| Battle of Crete | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of theBattle of Greece and theMediterranean theatre | |||||||||
 GermanFallschirmjäger landing on Crete, May 1941 | |||||||||
| |||||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||||
 United Kingdom Greece New Zealand Australia |  Germany Italy | ||||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
| Robert LaycockBernard C. Freyberg |  Kurt StudentWalter KochFrancesco Mimbelli | ||||||||
| Strength | |||||||||
| United Kingdom: 18,047[1][a] Greece: 10,258[1] – 11,451[2] New Zealand: 7,702[1] Australia: 6,540[1] Total: 42,547[1] | Germany: 22,000 paratroopers and mountain troops[3] 280 bombers 150 dive bombers 180 fighters 500 transports 80 troop gliders Italy: 2,700 | ||||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||||
British Commonwealth[4] 3,579+ killed and missing 1,918 wounded 12,254 captured Greece[5] 544+ killed and missing 5,225 captured Material: Royal Navy:[6][b] 12 fleet and 7 auxiliary ships sunk, 22 damaged Royal Air Force: 21 aircraft shot down 12 aircraft destroyed on ground Total: ~23,000 total casualties[7] 4,000 to 6,000 killed[8] (4,000 ground troops, 2,000 sailors) | |||||||||
| Over 500 Greek civilians executed by Axis soldiers. | |||||||||
TheBattle of Crete (German:Luftlandeschlacht um Kreta,Greek:Μάχη της Κρήτης), codenamedOperation Mercury (German:Unternehmen Merkur), was a majorAxisairborne andamphibious operation duringWorld War II to capture the island ofCrete. It began on the morning of 20 May 1941, with multipleGerman airborne landings on Crete.Greek and otherAllied forces, along with Cretan civilians, defended the island.[11] After only one day of fighting, the Germans had suffered heavy casualties and the Allied troops were confident that they would defeat the invasion. The next day, through communication failures, Allied tactical hesitation, and German offensive operations,Maleme Airfield in western Crete fell, enabling the Germans to land reinforcements and overwhelm the defensive positions on the north of the island. Allied forces withdrew to the south coast. More than half were evacuated by the BritishRoyal Navy and the remainder surrendered or joined theCretan resistance. The defence of Crete evolved into a costly naval engagement; by the end of the campaign the Royal Navy's eastern Mediterranean strength had been reduced to only two battleships and three cruisers.[12]
The Battle of Crete was the first occasion whereFallschirmjäger (German paratroops) were useden masse, the first mainly airborne invasion in military history, the first time the Allies made significant use of intelligence from decrypted German messages from theEnigma machine,[13][14] and the first timeGerman troops encountered mass resistance from a civilian population.[15] Due to the number of casualties and the belief that airborne forces no longer had the advantage of surprise,Adolf Hitler became reluctant to authorise further large airborne operations, preferring instead to employparatroopers as ground troops.[16] In contrast, the Allies were impressed by the potential of paratroopers and started to form airborne-assault andairfield-defence regiments.
British forces had initially garrisoned Crete when theItaliansattacked Greece on 28 October 1940,[17] enabling the Greek government to employ theFifth Cretan Division in the mainland campaign.[18] This arrangement suited the British: Crete could provide the Royal Navy with excellent harbours in the easternMediterranean, from which it could threaten the Axis south-eastern flank,[19] and thePloiești oil fields inRomania would be within range of Britishbombers based on the island.
The Italians were repulsed, but the subsequent German invasion of April 1941 (Operation Marita), succeeded in overrunning mainland Greece. At the end of the month, 57,000 Allied troops were evacuated by the Royal Navy. Some were sent to Crete to bolster itsgarrison until fresh forces could be organised, although most had lost their heavy equipment.[20]Winston Churchill, theBritish prime minister, sent a telegram to theChief of the Imperial General Staff, GeneralSir John Dill: "To lose Crete because we had not sufficient bulk of forces there would be a crime."[21]
TheGerman Army High Command (Oberkommando des Heeres, OKH) was preoccupied with finalizing preparations forOperation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union, and was largely opposed to a German attack on Crete.[22] However, Hitler remained concerned about attacks in other theatres, in particular on his Romanian fuel supply,[18] andLuftwaffe commanders were enthusiastic about the idea of seizing Crete by a daring airborne attack.[23] The desire to regain prestige after their defeat by theRoyal Air Force (RAF) in theBattle of Britain the year before, may also have played a role in their thinking, especially before the advent of the much more important invasion of the Soviet Union.[24] Hitler was won over by the audacious proposal and in Directive 31 he asserted that "Crete... will be the operational base from which to carry on the air war in the Eastern Mediterranean, in co-ordination with the situation in North Africa."[25] The directive also stated that the operation was to be in May[24] and must not be allowed to interfere with the planned campaign against the Soviet Union.[24] Before the invasion, the Germans conducted a bombing campaign to establishair superiority and forced the RAF to move its remaining aeroplanes toAlexandria inEgypt.[26]
No RAF units were based permanently at Crete until April 1941, but airfield construction had begun, radar sites had been built and stores delivered. Equipment was scarce in the Mediterranean and in the backwater of Crete. The British forces had seven commanders in seven months. In early April, airfields at Maleme and Heraklion and the landingstrip at Rethymno on the north coast were ready and another strip atPediada-Kastelli was nearly finished. After the German invasion of Greece, the role of the Crete garrison changed from the defence of a naval anchorage to preparing to repel an invasion. On 17 April, Group CaptainGeorge Beamish was appointed Senior Air Officer, Crete, taking over from a flight-lieutenant whose duties and instructions had been only vaguely defined. Beamish was ordered to prepare the reception of theBristol Blenheim bombers of30 and203 squadrons from Egypt and the remaining fighter aircraft from Greece, to cover the evacuation of W Force, which enabled the transfer of25,000 British and Dominion troops to the island, preparatory to their relief by fresh troops from Egypt.[27]
The navy tried to deliver 27,000 long tons (27,000 t) of supplies from1–20 May 1941, but Luftwaffe attacks forced most ships to turn back, and only 2,700 long tons (2,700 t) were delivered. Only about3,500 trained British and Greek soldiers were on the island, and the defence devolved to the shaken and poorly equipped troops from Greece, assisted by the last fighters of33,80 and112 squadrons and a squadron of theFleet Air Arm, once the Blenheims were ordered back to Egypt. In mid-May, the four squadrons had about two dozen aircraft, of which only about twelve were serviceable due to a lack of tools and spares. The unfinished ground at Pediada-Kastelli was blocked with trenches and heaps of soil and all but narrow flight paths were blocked at Heraklion andRethymno by barrels full of earth. At Maleme,blast pens were built for the aircraft, and barrels full of petrol were kept ready to be ignited by machine-gun fire. Around each ground, a few field guns, anti-aircraft guns, twoinfantry tanks and two or three light tanks were sited. The three areas were made into independent sectors, but there were only eightQF 3-inch and twentyBofors 40 mm anti-aircraft guns.[28]
On 30 April 1941,Major-generalBernard FreybergVC aNew Zealand Army officer, was appointed commander of the Allied forces on Crete (Creforce).[29] He was Churchill's personal choice, as the British Prime Minister admired his loyalty and the bravery he had shown during the First World War.[30] By May, the Greek forces consisted of approximately9,000 troops: threebattalions of the5th Greek Division, which had been left behind when the rest of the unit had been transferred to the mainland against the German invasion; theCretan Gendarmerie (2,500 men); theHeraklion Garrison Battalion, a defence unit made up mostly of transport and supply personnel; and remnants of the 12th and 20th Greek divisions, which had also escaped from the mainland to Crete and were organised under British command. Cadets from the Gendarmerie academy and recruits from Greek training centres in thePeloponnese had been transferred to Crete to replace the trained soldiers sent to fight on the mainland. These troops were already organised into numbered recruit training regiments, and it was decided to use this structure to organise the Greek troops, supplementing them with experienced men arriving from the mainland.
TheBritish Commonwealth contingent consisted of the original14,000-man British garrison and another25,000 British and Commonwealth troops evacuated from the mainland. These evacuees were a combination of intact units, composite units improvised locally, stragglers from every type of army unit, anddeserters; most of them lacked heavy equipment. The main formed units were the2nd New Zealand Division, less the 6th Brigade and division headquarters; the19th Australian Brigade Group; and the14th Infantry Brigade of the British6th Division. There were about 15,000 front-line Commonwealth infantry, augmented by about 5,000 non-infantry personnel equipped as infantry and a composite Australianartillery battery.[31] On 4 May, Freyberg sent a message to the British commander in the Middle East, GeneralArchibald Wavell, requesting the evacuation of about 10,000 unwanted personnel who did not have weapons and had "little or no employment other than getting into trouble with the civil population". As the weeks passed, some 3,200 British, 2,500 Australian and 1,300 New Zealander troops were evacuated to Egypt, but it became evident that it would not be possible to remove all the unwanted troops. Between the night of 15 May and morning of 16 May, the allied forces were reinforced by the 2nd Battalion of theLeicester Regiment, which had been transported from Alexandria to Heraklion byHMS Gloucester andHMS Fiji.[32]
On 17 May, the garrison on Crete included about 15,000 Britons, 7,750 New Zealanders, 6,500 Australians and 10,200 Greeks.[33] On the morning of 19 May, these were augmented by a further 700 men of theArgyll and Sutherland Highlanders, who had been transported from Alexandria toTymbaki overnight byHMS Glengyle.[32]
On 25 April, Hitler signed Directive 28, ordering the invasion of Crete. The Royal Navy retained control of the waters around Crete, so anamphibious assault would have been a risky proposition. With German air superiority assured, an airborne invasion was chosen. This was to be the first big airborne invasion, although the Germans had made smaller parachute andglider-borne assaults in the invasions ofDenmark andNorway,Belgium,the Netherlands,France and mainlandGreece. In Greece,Fallschirmjäger had been dispatched to capture the bridge over theCorinth Canal, which was being readied for demolition by theRoyal Engineers. German engineers landed near the bridge in gliders, while parachute infantry attacked the perimeter defence. The bridge was damaged in the fighting, which slowed the German advance and gave the Allies time to evacuate 18,000 troops to Crete and 23,000 to Egypt, albeit with the loss of most of their heavy equipment.[34]
In May,Fliegerkorps XI moved from Germany to the Athens area, but the destruction wrought during the invasion of Greece forced a postponement of the attack to 20 May. New airfields were built, and 280 long-range bombers,150 dive-bombers,90 Bf 109s,90 Bf 110s and 40 reconnaissance aircraft ofFliegerkorps VIII were assembled, along with530 Ju 52 transport aircraft and 100 gliders. TheBf 109s andStuka dive-bombers were based on forward airfields at Molaoi, Melos and Karpathos (then Scarpanto), with Corinth and Argos as base airfields. TheBf 110s were based at airfields near Athens, Argos and Corinth, all within 200 mi (320 km) of Crete, and the bomber or reconnaissance machines were accommodated at Athens, Salonica and a detachment on Rhodes, along with bases in Bulgaria at Sofia and Plovdiv, ten of the airfields being all-weather and 200–250 miles (320–400 km) from Crete. The transport aircraft flew from bases near Athens and southern Greece, including Eleusis, Tatoi, Megara and Corinth. British night bombers attacked the areas in the last few nights before the invasion, and Luftwaffe aircraft eliminated the British aircraft on Crete.[35]
The Germans planned to useFallschirmjäger to capture important points on the island, including airfields that could then be used to fly in supplies and reinforcements.Fliegerkorps XI was to co-ordinate the attack by the7thFlieger Division, which would land by parachute and glider, followed by the22nd Air Landing Division once the airfields were secure. The operation was scheduled for 16 May 1941, but was postponed to 20 May, with the5th Mountain Division replacing the 22nd Air Landing Division. To support the German attack on Crete, eleven Italian submarines took post off Crete or the British bases of Sollum and Alexandria in Egypt.[36][d]
Major-General Kurt Student did not add an attack on Crete to Operation Marita until March 1941; supply difficulties delayed the assembly ofFliegerkorps XI and its500 Ju 52s, then more delays forced a postponement until 20 May 1941. The War Cabinet in Britain had expected the Germans to use paratroops in the Balkans, and on 25 March, British decrypts of LuftwaffeEnigma wireless traffic revealed thatFliegerkorps XI was assembling Ju 52s for glider-towing, and British Military Intelligence reported that250 aircraft were already in the Balkans. On 30 March,Detachment Süssmann, part of the7thFliegerdivision, was identified at Plovdiv. Notice of the target of these units did not arrive, but on 18 April it was found that250 Ju 52s had been withdrawn from routine operations, and on 24 April it became known that Göring had reserved them for a special operation. The operation turned out to be a descent on the Corinth Canal on 26 April, but then a second operation was discovered and that supplies (particularly of fuel), had to be delivered toFliegerkorps XI by 5 May; a Luftwaffe message referring to Crete for the first time was decrypted on 26 April.[37]
The British Chiefs of Staff were apprehensive that the target could be changed to Cyprus or Syria as a route into Iraq during theAnglo-Iraqi War(2–31 May 1941) and suspected that references to Crete were a deception, despite having no grounds for this, and on 3 May Churchill thought that the attack might be a decoy. The command in Crete had been informed on 18 April, despite the doubts, and Crete was added to a link from theGC & CS to Cairo, while on 16 and 21 April, intelligence that airborne operations were being prepared in Bulgaria was passed on. On 22 April, the HQ in Crete was ordered to burn all material received through theUltra link, but Churchill ruled that the information must still be provided. When Freyberg took over on 30 April, the information was disguised as information from a spy in Athens. Remaining doubts about an attack on Crete were removed on 1 May, when the Luftwaffe was ordered to stop bombing airfields on the island and miningSouda Bay and to photograph all of the island. By 5 May it was clear that the attack was not imminent and, next day, 17 May was revealed as the expected day for the completion of preparations, along with the operation orders for the plan from the D-day landings in the vicinity of Maleme and Chania, Heraklion, and Rethymno.[37]
AdmiralWilhelm Canaris, chief of theAbwehr, originally reported 5,000 British troops on Crete and no Greek forces. It is not clear whether Canaris, who had an extensive intelligence network at his disposal, was misinformed or was attempting to sabotage Hitler's plans (Canaris was killed much later in the war for supposedly participating in the20 July Plot).Abwehr also predicted the Cretan population would welcome the Germans as liberators, due to their strongrepublican and anti-monarchist feelings and would want to receive the "... favourable terms which had been arranged on the mainland ..."[38] WhileEleftherios Venizelos, the late republican prime minister of Greece, had been a Cretan and support for his ideas was strong on the island, the Germans seriously underestimated Cretan loyalty. KingGeorge and his entourage escaped from Greece via Crete with the help of Greek and Commonwealth soldiers, Cretan civilians, and even a band of prisoners who had been released from captivity by the Germans. 12th Army Intelligence painted a less optimistic picture, but also underestimated the number of British Commonwealth forces and the number of Greek troops who had been evacuated from the mainland. GeneralAlexander Löhr, the theatre commander, was convinced the island could be taken with two divisions, but decided to keep 6th Mountain Division inAthens as a reserve.
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The Germans used the new7.5 cmLeichtgeschütz 40 light gun (arecoilless rifle). At 320 lb (150 kg), it weighed1⁄10 as much as a standard German 75 mmfield gun, yet had2⁄3 of its range. It fired a 13 lb (5.9 kg) shell more than 3 mi (4.8 km). A quarter of the German paratroops jumped with anMP 40submachine gun, often carried with abolt-actionKarabiner 98k rifle and most German squads had anMG 34machine gun.[39] The Germans used colour-coded parachutes to distinguish the canisters carrying rifles, ammunition, crew-served weapons and other supplies. Heavy equipment like theLeichtgeschütz 40 were dropped with a special triple-parachute harness to bear the extra weight.
The troops also carried special strips of cloth to unfurl in patterns to signal to low-flying fighters, to co-ordinate air support and for supply drops. The German procedure was for individual weapons to be dropped in canisters, due to their practice of exiting the aircraft at low altitude. This was a flaw that left the paratroopers armed only with knives, pistols and grenades in the first few minutes after landing. Poor design of German parachutes compounded the problem; the standard German harness had only one riser to thecanopy and could not be steered. Even the 25 percent of paratroops armed with sub-machine guns were at a disadvantage, given the weapon's limited range. ManyFallschirmjäger were shot before they reached weapons canisters.
Greek troops were armed withMannlicher–Schönauer6.5 mm mountain carbines or ex-Austrian 8x56RSteyr-Mannlicher M1895 rifles, the latter a part of post-World War I reparations; about 1,000 Greeks carried antiqueFusil Gras mle 1874 rifles. The garrison had been stripped of its bestcrew-served weapons, which were sent to the mainland; there were twelve obsolescentSt. Étienne Mle 1907 light machine-guns and forty miscellaneous LMGs. Many Greek soldiers had fewer than thirty rounds of ammunition but could not be supplied by the British, who had no stocks in the correct calibres. Those with insufficient ammunition were posted to the eastern sector of Crete, where the Germans were not expected in force. The 8th Greek Regiment was under strength and many soldiers were poorly trained and poorly equipped. The unit was attached to10th New Zealand Infantry Brigade (BrigadierHoward Kippenberger), who placed it in a defensive position around the village ofAlikianos where, with local civilian volunteers, they held out against the German 7th Engineer Battalion.
Though Kippenberger had referred to them as "...nothing more than malaria-ridden little chaps...with only four weeks of service," the Greek troops repulsed German attacks until they ran out of ammunition, whereupon they began charging with fixed bayonets, overrunning German positions and capturing rifles and ammunition. The engineers had to be reinforced by two battalions of German paratroops, yet the 8th Regiment held on until 27 May, when the Germans made acombined arms assault by Luftwaffe aircraft and mountain troops. The Greek stand helped to protect the retreat of the Commonwealth forces, who were evacuated atSfakia. Beevor and McDougal Stewart write that the defence of Alikianos gained at least 24 more hours for the completion of the final leg of the evacuation behindLayforce. The troops who were protected as they withdrew had begun the battle with more and better equipment than the 8th Greek Regiment.[citation needed]
British and Commonwealth troops used the standardLee–Enfield rifle,Bren light machine gun andVickers medium machine gun. The British had about 85 artillery pieces of various calibres, many of them captured Italian weapons without sights.[40]Anti-aircraft defences consisted of one light anti-aircraft battery equipped with 20 mm automatic cannon, split between the two airfields. The guns were camouflaged, often in nearby olive groves, and some were ordered to hold their fire during the initial assault to mask their positions from German fighters anddive-bombers. The British had nineMatilda IIA infantry tanks of "B" Squadron,7th Royal Tank Regiment (7th RTR) and sixteenLight Tanks Mark VIB from "C" Squadron,3rd King's Own Hussars.[41]
The Matildas had 40 mmOrdnance QF 2 pounder guns, which only firedarmour-piercing rounds – not effective anti-personnel weapons. (High explosive rounds in small calibres were considered impractical).[41] The tanks were in poor mechanical condition, as the engines were worn and could not be overhauled on Crete. Most tanks were used as mobilepillboxes to be brought up and dug in at strategic points. One Matilda had a damaged turret crank that allowed it to turn clockwise only. Many British tanks broke down in the rough terrain, not in combat. The British and their allies did not possess sufficientUniversal Carriers or trucks, which would have provided the mobility and firepower needed for rapid counter-attacks before the invaders could consolidate.[41]
Hitler authorisedUnternehmen Merkur (named after the swift Roman godMercury) with Directive 28; the forces used were to come from airborne and air units already in the area and units intended forUnternehmen Barbarossa were to conclude operations before the end of May,Barbarossa was not to be delayed by the attack on Crete, which had to begin soon or would be cancelled. Planning was rushed and much ofUnternehmen Merkur was improvised, including the use of troops who were not trained for airborne assaults.[citation needed] The Germans planned to captureMaleme, but there was debate over the concentration of forces there and the number to be deployed against other objectives, such as the smaller airfields at Heraklion and Rethymno. The Luftwaffe commander,Colonel General Alexander Löhr, and theKriegsmarine commander, AdmiralKarlgeorg Schuster, wanted more emphasis on Maleme, to achieve overwhelming superiority of force.[42] Student wanted to disperse the paratroops more, to maximise the effect of surprise.[42] As the primary objective, Maleme offered several advantages: it was the largest airfield and big enough for heavy transport aircraft, it was close enough to the mainland for air cover from land-basedMesserschmitt Bf 109 fighters and it was near the north coast, so seaborne reinforcements could be brought up quickly. A compromise plan byHermann Göring was agreed, and in the final draft, Maleme was to be captured first, while not ignoring the other objectives.[43]
The invasion force was divided intoKampfgruppen (battlegroups), Centre, West and East, each with a code name following the classical theme established by Mercury; 750 glider-borne troops, 10,000 paratroops, 5,000 airlifted mountain soldiers and 7,000 seaborne troops were allocated to the invasion. The largest proportion of the forces were in Group West. German airborne theory was based on parachuting a small force onto enemy airfields. The force would capture the perimeter and local anti-aircraft guns, allowing a much larger force to land by glider.[44] Freyberg knew this after studying earlier German operations and decided to make the airfields unusable for landing, but was countermanded by theMiddle East Command in Alexandria.[45] The staff felt the invasion was doomed now that it had been compromised and may have wanted the airfields intact for the RAF once the invasion was defeated.[45] The Germans were able to land reinforcements without fully operational airfields. One transport pilot crash-landed on a beach, others landed in fields, discharged their cargo and took off again. With the Germans willing to sacrifice some transport aircraft to win the battle, it is not clear whether a decision to destroy the airfields would have made any difference, particularly given the number of troops delivered by expendable gliders.[45]
| Group name | Codename | Commander | Target |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gruppe Mitte (Group Centre) | Mars | GeneralmajorWilhelm Süssmann | Prison Valley, Chania Souda, Rethymno |
| Gruppe West (Group West) | Comet | GeneralmajorEugen Meindl | Maleme |
| Gruppe Ost (Group East) | Orion | OberstBruno Bräuer | Heraklion |
At 08:00 on 20 May 1941, German paratroopers, jumping out of dozens ofJunkers Ju 52 aircraft, landed near Maleme Airfield and the town ofChania. The21st,22nd and23rd New Zealand battalions held Maleme Airfield and the vicinity. The Germans suffered many casualties in the first hours of the invasion: a company of III Battalion, 1st Assault Regiment lost 112 killed out of 126 men, and 400 of 600 men in III Battalion were killed on the first day.[46] Most of the parachutists were engaged by New Zealanders defending the airfield and by Greek forces near Chania. Many gliders following the paratroops were hit bymortar fire seconds after landing, and the New Zealand and Greek defenders almost annihilated the glider troops who landed safely.[46]
Some paratroopers and gliders missed their objectives near both airfields and set up defensive positions to the west of Maleme Airfield and in "Prison Valley" near Chania. Both forces were contained and failed to take the airfields, but the defenders had to deploy to face them.[47] Towards the evening of 20 May, the Germans slowly pushed the New Zealanders back from Hill 107, which overlooked the airfield. Greek police and cadets took part, with the 1st Greek Regiment (Provisional) combining with armed civilians to rout a detachment of German paratroopers dropped atKastelli. The 8th Greek Regiment and elements of the Cretan forces severely hampered movement by the 95th Reconnaissance Battalion onKolimbari andPaleochora, where Allied reinforcements from North Africa could be landed.
A second wave of German transports supported by Luftwaffe andRegia Aeronautica attack aircraft, arrived in the afternoon, dropping more paratroopers and gliders containing assault troops.[48] One group attacked at Rethymno at 16:15 and another attacked at Heraklion at 17:30, where the defenders were waiting for them and inflicted many casualties.
The Rethymno–Heraklion sector was defended by the British 14th Brigade, as well as the2/4th Australian Infantry Battalion and the Greek 3rd, 7th and "Garrison" (ex-5th Crete Division) battalions. The Greeks lacked equipment and supplies, particularly the Garrison Battalion. The Germans pierced the defensive cordon around Heraklion on the first day, seizing the Greek barracks on the west edge of the town and capturing the docks; the Greeks counter-attacked and recaptured both points. The Germans dropped leaflets threatening dire consequences if the Allies did not surrender immediately. The next day, Heraklion was heavily bombed and the depleted Greek units were relieved and assumed a defensive position on the road toKnossos.[citation needed]
As night fell, none of the German objectives had been secured. Of 493 German transport aircraft used during the airdrop, seven were lost to anti-aircraft fire. The bold plan to attack in four places to maximise surprise, rather than concentrating on one, seemed to have failed, although the reasons were unknown to the Germans at the time.
Among the paratroopers who landed on the first day was former world heavyweight championboxerMax Schmeling, who held the rank ofGefreiter at the time. Schmeling survived the battle and the war.
Overnight, the 22nd New Zealand Infantry Battalion withdrew from Hill 107, leaving Maleme Airfield undefended. During the previous day, the Germans had cut communications between the two westernmost companies of the battalion and the battalion commander, Lieutenant ColonelLeslie Andrew VC, who was on the eastern side of the airfield. The lack of communication was assumed to mean that the battalion had been overrun in the west. With the weakened state of the eastern elements of the battalion and believing the western elements to have been overrun, Andrew requested reinforcement by the 23rd Battalion.[49] BrigadierJames Hargest denied the request on the mistaken grounds that the 23rd Battalion was busy repulsing parachutists in its sector. After a failed counter-attack late in the day on 20 May, with the eastern elements of his battalion, Andrew withdrew under cover of darkness to regroup, with the consent of Hargest.[50] Captain Campbell, commanding the westernmost company of the 22nd Battalion, out of contact with Andrew, did not learn of the withdrawal of the 22nd Battalion until early in the morning, at which point he also withdrew from the west of the airfield.[51][52] This misunderstanding, representative of the failings of communication and co-ordination in the defence of Crete, cost the Allies the airfield and allowed the Germans to reinforce their invasion force unopposed.[53] In Athens, Student decided to concentrate on Maleme on 21 May, as this was the area where the most progress had been made and because an early morning reconnaissance flight over Maleme Airfield was unopposed.[50][54] The Germans quickly exploited the withdrawal from Hill 107 to take control of Maleme Airfield, just as a sea landing took place nearby. The Allies continued to bombard the area asJu 52s flew in units of the 5th Mountain Division at night.[51]
In the afternoon of 21 May 1941, Freyberg ordered a counter-attack to retake Maleme Airfield during the night of 21/22 May. The 2/7th Battalion was to move 18 miles (29 km) north to relieve the20th Battalion, which would participate in the attack. The 2/7th Battalion had no transport, and vehicles for the battalion were delayed by German aircraft. By the time the battalion moved north to relieve 20th Battalion for the counter-attack, it was 23:30, and the 20th Battalion took three hours to reach the staging area, with its first elements arriving around 02:45.[51] The counter-attack began at 03:30 but failed because of German daylight air support.[50] (BrigadierGeorge Alan Vasey and Lieutenant-ColonelWilliam Cremor have criticised Freyberg for not properly defending Maleme Airfield.)[55] Hargest also blamed Freyberg for the loss of the airfield.[56]
An Axis convoy of around 20caïques, escorted by theItalian torpedo boat Lupo, tried to land German reinforcements near Maleme.Force D under Rear-AdmiralIrvine Glennie, with three light cruisers and four destroyers, intercepted the convoy before midnight; the convoy turned back with the loss of more than half of its boats, despiteLupo's defence.[57] The attacking British force suffered only slight damage on cruiserHMS Orion caused by friendly fire.[58] About2⁄3 of the German force of more than 2,000 men was saved by the Italian naval commander,Francesco Mimbelli, against an overwhelmingly superior Allied naval force. A total of 297 German soldiers, two Italian seamen[59] and two British sailors onOrion were killed.[60] Eight caiques were caught and sunk, while at least another six managed to get away,[61] along with three Italian escorting motor-sailing boats.[60] Only one caïque and one cutter from the convoy reached Crete. The caïque landed 3 officers and 110 German soldiers near Cape Spatha, while the cutter arrived safely inAkrotiri, where her crew was engaged by a British Army patrol[62] and took heavy casualties. Of the German soldiers who landed at Akrotiri, only one managed to get through the British lines and join the German paratroopers already fighting for Chania.[63] According to other authors, only one German officer and 35 men from the 100th Regiment landed from the caïque that arrived in Crete.[64]
The defending force organised for a night counter-attack on Maleme by two New Zealand battalions, the 20th Battalion of the 4th Brigade and the28th Maori Battalion of the 5th Brigade. A New Zealand officer present at the battle claimed a long delay ordering the planned counter-attack turned a night attack into a day attack, which led to its failure.[54] Fears of a sea landing meant that a number of units that could have taken part in the attack were left in place, although this possibility was removed by the Royal Navy which arrived too late for the plans to be changed. The delayed counter-attack on the airfield came in daylight on 22 May, when the troops facedStuka dive bombers, dug-in paratroops and mountain troops. The attack slowly petered out and failed to retake the airfield, which forced the defenders into withdrawals to the eastern end of the island, to avoid being out-flanked.[54]
Admiral Andrew Cunningham sent Force C (three cruisers and four destroyers, commanded by Rear AdmiralEdward Leigh Stuart King) into theAegean Sea through theKasos Strait, to attack a second flotilla of transports, escorted by the Italian torpedo boatSagittario. The force sank an isolatedcaïque at 08:30, saving itself from an air attack that struck the cruiserHMS Naiad as the German pilots tried to avoid killing their troops in the water. The British squadron was under constant air attack and, short of anti-aircraft ammunition, steamed on toward Milos, sightingSagittario at 10:00. King made the "difficult" decision not to press the attack, despite his overpowering advantage, because of the shortage of ammunition and the severity of the air attacks.[65] The transports were defended by a torpedo charge bySagittario, which also laid a smoke screen and traded fire with the British force,[66][67] trying to lure them to a different direction. Indeed, King was unaware that a major enemy convoy was ahead of his force until 11:00.[60] Eventually, the convoy and its escort managed to slip away undamaged. King's ships, despite their failure to destroy the German troop transports, had succeeded in forcing the Axis to abort the landing by their mere presence at sea. During the search and withdrawal from the area, Force C suffered many losses to German bombers.Naiad was damaged by near misses and the cruiserHMS Carlisle was hit. Cunningham later criticised King, saying that the safest place during the air attack was amongst the flotilla ofcaïques.[66][67]
While Force C made its attack on the convoy, Force A1 (Rear AdmiralH B Rawlings), Force B (Captain Henry A Rowley) and Glennie's Force D converged west ofAntikythera. Concerned about the level of anti-aircraft ammunition available following repeated air attacks, the combined force was ordered to report on their stock of high-angle ammunition at 09:31. Of the cruisers,HMS Ajax had 40 per cent,Orion 38 per cent,Fiji 30 per cent,HMS Dido 25 per cent andGloucester only 18 per cent.Ajax,Orion andDido were ordered to return to Alexandria with Glennie's Force D to rearm butGloucester andFiji remained with Rawlings' Force A1.[68]
At 12:25 Force A1, stationed 20 to 30 miles west of Antikythera, received a request from King to support the damagedNaiad. Force A1 headed east into theKythera Channel, rendezvousing with Force C between 13:30 and 14:00. As the more senior admiral, King took command, with air attacks now inflicting damage on both forces. A bomb struckHMS Warspite and the destroyerHMS Greyhound was sunk. King sentHMS Kandahar andHMS Kingston to pick up survivors, while the cruisersFiji andGloucester were ordered respectively at 14:02 and 14:07 to provide anti-aircraft support. Writing in despatches after the battle, Cunningham stated that King was unaware of the shortage of anti-aircraft ammunition inGloucester andFiji. At 14:13 King and Rawlings exchanged messages about the shortage of ammunition within both Force C and Force A1, with Rawlings expressing concern about the orders given toGloucester andFiji. Following this communication, King issued an order to recall bothGloucester andFiji at 14:57.[68][69]
Between 15:30 and 15:50, while attempting to rejoin Force A1,Gloucester was hit by several bombs and had to be left behind due to the air attacks;[70] the ship was sunk and 22 officers and 700 ratings were killed.[68][71] The air attacks on Force A1 and Force C continued; two bombs hit the battleshipHMS Valiant and another hitFiji, disabling her at 18:45. AJunkers Ju 88 flown by LieutenantGerhard Brenner dropped three bombs onFiji, sinking her at 20:15.[72] Five hundred survivors were rescued byKandahar andKingston that night. The Royal Navy had lost two cruisers and a destroyer but had managed to force the invasion fleet to turn round.[73] Royal Navy AA gunners shot down fiveJunkers Ju 87s and five Ju 88s and damaged sixteen more, some of which crash-landed upon their return to base on the night of 21/22 May.[74]
Fighting against fresh German troops, the Allies retreated southward. The 5th Destroyer Flotilla, consisting ofHMS Kelly,HMS Kipling,HMS Kelvin,HMS Jackal andHMS Kashmir (Captain, LordLouis Mountbatten), was ordered to leaveMalta on 21 May, to join the fleet off Crete, and arrived afterGloucester andFiji were sunk. They were sent to pick up survivors and then diverted to attack a German convoy of about fifty ships andcaïques off Cape Spatha on Rodopou peninsula, western Crete, on the night of 22/23 May and then shell the Germans at Maleme.Kelvin andJackal were diverted to another search while Mountbatten, withKelly,Kashmir andKipling, was to go to Alexandria.[75]
When rounding the western side of Crete, the three ships were attacked by 24 Ju 87Stuka dive bombers.Kashmir was hit and sank in two minutes, andKelly was hit and turned turtle soon after and later sank.Kelly shot down aStuka before sinking and another was badly damaged and crashed upon returning to base.[76]Kipling survived 83 bombs, while 279 survivors were rescued from the ships. (TheNoël Coward filmIn Which We Serve was based on this action.)[77] The Royal Navy had suffered so many losses from air attacks that on 23 May Admiral Cunningham signalled his superiors that daylight operations could no longer continue, but the Chiefs of Staff demurred.[78] German search-and-rescue aircraft and Italian motor torpedo boats spotted and rescued the 262 survivors from the German light convoy sunk off Cape Spatha.
After air attacks on Allied positions inKastelli on 24 May, the 95thGebirgs Pioneer Battalion advanced on the town.[79] These air attacks enabled the escape of German paratroopers captured on 20 May; the escapees killed or captured several New Zealand officers assigned to lead the 1st Greek Regiment. The Greeks put up determined resistance but, with only 600 rifles and a few thousand rounds of ammunition available for 1,000 ill-trained men, they were unable to repel the German advance.[80] Fighting by the remnants of the 1st Greek Regiment continued in the Kastelli area until 26 May, hampering German efforts to land reinforcements.
Despite the dangers posed by British naval forces, theKriegsmarine made another attempt to supply the invasion by sea. On 24 MayOberleutnant-zur-See Österlin, who had led the Maleme Flotilla, was given the task of transporting twoPanzer II light tanks to Kastelli Kisamou. Österlin commandeered a small wooden lighter atPiraeus and arranged for the tanks to be lowered onto it. At dusk the next day, the lighter, towed by the small harbour tugKentauros, left Piraeus and headed south towards Crete. Reports of British naval units operating nearby convinced Admiral Schuster to delay the operation and he ordered Österlin to make for a small harbour on the German-occupied island ofKithira.[81][82] At a meeting in Athens on 27 May, Luftwaffe Generals Richthofen, Jeschonnek, and Löhr pressed Schuster to get the tanks delivered somehow before "... the Englander claws himself erect again".[83] One of Richthofen's liaison officers had returned from the island on 26 May; the paratroopers were in poor condition, lacking in discipline, and "at loose ends". He stressed the "absolute and immediate need" for "reinforcement by sea shipment of heavy weaponry if the operation is to get ahead at all."[83]
Awful news from Crete. We are scuppered there, and I'm afraid the morale and material effects will be serious. Certainly the Germans are past-masters in the art of war—andgreat warriors. If we beat them, we shall have worked a miracle.
— Alexander Cadogan, Diary, 27 May 1941[84]
Schuster issued Österlin new orders to sail for theGulf of Kissamos, where a landing beach had already been selected and marked out. Upon nearing the shore on 28 May, the lighter was positioned ahead of the tug and firmly beached. A party of engineers then blew the lighter's bow off using demolition charges and the two tanks rolled ashore. They were soon assigned toAdvance Detachment Wittman, which had assembled near Prison Valley reservoir the day before. This ad hoc group was composed of a motorcycle battalion, the Reconnaissance Battalion, an anti-tank unit, a motorised artillery troop, and some engineers. General Ringel gave orders for Wittmann to "strike out from Platanos at 03:00 on 28 May in pursuit of the British 'main' via the coastal highway to Rethymno" and thence towards Heraklion.[81] Although they did not play a decisive role, the panzers were useful in helping round up British troops in theKissamos area, before speeding eastward in support of the German pursuit column.[81]
On the night of 26/27 May, a detachment of some 800 men fromNo. 7 andNo. 50/52 Commandos, as part of Layforce, landed at Souda Bay (ColonelRobert Laycock).[85] Laycock had tried to land the force on 25 May, but had turned back due to bad weather.[85] Although armed mainly with only rifles and a small number of machine guns, they were to carry out rearguard actions in order to buy the garrison enough time to carry out an evacuation.[85]
Troops of the German 141st Mountain Regiment blocked a section of the road between Souda and Chania. On the morning of 27 May, the New Zealand28th (Māori) Battalion, theAustralian 2/7th Battalion and theAustralian 2/8th Battalion cleared the road by abayonet charge (the "Battle of 42nd Street").[86] Command in London decided the cause was hopeless after General Wavell informed the Prime Minister at 0842, 27 May, that the battle was lost, and ordered an evacuation.[87] Freyberg concurrently ordered his troops to withdraw to the south coast to be evacuated.[citation needed]
On 26 May, in the face of the stalled German advance, senior Wehrmacht officers requested Mussolini to send Italian Army units to Crete in order to help the German forces fighting there.[88][need quotation to verify] On the afternoon of 27 May, an Italian convoy departed fromRhodes with the intention of landing a brigade from the50th Infantry Division Regina, supported by 13L3/35 light tanks.[89] Italian participation in the battle of Crete was limited and finally on 28 May, when the campaign was already decided in the Germans' favour and Allied evacuation had begun, an Italian landing force approached the east coast of the island, off Sitia.[90][91][92]
At 13:30 on 28 May, the Italians believed that three cruisers and six destroyers of the Royal Navy were steaming up towards the northern coast of Crete in support of Allied troops, but the Royal Navy was fully occupied evacuating the Crete garrison.[87][89] The Italians assumed that the Royal Navy force would be offSitia, the planned landing site, by 17:00, and the commander decided that the slowest ship of the convoy would be taken in tow byLince to increase speed andCrispi was detached to shell the lighthouse at CapeSideros. The 3,000 men of the division and their equipment were on shore by 17:20 and advanced west mostly unopposed, rendezvousing with the Germans atIerapetra. The Italian troops later moved their headquarters from Sitia toAgios Nikolaos.[89][93]
The Germans pushed the British, Commonwealth and Greek forces steadily southward, using aerial and artillery bombardment, followed by waves of motorcycle and mountain troops (the rocky terrain making it difficult to employ tanks). The garrisons atSouda andBeritania gradually fell back along the road toVitsilokoumos, north of Sfakia. About halfway there, near the village ofAskyfou lay a large crater nicknamed "The Saucer", the only place wide and flat enough for a large parachute drop. Troops were stationed about its perimeter, to prevent a landing that might block the retreat.On the evening of the 27th, a small detachment of German troops penetrated Allied lines near Imbros Gorge threatening a column of retreating unarmed Allied forces. The attack was held off by four men, the only ones with weapons.[94] Led by Cpl Douglas Bignal, the men sacrificed themselves,[95]securing the withdrawal of the remainder. Amongst this group was New Zealander Pte Willy Falconer of the Maori battalion, a hero of 42nd Street and Galatas. Also killed were LCpl Philip Stamp and Pte Andrew Payton.[96]
Near Souda, the 5th New Zealand Brigade and the 2/7th Australian Battalion, held off the 141st Mountain Regiment, which had begun a flanking manoeuvre, and on 28 May, at the village ofStylos, the 5th New Zealand Brigade fought a rearguard action. The Luftwaffe was over Rethymno and Heraklion and they were able to retreat down the road.[97]
The retreat of the brigade was covered by two companies of the Māori Battalion under CaptainRangi Royal, who overran the I Battalion, 141stGebirgsjäger Regiment and halted the German advance. When the main unit was safely to the rear, the Māori retreated 24 miles (39 km), losing only two killed and eight wounded, all of whom were recovered. Layforce was the only big unit in this area to be cut off. Layforce had been sent to Crete by way of Sfakia when it was still hoped that reinforcements could be brought from Egypt to turn the tide of the battle.[85] The battalion-sized force was split up, with a 200-man detachment under Laycock at Souda to cover the retreat of the heavier units. Layforce and three British tanks were joined by the men of the 20th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Battery, who had been assigned to guard Souda docks and refused to believe that an evacuation had been ordered. After a day of battle, Laycock ordered a night retreat to Beritiana, where he was joined by Royal and the Māori, who managed to fight their way out, but Layforce was cut off near the village of Babali Khani (Agioi Pantes). Laycock and his Intelligence Officer,Evelyn Waugh, were able to escape in a tank. Most of the other men of the detachment and the 20th HAA Battery were killed or captured. (By the end of the operation about 600 of the 800 commandos sent to Crete were listed as killed, wounded or missing; only 179 men got off the island.)[98]
From 28 May – 1 June, troops were embarked for Egypt, most being lifted from Sfakia on the south coast. More than 4,000 troops were rescued from Heraklion on the night of 28/29 May but that naval force was attacked for hours by Luftwaffe dive bombers on the voyage back, suffering ships sunk and damaged with numerous casualties among naval personnel and troops. About 6,000 men were withdrawn by cruisers and destroyers from Sfakia on the night of 29 May. Two destroyers carried another 1,400 soldiers away on the night of the 30/31st. During the night of 31 May, Cunningham sent the cruiserPhoebe with four smaller vessels to transport more than 3,500 troops to Alexandria.[99] About 18,600 men of the 32,000 British troops on the island were evacuated; 12,000 British and Dominion troops and thousands of Greeks were still on Crete when the island came under German control on 1 June.[100]
Colonel Campbell, the commander at Rethymno, was forced to surrender his contingent. Rethymno fell and on the night of 30 May, German motorcycle troops linked up with the Italian troops who had landed on Sitia. On 1 June, the remaining 5,000 defenders at Sfakia surrendered.[101] By the end of December, about 500 Commonwealth troops remained at large on the island. While scattered and disorganised, these men and the partisans harassed German troops for long after the withdrawal.
Cretan civilians joined the battle with whatever weapons were at hand.[102] Most civilians went into action armed only with what they could gather from their kitchens or barns and several German parachutists were knifed or clubbed to death in olive groves. In one recorded incident, an elderly Cretan man clubbed a parachutist to death with his walking cane, before the German could disentangle himself from his parachute.[103] In another recorded incident, a local priest and his teenage son broke into a small village museum and took two rifles from the era of theBalkan Wars and sniped at German paratroops at landing zones. The Cretans also used captured German small arms. The Crete civilian actions against the Germans were not limited to harassment; mobs of armed civilians joined in the Greek counter-attacks atKastelli Hill and Paleochora; the British and New Zealand advisers at these locations were hard pressed to preventmassacres. Civilians also checked the Germans to the north and west of Heraklion and in the town centre.[104]
The Battle of Crete was not the first occasion during the Second World War where the German troops encountered widespread resistance from a civilian population, as similar events took place during the invasion of Poland (Kłecko); nevertheless it initially surprised and later outraged them. As most Cretan partisans wore no uniforms or insignia such as armbands or headbands, the Germans felt free of all of the constraints of the Hague Conventions and killed armed and unarmed civilians indiscriminately.[105][e] Even before the end of the battle, civilians were executed in places likeMissiria. Immediately after Crete fell,collective punishments against civilians intensified. Between 2 June and 1 August, 195 persons from the village of Alikianos and its vicinity were killed in mass shootings known as theAlikianos executions.[106] On 2 June, several male citizens fromKondomari were executed by a firing squad, with the shootings being captured on film by a German army war correspondent. On 3 June, the village ofKandanos was razed to the ground and about 180 of its inhabitants killed. After the war, Student, who ordered the shootings, avoided prosecution forwar crimes, despite Greek efforts to have him extradited.[107]
The firstresistance movement in Crete was established just two weeks after its capture. Throughout the German occupation in the years that followed, reprisals in retaliation for the involvement of the local population in the Cretan resistance continued. On several occasions, villagers were rounded up and summarily executed. In one of the worst incidents, around 20 villages east ofViannos and west of the Ierapetra provinces were looted and burnt in September 1943, with more than 500 of their inhabitants beingmassacred.[108] These massacres were among the deadliest during theAxis occupation of Greece during World War II. In August 1944, more than 940 houses inAnogeia were looted and then dynamited. During the same month, nine villages in theAmari Valley were destroyed and 165 people killed in what is now known as theHolocaust of Kedros.[109] All these reprisals were ordered byGeneralleutnantFriedrich-Wilhelm Müller, who was nicknamed "The Butcher of Crete". After the war, Müller was tried by a Greek military court and executed.[110]Assaults on civilians with lower death tolls occurred in places likeVorizia,Kali Sykia,Kallikratis,Skourvoula, andMalathyros.
The German Air Ministry was shocked by the number of transport aircraft lost in the battle, and Student, reflecting on the casualties suffered by the paratroopers, concluded after the war that Crete was the death of the airborne force. Hitler, believing airborne forces to be a weapon of surprise which had now lost that advantage, concluded that the days of the airborne corps were over and directed that paratroopers should be employed as ground-based troops in subsequent operations in the Soviet Union.[16]
The battle for Crete delayed Operation Barbarossa but not directly.[111] The start date forBarbarossa (22 June 1941) had been set several weeks before the Crete operation was considered and the directive by Hitler for Operation Mercury made it plain that preparations forMerkur must not interfere withBarbarossa.[24] Units assigned toMerkur were intended forBarbarossa and were forced to redeploy to Poland and Romania by the end of May. Movement of surviving units from Greece was not delayed. The transfer ofFliegerkorps VIII north, ready forBarbarossa, eased the Royal Navy evacuation of the defenders. The delay of Operation Barbarossa was exacerbated also by the late spring and floods in Poland.[112]
The Air operation impact of the Battle of Crete to Operation Barbarossa was direct.[113] The considerable losses of the Luftwaffe during the operation Mercury, specifically regarding troop carrier planes, affected the capacity of air power operations at the start of the Russian campaign. Additionally, with German parachute troops being decimated in Crete, there was an insufficient number of men that were qualified to carry out the huge-scale airborne operations that were necessary at the beginning of the invasion. Furthermore, the delay of the whole Balkan campaign, including the Battle of Crete, did not allow for exploiting the strategic advantages that German forces had gained in the Eastern Mediterranean. With the VIII Air Corps ordered to Germany for refitting before Crete was secured, significant command and communication issues hampered redeployment of the whole formation as the ground personnel was directly redeployed to their new bases in Poland.[113]
Thesinking of the German battleshipBismarck on 27 May distracted British public opinion but the loss of Crete, particularly as a result of the failure of the Allied land forces to recognise the strategic importance of the airfields, ledthe British government to make changes.[114][115] Only six days before the initial assault, the Vice Chief of Air Staff presciently wrote: "If the Army attach any importance to air superiority at the time of an invasion then they must take steps to protect our aerodromes with something more than men in their first or second childhood". Shocked and disappointed with the Army's inexplicable failure to recognise the importance of airfields in modern warfare, Churchill made the RAF responsible for the defence of its bases and theRAF Regiment was formed on 1 February 1942.[116] Allied commanders at first worried the Germans might use Crete as a springboard for further operations in the Mediterranean East Basin, possibly for an airborne attack onCyprus or a seaborne invasion of Egypt, in support ofAxis forces operating from Libya. Operation Barbarossa made it apparent that the occupation of Crete was a defensive measure to secure theAxis southern flank.[117]
For a fortnight, Enigma intercepts described the arrival ofFliegerkorps XI around Athens, the collection of 27,000registered tons of shipping and the effect of air attacks on Crete, which began on 14 May 1941. A postponement of the invasion was revealed on 15 May, and on 19 May, the probable date was given as the next day. The German objectives in Crete were similar to the areas already being prepared by the British, but foreknowledge increased the confidence of the local commanders in their dispositions. On 14 May, London warned that the attack could come any time after 17 May, which information Freyberg passed on to the garrison. On 16 May the British authorities expected an attack by 25,000 to 30,000 airborne troops in600 aircraft and by 10,000 troops transported by sea. (The real figures were 15,750 airborne troops in520 aircraft and7,000 by sea; late decrypts reduced uncertainty over the seaborne invasion.) The British mistakes were smaller than those of the Germans, who estimated the garrison to be only a third of the true figure. (The after-action report ofFliegerkorps XI contained a passage recounting that the operational area had been so well prepared that it gave the impression that the garrison had known the time of the invasion.[118])
The Germans captured a message from London marked "Personal for General Freyberg" which was translated into German and sent to Berlin. Dated 24 May and headed "According to most reliable source" it said where German troops were on the previous day (which could have been from reconnaissance) but also specified that the Germans were next going to "attack Suda Bay". This could have indicated that Enigma messages were compromised.[119]
Antony Beevor in 1991 and P. D. Antill in 2005 wrote that Allied commanders knew of the invasion throughUltra intercepts. Freyberg, informed of the air component of the German battle plan, had started to prepare a defence near the airfields and along the north coast. He had been hampered by a lack of modern equipment, and the lightly armed paratroopers had about the same firepower as the defenders, if not more. Ultra intelligence was detailed but was taken out of context and misinterpreted.[120][121]While emphasis was placed on the airborne assault, the German messages also mentioned seaborne operations; Freyberg, expecting an amphibious landing, garrisoned the coast – which reduced the number of men available to defend the airfield at Maleme, the principal German objective.[122] In 1993,F. H. Hinsley, the official historian of British intelligence during the war, wrote that the Germans had more casualties in the conquest of Crete than in the rest of the Greek campaign; the 7thFliegerdivision was decimated, leaving the Germans with a crippled airborne arm. It was the only unit of its kind and was not rebuilt.[123]
Hinsley wrote that it was difficult to measure the influence of intelligence gained during the battle, because although Ultra revealed German situation reports, reinforcement details and unit identifications, and although more intelligence was gleaned from prisoners and captured documents, it was not known how swiftly the information reached Freyberg or how he used it. The German parachute warfare manual had been captured in 1940, and after the war Student said that he would have changed tactics had he known this. Field-signals intelligence was obtained, including bombing instructions and information from theFliegerkorps XI tactical code. Lack of air cover prevented much British air reconnaissance north of Crete, but on 21 May signals intelligence enabled an aircraft to spot a convoy. After midnight the navy sank twelve ships and the rest scattered, which led to a second invasion convoy being called back. The second convoy was intercepted during the morning of 22 May, despite the cost to the navy of a daylight operation, and no more seaborne attempts were made.[124]
Official German casualty figures are contradictory due to minor variations in documents produced by German commands on various dates. Davin estimated 6,698 losses, based upon an examination of various sources.[125] Davin wrote that his estimate might exclude lightly wounded soldiers.[126]
Reports of German casualties in British reports are in almost all cases exaggerated and are not accepted against the official contemporary German returns, prepared for normal purposes and not for propaganda.
— Davin[127]
In 1956, Playfair and the other British official historians, gave figures of 1,990 Germans killed, 2,131 wounded, 1,995 missing, a total of 6,116 men "compiled from what appear to be the most reliable German records".[128]
Exaggerated reports of German casualties began to appear after the battle had ended. In New Zealand,The Press on 12 June 1941 reported that
The Germans lost at least 12,000 killed and wounded, and about 5,000 drowned.
— Taylor[129]
Churchill claimed that the Germans must have suffered well over 15,000 casualties. Buckley, based on British intelligence assumptions of two enemies wounded for every one killed, gave an estimate of 16,800 casualties. TheUnited States Army Center of Military History, citing a report of the Historical Branch of the BritishCabinet Office, concluded that military historians accept estimates from 6,000 to 7,000 German casualties.[130] The Australian Graves Commission counted about 4,000 German graves in the Maleme–Souda Bay area, and about 1,000 more at Rethymno and Heraklion, that would have included deaths during the German occupation due to sickness, accidents, or fighting with partisan forces.[131]
The official historians recorded 147 Luftwaffe aircraft destroyed and 64 damaged beyond repair by enemy action, with 73 destroyed due to extensive non-combat damage, for a total of 284 aircraft. Another 84 planes had repairable non-combat damage. In 1987, Shores, Cull, and Malizia recorded losses of 220 aircraft destroyed and 64 written off due to damage, a total of 284 aircraft between 13 May and 1 June: 147 in combat, 73 non-combat, 64 written-off, and 125 damaged but repairable.[128][10] A total of 311 Luftwaffe aircrew were listed as killed or missing and 127 were wounded.[10] In a 1948 RAF staff publication, Luftwaffe losses were given as about 4,500 parachute and glider troop casualties and about 170 Ju 52s lost or severely damaged; losses in fighter and bomber units were small due to the lack of air opposition.[132]
The British lost 1,742 killed, 1,737 wounded, and 11,835 taken prisoner from a garrison of slightly more than 32,000 men; and there were 1,828 dead and 183 wounded Royal Navy personnel.[128] Of a force of more than 10,000 men, 5,255 Greek troops were captured.[133] After the war, the Allied graves from the four burial grounds that had been established by the Germans were moved to Souda Bay War Cemetery. A large number of civilians were killed in the crossfire or died fighting aspartisans. Many Cretan civilians were shot by the Germans in reprisal during the battle and in the occupation.[134] One Cretan source puts the number of Cretans killed by Germans at 6,593 men, 1,113 women, and 869 children. German records put the number of Cretans executed by firing squad as 3,474 and at least 1,000 civilians were killed in massacres late in 1944.[135]
The Luftwaffe sank the cruisersHMS Gloucester,HMS Fiji, andHMS Calcutta and the destroyersKelly,Greyhound andKashmir from 22 May – 1 June. Italian bombers from 41° Gruppo sank the destroyerHMS Juno on 21 May and on 28 May damaged another destroyer,HMS Imperial, beyond repair.[136][137] The British also lost the destroyerHMS Hereward on 29 May, when she was attacked by GermanJunkers Ju 87 "Stuka" dive-bombers.[138]
Damage to theaircraft carrierHMS Formidable, the battleshipsHMS Warspite andHMS Barham, the cruisersHMS Ajax,HMS Dido,HMS Orion, andHMAS Perth, the submarineHMS Rover, the destroyersHMS Kelvin andHMS Nubian, kept them out of action for months. At anchor inSouda Bay, northern Crete, the heavy cruiserHMS York was disabled by Italian explosive motor boats and beached on 26 March; and was later wrecked by demolition charges when Crete was evacuated in May.[139] By 1 June, the eastern Mediterranean strength of the Royal Navy had been reduced to two battleships and three cruisers, against four battleships and eleven cruisers of the Italian Navy.[12] For the British, the Battle of Crete was the costliest naval engagement of the entire war.[140]
Royal Navy shipborne anti-aircraft gun claims for the period of 15–27 May amounted to: "Twenty enemy aircraft ... shot down for certain, with 11 probables. At least 15 aircraft appeared to have been damaged ..."; from 28 May – 1 June, another two aircraft were claimed shot down and six more damaged, for a total of 22 claimed destroyed, 11 probably destroyed and 21 damaged.[141]
| Crete Military Casualties[f] | Killed | Missing (presumed dead) | TotalKilled andMissing | Wounded | Captured | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| British Commonwealth | 3,579 [142] | 3,579 [4] | 1,918 [4] | 12,254 [143] | 17,754 [144] | |
| German[9] | 1,353 | 2,421 | 3,774 | 2,120 | 5,894 | |
| Greek[5] | 426 | 118 | 544 | 5,225 | 5,769 |
For the German occupation of Crete, seeFortress Crete.
The first convincing demonstration of this potential in operational conditions came in May 1941, when the entire plan for the German airborne capture of Crete was decrypted two weeks before the invasion took place.
It appears that General Freyberg was introduced to Ultra only shortly before the battle of Crete began and therefore had no time to become familiar with its proper interpretation. This situation was exacerbated by the fact that 'he was forbidden to show it (the information derived from Ultra) to anyone or to discuss it with his intelligence staff.' [...] Moreover, tight security regulations prohibiting him from taking action on the basis of uncorroborated Ultra evidence limited its value.
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