Operation FB
Part of TheArctic Convoys of theSecond World War
Iceland, western start and terminus of reciprocal sailings to and from Murmansk
Date 29 October to 9 November 1942 Location Arctic Ocean Result Inconclusive
Belligerents
United Kingdom United States Soviet Union	Germany
Commanders and leaders
John Tovey Arseniy Golovko	Erich Raeder
Units involved
Royal Navy  Merchant Navy  Royal Air Force  Soviet Navy  Soviet Air Forces	Luftwaffe  Kriegsmarine
Strength
Eastbound: 13 merchant ships escorts (west): 4ASW trawlers escorts (east): 3 trawlers
Casualties and losses
Sunk: 5 Wrecked: 1 Recalled: 3
23 Soviet independent sailings 29 October 1942 – 24 January 1943, 1 sunk

Operation FB (29 October – 9 November 1942) took place as part of theArctic Convoys of theSecond World War. The operation consisted of independent sailings by unescorted merchant ships betweenIceland andMurmansk. In late 1942, the Allies had taken the offensive against Germany but the dispatch of supplies to theUSSR by convoy via the Arctic route was suspended, due to the demands of the Mediterranean campaign. Convoy PQ 19 was cancelled because theHome Fleet diverted ships to the Mediterranean forOperation Torch (8–16 November 1942) which would have had to be postponed for three weeks had ships been provided for Convoy PQ 19.

Discussions between the British Prime MinisterWinston Churchill and the US PresidentFranklin D. Roosevelt led to ships being dispatched independently to Russia from Iceland as a substitute for Convoy PQ 19, using thepolar night of the Arctic winter for concealment. The ships sailed at approximately twelve-hour intervals, with seven trawlers strung out along the routes as rescue ships. Of thirteen sailings to Russia, three were ordered to turn back and five arrived; of 23 independent departures from the USSR, 22 ships reached their destination. The new outbound convoy series JW, began withConvoy JW 51A (15–25 December 1942), returns being called RW.

In October 1941, afterOperation Barbarossa, the German invasion of theUSSR, which had begun on 22 June, the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, made a commitment to send a convoy to the Arctic ports of the USSR every ten days and to deliver1,200 tanks a month from July 1942 to January 1943, followed by2,000 tanks and another3,600 aircraft more than those already promised. The first convoy was due at Murmansk around 12 October and the next convoy was to depart Iceland on 22 October. A motley of British, Allied and neutral shipping loaded with military stores and raw materials for the Soviet war effort would be assembled at Hvalfjordur, Iceland, convenient for ships from both sides of the Atlantic.^[1][a]

By late 1941, the convoy system used in the Atlantic had been established on the Arctic run; aconvoy commodore ensured that the ships' masters and signals officers attended a briefing before sailing to make arrangements for the management of the convoy, which sailed in a formation of long rows of short columns. The commodore was usually a retired naval officer, aboard a ship identified by a white pendant with a blue cross. The commodore was assisted by a Naval signals party of four men, who used lamps, semaphore flags and telescopes to pass signals, coded from books carried in a bag, weighted to be dumped overboard. In large convoys, the commodore was assisted by vice- and rear-commodores who directed the speed, course and zig-zagging of the merchant ships and liaised with the escort commander.^[3]

Due to the losses ofConvoy PQ 18 (2–21 September) in the Arctic andOperation Torch (8–16 November) in the Mediterranean, for which more than 500 ships had to be escorted, much of the BritishHome Fleet was sent south. TheUnited States andBritain suspendedArctic Convoys to theSoviet Union for the autumn. The US presidentFranklin D. Roosevelt had favoured sending Convoy PQ 19 but the British had replied that it would delay Torch for three weeks. Roosevelt suggested sending three smaller convoys with fewer escorts butWinston Churchill called this unrealistic.^[4] Soviet forces were fighting theBattle of Stalingrad (23 August 1942 – 2 February 1943) on theEastern Front and the hiatus was much resented by the Soviet leadership, which judged British reasons for the cessation of Arctic convoys to be specious. the British claimed that the ceaseless Home Fleet operations amounted to a ratio of warships to convoyed merchant ships of nearly 1:1 on the Arctic run and that the British contribution to the Red Army in tanks and aircraft far exceeded that of the US.^[5]

The BritishGovernment Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) based atBletchley Park housed a small industry of code-breakers andtraffic analysts. By June 1941, the GermanEnigma machine Home Waters (Heimish) settings used by surface ships and U-boats could quickly be read. On 1 February 1942, the Enigma machines used in U-boats in the Atlantic and Mediterranean were changed but German ships and the U-boats in Arctic waters continued with the olderHeimish (Hydra from 1942, Dolphin to the British). By mid-1941, BritishY-stations were able to receive and readLuftwaffeW/T transmissions and give advance warning ofLuftwaffe operations.^[6][7]

In 1941, naval Headache personnel with receivers to eavesdrop onLuftwaffe wireless transmissions were embarked on warships and from May 1942, ships gained RAF Ycomputor parties, which sailed with cruiser admirals in command of convoy escorts, to interpretLuftwaffe W/T signals intercepted by the Headaches. The Admiralty sent details ofLuftwaffe wireless frequencies, call signs and the daily local codes to the computors, which combined with their knowledge ofLuftwaffe procedures, could glean fairly accurate details of German reconnaissance sorties. Sometimes computors predicted attacks twenty minutes before they were detected by radar.^[6][7]

The rival GermanBeobachtungsdienst (B-Dienst, Observation Service) of theKriegsmarineMarinenachrichtendienst (MND, Naval Intelligence Service) had broken several Admiralty codes and cyphers by 1939, which were used to helpKriegsmarine ships elude British forces and provide opportunities for surprise attacks. From June to August 1940, six British submarines were sunk in the Skaggerak using information gleaned from British wireless signals. In 1941,B-Dienst read signals from the Commander in Chief Western Approaches informing convoys of areas patrolled by U-boats, enabling the submarines to move into "safe" zones.^[8]B-Dienst had broken Naval Cypher No 3 in February 1942 and by March was reading up to 80 per cent of the traffic, which continued until 15 December 1943. By coincidence, the British lost access to theShark cypher and had no information to send in Cypher No 3 which might compromise Ultra.^[9] In early September,Finnish Radio Intelligence deciphered a Soviet Air Force transmission which divulged the convoy itinerary and forwarded it to the Germans.^[10]

In the Arctic autumn, the hours of daylight diminished until by midwinter there was only twilight at noon, conditions in which convoys had the best chance of evading German aircraft, ships and U-boats. The surviving ships of Convoy PQ 18 (2–21 September 1942) were still in Soviet ports, unloaded and waiting to return. Forty ships were ready to sail to the USSR in Convoy PQ 19 but this convoy operation had suspended by the British, to the dismay of the US and the anger of the USSR. The suggestion that some ships should sail independently in the meantime, gained favour and a British ship owner, J. A. Bilmeir, offered cash bonuses in advance of £100 each for officers and £50 per rating for volunteers. The Russians had also asked that two Soviet ships at anchor in Iceland be sent back independently to Archangel.^[11]

Frederich Engels sailed on 11 August andBelomorkanal (2,920 GRT) followed next day, both reaching Archangel, which increased optimism at theAdmiralty, that the slower merchant ships that had been part of PQ 19 could emulate the feat in the lengthening Arctic nights. Churchill assured Roosevelt that any ships sent would be British with volunteer crews but this was not true.^[11] On 13 October, the cruiserHMS Argonaut with destroyersHMS Intrepid andObdurate sailed for Archangel with a medical unit equipped for men suffering from wounds and exposure;Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft spotted the ships but they were not attacked. On return the ships carried the aircrew and ground staff of the twoHampden torpedo-bomber squadrons based in Russia duringOperation Orator in September.^[12]

From 24 to 28 September, the cruiserAdmiral Hipper (Captain Hans Hartmann) and five destroyers conductedOperation Zarin, a sortie to mine the west coast ofNovaya Zemlya.^[13] On 5 November,Admiral Hipper sailed again with the 5th Destroyer Flotilla comprisingZ29,Z30,Friedrich Eckoldt andRichard Beitzen, after receiving information from aircraft and U-boats, that individual Allied ships were running the gauntlet through theBarents Sea.^[14] The Germans had intended to exploit the absence of much of the Home Fleet to attack convoys withAdmiral Hipper but the weather was too bad for its escorting destroyers and an operation againstConvoy QP 15 was cancelled.^[15] In November,Luftflotte 5, the German air command in Norway and Finland, was ordered to transfer itsJunkers Ju 88 andHeinkel He 111 bombers and torpedo-bombers to the Mediterranean against Operation Torch, a decision which the British learned of through Ultra intercepts. Only theHeinkel 115 floatplanes, suitable for torpedo attacks on stragglers, with someJunkers Ju 87 dive-bombers were left in Norway, along with a few long-range reconnaissance aircraft to observe for the surface and U-boat forces.^[16]

SS Richard H. Alvey andEmpire Galliard sailed on 29 October, departing from Iceland at roughly twelve-hour [200 nmi (370 km; 230 mi)] intervals, British and American merchantmen making alternate sailings, along with the Soviet vesselDekabrist, that sailed withSS John Walker andEmpire Gilbert on 20 October.SS John H. B. Latrobe, andChulmleigh sailed on 31 October,SS Hugh Williamson andEmpire Sky on 1 November.SS William Clark andEmpire Scott sailed on 2 November followed byDaldorch on 3 November andBriarwood on 4 November.^[18] The ships took different routes and had the protection of submarine patrols north ofBear Island.^[19] Theanti-submarinetrawlersHMT Cape Palliser,HMT Northern Pride andHMT Northern Spray departed from the Clyde on 23 October for Reykjavík, arriving on 28 October to take on supplies then move to Hvalfjörður (Hvalfjord) to coal during the night, completing at6:00 a.m. on 29 October. WithHMT St Elstan, they formed a line along the route from Iceland toMurmansk from whence,HMT Cape Argona,HMT Cape Mariato andHMT St Kenan sailed to provide the eastern continuation of the line.^[18]Northern Spray attacked a U-boat and with a rare Catalina reconnaissance along the track to be followed by the ships, German suspicions were aroused. The BritishSS Briarwood andSS Daldorch and the USSS John H. B. Latrobe were recalled as a precaution.^[20]

On 2 November,Empire Gilbert was sunk byU-586 (Kapitänleutnant Dietrich von der Esch) off Iceland. On 4 November, reconnaissance aircraft ofKüstenfliegergruppe 406 began to spot ships.Ju 88s of I/KG 30 summoned to the scene, bombed and sank the Soviet shipDekabrist; II/KG 30 damagedSS Chulmleigh andWilliam Clark, which was finished off byU-354 (Kapitänleutnant Karl-Heinz Herbschleb) later that day. On 5 November, aCatalina north of Iceland spotted and sankU-408 (Korvettenkapitän Reinhard von Hymmen).Chulmleigh went aground on theSørkapp (South Cape) ofSpitzbergen, the main island of Svalbard; unable to refloat and disabled by the bombing, it was abandoned and then torpedoed byU-625 on 16 November. The crew suffered a six-week ordeal on Spitzbergen before the survivors were rescued by theFree Norwegian occupation force. On 6 November,U-625 (Oberleutnant zur See Hans Benker) sankSS Empire Sky, which was lost with all hands.^[21]

On 5 November, the heavy cruiserAdmiral Hipper (Captain Hans Hartmann, the Commander Cruisers (Befehlshaber der Kreuzer, BdK, Vice-AdmiralOskar Kummetz embarked) with the 5th Destroyer Flotilla (CaptainAlfred Schemmel) comprisingZ27,Z30,Friedrich Eckoldt andRichard Breitzen sailed to intercept the independents.Kampfgeschwader 30 flew reconnaissance sorties. On 7 November the spotter aircraft ofAdmiral Hipper found the Soviet tankerDonbass that was sunk byZ27, along with the auxiliary escort ship BO-78.^[21]

Convoy QP 15 (convoy commodore, Captain W. C. Meek) was a return convoy of thirty emptymerchant ships from the USSR and was the last of the QP series. The convoy sailed from Archangel on 17 November with 14 US, 8 British, 7 Soviet, a Panamanian merchant ship and theConvoy rescue shipCopeland. On US ship failed to set out and another ran aground, both being too late to catch up; the rescue shipRathlin was also left behind with a damaged rudder. The convoy had a local escort of four minesweepers and the close escort comprised a minesweeper and four corvettes; the Soviet destroyersBaku andSokrushitelny accompanied until 20 November. Four British destroyers from Kola accompanying the convoy detached on 26 November with fuel shortage.^[22] Two British cruisers and three destroyers took station west of Bear Island and four submarines were sent to patrol nearAltenfjord to deter surface raiders. The convoy could still be routed north of Bear Island and signals intelligence had revealed the transfer of theLuftwaffe bombers and torpedo-bombers to the Mediterranean.^[17]

On 20 November, a gale blew up and scattered the convoy in the seasonal perpetual darkness.Baku was badly damaged in the storm but managed to limp back to port; a large wave hitSokrushitelny and ripped off the stern.Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft were grounded andKriegsmarine ships stayed in port, as the British had hoped when planning the convoy. Three Soviet destroyers were sent to assistBaku and managed to rescue 187 crew from theSokrushitelny but were not able to save the ship, which sank on 22 November. Neither of the two British groups of reinforcing destroyers found the convoy, which, west of Bear Island, had fragmented. On 23 November, theU-625 torpedoed and sank the British freighterGoolistan and later in the day,U-601 sank the Soviet freighterKuznets Lesov; both ships were lost with all hands. The rest of the merchant ships were reassembled in two groups and arrived inLoch Ewe in the north of Scotland on 30 November and 3 December.^[23]

Three ships for north Russia were ordered to turn back after a U-boat sighting, four were sunk, one was wrecked and five arrived safely. On the return journey, 23 ships sailed for Iceland, one was sunk and 22 arrived.^[11] In 1956, the British naval official historian,Stephen Roskill, wrote that,

These independent sailings were more successful than some people had expected.^[17]

The tactic of independent voyages resembled the "patrol and independent sailings" of theFirst World War, which in 2004, Richard Woodman called an "absurd expedient" that was "quite useless".^[19] A similar initiative in early 1943 by the Soviet authorities for ships independently to make the westward journey, suffered one loss from 23 sailings. Convoy QP 15, the last of the PQ–QP convoys had departed Archangel on 17 November and arrived at Loch Ewe on 30 November. Subsequent convoys were given the codes JW for convoys to the USSR and RA for the return journey.^[24]

Independent sailings, Iceland to USSR, 1942^[25]

Name	Year	Flag	GRT	Notes
SS Briarwood	1930	United Kingdom	4,019	4 November, turned back
SS Daldorch	1930	United Kingdom	5,571	3 November, turned back
SS John H. B. Latrobe	1942	United States	7,176	31 October, turned back
SSEmpire Gilbert	1941	United Kingdom	6,640	30 October, sunk byU-586
Dekabrist	1903	Soviet Union	7,363	30 October, sunk by I/KG 30 4 November
SS William Clark	1942	United States	7,167	2 November, bombed II/KG 30, sunk byU-354
SSEmpire Sky	1941	United Kingdom	7,445	1 November, sunk byU-625
SS Chulmleigh	1938	United Kingdom	5,445	31 October, strandedSpitzbergen, bombed II/KG 30;U-625 16 November
SS John Walker	1942	United States	7,176	30 October
SS Richard H. Alvey	1942	United States	7,176	29 October
SSHugh Williamson	1942	United States	7,176	1 November
SSEmpire Scott	1941	United Kingdom	6,150	2 November
SSEmpire Galliard	1942	United Kingdom	7,170	29 October

Russian sailings 29 October 1942 – 24 January 1943^[26]

Name	Year	Flag	GRT	Notes
SS Aldan	1912	Soviet Union	2,161
SS Azerbaijan	1932	Soviet Union	6,114	Eastbound, 31 October – 9 November
SS Chernyshevsk1	1919	Soviet Union	3,588	Eastbound, 2–11 November
SS Donbass	1935	Soviet Union	7,925	Eastbound, 4–7 November, bombed, sunkZ27, 76°24′N, 41°30′E
SS Dvina	1922	Soviet Union	1,773	Eastbound, 24 November – 5 December
SS Elna II	1903	Soviet Union	3,221	Eastbound, 25 November – 5 December
SS Kara	1933	Soviet Union	2,325
SS Komsomolets Arctiki	1897	Soviet Union	3,450	Eastbound, 14–24 November
SS Krasnoe Znamya	1901	Soviet Union	2,271
SS Kuzbass	1914	Soviet Union	3,109
SS Mironich	1927	Soviet Union	2,274	Eastbound, 25 November – 5 December
SS Msta	1921	Soviet Union	1,984
SS Mussoviet	1935	Soviet Union	3,109	Eastbound, 29 October – 7 November
SS OB	1917	Soviet Union	2,198
SS Okhta	1918	Soviet Union	1,357
SS Osmussaar	1909	Soviet Union	2,229
SS Sakko	1929	Soviet Union	2,363
SS Sheksna	1918	Soviet Union	2,242
SS Shilka	1916	Soviet Union	1,388
SS Soroka	1926	Soviet Union	1,718
SS Uritski	1929	Soviet Union	2,336
SS Vanzetti	1928	Soviet Union	2,368
SS Vetluga	1918	Soviet Union	1,717

• Boyd, Andrew (2024).Arms for Russia & the Naval War in the Arctic 1941–9145. Barnsley: Seaforth (Pen & Sword). pp. 363−364.ISBN 978-1-3990-3886-7.
• Davies, James (2004)."Feature Article: 'Liberty' Cargo Ship"(PDF).ww2ships.com. Retrieved14 March 2023.
• Hutson, H. C. (2012).Arctic Interlude: Independent to North Russia (6th ed.). CreateSpace Independent Publishing.ISBN 978-1-4810-0668-2.
• Mitchell, William Harry; Sawyer, Leonard Arthur (1990).The Empire Ships (2nd ed.). London, New York, Hamburg, Hong Kong: Lloyd's of London Press Ltd.ISBN 1-85044-275-4.
• Richards, Denis; St G. Saunders, H. (1975) [1954].Royal Air Force 1939–1945: The Fight Avails. History of the Second World War, Military Series. Vol. II (pbk. ed.). London:HMSO.ISBN 978-0-11-771593-6. Retrieved14 April 2018.
• Smith, William (2023).Allied convoys to Northern Russia 1941–1945: Politics, Strategy and Tactics. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Maritime.ISBN 978-1-39905-473-7.

Wikimedia Commons has media related toArctic convoys of World War II.

• Convoy web

• Arctic naval operations of World War II
• Arctic convoys of World War II
• Economic aid during World War II
• Military logistics of World War II
• Military in the Arctic
• Foreign trade of the Soviet Union
• Naval battles and operations of World War II involving the United Kingdom
• Naval operations of the Kriegsmarine

• Articles containing Russian-language text
• Articles with short description
• Short description is different from Wikidata
• Use British English from April 2018
• All Wikipedia articles written in British English
• Use dmy dates from April 2022
• Articles containing German-language text
• CS1 Finnish-language sources (fi)
• Commons category link is locally defined