.[46]
The Germans lost71 panzers—nearly90 per cent of the tanks used—while sixty other vehicles were destroyed or captured.[53] The Germans suffered nearly2,800 casualties and another2,200 men, who could not be easily replaced, were captured.[49] The British suffered1,800 casualties and lost2,300 men taken prisoner,16 tanks,17 guns,13 anti-tank guns and forty other vehicles.[54]
On 17 March, Axis forces were reinforced by the 504th Heavy Panzer Battalion, while the 501st repaired 25 of its tanks bringing it back up to quarter strength.[47] Ochsenkopf was to be the last big offensive by the 5th Panzer Army in Africa.[4] As mopping up and clearing operations took place over the next two weeks by the British, one key area needed to be retaken - a high point that dominated the area to the South West of the Sedjenane, known as 'Bowler Hat'. The task allotted was given to the 1st Battalion of 1st Parachute brigade, and on 20 March a well directed and heavy bombardment supported by a flanking attack across a river using a bridge laid down by the Parachute Field Squadron, the Paras charged and surprised the German defenders. They were in the process of being relieved, but were driven off by the British and the hill was taken with minimal loss.[55]
A week later, the 46th Infantry Division attacked with the 138th Infantry Brigade, keeping the 128th Infantry Brigade in reserve and the attached36th Infantry Brigade, 1st Parachute Brigade and French units (including atabor of specialist mountainGoumiers). The division was supported by the field artillery of two divisions, medium and heavy guns. In four days, the 46th Infantry Division recaptured the ground lost toDivision von Manteuffel and took850 German and Italian prisoners.[56] Sedjenane was re-captured by the Allies on 1 April.[57]
On 7 April, Anderson ordered the78th Infantry Division to clear the Béja–Medjez road. With artillery and close air support, the division methodically advanced 16 km (10 mi) through mountain terrain for ten days on a 16 km (10 mi) front. The4th Infantry Division moved up on the left of the 78th Infantry Division and pushed towards Sidi Nisr.[56] With the salient at Medjez relieved and lateral roads in the V Corps area cleared, Anderson began to prepare the big attack scheduled for 22 April to take Tunis. Within three weeks the Axis front collapsed and the230,000 remaining troops in Tunisia surrendered.[46][56]
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